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In 2016, Gupta and Cahill challenged the field of psychiatry to reexamine prescribing patterns.1 They warned against the use of polypharmacy when not attached to improved patient functioning. They were concerned with the limited evidence for polypharmacy as well as DSM diagnostic criteria. In their inspiring article, they described a process of deprescribing.
In an effort to study and practice their recommendations, we have noticed a lack of literature examining the elimination of diagnostic labels. While there have been some studies looking at comorbidity, especially with substance use disorders,2 there is a paucity of scientific evidence on patients with numerous diagnoses. Yet our practices are filled with patients who have been labeled with multiple conflicting or redundant diagnoses throughout their lives depending on the setting or the orientation of the practitioner.
The DSM-5 warns against diagnosing disorders when “the occurrence … is not better explained by” another disorder.3 A mix of diagnoses creates confusion for patients as well as clinicians trying to sort through their reported psychiatric histories.
A routine example would include a patient presenting for an initial evaluation and stating “I’ve been diagnosed as manic-depressive, high anxiety, split personality, posttraumatic stress, insomnia, ADD, and depression.” A review of the medical record will reveal a list of diagnoses, including bipolar II, generalized anxiety disorder, borderline personality disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, unspecified insomnia, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and major depressive disorder. The medication list includes lamotrigine, valproic acid, citalopram, bupropion, buspirone, prazosin, methylphenidate, clonazepam, hydroxyzine, and low-dose quetiapine at night as needed.
This is an example of polypharmacy treating multiple, and at times conflicting, diagnoses. While an extreme case, in our experience, cases like this are not uncommon. It was actually in our efforts to examine deprescribing that we noticed this quandary. When inquiring about patients on many psychotropic medications, we often receive this retort: the patient is only prescribed one medication per disorder. Some providers have the belief that multiple disorders justify multiple medications, and that this tautological thinking legitimizes polypharmacy.
A patient who has varying moods, some fears, a fluctuating temperament, past traumas, occasional difficulty sleeping, intermittent inattention, and some sadness may be given all the diagnoses listed above and the resulting medication list. The multiplication of diagnoses, “polydiagnosing,” is a convenient justification for future polypharmacy. A lack of careful assessment and thinking in the application of new diagnoses permits the use of increasing numbers of pharmacological agents. A constellation of symptoms of anxiety, concentration deficits, affective dysregulation, and psychosis may justify the combination of benzodiazepines, stimulants, mood stabilizers, and antipsychotics, while a patient with “just” schizophrenia who is sometimes sad, scared, or distracted is more likely to be kept on just one medication, likely an antipsychotic.
Contrary to most medical disorders (for example, tuberculosis) but similar to others (for example, chronic pain), psychiatric disorders are based on the opinion of a “modest number of ‘expert’ classifications.”4 While the broad categories of disorders are justifiable, individual diagnoses are burdened with high rates of comorbidity; lack of treatment specificity; and evidence that distinct syndromes share a genetic basis. Those concerns were exemplified in the study examining the inter-rater reliability of DSM-5 diagnoses, where many disorders were found to have questionable validity.5
A psychiatric diagnosis should be based on biological, psychological, and social factors, which align with our understanding of the natural course of an illness. A patient presenting with transient symptoms of sadness in the context of significant social factors like homelessness and/or significant biological factors associated with schizophrenia should not reflexively receive an additional diagnosis of a depressive disorder. A patient reporting poor concentration in the context of a manic episode should not receive an additional diagnosis of attention-deficit disorder. An older patient with depression on multiple antipsychotics for adjunctive treatment should not necessarily receive a diagnosis of cognitive disorder at the first sign of memory problems.
The cavalier and inconsistent use of diagnoses renders the patients with no clear narrative of who they are. They end up integrating the varying providers’ opinions as a cacophony of labels of unclear significance. Many patients have contradictory diagnoses like major depressive disorder and bipolar disorder, or schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder. Those inaccurate diagnoses could not only lead to treatment mistakes, but also psychological harm.6
A clearer diagnostic picture is not only more scientifically sound but also more coherent to the patient. This in turn can lead to an improved treatment alliance and buy-in from the patient.
