In Chief

Improving medication accuracy, transitions of care, health information technology, and other ED patient-safety strategies are offered in this month’s Emergency Medicine cover article, “Patient Safety in the Emergency Department,” by emergency physician (EP)/toxicologist Brenna M. Farmer, MD, a colleague for many years.

As Dr Farmer notes in her introduction, patient safety—in the ED and elsewhere—has received a great deal of attention since the publication of the two landmark Institute of Medicine (IOM) studies in 1999 and 2001 that documented an enormous number of medical errors and recommended improvements in medical care. More than a decade and a half after their publication, is there any evidence that these reports have led to a reduction in the number of serious adverse effects and deaths due to medical errors?

Although most EPs believe that ED safety measures have reduced the overall number of errors, there is a scarcity of published data demonstrating a direct cause-and-effect relationship in reducing the number of adverse events and deaths. A recent analysis of National Hospital Ambulatory Medical Care Survey data by EPs Kanzaria, Probst, and Hsia (Health Aff [Millwood]. 2016;35[7]:1303-1308) found that ED death rates dropped by nearly 50% between 1997 and 2011. Most of this reporting period includes the years following the IOM reports before the implementation of the Affordable Care Act measures. One might reasonably assume that the decrease in ED death rates since 1997 is at least partly due to the safety measures described by Dr Farmer. However, Kanzaria et al hypothesize that the reduction is probably due to palliative and prehospital care efforts which “shift the locus of deaths,” to recent advances in emergency critical care, and to public health successes in smoking cessation, motor vehicle safety, etc. Conspicuously absent from their list of possible measures responsible for the reduction in ED death rates are ED safety measures.

If Kanzaria et al are correct in attributing the reduction in ED deaths to measures taken by others to decrease the number of dying patients brought to EDs, then it may be reasonable to look for the benefit of eliminating serious ED errors to a decrease in death rates after patients leave the ED for inpatient services. Though inpatient death-rate data is available only since 2005, Kanzaria et al report no significant change in the inpatient death rate between 2005 and 2011. It is possible, however, that the improvements in ED critical care hypothesized by the authors to be partly responsible for reducing ED death rates enable sicker patients to survive longer and ultimately succumb to their serious illnesses as inpatients. If so, this could offset any evident reduction in inpatient mortality from the avoidance of serious errors in the ED.

In any case, Dr Farmer does present direct evidence that safety measures are effective in reducing morbidity, and probably mortality. For example, in one study cited, medication errors were 13.5 times less likely to occur when an ED pharmacist was present, and clearly, avoiding doubling the doses of potent cardiac medications or sedative hypnotics, avoiding dangerous drug interactions, and choosing the correct type, dose, and time of administration of antibiotics and all meds must be responsible for reducing morbidity and ultimately mortality. It is also worth recalling that with respect to patient safety, emergency medicine is undoubtedly the safest medical specialty ever created, pioneering from its inception 24/7 bedside attending presence and mandatory recertifications, years to decades before other specialties adopted these practices. Thanks to these efforts, EDs are much safer than they had been previously, and by implementing the measures described by Dr Farmer will be safer still.  

Improving medication accuracy, transitions of care, health information technology, and other ED patient-safety strategies are offered in this month’s Emergency Medicine cover article, “Patient Safety in the Emergency Department,” by emergency physician (EP)/toxicologist Brenna M. Farmer, MD, a colleague for many years.

As Dr Farmer notes in her introduction, patient safety—in the ED and elsewhere—has received a great deal of attention since the publication of the two landmark Institute of Medicine (IOM) studies in 1999 and 2001 that documented an enormous number of medical errors and recommended improvements in medical care. More than a decade and a half after their publication, is there any evidence that these reports have led to a reduction in the number of serious adverse effects and deaths due to medical errors?

Although most EPs believe that ED safety measures have reduced the overall number of errors, there is a scarcity of published data demonstrating a direct cause-and-effect relationship in reducing the number of adverse events and deaths. A recent analysis of National Hospital Ambulatory Medical Care Survey data by EPs Kanzaria, Probst, and Hsia (Health Aff [Millwood]. 2016;35[7]:1303-1308) found that ED death rates dropped by nearly 50% between 1997 and 2011. Most of this reporting period includes the years following the IOM reports before the implementation of the Affordable Care Act measures. One might reasonably assume that the decrease in ED death rates since 1997 is at least partly due to the safety measures described by Dr Farmer. However, Kanzaria et al hypothesize that the reduction is probably due to palliative and prehospital care efforts which “shift the locus of deaths,” to recent advances in emergency critical care, and to public health successes in smoking cessation, motor vehicle safety, etc. Conspicuously absent from their list of possible measures responsible for the reduction in ED death rates are ED safety measures.

If Kanzaria et al are correct in attributing the reduction in ED deaths to measures taken by others to decrease the number of dying patients brought to EDs, then it may be reasonable to look for the benefit of eliminating serious ED errors to a decrease in death rates after patients leave the ED for inpatient services. Though inpatient death-rate data is available only since 2005, Kanzaria et al report no significant change in the inpatient death rate between 2005 and 2011. It is possible, however, that the improvements in ED critical care hypothesized by the authors to be partly responsible for reducing ED death rates enable sicker patients to survive longer and ultimately succumb to their serious illnesses as inpatients. If so, this could offset any evident reduction in inpatient mortality from the avoidance of serious errors in the ED.

In any case, Dr Farmer does present direct evidence that safety measures are effective in reducing morbidity, and probably mortality. For example, in one study cited, medication errors were 13.5 times less likely to occur when an ED pharmacist was present, and clearly, avoiding doubling the doses of potent cardiac medications or sedative hypnotics, avoiding dangerous drug interactions, and choosing the correct type, dose, and time of administration of antibiotics and all meds must be responsible for reducing morbidity and ultimately mortality. It is also worth recalling that with respect to patient safety, emergency medicine is undoubtedly the safest medical specialty ever created, pioneering from its inception 24/7 bedside attending presence and mandatory recertifications, years to decades before other specialties adopted these practices. Thanks to these efforts, EDs are much safer than they had been previously, and by implementing the measures described by Dr Farmer will be safer still.  

