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Toy soldier syndrome: A consequence of parental cognitive dissonance
Editor’s note: Readers’ Forum is a department for correspondence from readers that is not in response to articles published in
Childhood and adolescence are periods with marked psychobehavioral development of the brain. The sense of self, identity, and role are established. This process is not without risk because brain regions governing reward, impulsivity, and sensation-seeking are relatively more developed and influential than higher-order cognitive regions regulating behavioral inhibition, decision-making, and planning, which continue to mature into one’s early to mid-20s. Consequently, while the developing brain is “under construction” by forging new pathways and taking advantage of its immense neuroplasticity, it is also prone to psychological insults under exposure to stressful events, attitudes, and behaviors, including those that can arise in the family.1
Most people would agree that there is no stronger emotion than parental love. The origins of this powerful biobehavioral bonding with a child have been attributed to maternal release of oxytocin, known colloquially as the “love hormone,” during the birthing process, and to both biological parents experiencing psychosocial attachment with their infant. Therefore, common sense dictates that parents would do anything to protect their offspring, and that no parent would deliberately behave in a manner that harms their child.
Common sense notwithstanding, reports of both child neglect and abuse are common. States have established agencies to protect children from their own parents. The answers to the question “Whose kids are they?” and under what circumstances the state has the authority to warn or reprimand parents, or even temporarily or permanently separate minors from their parents, are complex and vary by state.
In this commentary, we describe harmful actions committed by parents with the intention of protecting the impressionable minds of their children from malevolent forces or intrusive and unhealthy ideas. Second, we examine how to protect a minor from parental actions that are well-meaning but potentially harmful.
Parent-child communication
Delusional family interactions. Originally described in 1877 as “folie à deux,”2 shared madness is an extreme and uncommon parental psychiatric condition harmful to a child’s mental health. It is primarily characterized by parental-initiated delusions shared with the child that are typically persecutory and attributed to danger from vengeful folks or grandiose in nature. The question of whether the “folie” or “madness” is contagious arises due to the propensity of the child to adopt these delusions under an imposed insular or restrictive environment. Separating the child from the environment dominated by the delusional adult usually is sufficient to reverse the symptoms due to reality testing.
Normative familial communication. In contrary to a delusional familial interaction, normative family traditions and values are a unifying psychosocial force and a source of bonding and loyalty from an early age. A ubiquitous example is the support of a local sports team, and the emotional turmoil associated with the team’s wins and losses, accompanied by “hating” a rival. These family rituals are commonly devoid of emotional negative consequences for an impressionable young mind unless the child is exposed to unsportsmanlike emotional, verbal, or aggressive behavior by an adult at home in front of the television or in the stands at a game.
Continue to: Unfortunately...
Unfortunately, the “love-hate” dichotomy rooted in family-generated traditions of loyalty is becoming more evident in today’s turbulent sociopolitical environment. Children and young adolescents are not prepared to cope with the stressful effects of repeated exposure to intense conflictual events at home when parents adopt opposing sociopolitical ideologies. Furthermore, a parent might intentionally expose their child to emotionally conflictual circumstances in the name of a perceived value that might create and exacerbate stress, fear, and self-loathing. Ironically, by doing what a parent believes is right for their child, they might be transforming the child without their consent into a variant of a “toy soldier by proxy.” Such a child is a tool expected to follow the parental pathway and belief system without questioning, or even having the cognitive ability to do so, given their ongoing bio-behavioral and moral developmental phase.3
This new normative exposure to conflictual situations at the will of the parent is not only limited to watching them remotely but also may include participating in what is meant to be a peaceful protest or march. As we all witnessed in 2020, such events can easily deteriorate into unsafe environments rife with lawlessness and uncontrolled violence. This has included clashes between opposing groups who are matched in zeal and conviction, as well as opposition to or endangerment by law enforcement personnel trying to restore order by force. This is not where a responsible parent should take their child. Furthermore, there is the danger of loss of privacy of children exposed by media following their participation in public activity. This may lead to hate mail as that would further confuse and jeopardize a peaceful lifestyle, which is highly desirable for a developing child.
Cognitive dissonance. Have these parents temporarily allowed the limbic system to trump the restraints of the prefrontal cortex, as exhibited by an impulsive and risky behavior driven by poor insight? Have these parents thoughtfully weighed the balance between the merit of a child’s exposure to such conflictual circumstances and the peril of negative emotional consequences? This is illustrated by a mother who has been taking her preadolescent son to demonstrations regularly because “I want him to see how democracy works.”
Might this be a case of cognitive dissonance (CD) that amounts to unwitting mental child abuse if it happens repeatedly? According to the CD theory, there is a tendency to seek consistency between cognitions (eg, beliefs, opinions) and attitudes or behaviors. Inconsistency between these variables is termed “dissonance.”4,5 The importance attached to the dissonant belief affects the severity of the dissonance. The dissonance occurs when a parent must choose between 2 incompatible beliefs or actions. A classic demonstration of CD is when an adult requests that an adolescent follows his instructions (eg, “do not smoke or drink alcohol”), yet the adult does not act accordingly (eg, they smoke or drink). Role modeling demonstrated by such a discrepancy is a cause of confusion in the child. In terms of this article, the CD is between what the parent believes is an important learning experience by exercising the perceived right to pass to the child the parental value system vs compromising the protection of the child by exposing them to the potential negative consequences of a risky situation.
What can parents and therapists do?
Usually, parents mean well. It is important to communicate to parents the importance of refraining from forcing their children to join their battles. Calculating risks based on an intuitive approach is flawed because doing so is based on beliefs and emotions that originated in the limbic system (“I feel that”…) and are neither precise nor accurate.6 Teaching our youth in the school system how to think (eg, the science of logic and history of science) vs what to think (ie, indoctrination) is a key to healthy cognitive development. Furthermore, children need to have the time, space, and opportunities (learning moments) to develop this capacity. It is not until approximately age 16 that abstract thinking capabilities are developed. Cognitive dissonance can be eliminated by reducing the valence of the conflicting beliefs or by removing the conflicting attitude or behavior.
As parents and as mental health professionals, we should carry the necessary burden of responsibility to prevent the risk of “lost childhood” due to parental emotional zeal and righteousness that lead to early exposure to damaging adversity. We cannot afford to turn our children into exploitable tools (ie, toy soldiers) in conflicts they do not fully grasp.
1. Bagot KS, Kaminer Y. Harm reduction for youth in treatment with substance use disorders: one size does not fit all. Curr Addict Rep. 2018;5:379-385.
2. Arnon D, Patel A, Tan GM. The nosological significance of Folie à Deux: a review of the literature. Ann Gen Psychiatry. 2006;5:11.