How should a provider practice de-diagnosing? Based on the work of Reeve, et al.,7 on the principles crucial to deprescribing, and subsequent research by Gupta and Cahill,8 we compiled a list of considerations for practitioners wishing to engage in this type of work with their patients.
Choose the right time. While insurance companies require diagnostic findings from the first visit, abrupt de-diagnosing for the sake of simplifying the record from that first visit could be detrimental. Patients can become attached to and find meaning in their diagnostic labels. This was exemplified with the removal of Asperger’s syndrome from the DSM-5.9 Acute symptomatology may be an opportune time to revisit the core pathology of a patient, or a poor time for a patient to have this discussion.
Compile a list of all the patient’s diagnoses. Our initial visits are often illuminated when patients enumerate the vast number of diagnoses they have been given by different providers. Patients will often list half a dozen diagnoses. The patterns often follow life courses with ADHD, conduct disorder, and learning disability in childhood; with anxiety, depression, and/or bipolar disorder in early adulthood; to complicated grief, depression with pseudodementia, and neurocognitive disorders in older adults. Yet patients rarely appreciate the temporary or episodic nature of mental disorders and instead accumulate diagnoses at each change of provider.
Initiate discussion with the patient. It is meaningful to see if patients resonate with the question, “Do you ever feel like every psychiatrist you have seen has given you a different diagnosis?” In our experience, patients’ reactions to this question usually exemplify the problematic nature of the vast array of diagnoses our patients are given. The majority of them are unable to confidently explain the meaning of those diagnoses, the context in which they were given, or their significance. This simple exercise has a powerful effect on raising awareness to patients of the problematic nature of polydiagnosing.
Introduce de-diagnosing. The engagement of patients in the diagnostic process has a significant effect. Reviewing not only diagnostic criteria but also nosology and debates in our understanding of diagnoses can provide patients with further engagement in their care. A simple review of the debate of the bereavement exclusion may permit a patient to not only understand the complexity, but also the changing nature of diagnoses. Suddenly, they are no longer bystanders, but informed participants in their care.
Identify diagnoses most appropriate for removal. Contradictory diagnoses are common in the clinical settings we work in. We routinely see patients carrying multiple mood diagnoses, despite our diagnostic systems not permitting one to have both unipolar and bipolar depression. Superfluous diagnoses are also frequent, with patients receiving depressive, or anxious labels when in an acute state of psychosis or mania. This is exemplified by patients suffering from thought blocking and receiving cognitive or attention-related diagnoses. Concurrent yet different diagnoses are also common in patients with a different list of diagnoses by their primary care provider, their therapist, and their psychiatrist. This is particularly problematic as it forces the patient to alternate their thinking or choose between their providers.
Create a new narrative for the patient. Once diagnoses are explained, clarified, and understood, patients with the help of their providers can reexamine their life story under a new and simplified construct. This process often leads to a less confusing sense of self, an increased dedication to the treatment process, whether behavioral, social, psychological, or pharmacologic.
Consider deprescribing. With a more straightforward and more grounded list of diagnoses (or simply one diagnosis), we find the process of deprescribing to be simpler and more engaging for patients. For example, patients can clearly understand the lack of necessity of an antipsychotic prescription for a resolved substance-induced psychosis. Patients are more engaged in their care, leading to improved medication compliance and less attachment to discontinued medications.
Monitor and adapt. One should of course reevaluate diagnoses as the course of illness provides us with additional information. However, we suggest waiting for a manic episode to emerge prior to diagnosing bipolar rather than suggesting the diagnosis because a patient was wearing red shoes, spoke multiple languages, had multiple degrees and was creative.10 The contextual basis and progression of the symptoms should lead to continual reassessment of diagnoses.
Physicians are aware of the balance between Occam’s razor, which promotes the simplest single explanation for a problem, versus Hickam’s dictum that reminds us that patients can have as many diseases as they please. However, similarly to polypharmacy, “polydiagnosing” has negative effects. While the field of psychiatry’s advancing knowledge may encourage providers to diagnose their patients with the growing number of diagnoses, patients still need and benefit from a coherent and clear medical narrative. Psychiatry would be wise to recognize this concerning trend, in its attempt at rectifying polypharmacy.