Improving medication accuracy, transitions of care, health information technology, and other ED patient-safety strategies are offered in this month’s Emergency Medicine cover article, “Patient Safety in the Emergency Department,” by emergency physician (EP)/toxicologist Brenna M. Farmer, MD, a colleague for many years.

As Dr Farmer notes in her introduction, patient safety—in the ED and elsewhere—has received a great deal of attention since the publication of the two landmark Institute of Medicine (IOM) studies in 1999 and 2001 that documented an enormous number of medical errors and recommended improvements in medical care. More than a decade and a half after their publication, is there any evidence that these reports have led to a reduction in the number of serious adverse effects and deaths due to medical errors?

Although most EPs believe that ED safety measures have reduced the overall number of errors, there is a scarcity of published data demonstrating a direct cause-and-effect relationship in reducing the number of adverse events and deaths. A recent analysis of National Hospital Ambulatory Medical Care Survey data by EPs Kanzaria, Probst, and Hsia (Health Aff [Millwood]. 2016;35[7]:1303-1308) found that ED death rates dropped by nearly 50% between 1997 and 2011. Most of this reporting period includes the years following the IOM reports before the implementation of the Affordable Care Act measures. One might reasonably assume that the decrease in ED death rates since 1997 is at least partly due to the safety measures described by Dr Farmer. However, Kanzaria et al hypothesize that the reduction is probably due to palliative and prehospital care efforts which “shift the locus of deaths,” to recent advances in emergency critical care, and to public health successes in smoking cessation, motor vehicle safety, etc. Conspicuously absent from their list of possible measures responsible for the reduction in ED death rates are ED safety measures.

If Kanzaria et al are correct in attributing the reduction in ED deaths to measures taken by others to decrease the number of dying patients brought to EDs, then it may be reasonable to look for the benefit of eliminating serious ED errors to a decrease in death rates after patients leave the ED for inpatient services. Though inpatient death-rate data is available only since 2005, Kanzaria et al report no significant change in the inpatient death rate between 2005 and 2011. It is possible, however, that the improvements in ED critical care hypothesized by the authors to be partly responsible for reducing ED death rates enable sicker patients to survive longer and ultimately succumb to their serious illnesses as inpatients. If so, this could offset any evident reduction in inpatient mortality from the avoidance of serious errors in the ED.

In any case, Dr Farmer does present direct evidence that safety measures are effective in reducing morbidity, and probably mortality. For example, in one study cited, medication errors were 13.5 times less likely to occur when an ED pharmacist was present, and clearly, avoiding doubling the doses of potent cardiac medications or sedative hypnotics, avoiding dangerous drug interactions, and choosing the correct type, dose, and time of administration of antibiotics and all meds must be responsible for reducing morbidity and ultimately mortality. It is also worth recalling that with respect to patient safety, emergency medicine is undoubtedly the safest medical specialty ever created, pioneering from its inception 24/7 bedside attending presence and mandatory recertifications, years to decades before other specialties adopted these practices. Thanks to these efforts, EDs are much safer than they had been previously, and by implementing the measures described by Dr Farmer will be safer still.  

COMMENTARY

Establishing Pulmonary and Critical Care Medicine in China: 2016 Report on Implementation and Government Recognition: Joint Statement of the Chinese Association of Chest Physicians and the American College of Chest Physicians.

By Dr. Renli Qiao et al, on behalf of the China-CHEST PCCM Program Steering Committee.

CONTEMPORARY REVIEWS IN SLEEP MEDICINE

Cancer and OSA: Current Evidence From Human Studies. By Dr. M. A. Martinez-Garcia et al.

ORIGINAL RESEARCH

Association Between Occupational Exposures and Sarcoidosis: An Analysis From Death Certificates in the United States, 1988-1999. By Dr. H. Liu et al.

Nonlinear Imputation of PaO2/FIO2 From SpO2/FIO2 Among Patients With Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome. By Dr. S. M. Brown et al.

Blood Eosinophils and Outcomes in Severe Hospitalized Exacerbations of COPD. By Dr. M. Bafadhel et al.

A Randomized Controlled Trial of a Novel Sheath Cryoprobe for Bronchoscopic Lung Biopsy in a Porcine Model. By Dr. L. B. Yarmus et al.

COMMENTARY

Establishing Pulmonary and Critical Care Medicine in China: 2016 Report on Implementation and Government Recognition: Joint Statement of the Chinese Association of Chest Physicians and the American College of Chest Physicians.

By Dr. Renli Qiao et al, on behalf of the China-CHEST PCCM Program Steering Committee.

CONTEMPORARY REVIEWS IN SLEEP MEDICINE

Cancer and OSA: Current Evidence From Human Studies. By Dr. M. A. Martinez-Garcia et al.

ORIGINAL RESEARCH

Association Between Occupational Exposures and Sarcoidosis: An Analysis From Death Certificates in the United States, 1988-1999. By Dr. H. Liu et al.

Nonlinear Imputation of PaO2/FIO2 From SpO2/FIO2 Among Patients With Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome. By Dr. S. M. Brown et al.

Blood Eosinophils and Outcomes in Severe Hospitalized Exacerbations of COPD. By Dr. M. Bafadhel et al.

A Randomized Controlled Trial of a Novel Sheath Cryoprobe for Bronchoscopic Lung Biopsy in a Porcine Model. By Dr. L. B. Yarmus et al.

COMMENTARY

Establishing Pulmonary and Critical Care Medicine in China: 2016 Report on Implementation and Government Recognition: Joint Statement of the Chinese Association of Chest Physicians and the American College of Chest Physicians.

By Dr. Renli Qiao et al, on behalf of the China-CHEST PCCM Program Steering Committee.

CONTEMPORARY REVIEWS IN SLEEP MEDICINE

Cancer and OSA: Current Evidence From Human Studies. By Dr. M. A. Martinez-Garcia et al.

ORIGINAL RESEARCH

Association Between Occupational Exposures and Sarcoidosis: An Analysis From Death Certificates in the United States, 1988-1999. By Dr. H. Liu et al.

Nonlinear Imputation of PaO2/FIO2 From SpO2/FIO2 Among Patients With Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome. By Dr. S. M. Brown et al.