3. Kohlberg L. The philosophy of moral development: the nature and validity of moral stages. Harper & Row; 1984.
4. Festinger L. A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford University Press; 1957.
5. Festinger L. Cognitive dissonance. Sci Am. 1962;207:93-102.
6. Henderson SW, Gerson R, Phillips B. What is “high risk” and what are we actually supposed to do about it? J Am Acad Child Adolesc Psychiatry. 2019;58(6):561-564.
Editor’s note: Readers’ Forum is a department for correspondence from readers that is not in response to articles published in
Childhood and adolescence are periods with marked psychobehavioral development of the brain. The sense of self, identity, and role are established. This process is not without risk because brain regions governing reward, impulsivity, and sensation-seeking are relatively more developed and influential than higher-order cognitive regions regulating behavioral inhibition, decision-making, and planning, which continue to mature into one’s early to mid-20s. Consequently, while the developing brain is “under construction” by forging new pathways and taking advantage of its immense neuroplasticity, it is also prone to psychological insults under exposure to stressful events, attitudes, and behaviors, including those that can arise in the family.1
Most people would agree that there is no stronger emotion than parental love. The origins of this powerful biobehavioral bonding with a child have been attributed to maternal release of oxytocin, known colloquially as the “love hormone,” during the birthing process, and to both biological parents experiencing psychosocial attachment with their infant. Therefore, common sense dictates that parents would do anything to protect their offspring, and that no parent would deliberately behave in a manner that harms their child.
Common sense notwithstanding, reports of both child neglect and abuse are common. States have established agencies to protect children from their own parents. The answers to the question “Whose kids are they?” and under what circumstances the state has the authority to warn or reprimand parents, or even temporarily or permanently separate minors from their parents, are complex and vary by state.
In this commentary, we describe harmful actions committed by parents with the intention of protecting the impressionable minds of their children from malevolent forces or intrusive and unhealthy ideas. Second, we examine how to protect a minor from parental actions that are well-meaning but potentially harmful.
Parent-child communication
Delusional family interactions. Originally described in 1877 as “folie à deux,”2 shared madness is an extreme and uncommon parental psychiatric condition harmful to a child’s mental health. It is primarily characterized by parental-initiated delusions shared with the child that are typically persecutory and attributed to danger from vengeful folks or grandiose in nature. The question of whether the “folie” or “madness” is contagious arises due to the propensity of the child to adopt these delusions under an imposed insular or restrictive environment. Separating the child from the environment dominated by the delusional adult usually is sufficient to reverse the symptoms due to reality testing.
Normative familial communication. In contrary to a delusional familial interaction, normative family traditions and values are a unifying psychosocial force and a source of bonding and loyalty from an early age. A ubiquitous example is the support of a local sports team, and the emotional turmoil associated with the team’s wins and losses, accompanied by “hating” a rival. These family rituals are commonly devoid of emotional negative consequences for an impressionable young mind unless the child is exposed to unsportsmanlike emotional, verbal, or aggressive behavior by an adult at home in front of the television or in the stands at a game.
Continue to: Unfortunately...
Unfortunately, the “love-hate” dichotomy rooted in family-generated traditions of loyalty is becoming more evident in today’s turbulent sociopolitical environment. Children and young adolescents are not prepared to cope with the stressful effects of repeated exposure to intense conflictual events at home when parents adopt opposing sociopolitical ideologies. Furthermore, a parent might intentionally expose their child to emotionally conflictual circumstances in the name of a perceived value that might create and exacerbate stress, fear, and self-loathing. Ironically, by doing what a parent believes is right for their child, they might be transforming the child without their consent into a variant of a “toy soldier by proxy.” Such a child is a tool expected to follow the parental pathway and belief system without questioning, or even having the cognitive ability to do so, given their ongoing bio-behavioral and moral developmental phase.3
This new normative exposure to conflictual situations at the will of the parent is not only limited to watching them remotely but also may include participating in what is meant to be a peaceful protest or march. As we all witnessed in 2020, such events can easily deteriorate into unsafe environments rife with lawlessness and uncontrolled violence. This has included clashes between opposing groups who are matched in zeal and conviction, as well as opposition to or endangerment by law enforcement personnel trying to restore order by force. This is not where a responsible parent should take their child. Furthermore, there is the danger of loss of privacy of children exposed by media following their participation in public activity. This may lead to hate mail as that would further confuse and jeopardize a peaceful lifestyle, which is highly desirable for a developing child.
Cognitive dissonance. Have these parents temporarily allowed the limbic system to trump the restraints of the prefrontal cortex, as exhibited by an impulsive and risky behavior driven by poor insight? Have these parents thoughtfully weighed the balance between the merit of a child’s exposure to such conflictual circumstances and the peril of negative emotional consequences? This is illustrated by a mother who has been taking her preadolescent son to demonstrations regularly because “I want him to see how democracy works.”
Might this be a case of cognitive dissonance (CD) that amounts to unwitting mental child abuse if it happens repeatedly? According to the CD theory, there is a tendency to seek consistency between cognitions (eg, beliefs, opinions) and attitudes or behaviors. Inconsistency between these variables is termed “dissonance.”4,5 The importance attached to the dissonant belief affects the severity of the dissonance. The dissonance occurs when a parent must choose between 2 incompatible beliefs or actions. A classic demonstration of CD is when an adult requests that an adolescent follows his instructions (eg, “do not smoke or drink alcohol”), yet the adult does not act accordingly (eg, they smoke or drink). Role modeling demonstrated by such a discrepancy is a cause of confusion in the child. In terms of this article, the CD is between what the parent believes is an important learning experience by exercising the perceived right to pass to the child the parental value system vs compromising the protection of the child by exposing them to the potential negative consequences of a risky situation.
What can parents and therapists do?
Usually, parents mean well. It is important to communicate to parents the importance of refraining from forcing their children to join their battles. Calculating risks based on an intuitive approach is flawed because doing so is based on beliefs and emotions that originated in the limbic system (“I feel that”…) and are neither precise nor accurate.6 Teaching our youth in the school system how to think (eg, the science of logic and history of science) vs what to think (ie, indoctrination) is a key to healthy cognitive development. Furthermore, children need to have the time, space, and opportunities (learning moments) to develop this capacity. It is not until approximately age 16 that abstract thinking capabilities are developed. Cognitive dissonance can be eliminated by reducing the valence of the conflicting beliefs or by removing the conflicting attitude or behavior.
As parents and as mental health professionals, we should carry the necessary burden of responsibility to prevent the risk of “lost childhood” due to parental emotional zeal and righteousness that lead to early exposure to damaging adversity. We cannot afford to turn our children into exploitable tools (ie, toy soldiers) in conflicts they do not fully grasp.
