David Lehman, MD

It is assumed that psychiatrists in general, but particularly in academia, are progressive liberals. There is evidence to support this idea, with a survey finding that more than three-quarters of U.S. psychiatrists are registered Democrats.¹

Other corroborating factors to our field’s progressive tendency include the publication of pseudo-political books like “The Dangerous Case of Donald Trump: 27 Psychiatrists and Mental Health Experts Assess a President” – without a well-known equivalent on the other side.

Additionally, psychiatry has in the recent past, rightfully spent significant effort examining the disproportional trauma faced by patients with underprivileged backgrounds, which is often seen as a political position. The American Psychiatric Association has itself taken a stance on the national debate about abortion to warn against the psychiatric consequences of the Dobbs v. Jackson Supreme Court decision despite the clear political statement it makes.

We understand a likely rationale for psychiatry’s liberal tendency. Most psychiatrists support political objectives that provide resources for the treatment of the severely mentally ill. In general, the psychosocial consequences of mental illness place a downward economic pressure on our patients that leads to poverty and its associated traumas that then tend to feedback to worsen the severity of the illness itself. It is thus natural for psychiatry to promote political causes such as progressivism that focus on the needs of economically and socially struggling communities. If one posits a natural role for psychiatry in promoting the interests of patients, then it is a short leap to psychiatry promoting the political causes of the underprivileged, often in the form of endorsing the Democratic party.

As a result, a proportion of patients come into psychiatric treatment with expectations that their providers will negatively judge them and possibly punish their conservative beliefs or Republican political affiliation. Herein lies a question – “Is psychiatry willing to make 46.9% of Americans uncomfortable?” How should psychiatry address the 46.9% of Americans who voted Republican during the 2020 presidential election? In our desire to support the disadvantaged, how political are we willing to get and at what cost? While we cannot speak for the field as a whole, it is our concern that a vast percentage of Americans feel alienated from talking to us, which is particularly problematic in a field based on mutual trust and understanding.

Dr. Lehman is a professor of psychiatry at the University of California, San Diego. He is codirector of all acute and intensive psychiatric treatment at the Veterans Affairs Medical Center in San Diego, where he practices clinical psychiatry. He has no conflicts of interest. Dr. Badre is a clinical and forensic psychiatrist in San Diego. He holds teaching positions at the University of California, San Diego, and the University of San Diego. He teaches medical education, psychopharmacology, ethics in psychiatry, and correctional care. Dr. Badre can be reached at his website, BadreMD.com. He has no conflicts of interest.

References

1. Sanger-Katz M. Your surgeon is probably a Republican, your psychiatrist probably a Democrat. New York Times. 2016 Oct 6.

2. Ba B et al. Who are the police? Descriptive representation in the coercive arm of government. 2022 Mar 21.

3. Rainey J. Union leader tells Republican convention why cops back Trump. Los Angeles Times. 2020 Aug 26.

4. Igielnik R et al. Trump draws stronger support from veterans than from the public on leadership of U.S. military. Pew Research Center. 2019 July 10.

It is assumed that psychiatrists in general, but particularly in academia, are progressive liberals. There is evidence to support this idea, with a survey finding that more than three-quarters of U.S. psychiatrists are registered Democrats.¹

Other corroborating factors to our field’s progressive tendency include the publication of pseudo-political books like “The Dangerous Case of Donald Trump: 27 Psychiatrists and Mental Health Experts Assess a President” – without a well-known equivalent on the other side.

Additionally, psychiatry has in the recent past, rightfully spent significant effort examining the disproportional trauma faced by patients with underprivileged backgrounds, which is often seen as a political position. The American Psychiatric Association has itself taken a stance on the national debate about abortion to warn against the psychiatric consequences of the Dobbs v. Jackson Supreme Court decision despite the clear political statement it makes.

We understand a likely rationale for psychiatry’s liberal tendency. Most psychiatrists support political objectives that provide resources for the treatment of the severely mentally ill. In general, the psychosocial consequences of mental illness place a downward economic pressure on our patients that leads to poverty and its associated traumas that then tend to feedback to worsen the severity of the illness itself. It is thus natural for psychiatry to promote political causes such as progressivism that focus on the needs of economically and socially struggling communities. If one posits a natural role for psychiatry in promoting the interests of patients, then it is a short leap to psychiatry promoting the political causes of the underprivileged, often in the form of endorsing the Democratic party.