Blood Eosinophils and Outcomes in Severe Hospitalized Exacerbations of COPD. By Dr. M. Bafadhel et al.

A Randomized Controlled Trial of a Novel Sheath Cryoprobe for Bronchoscopic Lung Biopsy in a Porcine Model. By Dr. L. B. Yarmus et al.

While most Americans were still reacting in horror and disbelief to news of a mass shooting at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida in the early morning hours of June 12, 2016, the thoughts of most emergency physicians (EPs) were probably focused on the ongoing efforts to save as many victims as possible: What was the closest Level 1 trauma center, and how deep was the ED staffing there that night? Was there a need for additional resources, and perhaps even, could they get there in time to help? In this issue of Emergency Medicine (EM), Residency Program Director Salvatore Silvestri, MD, and his emergency medicine colleagues masterfully recount events from that night as they unfolded, both at the scene and two blocks away at the Orlando Regional Medical Center (ORMC) ED, in the minutes and hours following the first reported shootings.

Being prepared for a mass-casualty incident (MCI) is an extraordinarily expensive requirement of a hospital: It must acquire and maintain adequate resources and communication capabilities; periodically perform unannounced drills that disrupt other hospital activities; and ensure that all EPs and staff are not only able to perform their own day-to-day roles as attending physicians, residents, nurses, etc, but are also capable of taking on even greater responsibilities during an MCI—depending on the day and time it occurs. As you will read in the pages that follow, in the early morning hours of June 12, many of the practiced exercises and rehearsed procedures proved useful, even life-saving, while others had to be discarded or ignored in favor of improvised solutions to rapidly transport and treat the large number of victims with unanticipated needs, under unique conditions. 

In any MCI, saving the largest number of victims invariably depends on rapidly instituting some deviations from standard operating procedures (SOPs) and standards of care (SOCs). As described by the ORMC EP authors, “...law enforcement vehicles and ambulances would make the two-block drive from the scene to ORMC carrying as many patients as they safely could, and return immediately after offload….minimal interventions were performed and unlike standard procedure, EMS could offer no prearrival report to the hospital.”

Deviations from SOPs and SOCs during an MCI are not confined to prehospital care, but often extend into the ED and beyond. Most difficult for an EP participating in an MCI is the moment of realization that the sheer number of seriously injured and dying patients arriving en masse mandates a change from “ED triage” to “battlefield triage.” As Dr Ponder recalled, “One of the first few patients I saw was pulse­less, and as I went to start chest compressions, I was stopped by a trauma surgeon who said, ‘He’s gone, focus on the ones we can help.’”

In EDs, dying patients are attended to first with extensive staff and resources, while, as a result, less seriously ill patients must sometimes wait longer for care. The opposite is true on the battlefield, where near-death victims of lethal injuries are provided only with comfort care, at most, in order to save those who have a chance of surviving their extensive or serious injuries. 

For hospitals and staff, the costs incurred by disaster preparedness are great and invariably exceed government funding provided for these efforts, but how much greater would be the human toll from an MCI without such efforts? All EPs should be proud of what our colleagues at ORMC accomplished on June 12. Though most EPs may never have to deal directly with an MCI, the Orlando nightclub shooting incident was only one of the latest MCIs, certainly not one of the last.

Previous editorials on MCIs may be found in EM September 2006 (9/11), June 2011 (first responders), September 2011 (9/11), November 2011 (surge capacity), and September 2012 (surge capacity/Hurricane Sandy).

While most Americans were still reacting in horror and disbelief to news of a mass shooting at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida in the early morning hours of June 12, 2016, the thoughts of most emergency physicians (EPs) were probably focused on the ongoing efforts to save as many victims as possible: What was the closest Level 1 trauma center, and how deep was the ED staffing there that night? Was there a need for additional resources, and perhaps even, could they get there in time to help? In this issue of Emergency Medicine (EM), Residency Program Director Salvatore Silvestri, MD, and his emergency medicine colleagues masterfully recount events from that night as they unfolded, both at the scene and two blocks away at the Orlando Regional Medical Center (ORMC) ED, in the minutes and hours following the first reported shootings.

Being prepared for a mass-casualty incident (MCI) is an extraordinarily expensive requirement of a hospital: It must acquire and maintain adequate resources and communication capabilities; periodically perform unannounced drills that disrupt other hospital activities; and ensure that all EPs and staff are not only able to perform their own day-to-day roles as attending physicians, residents, nurses, etc, but are also capable of taking on even greater responsibilities during an MCI—depending on the day and time it occurs. As you will read in the pages that follow, in the early morning hours of June 12, many of the practiced exercises and rehearsed procedures proved useful, even life-saving, while others had to be discarded or ignored in favor of improvised solutions to rapidly transport and treat the large number of victims with unanticipated needs, under unique conditions. 

In any MCI, saving the largest number of victims invariably depends on rapidly instituting some deviations from standard operating procedures (SOPs) and standards of care (SOCs). As described by the ORMC EP authors, “...law enforcement vehicles and ambulances would make the two-block drive from the scene to ORMC carrying as many patients as they safely could, and return immediately after offload….minimal interventions were performed and unlike standard procedure, EMS could offer no prearrival report to the hospital.”

Deviations from SOPs and SOCs during an MCI are not confined to prehospital care, but often extend into the ED and beyond. Most difficult for an EP participating in an MCI is the moment of realization that the sheer number of seriously injured and dying patients arriving en masse mandates a change from “ED triage” to “battlefield triage.” As Dr Ponder recalled, “One of the first few patients I saw was pulse­less, and as I went to start chest compressions, I was stopped by a trauma surgeon who said, ‘He’s gone, focus on the ones we can help.’”

In EDs, dying patients are attended to first with extensive staff and resources, while, as a result, less seriously ill patients must sometimes wait longer for care. The opposite is true on the battlefield, where near-death victims of lethal injuries are provided only with comfort care, at most, in order to save those who have a chance of surviving their extensive or serious injuries. 

For hospitals and staff, the costs incurred by disaster preparedness are great and invariably exceed government funding provided for these efforts, but how much greater would be the human toll from an MCI without such efforts? All EPs should be proud of what our colleagues at ORMC accomplished on June 12. Though most EPs may never have to deal directly with an MCI, the Orlando nightclub shooting incident was only one of the latest MCIs, certainly not one of the last.