Editor’s note: Readers’ Forum is a department for correspondence from readers that is not in response to articles published in
Childhood and adolescence are periods with marked psychobehavioral development of the brain. The sense of self, identity, and role are established. This process is not without risk because brain regions governing reward, impulsivity, and sensation-seeking are relatively more developed and influential than higher-order cognitive regions regulating behavioral inhibition, decision-making, and planning, which continue to mature into one’s early to mid-20s. Consequently, while the developing brain is “under construction” by forging new pathways and taking advantage of its immense neuroplasticity, it is also prone to psychological insults under exposure to stressful events, attitudes, and behaviors, including those that can arise in the family.1
Most people would agree that there is no stronger emotion than parental love. The origins of this powerful biobehavioral bonding with a child have been attributed to maternal release of oxytocin, known colloquially as the “love hormone,” during the birthing process, and to both biological parents experiencing psychosocial attachment with their infant. Therefore, common sense dictates that parents would do anything to protect their offspring, and that no parent would deliberately behave in a manner that harms their child.
Common sense notwithstanding, reports of both child neglect and abuse are common. States have established agencies to protect children from their own parents. The answers to the question “Whose kids are they?” and under what circumstances the state has the authority to warn or reprimand parents, or even temporarily or permanently separate minors from their parents, are complex and vary by state.
In this commentary, we describe harmful actions committed by parents with the intention of protecting the impressionable minds of their children from malevolent forces or intrusive and unhealthy ideas. Second, we examine how to protect a minor from parental actions that are well-meaning but potentially harmful.
Parent-child communication
Delusional family interactions. Originally described in 1877 as “folie à deux,”2 shared madness is an extreme and uncommon parental psychiatric condition harmful to a child’s mental health. It is primarily characterized by parental-initiated delusions shared with the child that are typically persecutory and attributed to danger from vengeful folks or grandiose in nature. The question of whether the “folie” or “madness” is contagious arises due to the propensity of the child to adopt these delusions under an imposed insular or restrictive environment. Separating the child from the environment dominated by the delusional adult usually is sufficient to reverse the symptoms due to reality testing.
Normative familial communication. In contrary to a delusional familial interaction, normative family traditions and values are a unifying psychosocial force and a source of bonding and loyalty from an early age. A ubiquitous example is the support of a local sports team, and the emotional turmoil associated with the team’s wins and losses, accompanied by “hating” a rival. These family rituals are commonly devoid of emotional negative consequences for an impressionable young mind unless the child is exposed to unsportsmanlike emotional, verbal, or aggressive behavior by an adult at home in front of the television or in the stands at a game.
Continue to: Unfortunately...
Unfortunately, the “love-hate” dichotomy rooted in family-generated traditions of loyalty is becoming more evident in today’s turbulent sociopolitical environment. Children and young adolescents are not prepared to cope with the stressful effects of repeated exposure to intense conflictual events at home when parents adopt opposing sociopolitical ideologies. Furthermore, a parent might intentionally expose their child to emotionally conflictual circumstances in the name of a perceived value that might create and exacerbate stress, fear, and self-loathing. Ironically, by doing what a parent believes is right for their child, they might be transforming the child without their consent into a variant of a “toy soldier by proxy.” Such a child is a tool expected to follow the parental pathway and belief system without questioning, or even having the cognitive ability to do so, given their ongoing bio-behavioral and moral developmental phase.3
This new normative exposure to conflictual situations at the will of the parent is not only limited to watching them remotely but also may include participating in what is meant to be a peaceful protest or march. As we all witnessed in 2020, such events can easily deteriorate into unsafe environments rife with lawlessness and uncontrolled violence. This has included clashes between opposing groups who are matched in zeal and conviction, as well as opposition to or endangerment by law enforcement personnel trying to restore order by force. This is not where a responsible parent should take their child. Furthermore, there is the danger of loss of privacy of children exposed by media following their participation in public activity. This may lead to hate mail as that would further confuse and jeopardize a peaceful lifestyle, which is highly desirable for a developing child.
Cognitive dissonance. Have these parents temporarily allowed the limbic system to trump the restraints of the prefrontal cortex, as exhibited by an impulsive and risky behavior driven by poor insight? Have these parents thoughtfully weighed the balance between the merit of a child’s exposure to such conflictual circumstances and the peril of negative emotional consequences? This is illustrated by a mother who has been taking her preadolescent son to demonstrations regularly because “I want him to see how democracy works.”
Might this be a case of cognitive dissonance (CD) that amounts to unwitting mental child abuse if it happens repeatedly? According to the CD theory, there is a tendency to seek consistency between cognitions (eg, beliefs, opinions) and attitudes or behaviors. Inconsistency between these variables is termed “dissonance.”4,5 The importance attached to the dissonant belief affects the severity of the dissonance. The dissonance occurs when a parent must choose between 2 incompatible beliefs or actions. A classic demonstration of CD is when an adult requests that an adolescent follows his instructions (eg, “do not smoke or drink alcohol”), yet the adult does not act accordingly (eg, they smoke or drink). Role modeling demonstrated by such a discrepancy is a cause of confusion in the child. In terms of this article, the CD is between what the parent believes is an important learning experience by exercising the perceived right to pass to the child the parental value system vs compromising the protection of the child by exposing them to the potential negative consequences of a risky situation.
What can parents and therapists do?
Usually, parents mean well. It is important to communicate to parents the importance of refraining from forcing their children to join their battles. Calculating risks based on an intuitive approach is flawed because doing so is based on beliefs and emotions that originated in the limbic system (“I feel that”…) and are neither precise nor accurate.6 Teaching our youth in the school system how to think (eg, the science of logic and history of science) vs what to think (ie, indoctrination) is a key to healthy cognitive development. Furthermore, children need to have the time, space, and opportunities (learning moments) to develop this capacity. It is not until approximately age 16 that abstract thinking capabilities are developed. Cognitive dissonance can be eliminated by reducing the valence of the conflicting beliefs or by removing the conflicting attitude or behavior.
As parents and as mental health professionals, we should carry the necessary burden of responsibility to prevent the risk of “lost childhood” due to parental emotional zeal and righteousness that lead to early exposure to damaging adversity. We cannot afford to turn our children into exploitable tools (ie, toy soldiers) in conflicts they do not fully grasp.
1. Bagot KS, Kaminer Y. Harm reduction for youth in treatment with substance use disorders: one size does not fit all. Curr Addict Rep. 2018;5:379-385.
2. Arnon D, Patel A, Tan GM. The nosological significance of Folie à Deux: a review of the literature. Ann Gen Psychiatry. 2006;5:11.
3. Kohlberg L. The philosophy of moral development: the nature and validity of moral stages. Harper & Row; 1984.
4. Festinger L. A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford University Press; 1957.
5. Festinger L. Cognitive dissonance. Sci Am. 1962;207:93-102.
6. Henderson SW, Gerson R, Phillips B. What is “high risk” and what are we actually supposed to do about it? J Am Acad Child Adolesc Psychiatry. 2019;58(6):561-564.
1. Bagot KS, Kaminer Y. Harm reduction for youth in treatment with substance use disorders: one size does not fit all. Curr Addict Rep. 2018;5:379-385.
