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When the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations came to our hospital for a survey last fall, our administration was confident that the review would be favorable. The Joint Commission was stressing the reliability of hospitals and so were we. We had chartered a “High-Reliability Organization Enterprise Steering Committee” that was “empowered to make recommendations to the (executive board) on what is needed to achieve the goals of high reliability across the enterprise.” High reliability was a priority for our administration and for the Joint Commission. Unfortunately, nearly no one else knew what high reliability meant.
In 2001, Karl E. Weick and Kathleen M. Sutcliffe published their book, “Managing the Unexpected: Resilient Performance in an Age of Uncertainty,” (Hoboken, N.J.: Jossey-Bass, 2001), which defined high-reliability organizations as those that reliably prevent error. They included examples from the military and from aviation. They proffered five principles to guide those organizations wishing to become highly reliable:
1. Preoccupation with failure.
2. Reluctance to simplify interpretations.
3. Sensitivity to operations.
4. Commitment to resilience.
5. Deference to expertise.
In September 2005, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality created a document to adapt the concepts developed by Mr. Weick and Ms. Sutcliffe to the health care industry, where opportunities to avoid error and prevent catastrophe abound. The eventual result has been steady progress in measuring avoidable health care errors, such as avoiding central line–associated blood stream infections and holding health care organizations accountable for their reduction. However, organizational cultures are difficult to change, and there is still a long way to go.
In contrast to large systems, individual providers can change quickly, especially if there is incentive to do so. What principles would increase our own ability to become a high-reliability individuals (HRIs):
• Recognize failure as systemic, not personal. Health care providers are humans, and humans make mistakes. Unfortunately, we come from a tradition that rewards success and penalizes failure. Research shows that is better to recognize failure as something to be prevented next time rather than to be punished now. Admonitions to pay attention, focus more, and remember better rely on fallible humans and reliably fail. Systems solutions, such as checklists, timeouts, and hard stops reliably succeed. HRIs should blame error less often on people, and more often on system failures.
• Simple solutions are preferred to complex requirements. Chemotherapy was once calculated and written by hand. Every cancer center can recall tragic disasters that occurred as a result of errors either by the ordering physician or by interpretations made by pharmacists and nurses. The introduction of electronic chemotherapy ordering has nearly eliminated these mistakes. HRIs can initiate technology solutions to their work to help reduce the risk of errors.
• Sensitivity to patients. Patients often desire to be included as partners in their care. In addition to being present and attentive to patients, why not enlist them as colleagues in care? For example, the patient who has their own calendar of chemotherapy treatments – complete with agents, doses, and schedules – will be more likely to question perceived errors. HRIs are transparent.
• Resilience in character. Learning to accept the potential for error requires acceptance that others also are trying to prevent error and are not judging your competence. The physician who attacks those who are trying to help reduces the psychological safety required for colleagues to speak up when potential errors are identified. Physicians will become HRIs only when they lower their defenses and become more teammates rather than a soloists.
• Deference to evidence. The “way it has always been” must give way to the way things are. Anecdotes and personal conviction do not meet scientific standards and should be abandoned in the face of evidence. Yet, this seemingly obvious principle often is disregarded when clinicians are presented with standardized treatment pathways and limited formularies in the name of autonomy; autonomy is fine until patients are endangered by it. The HRI practices evidence-based medicine.
Marty Makary, MD, explores most of these principles in his book “Unaccountable: What Hospitals Won’t Tell You and How Transparency Can Revolutionize Health Care”(London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2012). While written from a surgeon’s perspective, Dr. Makary exposes the dangerous state of modern medical care across all specialties. I recommend it as a sobering assessment of the way things are and as a prescription for health care systems and physicians to help them become more reliable.
How are you driving safety in your area? What are some best practices we can share with others? I invite you to reply to hematologynews@frontlinemedcom.com to initiate a broader discussion of patient safety and reliability. Responses will be posted to hematologynews.com.
Dr. Kalaycio is Editor in Chief of Hematology News. Dr. Kalaycio chairs the department of hematologic oncology and blood disorders at Cleveland Clinic Taussig Cancer Institute. Contact him at kalaycm@ccf.org.