As a result, a proportion of patients come into psychiatric treatment with expectations that their providers will negatively judge them and possibly punish their conservative beliefs or Republican political affiliation. Herein lies a question – “Is psychiatry willing to make 46.9% of Americans uncomfortable?” How should psychiatry address the 46.9% of Americans who voted Republican during the 2020 presidential election? In our desire to support the disadvantaged, how political are we willing to get and at what cost? While we cannot speak for the field as a whole, it is our concern that a vast percentage of Americans feel alienated from talking to us, which is particularly problematic in a field based on mutual trust and understanding.

Dr. Lehman is a professor of psychiatry at the University of California, San Diego. He is codirector of all acute and intensive psychiatric treatment at the Veterans Affairs Medical Center in San Diego, where he practices clinical psychiatry. He has no conflicts of interest. Dr. Badre is a clinical and forensic psychiatrist in San Diego. He holds teaching positions at the University of California, San Diego, and the University of San Diego. He teaches medical education, psychopharmacology, ethics in psychiatry, and correctional care. Dr. Badre can be reached at his website, BadreMD.com. He has no conflicts of interest.

References

1. Sanger-Katz M. Your surgeon is probably a Republican, your psychiatrist probably a Democrat. New York Times. 2016 Oct 6.

2. Ba B et al. Who are the police? Descriptive representation in the coercive arm of government. 2022 Mar 21.

3. Rainey J. Union leader tells Republican convention why cops back Trump. Los Angeles Times. 2020 Aug 26.

4. Igielnik R et al. Trump draws stronger support from veterans than from the public on leadership of U.S. military. Pew Research Center. 2019 July 10.

It is assumed that psychiatrists in general, but particularly in academia, are progressive liberals. There is evidence to support this idea, with a survey finding that more than three-quarters of U.S. psychiatrists are registered Democrats.¹

Other corroborating factors to our field’s progressive tendency include the publication of pseudo-political books like “The Dangerous Case of Donald Trump: 27 Psychiatrists and Mental Health Experts Assess a President” – without a well-known equivalent on the other side.

Additionally, psychiatry has in the recent past, rightfully spent significant effort examining the disproportional trauma faced by patients with underprivileged backgrounds, which is often seen as a political position. The American Psychiatric Association has itself taken a stance on the national debate about abortion to warn against the psychiatric consequences of the Dobbs v. Jackson Supreme Court decision despite the clear political statement it makes.

We understand a likely rationale for psychiatry’s liberal tendency. Most psychiatrists support political objectives that provide resources for the treatment of the severely mentally ill. In general, the psychosocial consequences of mental illness place a downward economic pressure on our patients that leads to poverty and its associated traumas that then tend to feedback to worsen the severity of the illness itself. It is thus natural for psychiatry to promote political causes such as progressivism that focus on the needs of economically and socially struggling communities. If one posits a natural role for psychiatry in promoting the interests of patients, then it is a short leap to psychiatry promoting the political causes of the underprivileged, often in the form of endorsing the Democratic party.

As a result, a proportion of patients come into psychiatric treatment with expectations that their providers will negatively judge them and possibly punish their conservative beliefs or Republican political affiliation. Herein lies a question – “Is psychiatry willing to make 46.9% of Americans uncomfortable?” How should psychiatry address the 46.9% of Americans who voted Republican during the 2020 presidential election? In our desire to support the disadvantaged, how political are we willing to get and at what cost? While we cannot speak for the field as a whole, it is our concern that a vast percentage of Americans feel alienated from talking to us, which is particularly problematic in a field based on mutual trust and understanding.

Dr. Lehman is a professor of psychiatry at the University of California, San Diego. He is codirector of all acute and intensive psychiatric treatment at the Veterans Affairs Medical Center in San Diego, where he practices clinical psychiatry. He has no conflicts of interest. Dr. Badre is a clinical and forensic psychiatrist in San Diego. He holds teaching positions at the University of California, San Diego, and the University of San Diego. He teaches medical education, psychopharmacology, ethics in psychiatry, and correctional care. Dr. Badre can be reached at his website, BadreMD.com. He has no conflicts of interest.

References

1. Sanger-Katz M. Your surgeon is probably a Republican, your psychiatrist probably a Democrat. New York Times. 2016 Oct 6.