2. Arnon D, Patel A, Tan GM. The nosological significance of Folie à Deux: a review of the literature. Ann Gen Psychiatry. 2006;5:11.
3. Kohlberg L. The philosophy of moral development: the nature and validity of moral stages. Harper & Row; 1984.
4. Festinger L. A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford University Press; 1957.
5. Festinger L. Cognitive dissonance. Sci Am. 1962;207:93-102.
6. Henderson SW, Gerson R, Phillips B. What is “high risk” and what are we actually supposed to do about it? J Am Acad Child Adolesc Psychiatry. 2019;58(6):561-564.
COVID-19 and decision-making capacity; more
COVID-19 and decision-making capacity
Dr. Ryznar’s article “Evaluating patients’ decision-making capacity during COVID-19” (Evidence-Based Reviews,
For example, in a controversial 2007 case in Atlanta, Georgia, an attorney with active tuberculosis failed to heed medical advice to refrain from traveling.1 The patient’s uncooperativeness did not implicate concerns over his decisional capacity.1 However, his international and interstate travel triggered the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s legal authority under the Public Health Service Act to prevent the entry and spread of communicable disease.1-3 An authorized order from a duly constituted public health authority is issued and enforceable without regard to clinical determinations of capacity (and is generally subject to challenge via judicial or other due process mechanisms as a government-sanctioned deprivation of liberty to protect public welfare). State laws and local ordinances require physicians to notify the appropriate public health department when patients test positive for certain contagious diseases.
The difficulty with involuntarily detaining a cognitively intact patient due to concern over their contagion risk and erroneous beliefs runs considerably deeper than eliciting a “political backlash” or managing the qualms of hospital security officers. It is a fundamental matter of proper legal authority. Psychiatrists and other physicians assess patients’ decision-making capacity for specific treatment decisions on a case-by-case basis, seeking to preserve autonomy while practicing beneficence. Public health officers are agents of the state with designated authorities to control the spread of disease. A capacity determination in the absence of neurocognitive deficits implies the psychiatrist is evaluating the soundness of the patient’s ideas as opposed to their cognition, overlooking the reality that fully capable individuals can possess dubious—and even unsalutary—beliefs. While physicians educate patients about the risks of contracting and communicating infection, they are thankfully not tasked with arbitrating sociopolitical disputes at the bedside. Such controversies regarding pandemic response do not belong under the rubric of medical decision-making capacity. Conflating psychosomatic medicine consultations with public health orders risks unmooring capacity determinations from their medicolegal and bioethical foundations.
Charles G. Kels, JD
S Army Medical Center of Excellence
San Antonio, Texas
Disclaimer: The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of any government agency.
References
1. Tanne JH. Tuberculosis case exposes flaws in international public health systems. BMJ. 2007;334(7605):1187.
2. Public Health Service Act, 42 USC § 264-272 (1944).
3. Interstate and Foreign Quarantine, 42 CFR Parts 70-71 (2017).
The author responds
I appreciate Mr. Kels’s letter and explicit discussion of the limits of decision-making capacity. I agree that physicians should not overstep their legal authority and ethical mandate. The specific case discussed in my article was a patient who was symptomatic from COVID-19 who wanted to leave the hospital against medical advice. The contagious nature of this virus certainly falls under the risk/benefit analysis of the clinical situation because it is an important aspect of understanding the nature of the illness and treatment/recovery process (as a thought example, consider that such a patient lives with their elderly mother who has heart disease and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and the patient does not want their mother to die). From a medicolegal perspective, the risk of infection to others may not necessarily outweigh the benefit of autonomy, especially because decision-making capacity assessments are made with the purpose of balancing autonomy and beneficence of the patient, not others. I highlighted the relative importance of autonomy using the weight of the arrows in Figure 2 of my article. I did not task physicians with arbitrating sociopolitical disputes, but merely highlighted how the current climate can impact people’s personal views on COVID-19, which sometimes can run counter to scientific evidence. If a patient has an erroneous view about an illness, it is our duty to try to help them understand if it directly impacts their health or affects their decision-making process, especially in a high-stakes clinical scenario.
Elizabeth Ryznar, MD, MSc
Assistant Professor
Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences
Johns Hopkins School of Medicine
Baltimore, Maryland
Continue to: Olanzapine for treatment-resistant anxiety
Olanzapine for treatment-resistant anxiety
Ms. A, age 62, was a retired high school teacher. Her primary care physician referred her to me for persistent, disabling anxiety. Her condition was recently worsened by a trial of escitalopram, 5 mg/d, which led her to visit the emergency department (ED). There she was prescribed lorazepam, 0.5 mg as needed, which helped her somewhat. Her medical conditions included prominent gastrointestinal (GI) symptoms, with nausea and a restricted diet; tinnitus; and chronic bilateral hand tremors. Her initial Patient Health Questionnaire-9 (PHQ-9) score was 11, and her Generalized Anxiety Disorder-7 (GAD-7) score was 10.
Initially, I encouraged Ms. A to exercise regularly, and I changed her lorazepam from 0.5 mg as-needed to 0.5 mg twice a day. I also referred her to a psychologist for psychotherapy. She showed limited improvement. I increased her lorazepam to 1 mg 3 times a day and started sertraline, 12.5 mg/d, but she soon experienced chest tightness and was admitted to the ED for observation and a cardiac workup. After she visited the ED, Ms. A stopped taking sertraline.
When I next saw Ms. A, she agreed to a trial of olanzapine, 2.5 mg/d at bedtime. Three weeks later, she told me, “I feel so much better.” Her scores on the PHQ-9 and GAD-7 were 0 and 1, respectively. Her GI complaints decreased, she had gained a little weight, and her tinnitus bothered her less. Lorazepam was gradually decreased and stopped.
After approximately 2 years, Ms. A had experienced no long-term adverse effects. We agreed to gradually discontinue olanzapine. Over the next 4 months, Ms. A decreased and stopped taking olanzapine at her own discretion.Three weeks after she stopped taking olanzapine, Ms. A reported that her psychiatric and GI symptoms had returned. She still maintained weekly visits with her psychotherapist. Her GI specialist asked if I could prescribe her olanzapine again. I restarted Ms. A on olanzapine, 2.5 mg/d at bedtime. By the next month, she said she felt much better (PHQ-9: 0; GAD-7: 1). I last saw Ms. A approximately 1 year ago.
Over the years, I have usually prescribed low-dose olanzapine alone or with other medications for patients with treatment-resistance who had no overt psychotic symptoms, I have used this medication for patients with “soft” psychotic thinking marked by severe anxiety, obsessions, compulsivity, perfectionism, and/or rumination.1 Evidence suggests olanzapine also may be effective for anorexia nervosa.2 There is good evidence for its use in the DSM-5 diagnosis of avoidant/restrictive food intake disorder (“a food avoidance emotional disorder”).3,4 In retrospect, Ms. A also likely met the criteria for the diagnosis of unspecified eating disorder. Despite extensive GI workup and follow-up, physical signs of GI pathology were equivocal.