When the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations came to our hospital for a survey last fall, our administration was confident that the review would be favorable. The Joint Commission was stressing the reliability of hospitals and so were we. We had chartered a “High-Reliability Organization Enterprise Steering Committee” that was “empowered to make recommendations to the (executive board) on what is needed to achieve the goals of high reliability across the enterprise.” High reliability was a priority for our administration and for the Joint Commission. Unfortunately, nearly no one else knew what high reliability meant.
In 2001, Karl E. Weick and Kathleen M. Sutcliffe published their book, “Managing the Unexpected: Resilient Performance in an Age of Uncertainty,” (Hoboken, N.J.: Jossey-Bass, 2001), which defined high-reliability organizations as those that reliably prevent error. They included examples from the military and from aviation. They proffered five principles to guide those organizations wishing to become highly reliable:
1. Preoccupation with failure.
2. Reluctance to simplify interpretations.
3. Sensitivity to operations.
4. Commitment to resilience.
5. Deference to expertise.
In September 2005, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality created a document to adapt the concepts developed by Mr. Weick and Ms. Sutcliffe to the health care industry, where opportunities to avoid error and prevent catastrophe abound. The eventual result has been steady progress in measuring avoidable health care errors, such as avoiding central line–associated blood stream infections and holding health care organizations accountable for their reduction. However, organizational cultures are difficult to change, and there is still a long way to go.
In contrast to large systems, individual providers can change quickly, especially if there is incentive to do so. What principles would increase our own ability to become a high-reliability individuals (HRIs):
• Recognize failure as systemic, not personal. Health care providers are humans, and humans make mistakes. Unfortunately, we come from a tradition that rewards success and penalizes failure. Research shows that is better to recognize failure as something to be prevented next time rather than to be punished now. Admonitions to pay attention, focus more, and remember better rely on fallible humans and reliably fail. Systems solutions, such as checklists, timeouts, and hard stops reliably succeed. HRIs should blame error less often on people, and more often on system failures.
• Simple solutions are preferred to complex requirements. Chemotherapy was once calculated and written by hand. Every cancer center can recall tragic disasters that occurred as a result of errors either by the ordering physician or by interpretations made by pharmacists and nurses. The introduction of electronic chemotherapy ordering has nearly eliminated these mistakes. HRIs can initiate technology solutions to their work to help reduce the risk of errors.
• Sensitivity to patients. Patients often desire to be included as partners in their care. In addition to being present and attentive to patients, why not enlist them as colleagues in care? For example, the patient who has their own calendar of chemotherapy treatments – complete with agents, doses, and schedules – will be more likely to question perceived errors. HRIs are transparent.
• Resilience in character. Learning to accept the potential for error requires acceptance that others also are trying to prevent error and are not judging your competence. The physician who attacks those who are trying to help reduces the psychological safety required for colleagues to speak up when potential errors are identified. Physicians will become HRIs only when they lower their defenses and become more teammates rather than a soloists.
• Deference to evidence. The “way it has always been” must give way to the way things are. Anecdotes and personal conviction do not meet scientific standards and should be abandoned in the face of evidence. Yet, this seemingly obvious principle often is disregarded when clinicians are presented with standardized treatment pathways and limited formularies in the name of autonomy; autonomy is fine until patients are endangered by it. The HRI practices evidence-based medicine.
Marty Makary, MD, explores most of these principles in his book “Unaccountable: What Hospitals Won’t Tell You and How Transparency Can Revolutionize Health Care”(London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2012). While written from a surgeon’s perspective, Dr. Makary exposes the dangerous state of modern medical care across all specialties. I recommend it as a sobering assessment of the way things are and as a prescription for health care systems and physicians to help them become more reliable.
How are you driving safety in your area? What are some best practices we can share with others? I invite you to reply to hematologynews@frontlinemedcom.com to initiate a broader discussion of patient safety and reliability. Responses will be posted to hematologynews.com.
Dr. Kalaycio is Editor in Chief of Hematology News. Dr. Kalaycio chairs the department of hematologic oncology and blood disorders at Cleveland Clinic Taussig Cancer Institute. Contact him at kalaycm@ccf.org.
