Geoffrey L. Risley, MD

Dr. Risley together with associate editor Dr. O. William Brown describe a case involving failure to document, a common complaint in malpractice litigation.

A 63-year-old white male, actively working, presented with a 5.3-cm infra-renal abdominal aortic aneurysm (AAA). His anatomy was deemed appropriate for endovascular AAA repair and was cleared by his cardiologist for that procedure. The patient underwent a thorough informed consent regarding endovascular and open options as well as the option for continued AAA surveillance. Of note, the patient never had his family with him at any time during the decision-making process, nor with him in the preoperative holding area.

He underwent an aorto- bi- iliac unibody endovascular graft placement. During delivery of the main body, the right common iliac artery ruptured. Initial attempts at endovascular control and subsequent right retroperitoneal exposure and repair of the iliac rupture were unsuccessful, ultimately requiring laparotomy, explant of the device, and aorto- bi-femoral bypass graft. The first time the surgeon met the large family was at the completion of the procedure to explain the complications that were encountered. The patient had a very “rocky” ICU course with complications of ARDS (acute respiratory distress syndrome), acute renal insufficiency, anemia, encephalopathy, and thrombocytopenia. He was initially started on Lovenox on POD # 2 in addition to SCDs (sequential compression devices) for DVT prophylaxis.

Lovenox was stopped because of thrombocytopenia, and mechanical SCD prophylaxis was maintained. As his platelet count recovered and his HIT (heparin-induced thrombocytopenia) screen came back negative, discussion was undertaken to resume his chemical thromboprophylaxis.

It was elected to leave him on only the SCDs because of potential bleeding complications. He continued to improve, but developed a swollen left lower extremity as a result of a DVT. He was placed on heparin drip and converted to Coumadin. Despite an INR of 2.7 on the day he was to be discharged to the rehabilitation center, and shortly after a walk with the therapists and his family, he suffered a fatal pulmonary embolism.

Ultimately, the hospital, the intensivist and the surgeon were sued for failure to adequately provide prophylaxis and treat the DVT. The case was settled. The criticisms were that the physicians failed to provide both mechanical and chemical thromboprophylaxis, particularly after the HIT panel was negative. No criticisms of the intra-operative complications were levied.

The plaintiff’s expert in this case was a physician who was board certified in internal medicine, anesthesiology, and critical care. He had no training in general surgery or vascular surgery. Accordingly, although he may have made suggestions regarding post operative surgical care he had no experience in being the responsible physician for making a postoperative surgical decision. In addition, assertions regarding the incidence of DVT in specific patient populations were exaggerated. Yet the case still settled.

This case emphasizes several important issues. First, communication is paramount in potentially avoiding medical malpractice litigation. The surgeon never met anyone from the patient’s large and involved family until he had to explain the reason his 2-hour planned procedure took 8 hours. The patient had clearly minimized to his family any of the risks discussed with him preoperatively. Prior to proceeding with any surgical intervention it is important that, if possible, a family member be informed of the risks and benefits of the planned procedure and that this conversation be documented in the chart.

Documentation remains very important not only during the informed consent process prior to surgery, but also in decision making regarding postoperative care. Although the physicians discussed the options of resuming the patient’s chemothromboprophylaxis, nothing was documented in the chart. If the discussion was documented, they may have been able to refute the allegation of failure to prevent the DVT.

Finally, in certain instances even when the facts support the judgments that were made regarding the care given, it may be the best “business decision” to settle a case. This is perhaps the most difficult concept for practicing surgeons to grasp. Whether physicians like it or not, medicine is a business and decisions made regarding defending or settling a law suit should not be based on emotion. We don’t do that in the operating room, and we should not do it in the courtroom.

Dr. Risley is the medical director of the Jacksonville Vein Center, Fla. 


The opinions expressed by the author neither imply nor establish a standard of care. Cases have been modified and may be fictional in order to maintain HIPPA and confidentiality regulations.