Among antipsychotics, olanzapine most closely resembles clozapine, the only antipsychotic that has been proved more efficacious than others for psychotic symptoms.5 There is also some research suggesting that olanzapine may be more efficacious.6 Obsessions and perfectionism are associated with dopamine D4 receptor activity, and D1, D2, and D3 receptors are involved in normalizing cognition and reward.7 There are appropriate concerns about adverse effects, especially metabolic syndrome and obesity, with olanzapine, but patients can have different profiles of receptor sensitivity. In my conversations with Ms. A’s primary care physician and GI specialist, metabolic syndrome was not an issue. Clearly, low-dose olanzapine was very helpful in her treatment.
Daniel Storch, MD
Key Point Health Services
Catonsville, Maryland
References
1. Goodnick PJ, Barrios CA. Use of olanzapine in non-psychotic psychiatric disorders. Expert Opin Pharmacother. 2001;2(4):667-680.
2. Brewerton TD. Psychopharmacologic management of eating disorders. Presented at: 25th Annual National Psychopharmacology Update; February 2020; Las Vegas, Nevada. Accessed December 8, 2020. https://legacy.audio-digest.org/pages/htmlos/pastissues.html?sub1=psychiatry&sub2=2020
3. Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders, 5th ed. American Psychiatric Association; 2013.
4. Brewerton TD, D’Agostino M. Adjunctive use of olanzapine in the treatment of avoidant restrictive food intake disorder in children and adolescents in an eating disorders program. J Child Adolesc Psychopharmacol. 2017;27(10):920-922.
5. Lobos CA, Komossa K, Rummel-Kluge C, et al. Clozapine versus other atypical antipsychotics for schizophrenia. Cochrane Database Syst Rev. 2010;(11):CD006633.
6. Komossa K, Rummel-Kluge C, Hunger H, et al. Olanzapine versus other atypical antipsychotics for schizophrenia. Cochrane Database Syst Rev. 2010;(3):CD006654.
7. Bachner-Melman R, Lerer E, Zohar AH, et al. Anorexia nervosa, perfectionism, and dopamine D4 receptor (DRD4). Am J Med Genet B Neuropsychiatr Genet. 2007;144B(6):748-756.
Continue to: Neuro-politics and academic paralysis...
Neuro-politics and academic paralysis
I commend Dr. Nasrallah for his brief, precisely defined, scientific editorial “Neuro-politics: Will you vote with your cortex or limbic system?” (From the Editor,
I would like to see
Similar to a hurricane or tsunami that pushes water into a river, this retrograde shift of feedback pathways is demonstrated by emotional narratives that have flooded the public and drowned facts and evidence-based practice. Furthermore, the science of convenience has emerged, where facts are eligible only if they justify the narrative. Any discussion, debate, or questioning of the rationale of the approach is met with hostility, naming, shaming, and even loss of employment at universities. I have sadly learned from frightened colleagues and from reading reports by academicians whose publications have been either rejected or coerced for revision following acceptance by a peer-reviewed journal or even retracted post-publication due to complaints, harassment, and threats by the politically correct “thought police.” Diversity of thinking and freedom of speech—core values and principles in academic dialogue—have been violated. Academicians are as perplexed as laboratory rats that need to learn which lever to push in order to receive a reward and avoid punishment in an ever-shifting environment. People have been pondering, “Is it time for flight, fright, or fight?” As Buffalo Springfield’s legendary Vietnam 1960s–era song “For What it’s Worth” states: “There’s battle lines being drawn and nobody’s right if everybody’s wrong.”
What we have learned from history is that the majority of people exercise passivity and hope as bystanders in order to avoid becoming victims of “collateral damage.” Are there no modern Giordano Bruno (the martyr of science), Copernicus, or Michelangelo who would challenge the “Church of the People” that has created new language, terminology, and culture and is on the verge of creating nouveau scientific principles that could lead to a monopoly of one segment of society that threatens pluralism of thought. Do we need dystopic books such as 1984 or Fahrenheit 451, or the experience of the French and Russian revolution (epitomized by the guillotine and the gulag) to remind us that we are a step away from education and reprogramming camps that used to be called universities? The American Association of University Professors’ most recent announcement on academic freedom ominously avoids using terms such as freedom of speech, diversity of opinions, or even pluralism.
I hope that psychiatrists will lead the way back to sanity, starting with focus groups and forums. It would amount to a group cognitive-behavioral therapy of immense proportion following a paradigm of “Problem Solving,” according to Albert Bandura’s social learning model. There is simply no other constructive way to get to the cheese at the end of the maze.
Yifrah Kaminer, MD
Professor Emeritus of Psychiatry & Pediatrics
University of Connecticut School of Medicine
Farmington, Connecticut
Disclosures: The authors report no financial relationships with any companies whose products are mentioned in this article, or with manufacturers of competing products.
COVID-19 and decision-making capacity
Dr. Ryznar’s article “Evaluating patients’ decision-making capacity during COVID-19” (Evidence-Based Reviews,
For example, in a controversial 2007 case in Atlanta, Georgia, an attorney with active tuberculosis failed to heed medical advice to refrain from traveling.1 The patient’s uncooperativeness did not implicate concerns over his decisional capacity.1 However, his international and interstate travel triggered the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s legal authority under the Public Health Service Act to prevent the entry and spread of communicable disease.1-3 An authorized order from a duly constituted public health authority is issued and enforceable without regard to clinical determinations of capacity (and is generally subject to challenge via judicial or other due process mechanisms as a government-sanctioned deprivation of liberty to protect public welfare). State laws and local ordinances require physicians to notify the appropriate public health department when patients test positive for certain contagious diseases.
The difficulty with involuntarily detaining a cognitively intact patient due to concern over their contagion risk and erroneous beliefs runs considerably deeper than eliciting a “political backlash” or managing the qualms of hospital security officers. It is a fundamental matter of proper legal authority. Psychiatrists and other physicians assess patients’ decision-making capacity for specific treatment decisions on a case-by-case basis, seeking to preserve autonomy while practicing beneficence. Public health officers are agents of the state with designated authorities to control the spread of disease. A capacity determination in the absence of neurocognitive deficits implies the psychiatrist is evaluating the soundness of the patient’s ideas as opposed to their cognition, overlooking the reality that fully capable individuals can possess dubious—and even unsalutary—beliefs. While physicians educate patients about the risks of contracting and communicating infection, they are thankfully not tasked with arbitrating sociopolitical disputes at the bedside. Such controversies regarding pandemic response do not belong under the rubric of medical decision-making capacity. Conflating psychosomatic medicine consultations with public health orders risks unmooring capacity determinations from their medicolegal and bioethical foundations.