Previous editorials on MCIs may be found in EM September 2006 (9/11), June 2011 (first responders), September 2011 (9/11), November 2011 (surge capacity), and September 2012 (surge capacity/Hurricane Sandy).

While most Americans were still reacting in horror and disbelief to news of a mass shooting at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida in the early morning hours of June 12, 2016, the thoughts of most emergency physicians (EPs) were probably focused on the ongoing efforts to save as many victims as possible: What was the closest Level 1 trauma center, and how deep was the ED staffing there that night? Was there a need for additional resources, and perhaps even, could they get there in time to help? In this issue of Emergency Medicine (EM), Residency Program Director Salvatore Silvestri, MD, and his emergency medicine colleagues masterfully recount events from that night as they unfolded, both at the scene and two blocks away at the Orlando Regional Medical Center (ORMC) ED, in the minutes and hours following the first reported shootings.

Being prepared for a mass-casualty incident (MCI) is an extraordinarily expensive requirement of a hospital: It must acquire and maintain adequate resources and communication capabilities; periodically perform unannounced drills that disrupt other hospital activities; and ensure that all EPs and staff are not only able to perform their own day-to-day roles as attending physicians, residents, nurses, etc, but are also capable of taking on even greater responsibilities during an MCI—depending on the day and time it occurs. As you will read in the pages that follow, in the early morning hours of June 12, many of the practiced exercises and rehearsed procedures proved useful, even life-saving, while others had to be discarded or ignored in favor of improvised solutions to rapidly transport and treat the large number of victims with unanticipated needs, under unique conditions. 

In any MCI, saving the largest number of victims invariably depends on rapidly instituting some deviations from standard operating procedures (SOPs) and standards of care (SOCs). As described by the ORMC EP authors, “...law enforcement vehicles and ambulances would make the two-block drive from the scene to ORMC carrying as many patients as they safely could, and return immediately after offload….minimal interventions were performed and unlike standard procedure, EMS could offer no prearrival report to the hospital.”

Deviations from SOPs and SOCs during an MCI are not confined to prehospital care, but often extend into the ED and beyond. Most difficult for an EP participating in an MCI is the moment of realization that the sheer number of seriously injured and dying patients arriving en masse mandates a change from “ED triage” to “battlefield triage.” As Dr Ponder recalled, “One of the first few patients I saw was pulse­less, and as I went to start chest compressions, I was stopped by a trauma surgeon who said, ‘He’s gone, focus on the ones we can help.’”

In EDs, dying patients are attended to first with extensive staff and resources, while, as a result, less seriously ill patients must sometimes wait longer for care. The opposite is true on the battlefield, where near-death victims of lethal injuries are provided only with comfort care, at most, in order to save those who have a chance of surviving their extensive or serious injuries. 

For hospitals and staff, the costs incurred by disaster preparedness are great and invariably exceed government funding provided for these efforts, but how much greater would be the human toll from an MCI without such efforts? All EPs should be proud of what our colleagues at ORMC accomplished on June 12. Though most EPs may never have to deal directly with an MCI, the Orlando nightclub shooting incident was only one of the latest MCIs, certainly not one of the last.

Previous editorials on MCIs may be found in EM September 2006 (9/11), June 2011 (first responders), September 2011 (9/11), November 2011 (surge capacity), and September 2012 (surge capacity/Hurricane Sandy).

In The Case Report Issue, we feature four separate case reports presenting different conditions, much like patients may present in succession to a busy ED. Though considered of lesser importance than other types of peer-reviewed literature in this era of evidence-based medicine, case reports nevertheless fulfill an important role in clinical practice, medical education, and even medical research by identifying and tracking an important cause of a developing disease--especially one with a toxicologic or infectious etiology. In some instances, case reports also identify effective or ineffective treatments (though the latter is more rarely reported) and adverse effects of approved treatments, especially those of a newly introduced “Phase IV” medication.

Often, the ED is the initial setting for many reportable occurrences, and in recent years, patients first presenting to EDs have alerted the entire medical community to serious emerging illnesses such as Legionnaires’ disease, HIV and AIDS, anthrax, and Ebola. Most recently, firsthand reports by a pair of mother/daughter physicians in Brazil linked an alarming appearance of several new cases of microcephaly to a rash that followed a mosquito bite during pregnancy, and ultimately to identification of the mosquito-borne Zika virus.

Similarly, toxicologists at urban poison centers have been able to rapidly link cases of new and puzzling adverse effects and deaths reported by area emergency physicians to a dangerous new street drug or combination of drugs in that area, such as synthetic cannabinoid agonists, or heroin mixed with scopolamine, and then immediately alert other physicians and the public to these dangers.

As recently described by Florek and Dellavalle in Journal of Medical Case Reports (http://bit.ly/28PLi7w), case reports make meaningful contributions to the knowledge and education of medical students, residents, fellows, and (we would add) attendings. Written with the goal of sharing information for medical or scientific purposes, they often serve as a young physician’s first experience with medical writing and provide a solid foundation for manuscript preparation and publication.

Finally, a good ED case report that includes accurate descriptions of all relevant features along with any unique departures from classical presentations, followed by an up-to-date review of current treatments, presents most of us with a vivid means of identifying and remembering the salient features of a clinical problem or disease.

In The Case Report Issue, we feature four separate case reports presenting different conditions, much like patients may present in succession to a busy ED. Though considered of lesser importance than other types of peer-reviewed literature in this era of evidence-based medicine, case reports nevertheless fulfill an important role in clinical practice, medical education, and even medical research by identifying and tracking an important cause of a developing disease--especially one with a toxicologic or infectious etiology. In some instances, case reports also identify effective or ineffective treatments (though the latter is more rarely reported) and adverse effects of approved treatments, especially those of a newly introduced “Phase IV” medication.

Often, the ED is the initial setting for many reportable occurrences, and in recent years, patients first presenting to EDs have alerted the entire medical community to serious emerging illnesses such as Legionnaires’ disease, HIV and AIDS, anthrax, and Ebola. Most recently, firsthand reports by a pair of mother/daughter physicians in Brazil linked an alarming appearance of several new cases of microcephaly to a rash that followed a mosquito bite during pregnancy, and ultimately to identification of the mosquito-borne Zika virus.