Dr. Badre is a clinical and forensic psychiatrist in San Diego. He holds teaching positions at the University of California, San Diego, and the University of San Diego. He teaches medical education, psychopharmacology, ethics in psychiatry, and correctional care. Dr. Badre can be reached at his website, BadreMD.com. He has no conflicts of interest. Dr. Lehman is a professor of psychiatry at the University of California, San Diego. He is codirector of all acute and intensive psychiatric treatment at the Veterans Affairs Medical Center in San Diego, where he practices clinical psychiatry. He has no conflicts of interest.
References
1. Gupta S & Cahill JD. A prescription for “deprescribing” in psychiatry. Psychiatr Serv. 2016 Aug 1;67(8):904-7. doi: 10.1176/appi.ps.201500359.
2. Schuckit MA. Comorbidity between substance use disorders and psychiatric conditions. Addiction. 2006 Sep;101 Suppl 1:76-88. doi: 10.1111/j.1360-0443.2006.01592.x.
3. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition, Text Revision (DSM-5-TR). American Psychiatric Association, 2022. https://psychiatry.org/psychiatrists/practice/dsm.
4. Kendler KS. An historical framework for psychiatric nosology. Psychol Med. 2009 Dec;39(12):1935-41. doi: 10.1017/S0033291709005753.
5. Regier DA et al. DSM-5 field trials in the United States and Canada. Am J Psychiatry. 2013 Jan;170(1):59-70. doi: 10.1176/appi.ajp.2012.12070999.
6. Bhattacharya R et al. When good news is bad news: psychological impact of false-positive diagnosis of HIV. AIDS Care. 2008 May;20(5):560-4. doi: 10.1080/09540120701867206.
7. Reeve E et al. Review of deprescribing processes and development of an evidence‐based, patient‐centred deprescribing process. Br J Clin Pharmacol. 2014 Oct;78(4):738-47. doi: 10.1111/bcp.12386.
8. Gupta S and Cahill JD. A prescription for “deprescribing” in psychiatry.
9. Solomon M. “On the appearance and disappearance of Asperger’s syndrome” in Kendler and Parnas (eds.) Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry IV: Classification of Psychiatric Illness. Oxford University Press, 2017. doi: 10.1093/med/9780198796022.003.0023.
10. Akiskal HS. Searching for behavioral indicators of bipolar II in patients presenting with major depressive episodes: The “red sign,” the “rule of three,” and other biographic signs of temperamental extravagance, activation, and hypomania. J Affect Disord. 2005 Feb;84(2-3):279-90. doi: 10.1016/j.jad.2004.06.002.
In 2016, Gupta and Cahill challenged the field of psychiatry to reexamine prescribing patterns.1 They warned against the use of polypharmacy when not attached to improved patient functioning. They were concerned with the limited evidence for polypharmacy as well as DSM diagnostic criteria. In their inspiring article, they described a process of deprescribing.
In an effort to study and practice their recommendations, we have noticed a lack of literature examining the elimination of diagnostic labels. While there have been some studies looking at comorbidity, especially with substance use disorders,2 there is a paucity of scientific evidence on patients with numerous diagnoses. Yet our practices are filled with patients who have been labeled with multiple conflicting or redundant diagnoses throughout their lives depending on the setting or the orientation of the practitioner.
The DSM-5 warns against diagnosing disorders when “the occurrence … is not better explained by” another disorder.3 A mix of diagnoses creates confusion for patients as well as clinicians trying to sort through their reported psychiatric histories.
A routine example would include a patient presenting for an initial evaluation and stating “I’ve been diagnosed as manic-depressive, high anxiety, split personality, posttraumatic stress, insomnia, ADD, and depression.” A review of the medical record will reveal a list of diagnoses, including bipolar II, generalized anxiety disorder, borderline personality disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, unspecified insomnia, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and major depressive disorder. The medication list includes lamotrigine, valproic acid, citalopram, bupropion, buspirone, prazosin, methylphenidate, clonazepam, hydroxyzine, and low-dose quetiapine at night as needed.