Dr. Risley together with associate editor Dr. O. William Brown describe a case involving failure to document, a common complaint in malpractice litigation.

A 63-year-old white male, actively working, presented with a 5.3-cm infra-renal abdominal aortic aneurysm (AAA). His anatomy was deemed appropriate for endovascular AAA repair and was cleared by his cardiologist for that procedure. The patient underwent a thorough informed consent regarding endovascular and open options as well as the option for continued AAA surveillance. Of note, the patient never had his family with him at any time during the decision-making process, nor with him in the preoperative holding area.

He underwent an aorto- bi- iliac unibody endovascular graft placement. During delivery of the main body, the right common iliac artery ruptured. Initial attempts at endovascular control and subsequent right retroperitoneal exposure and repair of the iliac rupture were unsuccessful, ultimately requiring laparotomy, explant of the device, and aorto- bi-femoral bypass graft. The first time the surgeon met the large family was at the completion of the procedure to explain the complications that were encountered. The patient had a very “rocky” ICU course with complications of ARDS (acute respiratory distress syndrome), acute renal insufficiency, anemia, encephalopathy, and thrombocytopenia. He was initially started on Lovenox on POD # 2 in addition to SCDs (sequential compression devices) for DVT prophylaxis.

Lovenox was stopped because of thrombocytopenia, and mechanical SCD prophylaxis was maintained. As his platelet count recovered and his HIT (heparin-induced thrombocytopenia) screen came back negative, discussion was undertaken to resume his chemical thromboprophylaxis.

It was elected to leave him on only the SCDs because of potential bleeding complications. He continued to improve, but developed a swollen left lower extremity as a result of a DVT. He was placed on heparin drip and converted to Coumadin. Despite an INR of 2.7 on the day he was to be discharged to the rehabilitation center, and shortly after a walk with the therapists and his family, he suffered a fatal pulmonary embolism.

Ultimately, the hospital, the intensivist and the surgeon were sued for failure to adequately provide prophylaxis and treat the DVT. The case was settled. The criticisms were that the physicians failed to provide both mechanical and chemical thromboprophylaxis, particularly after the HIT panel was negative. No criticisms of the intra-operative complications were levied.

The plaintiff’s expert in this case was a physician who was board certified in internal medicine, anesthesiology, and critical care. He had no training in general surgery or vascular surgery. Accordingly, although he may have made suggestions regarding post operative surgical care he had no experience in being the responsible physician for making a postoperative surgical decision. In addition, assertions regarding the incidence of DVT in specific patient populations were exaggerated. Yet the case still settled.

This case emphasizes several important issues. First, communication is paramount in potentially avoiding medical malpractice litigation. The surgeon never met anyone from the patient’s large and involved family until he had to explain the reason his 2-hour planned procedure took 8 hours. The patient had clearly minimized to his family any of the risks discussed with him preoperatively. Prior to proceeding with any surgical intervention it is important that, if possible, a family member be informed of the risks and benefits of the planned procedure and that this conversation be documented in the chart.

Documentation remains very important not only during the informed consent process prior to surgery, but also in decision making regarding postoperative care. Although the physicians discussed the options of resuming the patient’s chemothromboprophylaxis, nothing was documented in the chart. If the discussion was documented, they may have been able to refute the allegation of failure to prevent the DVT.

Finally, in certain instances even when the facts support the judgments that were made regarding the care given, it may be the best “business decision” to settle a case. This is perhaps the most difficult concept for practicing surgeons to grasp. Whether physicians like it or not, medicine is a business and decisions made regarding defending or settling a law suit should not be based on emotion. We don’t do that in the operating room, and we should not do it in the courtroom.

Dr. Risley is the medical director of the Jacksonville Vein Center, Fla. 


The opinions expressed by the author neither imply nor establish a standard of care. Cases have been modified and may be fictional in order to maintain HIPPA and confidentiality regulations.