Similarly, toxicologists at urban poison centers have been able to rapidly link cases of new and puzzling adverse effects and deaths reported by area emergency physicians to a dangerous new street drug or combination of drugs in that area, such as synthetic cannabinoid agonists, or heroin mixed with scopolamine, and then immediately alert other physicians and the public to these dangers.

As recently described by Florek and Dellavalle in Journal of Medical Case Reports (http://bit.ly/28PLi7w), case reports make meaningful contributions to the knowledge and education of medical students, residents, fellows, and (we would add) attendings. Written with the goal of sharing information for medical or scientific purposes, they often serve as a young physician’s first experience with medical writing and provide a solid foundation for manuscript preparation and publication.

Finally, a good ED case report that includes accurate descriptions of all relevant features along with any unique departures from classical presentations, followed by an up-to-date review of current treatments, presents most of us with a vivid means of identifying and remembering the salient features of a clinical problem or disease.

In The Case Report Issue, we feature four separate case reports presenting different conditions, much like patients may present in succession to a busy ED. Though considered of lesser importance than other types of peer-reviewed literature in this era of evidence-based medicine, case reports nevertheless fulfill an important role in clinical practice, medical education, and even medical research by identifying and tracking an important cause of a developing disease--especially one with a toxicologic or infectious etiology. In some instances, case reports also identify effective or ineffective treatments (though the latter is more rarely reported) and adverse effects of approved treatments, especially those of a newly introduced “Phase IV” medication.

Often, the ED is the initial setting for many reportable occurrences, and in recent years, patients first presenting to EDs have alerted the entire medical community to serious emerging illnesses such as Legionnaires’ disease, HIV and AIDS, anthrax, and Ebola. Most recently, firsthand reports by a pair of mother/daughter physicians in Brazil linked an alarming appearance of several new cases of microcephaly to a rash that followed a mosquito bite during pregnancy, and ultimately to identification of the mosquito-borne Zika virus.

Similarly, toxicologists at urban poison centers have been able to rapidly link cases of new and puzzling adverse effects and deaths reported by area emergency physicians to a dangerous new street drug or combination of drugs in that area, such as synthetic cannabinoid agonists, or heroin mixed with scopolamine, and then immediately alert other physicians and the public to these dangers.

As recently described by Florek and Dellavalle in Journal of Medical Case Reports (http://bit.ly/28PLi7w), case reports make meaningful contributions to the knowledge and education of medical students, residents, fellows, and (we would add) attendings. Written with the goal of sharing information for medical or scientific purposes, they often serve as a young physician’s first experience with medical writing and provide a solid foundation for manuscript preparation and publication.

Finally, a good ED case report that includes accurate descriptions of all relevant features along with any unique departures from classical presentations, followed by an up-to-date review of current treatments, presents most of us with a vivid means of identifying and remembering the salient features of a clinical problem or disease.

The 2015 American Heart Association CPR/ACLS update categorizes amiodarone and lidocaine as IIb drugs that “may be considered” for ventricular fibrillation or pulseless ventricular tachycardia unresponsive to CPR, defibrillation, or vasopressors. Out-of-hospital use of these drugs has previously been shown to increase survival rate to hospital admission, but not necessarily to hospital discharge.

The effects of amiodarone and lidocaine on the rate of survival to hospital discharge are addressed in a recent randomized, double-blind, out-of-hospital trial comparing amiodarone, lidocaine, and placebo in the treatment of shock-refractory ventricular fibrillation or pulseless ventricular tachycardia (N Engl J Med. 2016;374[18]:1711-1722). This study was conducted by the Resuscitation Outcomes Consortium (ROC) in 3,026 patients at 10 US and Canadian sites. The ROC authors concluded that “overall, neither amiodarone nor lidocaine resulted in a significantly higher rate of survival or favorable neurologic outcome than the rate with placebo.” But the article raises concerns about its methodology, appropriateness of its primary and secondary outcomes to out-of-hospital (or prehospital) care, and the manner in which its findings were reported.

Because of the condition (unconscious) and circumstances (out of hospital) of the patients at the time medication or placebo must be administered, this NIH-supported trial was conducted under exception from informed consent in emergency research, with FDA and Health Canada oversight, and with approval by trial-site Institutional Review Boards. Notwithstanding the list of regulatory bodies that approved the exception, is the trial appropriate for drugs previously demonstrated to be efficacious in improving survival rates to hospital admission—long considered the goal of prehospital care—when subsequent care from admission to hospital discharge is not standardized or controlled across multiple sites in two countries?

Another concern is the way the results were reported. Will the authors’ conclusion that overall, neither amiodarone nor lidocaine resulted in a significantly higher rate of survival  suggest to hurried readers that there is no benefit to any patient to hospital discharge from either antiarrhythmic agent? In the results section, the authors report “active drugs were associated with a survival rate that was significantly higher than the rate with placebo among patients with bystander-witnessed arrest but not among those with unwitnessed arrest.” Also noted in the accompanying editorial entitled “Out-of-Hospital Cardiac Arrest—Are Drugs Ever the Answer?” (N Engl J Med. 2016;374[18]:1781-1782), both drugs were associated with nonsignificant increases in survival rate, fewer subsequent shocks, and less administration of rhythm-control medications or need for CPR during hospitalization, compared with patients’ courses after placebo. 

The ROC trial is not the first or only out-of-hospital trial to use survival to hospital discharge as its primary outcome measure. A 1990-1991 study using death or discharge home to determine survival from out-of-hospital cardiac arrests in New York City found that of the 2,329 patients who met entry criteria for that study, overall survival was only 1.4%—which the authors attributed partly to lengthy elapsed time intervals at every step in the chain of survival, lack of adequate bystander CPR, and possibly sociodemographic features common to victims of cardiac arrest in large cities (JAMA. 1994;271[9]:678-683). The poor results  led to increases in first responders and AED availability but not the abandonment of properly performed CPR and ACLS. In the ROC trial, length of time from cardiac arrest to administration of medications clearly was shown to be a significant outcome determinant and was emphasized in the accompanying editorial. Here too shouldn’t we concentrate on optimizing the setting and timing of CPR and ACLS measures?  