When the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations came to our hospital for a survey last fall, our administration was confident that the review would be favorable. The Joint Commission was stressing the reliability of hospitals and so were we. We had chartered a “High-Reliability Organization Enterprise Steering Committee” that was “empowered to make recommendations to the (executive board) on what is needed to achieve the goals of high reliability across the enterprise.” High reliability was a priority for our administration and for the Joint Commission. Unfortunately, nearly no one else knew what high reliability meant.
In 2001, Karl E. Weick and Kathleen M. Sutcliffe published their book, “Managing the Unexpected: Resilient Performance in an Age of Uncertainty,” (Hoboken, N.J.: Jossey-Bass, 2001), which defined high-reliability organizations as those that reliably prevent error. They included examples from the military and from aviation. They proffered five principles to guide those organizations wishing to become highly reliable:
1. Preoccupation with failure.
2. Reluctance to simplify interpretations.
3. Sensitivity to operations.
4. Commitment to resilience.
5. Deference to expertise.
In September 2005, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality created a document to adapt the concepts developed by Mr. Weick and Ms. Sutcliffe to the health care industry, where opportunities to avoid error and prevent catastrophe abound. The eventual result has been steady progress in measuring avoidable health care errors, such as avoiding central line–associated blood stream infections and holding health care organizations accountable for their reduction. However, organizational cultures are difficult to change, and there is still a long way to go.
In contrast to large systems, individual providers can change quickly, especially if there is incentive to do so. What principles would increase our own ability to become a high-reliability individuals (HRIs):
• Recognize failure as systemic, not personal. Health care providers are humans, and humans make mistakes. Unfortunately, we come from a tradition that rewards success and penalizes failure. Research shows that is better to recognize failure as something to be prevented next time rather than to be punished now. Admonitions to pay attention, focus more, and remember better rely on fallible humans and reliably fail. Systems solutions, such as checklists, timeouts, and hard stops reliably succeed. HRIs should blame error less often on people, and more often on system failures.
• Simple solutions are preferred to complex requirements. Chemotherapy was once calculated and written by hand. Every cancer center can recall tragic disasters that occurred as a result of errors either by the ordering physician or by interpretations made by pharmacists and nurses. The introduction of electronic chemotherapy ordering has nearly eliminated these mistakes. HRIs can initiate technology solutions to their work to help reduce the risk of errors.
• Sensitivity to patients. Patients often desire to be included as partners in their care. In addition to being present and attentive to patients, why not enlist them as colleagues in care? For example, the patient who has their own calendar of chemotherapy treatments – complete with agents, doses, and schedules – will be more likely to question perceived errors. HRIs are transparent.
• Resilience in character. Learning to accept the potential for error requires acceptance that others also are trying to prevent error and are not judging your competence. The physician who attacks those who are trying to help reduces the psychological safety required for colleagues to speak up when potential errors are identified. Physicians will become HRIs only when they lower their defenses and become more teammates rather than a soloists.
• Deference to evidence. The “way it has always been” must give way to the way things are. Anecdotes and personal conviction do not meet scientific standards and should be abandoned in the face of evidence. Yet, this seemingly obvious principle often is disregarded when clinicians are presented with standardized treatment pathways and limited formularies in the name of autonomy; autonomy is fine until patients are endangered by it. The HRI practices evidence-based medicine.
Marty Makary, MD, explores most of these principles in his book “Unaccountable: What Hospitals Won’t Tell You and How Transparency Can Revolutionize Health Care”(London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2012). While written from a surgeon’s perspective, Dr. Makary exposes the dangerous state of modern medical care across all specialties. I recommend it as a sobering assessment of the way things are and as a prescription for health care systems and physicians to help them become more reliable.
How are you driving safety in your area? What are some best practices we can share with others? I invite you to reply to hematologynews@frontlinemedcom.com to initiate a broader discussion of patient safety and reliability. Responses will be posted to hematologynews.com.
Dr. Kalaycio is Editor in Chief of Hematology News. Dr. Kalaycio chairs the department of hematologic oncology and blood disorders at Cleveland Clinic Taussig Cancer Institute. Contact him at kalaycm@ccf.org.