This is an example of polypharmacy treating multiple, and at times conflicting, diagnoses. While an extreme case, in our experience, cases like this are not uncommon. It was actually in our efforts to examine deprescribing that we noticed this quandary. When inquiring about patients on many psychotropic medications, we often receive this retort: the patient is only prescribed one medication per disorder. Some providers have the belief that multiple disorders justify multiple medications, and that this tautological thinking legitimizes polypharmacy.
A patient who has varying moods, some fears, a fluctuating temperament, past traumas, occasional difficulty sleeping, intermittent inattention, and some sadness may be given all the diagnoses listed above and the resulting medication list. The multiplication of diagnoses, “polydiagnosing,” is a convenient justification for future polypharmacy. A lack of careful assessment and thinking in the application of new diagnoses permits the use of increasing numbers of pharmacological agents. A constellation of symptoms of anxiety, concentration deficits, affective dysregulation, and psychosis may justify the combination of benzodiazepines, stimulants, mood stabilizers, and antipsychotics, while a patient with “just” schizophrenia who is sometimes sad, scared, or distracted is more likely to be kept on just one medication, likely an antipsychotic.
Contrary to most medical disorders (for example, tuberculosis) but similar to others (for example, chronic pain), psychiatric disorders are based on the opinion of a “modest number of ‘expert’ classifications.”4 While the broad categories of disorders are justifiable, individual diagnoses are burdened with high rates of comorbidity; lack of treatment specificity; and evidence that distinct syndromes share a genetic basis. Those concerns were exemplified in the study examining the inter-rater reliability of DSM-5 diagnoses, where many disorders were found to have questionable validity.5
A psychiatric diagnosis should be based on biological, psychological, and social factors, which align with our understanding of the natural course of an illness. A patient presenting with transient symptoms of sadness in the context of significant social factors like homelessness and/or significant biological factors associated with schizophrenia should not reflexively receive an additional diagnosis of a depressive disorder. A patient reporting poor concentration in the context of a manic episode should not receive an additional diagnosis of attention-deficit disorder. An older patient with depression on multiple antipsychotics for adjunctive treatment should not necessarily receive a diagnosis of cognitive disorder at the first sign of memory problems.
The cavalier and inconsistent use of diagnoses renders the patients with no clear narrative of who they are. They end up integrating the varying providers’ opinions as a cacophony of labels of unclear significance. Many patients have contradictory diagnoses like major depressive disorder and bipolar disorder, or schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder. Those inaccurate diagnoses could not only lead to treatment mistakes, but also psychological harm.6
A clearer diagnostic picture is not only more scientifically sound but also more coherent to the patient. This in turn can lead to an improved treatment alliance and buy-in from the patient.
How should a provider practice de-diagnosing? Based on the work of Reeve, et al.,7 on the principles crucial to deprescribing, and subsequent research by Gupta and Cahill,8 we compiled a list of considerations for practitioners wishing to engage in this type of work with their patients.
Choose the right time. While insurance companies require diagnostic findings from the first visit, abrupt de-diagnosing for the sake of simplifying the record from that first visit could be detrimental. Patients can become attached to and find meaning in their diagnostic labels. This was exemplified with the removal of Asperger’s syndrome from the DSM-5.9 Acute symptomatology may be an opportune time to revisit the core pathology of a patient, or a poor time for a patient to have this discussion.
Compile a list of all the patient’s diagnoses. Our initial visits are often illuminated when patients enumerate the vast number of diagnoses they have been given by different providers. Patients will often list half a dozen diagnoses. The patterns often follow life courses with ADHD, conduct disorder, and learning disability in childhood; with anxiety, depression, and/or bipolar disorder in early adulthood; to complicated grief, depression with pseudodementia, and neurocognitive disorders in older adults. Yet patients rarely appreciate the temporary or episodic nature of mental disorders and instead accumulate diagnoses at each change of provider.