The 2015 American Heart Association CPR/ACLS update categorizes amiodarone and lidocaine as IIb drugs that “may be considered” for ventricular fibrillation or pulseless ventricular tachycardia unresponsive to CPR, defibrillation, or vasopressors. Out-of-hospital use of these drugs has previously been shown to increase survival rate to hospital admission, but not necessarily to hospital discharge.

The effects of amiodarone and lidocaine on the rate of survival to hospital discharge are addressed in a recent randomized, double-blind, out-of-hospital trial comparing amiodarone, lidocaine, and placebo in the treatment of shock-refractory ventricular fibrillation or pulseless ventricular tachycardia (N Engl J Med. 2016;374[18]:1711-1722). This study was conducted by the Resuscitation Outcomes Consortium (ROC) in 3,026 patients at 10 US and Canadian sites. The ROC authors concluded that “overall, neither amiodarone nor lidocaine resulted in a significantly higher rate of survival or favorable neurologic outcome than the rate with placebo.” But the article raises concerns about its methodology, appropriateness of its primary and secondary outcomes to out-of-hospital (or prehospital) care, and the manner in which its findings were reported.

Because of the condition (unconscious) and circumstances (out of hospital) of the patients at the time medication or placebo must be administered, this NIH-supported trial was conducted under exception from informed consent in emergency research, with FDA and Health Canada oversight, and with approval by trial-site Institutional Review Boards. Notwithstanding the list of regulatory bodies that approved the exception, is the trial appropriate for drugs previously demonstrated to be efficacious in improving survival rates to hospital admission—long considered the goal of prehospital care—when subsequent care from admission to hospital discharge is not standardized or controlled across multiple sites in two countries?

Another concern is the way the results were reported. Will the authors’ conclusion that overall, neither amiodarone nor lidocaine resulted in a significantly higher rate of survival  suggest to hurried readers that there is no benefit to any patient to hospital discharge from either antiarrhythmic agent? In the results section, the authors report “active drugs were associated with a survival rate that was significantly higher than the rate with placebo among patients with bystander-witnessed arrest but not among those with unwitnessed arrest.” Also noted in the accompanying editorial entitled “Out-of-Hospital Cardiac Arrest—Are Drugs Ever the Answer?” (N Engl J Med. 2016;374[18]:1781-1782), both drugs were associated with nonsignificant increases in survival rate, fewer subsequent shocks, and less administration of rhythm-control medications or need for CPR during hospitalization, compared with patients’ courses after placebo. 

The ROC trial is not the first or only out-of-hospital trial to use survival to hospital discharge as its primary outcome measure. A 1990-1991 study using death or discharge home to determine survival from out-of-hospital cardiac arrests in New York City found that of the 2,329 patients who met entry criteria for that study, overall survival was only 1.4%—which the authors attributed partly to lengthy elapsed time intervals at every step in the chain of survival, lack of adequate bystander CPR, and possibly sociodemographic features common to victims of cardiac arrest in large cities (JAMA. 1994;271[9]:678-683). The poor results  led to increases in first responders and AED availability but not the abandonment of properly performed CPR and ACLS. In the ROC trial, length of time from cardiac arrest to administration of medications clearly was shown to be a significant outcome determinant and was emphasized in the accompanying editorial. Here too shouldn’t we concentrate on optimizing the setting and timing of CPR and ACLS measures?  

The 2015 American Heart Association CPR/ACLS update categorizes amiodarone and lidocaine as IIb drugs that “may be considered” for ventricular fibrillation or pulseless ventricular tachycardia unresponsive to CPR, defibrillation, or vasopressors. Out-of-hospital use of these drugs has previously been shown to increase survival rate to hospital admission, but not necessarily to hospital discharge.

The effects of amiodarone and lidocaine on the rate of survival to hospital discharge are addressed in a recent randomized, double-blind, out-of-hospital trial comparing amiodarone, lidocaine, and placebo in the treatment of shock-refractory ventricular fibrillation or pulseless ventricular tachycardia (N Engl J Med. 2016;374[18]:1711-1722). This study was conducted by the Resuscitation Outcomes Consortium (ROC) in 3,026 patients at 10 US and Canadian sites. The ROC authors concluded that “overall, neither amiodarone nor lidocaine resulted in a significantly higher rate of survival or favorable neurologic outcome than the rate with placebo.” But the article raises concerns about its methodology, appropriateness of its primary and secondary outcomes to out-of-hospital (or prehospital) care, and the manner in which its findings were reported.

Because of the condition (unconscious) and circumstances (out of hospital) of the patients at the time medication or placebo must be administered, this NIH-supported trial was conducted under exception from informed consent in emergency research, with FDA and Health Canada oversight, and with approval by trial-site Institutional Review Boards. Notwithstanding the list of regulatory bodies that approved the exception, is the trial appropriate for drugs previously demonstrated to be efficacious in improving survival rates to hospital admission—long considered the goal of prehospital care—when subsequent care from admission to hospital discharge is not standardized or controlled across multiple sites in two countries?

Another concern is the way the results were reported. Will the authors’ conclusion that overall, neither amiodarone nor lidocaine resulted in a significantly higher rate of survival  suggest to hurried readers that there is no benefit to any patient to hospital discharge from either antiarrhythmic agent? In the results section, the authors report “active drugs were associated with a survival rate that was significantly higher than the rate with placebo among patients with bystander-witnessed arrest but not among those with unwitnessed arrest.” Also noted in the accompanying editorial entitled “Out-of-Hospital Cardiac Arrest—Are Drugs Ever the Answer?” (N Engl J Med. 2016;374[18]:1781-1782), both drugs were associated with nonsignificant increases in survival rate, fewer subsequent shocks, and less administration of rhythm-control medications or need for CPR during hospitalization, compared with patients’ courses after placebo. 