Charles G. Kels, JD
S Army Medical Center of Excellence
San Antonio, Texas
Disclaimer: The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of any government agency.
References
1. Tanne JH. Tuberculosis case exposes flaws in international public health systems. BMJ. 2007;334(7605):1187.
2. Public Health Service Act, 42 USC § 264-272 (1944).
3. Interstate and Foreign Quarantine, 42 CFR Parts 70-71 (2017).
The author responds
I appreciate Mr. Kels’s letter and explicit discussion of the limits of decision-making capacity. I agree that physicians should not overstep their legal authority and ethical mandate. The specific case discussed in my article was a patient who was symptomatic from COVID-19 who wanted to leave the hospital against medical advice. The contagious nature of this virus certainly falls under the risk/benefit analysis of the clinical situation because it is an important aspect of understanding the nature of the illness and treatment/recovery process (as a thought example, consider that such a patient lives with their elderly mother who has heart disease and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and the patient does not want their mother to die). From a medicolegal perspective, the risk of infection to others may not necessarily outweigh the benefit of autonomy, especially because decision-making capacity assessments are made with the purpose of balancing autonomy and beneficence of the patient, not others. I highlighted the relative importance of autonomy using the weight of the arrows in Figure 2 of my article. I did not task physicians with arbitrating sociopolitical disputes, but merely highlighted how the current climate can impact people’s personal views on COVID-19, which sometimes can run counter to scientific evidence. If a patient has an erroneous view about an illness, it is our duty to try to help them understand if it directly impacts their health or affects their decision-making process, especially in a high-stakes clinical scenario.
Elizabeth Ryznar, MD, MSc
Assistant Professor
Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences
Johns Hopkins School of Medicine
Baltimore, Maryland
Continue to: Olanzapine for treatment-resistant anxiety
Olanzapine for treatment-resistant anxiety
Ms. A, age 62, was a retired high school teacher. Her primary care physician referred her to me for persistent, disabling anxiety. Her condition was recently worsened by a trial of escitalopram, 5 mg/d, which led her to visit the emergency department (ED). There she was prescribed lorazepam, 0.5 mg as needed, which helped her somewhat. Her medical conditions included prominent gastrointestinal (GI) symptoms, with nausea and a restricted diet; tinnitus; and chronic bilateral hand tremors. Her initial Patient Health Questionnaire-9 (PHQ-9) score was 11, and her Generalized Anxiety Disorder-7 (GAD-7) score was 10.
Initially, I encouraged Ms. A to exercise regularly, and I changed her lorazepam from 0.5 mg as-needed to 0.5 mg twice a day. I also referred her to a psychologist for psychotherapy. She showed limited improvement. I increased her lorazepam to 1 mg 3 times a day and started sertraline, 12.5 mg/d, but she soon experienced chest tightness and was admitted to the ED for observation and a cardiac workup. After she visited the ED, Ms. A stopped taking sertraline.
When I next saw Ms. A, she agreed to a trial of olanzapine, 2.5 mg/d at bedtime. Three weeks later, she told me, “I feel so much better.” Her scores on the PHQ-9 and GAD-7 were 0 and 1, respectively. Her GI complaints decreased, she had gained a little weight, and her tinnitus bothered her less. Lorazepam was gradually decreased and stopped.
After approximately 2 years, Ms. A had experienced no long-term adverse effects. We agreed to gradually discontinue olanzapine. Over the next 4 months, Ms. A decreased and stopped taking olanzapine at her own discretion.Three weeks after she stopped taking olanzapine, Ms. A reported that her psychiatric and GI symptoms had returned. She still maintained weekly visits with her psychotherapist. Her GI specialist asked if I could prescribe her olanzapine again. I restarted Ms. A on olanzapine, 2.5 mg/d at bedtime. By the next month, she said she felt much better (PHQ-9: 0; GAD-7: 1). I last saw Ms. A approximately 1 year ago.
Over the years, I have usually prescribed low-dose olanzapine alone or with other medications for patients with treatment-resistance who had no overt psychotic symptoms, I have used this medication for patients with “soft” psychotic thinking marked by severe anxiety, obsessions, compulsivity, perfectionism, and/or rumination.1 Evidence suggests olanzapine also may be effective for anorexia nervosa.2 There is good evidence for its use in the DSM-5 diagnosis of avoidant/restrictive food intake disorder (“a food avoidance emotional disorder”).3,4 In retrospect, Ms. A also likely met the criteria for the diagnosis of unspecified eating disorder. Despite extensive GI workup and follow-up, physical signs of GI pathology were equivocal.
Among antipsychotics, olanzapine most closely resembles clozapine, the only antipsychotic that has been proved more efficacious than others for psychotic symptoms.5 There is also some research suggesting that olanzapine may be more efficacious.6 Obsessions and perfectionism are associated with dopamine D4 receptor activity, and D1, D2, and D3 receptors are involved in normalizing cognition and reward.7 There are appropriate concerns about adverse effects, especially metabolic syndrome and obesity, with olanzapine, but patients can have different profiles of receptor sensitivity. In my conversations with Ms. A’s primary care physician and GI specialist, metabolic syndrome was not an issue. Clearly, low-dose olanzapine was very helpful in her treatment.
Daniel Storch, MD
Key Point Health Services
Catonsville, Maryland
References
1. Goodnick PJ, Barrios CA. Use of olanzapine in non-psychotic psychiatric disorders. Expert Opin Pharmacother. 2001;2(4):667-680.
2. Brewerton TD. Psychopharmacologic management of eating disorders. Presented at: 25th Annual National Psychopharmacology Update; February 2020; Las Vegas, Nevada. Accessed December 8, 2020. https://legacy.audio-digest.org/pages/htmlos/pastissues.html?sub1=psychiatry&sub2=2020
3. Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders, 5th ed. American Psychiatric Association; 2013.
4. Brewerton TD, D’Agostino M. Adjunctive use of olanzapine in the treatment of avoidant restrictive food intake disorder in children and adolescents in an eating disorders program. J Child Adolesc Psychopharmacol. 2017;27(10):920-922.
5. Lobos CA, Komossa K, Rummel-Kluge C, et al. Clozapine versus other atypical antipsychotics for schizophrenia. Cochrane Database Syst Rev. 2010;(11):CD006633.
6. Komossa K, Rummel-Kluge C, Hunger H, et al. Olanzapine versus other atypical antipsychotics for schizophrenia. Cochrane Database Syst Rev. 2010;(3):CD006654.
7. Bachner-Melman R, Lerer E, Zohar AH, et al. Anorexia nervosa, perfectionism, and dopamine D4 receptor (DRD4). Am J Med Genet B Neuropsychiatr Genet. 2007;144B(6):748-756.
Continue to: Neuro-politics and academic paralysis...