Initiate discussion with the patient. It is meaningful to see if patients resonate with the question, “Do you ever feel like every psychiatrist you have seen has given you a different diagnosis?” In our experience, patients’ reactions to this question usually exemplify the problematic nature of the vast array of diagnoses our patients are given. The majority of them are unable to confidently explain the meaning of those diagnoses, the context in which they were given, or their significance. This simple exercise has a powerful effect on raising awareness to patients of the problematic nature of polydiagnosing.
Introduce de-diagnosing. The engagement of patients in the diagnostic process has a significant effect. Reviewing not only diagnostic criteria but also nosology and debates in our understanding of diagnoses can provide patients with further engagement in their care. A simple review of the debate of the bereavement exclusion may permit a patient to not only understand the complexity, but also the changing nature of diagnoses. Suddenly, they are no longer bystanders, but informed participants in their care.
Identify diagnoses most appropriate for removal. Contradictory diagnoses are common in the clinical settings we work in. We routinely see patients carrying multiple mood diagnoses, despite our diagnostic systems not permitting one to have both unipolar and bipolar depression. Superfluous diagnoses are also frequent, with patients receiving depressive, or anxious labels when in an acute state of psychosis or mania. This is exemplified by patients suffering from thought blocking and receiving cognitive or attention-related diagnoses. Concurrent yet different diagnoses are also common in patients with a different list of diagnoses by their primary care provider, their therapist, and their psychiatrist. This is particularly problematic as it forces the patient to alternate their thinking or choose between their providers.
Create a new narrative for the patient. Once diagnoses are explained, clarified, and understood, patients with the help of their providers can reexamine their life story under a new and simplified construct. This process often leads to a less confusing sense of self, an increased dedication to the treatment process, whether behavioral, social, psychological, or pharmacologic.
Consider deprescribing. With a more straightforward and more grounded list of diagnoses (or simply one diagnosis), we find the process of deprescribing to be simpler and more engaging for patients. For example, patients can clearly understand the lack of necessity of an antipsychotic prescription for a resolved substance-induced psychosis. Patients are more engaged in their care, leading to improved medication compliance and less attachment to discontinued medications.
Monitor and adapt. One should of course reevaluate diagnoses as the course of illness provides us with additional information. However, we suggest waiting for a manic episode to emerge prior to diagnosing bipolar rather than suggesting the diagnosis because a patient was wearing red shoes, spoke multiple languages, had multiple degrees and was creative.10 The contextual basis and progression of the symptoms should lead to continual reassessment of diagnoses.
Physicians are aware of the balance between Occam’s razor, which promotes the simplest single explanation for a problem, versus Hickam’s dictum that reminds us that patients can have as many diseases as they please. However, similarly to polypharmacy, “polydiagnosing” has negative effects. While the field of psychiatry’s advancing knowledge may encourage providers to diagnose their patients with the growing number of diagnoses, patients still need and benefit from a coherent and clear medical narrative. Psychiatry would be wise to recognize this concerning trend, in its attempt at rectifying polypharmacy.
Dr. Badre is a clinical and forensic psychiatrist in San Diego. He holds teaching positions at the University of California, San Diego, and the University of San Diego. He teaches medical education, psychopharmacology, ethics in psychiatry, and correctional care. Dr. Badre can be reached at his website, BadreMD.com. He has no conflicts of interest. Dr. Lehman is a professor of psychiatry at the University of California, San Diego. He is codirector of all acute and intensive psychiatric treatment at the Veterans Affairs Medical Center in San Diego, where he practices clinical psychiatry. He has no conflicts of interest.
References
1. Gupta S & Cahill JD. A prescription for “deprescribing” in psychiatry. Psychiatr Serv. 2016 Aug 1;67(8):904-7. doi: 10.1176/appi.ps.201500359.
2. Schuckit MA. Comorbidity between substance use disorders and psychiatric conditions. Addiction. 2006 Sep;101 Suppl 1:76-88. doi: 10.1111/j.1360-0443.2006.01592.x.
3. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition, Text Revision (DSM-5-TR). American Psychiatric Association, 2022. https://psychiatry.org/psychiatrists/practice/dsm.
4. Kendler KS. An historical framework for psychiatric nosology. Psychol Med. 2009 Dec;39(12):1935-41. doi: 10.1017/S0033291709005753.