The ROC trial is not the first or only out-of-hospital trial to use survival to hospital discharge as its primary outcome measure. A 1990-1991 study using death or discharge home to determine survival from out-of-hospital cardiac arrests in New York City found that of the 2,329 patients who met entry criteria for that study, overall survival was only 1.4%—which the authors attributed partly to lengthy elapsed time intervals at every step in the chain of survival, lack of adequate bystander CPR, and possibly sociodemographic features common to victims of cardiac arrest in large cities (JAMA. 1994;271[9]:678-683). The poor results  led to increases in first responders and AED availability but not the abandonment of properly performed CPR and ACLS. In the ROC trial, length of time from cardiac arrest to administration of medications clearly was shown to be a significant outcome determinant and was emphasized in the accompanying editorial. Here too shouldn’t we concentrate on optimizing the setting and timing of CPR and ACLS measures?  

If an ED is considered the “front door” to the hospital, how do we regard a free-standing emergency department (FSED) with no hospital attached to it? Fueled by continued hospital closures in the face of steadily increasing demands for emergency care, FSEDs are now replacing hospitals in previously well-served urban areas in addition to serving rural areas lacking alternative facilities.

According to The New York Times (http://nyti.ms/1TB8Z44), since 2000, 19 New York City hospitals “have either closed or overhauled how they operate.” As this issue of Emergency Medicine went to press, plans had been announced to replace Manhattan’s Beth Israel and Brooklyn’s Wyckoff Heights hospitals with FSEDs and expanded outpatient facilities. These hospitals and many others that have recently closed, including St Vincent’s (2010) and the Long Island College Hospital (2014), had been part of the health care landscape in New York for over 125 years.

What do FSEDs mean for emergency medicine (EM) and emergency physicians (EPs), and are they safe alternatives to traditional hospital-based EDs? Newer technologies and treatments, coupled with steadily increasing pressures to reduce inpatient stays, razor-thin hospital operating margins, and the refusal of state and local governments to bail out financially failing hospitals, have created a disconnect between the increasing need for emergency care and the decreasing number of inpatient beds.

On one end of the EM patient care spectrum, urgent care centers (UCCs) and retail pharmacy clinics—collectively referred to as “convenient care” centers—are rapidly proliferating to offer care to those with urgent, episodic, and relatively minor medical and surgical problems. (See “Urgent Care and the Urgent Need for Care” at http://bit.ly/1OSrHSA). With little or no regulatory oversight, convenient care centers staffed by EPs, family practitioners, internists, NPs, and PAs, offer extended hour care—but not 24/7 care—to anyone with adequate health insurance or the ability to pay for the care.

On the other end of the EM patient care spectrum are the FSEDs, now divided into two types: satellite EDs of nearby hospitals, and “FS”-FSEDs with no direct hospital connections. Almost all FSEDs receive 911 ambulances, are staffed at all times by trained and certified EPs and registered nurses (RNs) provide acute care and stabilization consistent with the standards for hospital-based EDs, and are open 24/7—a hallmark that distinguishes EDs from UCCs. FSEDs code and bill both for facility and provider services in the same way hospital-based EDs do. Although organized EM has enthusiastically embraced and endorsed FSEDs, its position on UCCs has been decidedly mixed.

Are FSEDs safe for patients requiring emergency care? The lack of uniform definitions and federal and state regulatory requirements make it difficult to gather and interpret meaningful clinical data on FSEDs and convenient care centers. But a well-equipped FSED, served by state-of-the-art pre- and inter-facility ambulances, and staffed by qualified EPs and RNs, should provide a safe alternative to hospital-based EDs for almost all patients in need of emergency care—especially when no hospital-based ED is available.

Specialty designations of qualifying area hospitals such as “Level I trauma center” will minimize but not completely eliminate bad outcomes of cases where even seconds may make the difference between life and death. In the end though, the real question may be is an FSED better than no ED at all?

Ideally, a hospital-based ED should be the epicenter of a network of both satellite convenient care centers and FSEDs, coordinating services, providing management and staffing for all parts of the network, and arranging safe, appropriate intranetwork ambulance transport.

Should you think that FSEDs are a new phenomenon, you might be surprised to discover that in 1875, after New York Hospital (now part of New York Presbyterian) closed its original lower Manhattan site to move further uptown, it opened a “House of Relief” in its old neighborhood that contained an emergency treatment center, an operating room, an isolation area, a dispensary, a reception area, examination rooms, an ambulance entrance, and wards to observe and treat patients until they could be safely transported to the new main hospital. FSEDs served 19th-century patients well, and in the 21st century may serve as a reminder that sometimes even in medicine, “everything old is new again!” (See http://bit.ly/1NSPlDG.)

Editor’s Note: Portions of this editorial were previously published in Emergency Medicine.

If an ED is considered the “front door” to the hospital, how do we regard a free-standing emergency department (FSED) with no hospital attached to it? Fueled by continued hospital closures in the face of steadily increasing demands for emergency care, FSEDs are now replacing hospitals in previously well-served urban areas in addition to serving rural areas lacking alternative facilities.

According to The New York Times (http://nyti.ms/1TB8Z44), since 2000, 19 New York City hospitals “have either closed or overhauled how they operate.” As this issue of Emergency Medicine went to press, plans had been announced to replace Manhattan’s Beth Israel and Brooklyn’s Wyckoff Heights hospitals with FSEDs and expanded outpatient facilities. These hospitals and many others that have recently closed, including St Vincent’s (2010) and the Long Island College Hospital (2014), had been part of the health care landscape in New York for over 125 years.

What do FSEDs mean for emergency medicine (EM) and emergency physicians (EPs), and are they safe alternatives to traditional hospital-based EDs? Newer technologies and treatments, coupled with steadily increasing pressures to reduce inpatient stays, razor-thin hospital operating margins, and the refusal of state and local governments to bail out financially failing hospitals, have created a disconnect between the increasing need for emergency care and the decreasing number of inpatient beds.

On one end of the EM patient care spectrum, urgent care centers (UCCs) and retail pharmacy clinics—collectively referred to as “convenient care” centers—are rapidly proliferating to offer care to those with urgent, episodic, and relatively minor medical and surgical problems. (See “Urgent Care and the Urgent Need for Care” at http://bit.ly/1OSrHSA). With little or no regulatory oversight, convenient care centers staffed by EPs, family practitioners, internists, NPs, and PAs, offer extended hour care—but not 24/7 care—to anyone with adequate health insurance or the ability to pay for the care.