Neuro-politics and academic paralysis
I commend Dr. Nasrallah for his brief, precisely defined, scientific editorial “Neuro-politics: Will you vote with your cortex or limbic system?” (From the Editor,
I would like to see
Similar to a hurricane or tsunami that pushes water into a river, this retrograde shift of feedback pathways is demonstrated by emotional narratives that have flooded the public and drowned facts and evidence-based practice. Furthermore, the science of convenience has emerged, where facts are eligible only if they justify the narrative. Any discussion, debate, or questioning of the rationale of the approach is met with hostility, naming, shaming, and even loss of employment at universities. I have sadly learned from frightened colleagues and from reading reports by academicians whose publications have been either rejected or coerced for revision following acceptance by a peer-reviewed journal or even retracted post-publication due to complaints, harassment, and threats by the politically correct “thought police.” Diversity of thinking and freedom of speech—core values and principles in academic dialogue—have been violated. Academicians are as perplexed as laboratory rats that need to learn which lever to push in order to receive a reward and avoid punishment in an ever-shifting environment. People have been pondering, “Is it time for flight, fright, or fight?” As Buffalo Springfield’s legendary Vietnam 1960s–era song “For What it’s Worth” states: “There’s battle lines being drawn and nobody’s right if everybody’s wrong.”
What we have learned from history is that the majority of people exercise passivity and hope as bystanders in order to avoid becoming victims of “collateral damage.” Are there no modern Giordano Bruno (the martyr of science), Copernicus, or Michelangelo who would challenge the “Church of the People” that has created new language, terminology, and culture and is on the verge of creating nouveau scientific principles that could lead to a monopoly of one segment of society that threatens pluralism of thought. Do we need dystopic books such as 1984 or Fahrenheit 451, or the experience of the French and Russian revolution (epitomized by the guillotine and the gulag) to remind us that we are a step away from education and reprogramming camps that used to be called universities? The American Association of University Professors’ most recent announcement on academic freedom ominously avoids using terms such as freedom of speech, diversity of opinions, or even pluralism.
I hope that psychiatrists will lead the way back to sanity, starting with focus groups and forums. It would amount to a group cognitive-behavioral therapy of immense proportion following a paradigm of “Problem Solving,” according to Albert Bandura’s social learning model. There is simply no other constructive way to get to the cheese at the end of the maze.
Yifrah Kaminer, MD
Professor Emeritus of Psychiatry & Pediatrics
University of Connecticut School of Medicine
Farmington, Connecticut
Disclosures: The authors report no financial relationships with any companies whose products are mentioned in this article, or with manufacturers of competing products.
COVID-19 and decision-making capacity
Dr. Ryznar’s article “Evaluating patients’ decision-making capacity during COVID-19” (Evidence-Based Reviews,
For example, in a controversial 2007 case in Atlanta, Georgia, an attorney with active tuberculosis failed to heed medical advice to refrain from traveling.1 The patient’s uncooperativeness did not implicate concerns over his decisional capacity.1 However, his international and interstate travel triggered the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s legal authority under the Public Health Service Act to prevent the entry and spread of communicable disease.1-3 An authorized order from a duly constituted public health authority is issued and enforceable without regard to clinical determinations of capacity (and is generally subject to challenge via judicial or other due process mechanisms as a government-sanctioned deprivation of liberty to protect public welfare). State laws and local ordinances require physicians to notify the appropriate public health department when patients test positive for certain contagious diseases.
The difficulty with involuntarily detaining a cognitively intact patient due to concern over their contagion risk and erroneous beliefs runs considerably deeper than eliciting a “political backlash” or managing the qualms of hospital security officers. It is a fundamental matter of proper legal authority. Psychiatrists and other physicians assess patients’ decision-making capacity for specific treatment decisions on a case-by-case basis, seeking to preserve autonomy while practicing beneficence. Public health officers are agents of the state with designated authorities to control the spread of disease. A capacity determination in the absence of neurocognitive deficits implies the psychiatrist is evaluating the soundness of the patient’s ideas as opposed to their cognition, overlooking the reality that fully capable individuals can possess dubious—and even unsalutary—beliefs. While physicians educate patients about the risks of contracting and communicating infection, they are thankfully not tasked with arbitrating sociopolitical disputes at the bedside. Such controversies regarding pandemic response do not belong under the rubric of medical decision-making capacity. Conflating psychosomatic medicine consultations with public health orders risks unmooring capacity determinations from their medicolegal and bioethical foundations.
Charles G. Kels, JD
S Army Medical Center of Excellence
San Antonio, Texas
Disclaimer: The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of any government agency.
References
1. Tanne JH. Tuberculosis case exposes flaws in international public health systems. BMJ. 2007;334(7605):1187.
2. Public Health Service Act, 42 USC § 264-272 (1944).
3. Interstate and Foreign Quarantine, 42 CFR Parts 70-71 (2017).
The author responds
I appreciate Mr. Kels’s letter and explicit discussion of the limits of decision-making capacity. I agree that physicians should not overstep their legal authority and ethical mandate. The specific case discussed in my article was a patient who was symptomatic from COVID-19 who wanted to leave the hospital against medical advice. The contagious nature of this virus certainly falls under the risk/benefit analysis of the clinical situation because it is an important aspect of understanding the nature of the illness and treatment/recovery process (as a thought example, consider that such a patient lives with their elderly mother who has heart disease and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and the patient does not want their mother to die). From a medicolegal perspective, the risk of infection to others may not necessarily outweigh the benefit of autonomy, especially because decision-making capacity assessments are made with the purpose of balancing autonomy and beneficence of the patient, not others. I highlighted the relative importance of autonomy using the weight of the arrows in Figure 2 of my article. I did not task physicians with arbitrating sociopolitical disputes, but merely highlighted how the current climate can impact people’s personal views on COVID-19, which sometimes can run counter to scientific evidence. If a patient has an erroneous view about an illness, it is our duty to try to help them understand if it directly impacts their health or affects their decision-making process, especially in a high-stakes clinical scenario.
Elizabeth Ryznar, MD, MSc
Assistant Professor
Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences
Johns Hopkins School of Medicine
Baltimore, Maryland
Continue to: Olanzapine for treatment-resistant anxiety
Olanzapine for treatment-resistant anxiety
Ms. A, age 62, was a retired high school teacher. Her primary care physician referred her to me for persistent, disabling anxiety. Her condition was recently worsened by a trial of escitalopram, 5 mg/d, which led her to visit the emergency department (ED). There she was prescribed lorazepam, 0.5 mg as needed, which helped her somewhat. Her medical conditions included prominent gastrointestinal (GI) symptoms, with nausea and a restricted diet; tinnitus; and chronic bilateral hand tremors. Her initial Patient Health Questionnaire-9 (PHQ-9) score was 11, and her Generalized Anxiety Disorder-7 (GAD-7) score was 10.