5. Regier DA et al. DSM-5 field trials in the United States and Canada. Am J Psychiatry. 2013 Jan;170(1):59-70. doi: 10.1176/appi.ajp.2012.12070999.
6. Bhattacharya R et al. When good news is bad news: psychological impact of false-positive diagnosis of HIV. AIDS Care. 2008 May;20(5):560-4. doi: 10.1080/09540120701867206.
7. Reeve E et al. Review of deprescribing processes and development of an evidence‐based, patient‐centred deprescribing process. Br J Clin Pharmacol. 2014 Oct;78(4):738-47. doi: 10.1111/bcp.12386.
8. Gupta S and Cahill JD. A prescription for “deprescribing” in psychiatry.
9. Solomon M. “On the appearance and disappearance of Asperger’s syndrome” in Kendler and Parnas (eds.) Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry IV: Classification of Psychiatric Illness. Oxford University Press, 2017. doi: 10.1093/med/9780198796022.003.0023.
10. Akiskal HS. Searching for behavioral indicators of bipolar II in patients presenting with major depressive episodes: The “red sign,” the “rule of three,” and other biographic signs of temperamental extravagance, activation, and hypomania. J Affect Disord. 2005 Feb;84(2-3):279-90. doi: 10.1016/j.jad.2004.06.002.
In 2016, Gupta and Cahill challenged the field of psychiatry to reexamine prescribing patterns.1 They warned against the use of polypharmacy when not attached to improved patient functioning. They were concerned with the limited evidence for polypharmacy as well as DSM diagnostic criteria. In their inspiring article, they described a process of deprescribing.
In an effort to study and practice their recommendations, we have noticed a lack of literature examining the elimination of diagnostic labels. While there have been some studies looking at comorbidity, especially with substance use disorders,2 there is a paucity of scientific evidence on patients with numerous diagnoses. Yet our practices are filled with patients who have been labeled with multiple conflicting or redundant diagnoses throughout their lives depending on the setting or the orientation of the practitioner.
The DSM-5 warns against diagnosing disorders when “the occurrence … is not better explained by” another disorder.3 A mix of diagnoses creates confusion for patients as well as clinicians trying to sort through their reported psychiatric histories.
A routine example would include a patient presenting for an initial evaluation and stating “I’ve been diagnosed as manic-depressive, high anxiety, split personality, posttraumatic stress, insomnia, ADD, and depression.” A review of the medical record will reveal a list of diagnoses, including bipolar II, generalized anxiety disorder, borderline personality disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, unspecified insomnia, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and major depressive disorder. The medication list includes lamotrigine, valproic acid, citalopram, bupropion, buspirone, prazosin, methylphenidate, clonazepam, hydroxyzine, and low-dose quetiapine at night as needed.
This is an example of polypharmacy treating multiple, and at times conflicting, diagnoses. While an extreme case, in our experience, cases like this are not uncommon. It was actually in our efforts to examine deprescribing that we noticed this quandary. When inquiring about patients on many psychotropic medications, we often receive this retort: the patient is only prescribed one medication per disorder. Some providers have the belief that multiple disorders justify multiple medications, and that this tautological thinking legitimizes polypharmacy.
A patient who has varying moods, some fears, a fluctuating temperament, past traumas, occasional difficulty sleeping, intermittent inattention, and some sadness may be given all the diagnoses listed above and the resulting medication list. The multiplication of diagnoses, “polydiagnosing,” is a convenient justification for future polypharmacy. A lack of careful assessment and thinking in the application of new diagnoses permits the use of increasing numbers of pharmacological agents. A constellation of symptoms of anxiety, concentration deficits, affective dysregulation, and psychosis may justify the combination of benzodiazepines, stimulants, mood stabilizers, and antipsychotics, while a patient with “just” schizophrenia who is sometimes sad, scared, or distracted is more likely to be kept on just one medication, likely an antipsychotic.