On the other end of the EM patient care spectrum are the FSEDs, now divided into two types: satellite EDs of nearby hospitals, and “FS”-FSEDs with no direct hospital connections. Almost all FSEDs receive 911 ambulances, are staffed at all times by trained and certified EPs and registered nurses (RNs) provide acute care and stabilization consistent with the standards for hospital-based EDs, and are open 24/7—a hallmark that distinguishes EDs from UCCs. FSEDs code and bill both for facility and provider services in the same way hospital-based EDs do. Although organized EM has enthusiastically embraced and endorsed FSEDs, its position on UCCs has been decidedly mixed.

Are FSEDs safe for patients requiring emergency care? The lack of uniform definitions and federal and state regulatory requirements make it difficult to gather and interpret meaningful clinical data on FSEDs and convenient care centers. But a well-equipped FSED, served by state-of-the-art pre- and inter-facility ambulances, and staffed by qualified EPs and RNs, should provide a safe alternative to hospital-based EDs for almost all patients in need of emergency care—especially when no hospital-based ED is available.

Specialty designations of qualifying area hospitals such as “Level I trauma center” will minimize but not completely eliminate bad outcomes of cases where even seconds may make the difference between life and death. In the end though, the real question may be is an FSED better than no ED at all?

Ideally, a hospital-based ED should be the epicenter of a network of both satellite convenient care centers and FSEDs, coordinating services, providing management and staffing for all parts of the network, and arranging safe, appropriate intranetwork ambulance transport.

Should you think that FSEDs are a new phenomenon, you might be surprised to discover that in 1875, after New York Hospital (now part of New York Presbyterian) closed its original lower Manhattan site to move further uptown, it opened a “House of Relief” in its old neighborhood that contained an emergency treatment center, an operating room, an isolation area, a dispensary, a reception area, examination rooms, an ambulance entrance, and wards to observe and treat patients until they could be safely transported to the new main hospital. FSEDs served 19th-century patients well, and in the 21st century may serve as a reminder that sometimes even in medicine, “everything old is new again!” (See http://bit.ly/1NSPlDG.)

Editor’s Note: Portions of this editorial were previously published in Emergency Medicine.

If an ED is considered the “front door” to the hospital, how do we regard a free-standing emergency department (FSED) with no hospital attached to it? Fueled by continued hospital closures in the face of steadily increasing demands for emergency care, FSEDs are now replacing hospitals in previously well-served urban areas in addition to serving rural areas lacking alternative facilities.

According to The New York Times (http://nyti.ms/1TB8Z44), since 2000, 19 New York City hospitals “have either closed or overhauled how they operate.” As this issue of Emergency Medicine went to press, plans had been announced to replace Manhattan’s Beth Israel and Brooklyn’s Wyckoff Heights hospitals with FSEDs and expanded outpatient facilities. These hospitals and many others that have recently closed, including St Vincent’s (2010) and the Long Island College Hospital (2014), had been part of the health care landscape in New York for over 125 years.

What do FSEDs mean for emergency medicine (EM) and emergency physicians (EPs), and are they safe alternatives to traditional hospital-based EDs? Newer technologies and treatments, coupled with steadily increasing pressures to reduce inpatient stays, razor-thin hospital operating margins, and the refusal of state and local governments to bail out financially failing hospitals, have created a disconnect between the increasing need for emergency care and the decreasing number of inpatient beds.

On one end of the EM patient care spectrum, urgent care centers (UCCs) and retail pharmacy clinics—collectively referred to as “convenient care” centers—are rapidly proliferating to offer care to those with urgent, episodic, and relatively minor medical and surgical problems. (See “Urgent Care and the Urgent Need for Care” at http://bit.ly/1OSrHSA). With little or no regulatory oversight, convenient care centers staffed by EPs, family practitioners, internists, NPs, and PAs, offer extended hour care—but not 24/7 care—to anyone with adequate health insurance or the ability to pay for the care.

On the other end of the EM patient care spectrum are the FSEDs, now divided into two types: satellite EDs of nearby hospitals, and “FS”-FSEDs with no direct hospital connections. Almost all FSEDs receive 911 ambulances, are staffed at all times by trained and certified EPs and registered nurses (RNs) provide acute care and stabilization consistent with the standards for hospital-based EDs, and are open 24/7—a hallmark that distinguishes EDs from UCCs. FSEDs code and bill both for facility and provider services in the same way hospital-based EDs do. Although organized EM has enthusiastically embraced and endorsed FSEDs, its position on UCCs has been decidedly mixed.

Are FSEDs safe for patients requiring emergency care? The lack of uniform definitions and federal and state regulatory requirements make it difficult to gather and interpret meaningful clinical data on FSEDs and convenient care centers. But a well-equipped FSED, served by state-of-the-art pre- and inter-facility ambulances, and staffed by qualified EPs and RNs, should provide a safe alternative to hospital-based EDs for almost all patients in need of emergency care—especially when no hospital-based ED is available.

Specialty designations of qualifying area hospitals such as “Level I trauma center” will minimize but not completely eliminate bad outcomes of cases where even seconds may make the difference between life and death. In the end though, the real question may be is an FSED better than no ED at all?

Ideally, a hospital-based ED should be the epicenter of a network of both satellite convenient care centers and FSEDs, coordinating services, providing management and staffing for all parts of the network, and arranging safe, appropriate intranetwork ambulance transport.

Should you think that FSEDs are a new phenomenon, you might be surprised to discover that in 1875, after New York Hospital (now part of New York Presbyterian) closed its original lower Manhattan site to move further uptown, it opened a “House of Relief” in its old neighborhood that contained an emergency treatment center, an operating room, an isolation area, a dispensary, a reception area, examination rooms, an ambulance entrance, and wards to observe and treat patients until they could be safely transported to the new main hospital. FSEDs served 19th-century patients well, and in the 21st century may serve as a reminder that sometimes even in medicine, “everything old is new again!” (See http://bit.ly/1NSPlDG.)

Editor’s Note: Portions of this editorial were previously published in Emergency Medicine.