Initially, I encouraged Ms. A to exercise regularly, and I changed her lorazepam from 0.5 mg as-needed to 0.5 mg twice a day. I also referred her to a psychologist for psychotherapy. She showed limited improvement. I increased her lorazepam to 1 mg 3 times a day and started sertraline, 12.5 mg/d, but she soon experienced chest tightness and was admitted to the ED for observation and a cardiac workup. After she visited the ED, Ms. A stopped taking sertraline.
When I next saw Ms. A, she agreed to a trial of olanzapine, 2.5 mg/d at bedtime. Three weeks later, she told me, “I feel so much better.” Her scores on the PHQ-9 and GAD-7 were 0 and 1, respectively. Her GI complaints decreased, she had gained a little weight, and her tinnitus bothered her less. Lorazepam was gradually decreased and stopped.
After approximately 2 years, Ms. A had experienced no long-term adverse effects. We agreed to gradually discontinue olanzapine. Over the next 4 months, Ms. A decreased and stopped taking olanzapine at her own discretion.Three weeks after she stopped taking olanzapine, Ms. A reported that her psychiatric and GI symptoms had returned. She still maintained weekly visits with her psychotherapist. Her GI specialist asked if I could prescribe her olanzapine again. I restarted Ms. A on olanzapine, 2.5 mg/d at bedtime. By the next month, she said she felt much better (PHQ-9: 0; GAD-7: 1). I last saw Ms. A approximately 1 year ago.
Over the years, I have usually prescribed low-dose olanzapine alone or with other medications for patients with treatment-resistance who had no overt psychotic symptoms, I have used this medication for patients with “soft” psychotic thinking marked by severe anxiety, obsessions, compulsivity, perfectionism, and/or rumination.1 Evidence suggests olanzapine also may be effective for anorexia nervosa.2 There is good evidence for its use in the DSM-5 diagnosis of avoidant/restrictive food intake disorder (“a food avoidance emotional disorder”).3,4 In retrospect, Ms. A also likely met the criteria for the diagnosis of unspecified eating disorder. Despite extensive GI workup and follow-up, physical signs of GI pathology were equivocal.
Among antipsychotics, olanzapine most closely resembles clozapine, the only antipsychotic that has been proved more efficacious than others for psychotic symptoms.5 There is also some research suggesting that olanzapine may be more efficacious.6 Obsessions and perfectionism are associated with dopamine D4 receptor activity, and D1, D2, and D3 receptors are involved in normalizing cognition and reward.7 There are appropriate concerns about adverse effects, especially metabolic syndrome and obesity, with olanzapine, but patients can have different profiles of receptor sensitivity. In my conversations with Ms. A’s primary care physician and GI specialist, metabolic syndrome was not an issue. Clearly, low-dose olanzapine was very helpful in her treatment.
Daniel Storch, MD
Key Point Health Services
Catonsville, Maryland
References
1. Goodnick PJ, Barrios CA. Use of olanzapine in non-psychotic psychiatric disorders. Expert Opin Pharmacother. 2001;2(4):667-680.
2. Brewerton TD. Psychopharmacologic management of eating disorders. Presented at: 25th Annual National Psychopharmacology Update; February 2020; Las Vegas, Nevada. Accessed December 8, 2020. https://legacy.audio-digest.org/pages/htmlos/pastissues.html?sub1=psychiatry&sub2=2020
3. Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders, 5th ed. American Psychiatric Association; 2013.
4. Brewerton TD, D’Agostino M. Adjunctive use of olanzapine in the treatment of avoidant restrictive food intake disorder in children and adolescents in an eating disorders program. J Child Adolesc Psychopharmacol. 2017;27(10):920-922.
5. Lobos CA, Komossa K, Rummel-Kluge C, et al. Clozapine versus other atypical antipsychotics for schizophrenia. Cochrane Database Syst Rev. 2010;(11):CD006633.
6. Komossa K, Rummel-Kluge C, Hunger H, et al. Olanzapine versus other atypical antipsychotics for schizophrenia. Cochrane Database Syst Rev. 2010;(3):CD006654.
7. Bachner-Melman R, Lerer E, Zohar AH, et al. Anorexia nervosa, perfectionism, and dopamine D4 receptor (DRD4). Am J Med Genet B Neuropsychiatr Genet. 2007;144B(6):748-756.
Continue to: Neuro-politics and academic paralysis...
Neuro-politics and academic paralysis
I commend Dr. Nasrallah for his brief, precisely defined, scientific editorial “Neuro-politics: Will you vote with your cortex or limbic system?” (From the Editor,
I would like to see
Similar to a hurricane or tsunami that pushes water into a river, this retrograde shift of feedback pathways is demonstrated by emotional narratives that have flooded the public and drowned facts and evidence-based practice. Furthermore, the science of convenience has emerged, where facts are eligible only if they justify the narrative. Any discussion, debate, or questioning of the rationale of the approach is met with hostility, naming, shaming, and even loss of employment at universities. I have sadly learned from frightened colleagues and from reading reports by academicians whose publications have been either rejected or coerced for revision following acceptance by a peer-reviewed journal or even retracted post-publication due to complaints, harassment, and threats by the politically correct “thought police.” Diversity of thinking and freedom of speech—core values and principles in academic dialogue—have been violated. Academicians are as perplexed as laboratory rats that need to learn which lever to push in order to receive a reward and avoid punishment in an ever-shifting environment. People have been pondering, “Is it time for flight, fright, or fight?” As Buffalo Springfield’s legendary Vietnam 1960s–era song “For What it’s Worth” states: “There’s battle lines being drawn and nobody’s right if everybody’s wrong.”
What we have learned from history is that the majority of people exercise passivity and hope as bystanders in order to avoid becoming victims of “collateral damage.” Are there no modern Giordano Bruno (the martyr of science), Copernicus, or Michelangelo who would challenge the “Church of the People” that has created new language, terminology, and culture and is on the verge of creating nouveau scientific principles that could lead to a monopoly of one segment of society that threatens pluralism of thought. Do we need dystopic books such as 1984 or Fahrenheit 451, or the experience of the French and Russian revolution (epitomized by the guillotine and the gulag) to remind us that we are a step away from education and reprogramming camps that used to be called universities? The American Association of University Professors’ most recent announcement on academic freedom ominously avoids using terms such as freedom of speech, diversity of opinions, or even pluralism.
I hope that psychiatrists will lead the way back to sanity, starting with focus groups and forums. It would amount to a group cognitive-behavioral therapy of immense proportion following a paradigm of “Problem Solving,” according to Albert Bandura’s social learning model. There is simply no other constructive way to get to the cheese at the end of the maze.
Yifrah Kaminer, MD
Professor Emeritus of Psychiatry & Pediatrics
University of Connecticut School of Medicine
Farmington, Connecticut
Disclosures: The authors report no financial relationships with any companies whose products are mentioned in this article, or with manufacturers of competing products.