Contrary to most medical disorders (for example, tuberculosis) but similar to others (for example, chronic pain), psychiatric disorders are based on the opinion of a “modest number of ‘expert’ classifications.”4 While the broad categories of disorders are justifiable, individual diagnoses are burdened with high rates of comorbidity; lack of treatment specificity; and evidence that distinct syndromes share a genetic basis. Those concerns were exemplified in the study examining the inter-rater reliability of DSM-5 diagnoses, where many disorders were found to have questionable validity.5
A psychiatric diagnosis should be based on biological, psychological, and social factors, which align with our understanding of the natural course of an illness. A patient presenting with transient symptoms of sadness in the context of significant social factors like homelessness and/or significant biological factors associated with schizophrenia should not reflexively receive an additional diagnosis of a depressive disorder. A patient reporting poor concentration in the context of a manic episode should not receive an additional diagnosis of attention-deficit disorder. An older patient with depression on multiple antipsychotics for adjunctive treatment should not necessarily receive a diagnosis of cognitive disorder at the first sign of memory problems.
The cavalier and inconsistent use of diagnoses renders the patients with no clear narrative of who they are. They end up integrating the varying providers’ opinions as a cacophony of labels of unclear significance. Many patients have contradictory diagnoses like major depressive disorder and bipolar disorder, or schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder. Those inaccurate diagnoses could not only lead to treatment mistakes, but also psychological harm.6
A clearer diagnostic picture is not only more scientifically sound but also more coherent to the patient. This in turn can lead to an improved treatment alliance and buy-in from the patient.
How should a provider practice de-diagnosing? Based on the work of Reeve, et al.,7 on the principles crucial to deprescribing, and subsequent research by Gupta and Cahill,8 we compiled a list of considerations for practitioners wishing to engage in this type of work with their patients.
Choose the right time. While insurance companies require diagnostic findings from the first visit, abrupt de-diagnosing for the sake of simplifying the record from that first visit could be detrimental. Patients can become attached to and find meaning in their diagnostic labels. This was exemplified with the removal of Asperger’s syndrome from the DSM-5.9 Acute symptomatology may be an opportune time to revisit the core pathology of a patient, or a poor time for a patient to have this discussion.
Compile a list of all the patient’s diagnoses. Our initial visits are often illuminated when patients enumerate the vast number of diagnoses they have been given by different providers. Patients will often list half a dozen diagnoses. The patterns often follow life courses with ADHD, conduct disorder, and learning disability in childhood; with anxiety, depression, and/or bipolar disorder in early adulthood; to complicated grief, depression with pseudodementia, and neurocognitive disorders in older adults. Yet patients rarely appreciate the temporary or episodic nature of mental disorders and instead accumulate diagnoses at each change of provider.
Initiate discussion with the patient. It is meaningful to see if patients resonate with the question, “Do you ever feel like every psychiatrist you have seen has given you a different diagnosis?” In our experience, patients’ reactions to this question usually exemplify the problematic nature of the vast array of diagnoses our patients are given. The majority of them are unable to confidently explain the meaning of those diagnoses, the context in which they were given, or their significance. This simple exercise has a powerful effect on raising awareness to patients of the problematic nature of polydiagnosing.
Introduce de-diagnosing. The engagement of patients in the diagnostic process has a significant effect. Reviewing not only diagnostic criteria but also nosology and debates in our understanding of diagnoses can provide patients with further engagement in their care. A simple review of the debate of the bereavement exclusion may permit a patient to not only understand the complexity, but also the changing nature of diagnoses. Suddenly, they are no longer bystanders, but informed participants in their care.
Identify diagnoses most appropriate for removal. Contradictory diagnoses are common in the clinical settings we work in. We routinely see patients carrying multiple mood diagnoses, despite our diagnostic systems not permitting one to have both unipolar and bipolar depression. Superfluous diagnoses are also frequent, with patients receiving depressive, or anxious labels when in an acute state of psychosis or mania. This is exemplified by patients suffering from thought blocking and receiving cognitive or attention-related diagnoses. Concurrent yet different diagnoses are also common in patients with a different list of diagnoses by their primary care provider, their therapist, and their psychiatrist. This is particularly problematic as it forces the patient to alternate their thinking or choose between their providers.