Dr. Risley together with associate editor Dr. O. William Brown describe a case involving failure to document, a common complaint in malpractice litigation.

A 63-year-old white male, actively working, presented with a 5.3-cm infra-renal abdominal aortic aneurysm (AAA). His anatomy was deemed appropriate for endovascular AAA repair and was cleared by his cardiologist for that procedure. The patient underwent a thorough informed consent regarding endovascular and open options as well as the option for continued AAA surveillance. Of note, the patient never had his family with him at any time during the decision-making process, nor with him in the preoperative holding area.

He underwent an aorto- bi- iliac unibody endovascular graft placement. During delivery of the main body, the right common iliac artery ruptured. Initial attempts at endovascular control and subsequent right retroperitoneal exposure and repair of the iliac rupture were unsuccessful, ultimately requiring laparotomy, explant of the device, and aorto- bi-femoral bypass graft. The first time the surgeon met the large family was at the completion of the procedure to explain the complications that were encountered. The patient had a very “rocky” ICU course with complications of ARDS (acute respiratory distress syndrome), acute renal insufficiency, anemia, encephalopathy, and thrombocytopenia. He was initially started on Lovenox on POD # 2 in addition to SCDs (sequential compression devices) for DVT prophylaxis.

Lovenox was stopped because of thrombocytopenia, and mechanical SCD prophylaxis was maintained. As his platelet count recovered and his HIT (heparin-induced thrombocytopenia) screen came back negative, discussion was undertaken to resume his chemical thromboprophylaxis.

It was elected to leave him on only the SCDs because of potential bleeding complications. He continued to improve, but developed a swollen left lower extremity as a result of a DVT. He was placed on heparin drip and converted to Coumadin. Despite an INR of 2.7 on the day he was to be discharged to the rehabilitation center, and shortly after a walk with the therapists and his family, he suffered a fatal pulmonary embolism.

Ultimately, the hospital, the intensivist and the surgeon were sued for failure to adequately provide prophylaxis and treat the DVT. The case was settled. The criticisms were that the physicians failed to provide both mechanical and chemical thromboprophylaxis, particularly after the HIT panel was negative. No criticisms of the intra-operative complications were levied.

The plaintiff’s expert in this case was a physician who was board certified in internal medicine, anesthesiology, and critical care. He had no training in general surgery or vascular surgery. Accordingly, although he may have made suggestions regarding post operative surgical care he had no experience in being the responsible physician for making a postoperative surgical decision. In addition, assertions regarding the incidence of DVT in specific patient populations were exaggerated. Yet the case still settled.

This case emphasizes several important issues. First, communication is paramount in potentially avoiding medical malpractice litigation. The surgeon never met anyone from the patient’s large and involved family until he had to explain the reason his 2-hour planned procedure took 8 hours. The patient had clearly minimized to his family any of the risks discussed with him preoperatively. Prior to proceeding with any surgical intervention it is important that, if possible, a family member be informed of the risks and benefits of the planned procedure and that this conversation be documented in the chart.

Documentation remains very important not only during the informed consent process prior to surgery, but also in decision making regarding postoperative care. Although the physicians discussed the options of resuming the patient’s chemothromboprophylaxis, nothing was documented in the chart. If the discussion was documented, they may have been able to refute the allegation of failure to prevent the DVT.

Finally, in certain instances even when the facts support the judgments that were made regarding the care given, it may be the best “business decision” to settle a case. This is perhaps the most difficult concept for practicing surgeons to grasp. Whether physicians like it or not, medicine is a business and decisions made regarding defending or settling a law suit should not be based on emotion. We don’t do that in the operating room, and we should not do it in the courtroom.

Dr. Risley is the medical director of the Jacksonville Vein Center, Fla. 


The opinions expressed by the author neither imply nor establish a standard of care. Cases have been modified and may be fictional in order to maintain HIPPA and confidentiality regulations.