Create a new narrative for the patient. Once diagnoses are explained, clarified, and understood, patients with the help of their providers can reexamine their life story under a new and simplified construct. This process often leads to a less confusing sense of self, an increased dedication to the treatment process, whether behavioral, social, psychological, or pharmacologic.
Consider deprescribing. With a more straightforward and more grounded list of diagnoses (or simply one diagnosis), we find the process of deprescribing to be simpler and more engaging for patients. For example, patients can clearly understand the lack of necessity of an antipsychotic prescription for a resolved substance-induced psychosis. Patients are more engaged in their care, leading to improved medication compliance and less attachment to discontinued medications.
Monitor and adapt. One should of course reevaluate diagnoses as the course of illness provides us with additional information. However, we suggest waiting for a manic episode to emerge prior to diagnosing bipolar rather than suggesting the diagnosis because a patient was wearing red shoes, spoke multiple languages, had multiple degrees and was creative.10 The contextual basis and progression of the symptoms should lead to continual reassessment of diagnoses.
Physicians are aware of the balance between Occam’s razor, which promotes the simplest single explanation for a problem, versus Hickam’s dictum that reminds us that patients can have as many diseases as they please. However, similarly to polypharmacy, “polydiagnosing” has negative effects. While the field of psychiatry’s advancing knowledge may encourage providers to diagnose their patients with the growing number of diagnoses, patients still need and benefit from a coherent and clear medical narrative. Psychiatry would be wise to recognize this concerning trend, in its attempt at rectifying polypharmacy.
Dr. Badre is a clinical and forensic psychiatrist in San Diego. He holds teaching positions at the University of California, San Diego, and the University of San Diego. He teaches medical education, psychopharmacology, ethics in psychiatry, and correctional care. Dr. Badre can be reached at his website, BadreMD.com. He has no conflicts of interest. Dr. Lehman is a professor of psychiatry at the University of California, San Diego. He is codirector of all acute and intensive psychiatric treatment at the Veterans Affairs Medical Center in San Diego, where he practices clinical psychiatry. He has no conflicts of interest.
References
1. Gupta S & Cahill JD. A prescription for “deprescribing” in psychiatry. Psychiatr Serv. 2016 Aug 1;67(8):904-7. doi: 10.1176/appi.ps.201500359.
2. Schuckit MA. Comorbidity between substance use disorders and psychiatric conditions. Addiction. 2006 Sep;101 Suppl 1:76-88. doi: 10.1111/j.1360-0443.2006.01592.x.
3. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition, Text Revision (DSM-5-TR). American Psychiatric Association, 2022. https://psychiatry.org/psychiatrists/practice/dsm.
4. Kendler KS. An historical framework for psychiatric nosology. Psychol Med. 2009 Dec;39(12):1935-41. doi: 10.1017/S0033291709005753.
5. Regier DA et al. DSM-5 field trials in the United States and Canada. Am J Psychiatry. 2013 Jan;170(1):59-70. doi: 10.1176/appi.ajp.2012.12070999.
6. Bhattacharya R et al. When good news is bad news: psychological impact of false-positive diagnosis of HIV. AIDS Care. 2008 May;20(5):560-4. doi: 10.1080/09540120701867206.
7. Reeve E et al. Review of deprescribing processes and development of an evidence‐based, patient‐centred deprescribing process. Br J Clin Pharmacol. 2014 Oct;78(4):738-47. doi: 10.1111/bcp.12386.
8. Gupta S and Cahill JD. A prescription for “deprescribing” in psychiatry.
9. Solomon M. “On the appearance and disappearance of Asperger’s syndrome” in Kendler and Parnas (eds.) Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry IV: Classification of Psychiatric Illness. Oxford University Press, 2017. doi: 10.1093/med/9780198796022.003.0023.
10. Akiskal HS. Searching for behavioral indicators of bipolar II in patients presenting with major depressive episodes: The “red sign,” the “rule of three,” and other biographic signs of temperamental extravagance, activation, and hypomania. J Affect Disord. 2005 Feb;84(2-3):279-90. doi: 10.1016/j.jad.2004.06.002.