2. Ba B et al. Who are the police? Descriptive representation in the coercive arm of government. 2022 Mar 21.

3. Rainey J. Union leader tells Republican convention why cops back Trump. Los Angeles Times. 2020 Aug 26.

4. Igielnik R et al. Trump draws stronger support from veterans than from the public on leadership of U.S. military. Pew Research Center. 2019 July 10.

In 2016, Gupta and Cahill challenged the field of psychiatry to reexamine prescribing patterns.¹ They warned against the use of polypharmacy when not attached to improved patient functioning. They were concerned with the limited evidence for polypharmacy as well as DSM diagnostic criteria. In their inspiring article, they described a process of deprescribing.

In an effort to study and practice their recommendations, we have noticed a lack of literature examining the elimination of diagnostic labels. While there have been some studies looking at comorbidity, especially with substance use disorders,² there is a paucity of scientific evidence on patients with numerous diagnoses. Yet our practices are filled with patients who have been labeled with multiple conflicting or redundant diagnoses throughout their lives depending on the setting or the orientation of the practitioner.

The DSM-5 warns against diagnosing disorders when “the occurrence … is not better explained by” another disorder.³ A mix of diagnoses creates confusion for patients as well as clinicians trying to sort through their reported psychiatric histories.

A routine example would include a patient presenting for an initial evaluation and stating “I’ve been diagnosed as manic-depressive, high anxiety, split personality, posttraumatic stress, insomnia, ADD, and depression.” A review of the medical record will reveal a list of diagnoses, including bipolar II, generalized anxiety disorder, borderline personality disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, unspecified insomnia, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and major depressive disorder. The medication list includes lamotrigine, valproic acid, citalopram, bupropion, buspirone, prazosin, methylphenidate, clonazepam, hydroxyzine, and low-dose quetiapine at night as needed.

This is an example of polypharmacy treating multiple, and at times conflicting, diagnoses. While an extreme case, in our experience, cases like this are not uncommon. It was actually in our efforts to examine deprescribing that we noticed this quandary. When inquiring about patients on many psychotropic medications, we often receive this retort: the patient is only prescribed one medication per disorder. Some providers have the belief that multiple disorders justify multiple medications, and that this tautological thinking legitimizes polypharmacy.

A patient who has varying moods, some fears, a fluctuating temperament, past traumas, occasional difficulty sleeping, intermittent inattention, and some sadness may be given all the diagnoses listed above and the resulting medication list. The multiplication of diagnoses, “polydiagnosing,” is a convenient justification for future polypharmacy. A lack of careful assessment and thinking in the application of new diagnoses permits the use of increasing numbers of pharmacological agents. A constellation of symptoms of anxiety, concentration deficits, affective dysregulation, and psychosis may justify the combination of benzodiazepines, stimulants, mood stabilizers, and antipsychotics, while a patient with “just” schizophrenia who is sometimes sad, scared, or distracted is more likely to be kept on just one medication, likely an antipsychotic.

Contrary to most medical disorders (for example, tuberculosis) but similar to others (for example, chronic pain), psychiatric disorders are based on the opinion of a “modest number of ‘expert’ classifications.”⁴ While the broad categories of disorders are justifiable, individual diagnoses are burdened with high rates of comorbidity; lack of treatment specificity; and evidence that distinct syndromes share a genetic basis. Those concerns were exemplified in the study examining the inter-rater reliability of DSM-5 diagnoses, where many disorders were found to have questionable validity.⁵

A psychiatric diagnosis should be based on biological, psychological, and social factors, which align with our understanding of the natural course of an illness. A patient presenting with transient symptoms of sadness in the context of significant social factors like homelessness and/or significant biological factors associated with schizophrenia should not reflexively receive an additional diagnosis of a depressive disorder. A patient reporting poor concentration in the context of a manic episode should not receive an additional diagnosis of attention-deficit disorder. An older patient with depression on multiple antipsychotics for adjunctive treatment should not necessarily receive a diagnosis of cognitive disorder at the first sign of memory problems.

The cavalier and inconsistent use of diagnoses renders the patients with no clear narrative of who they are. They end up integrating the varying providers’ opinions as a cacophony of labels of unclear significance. Many patients have contradictory diagnoses like major depressive disorder and bipolar disorder, or schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder. Those inaccurate diagnoses could not only lead to treatment mistakes, but also psychological harm.⁶

A clearer diagnostic picture is not only more scientifically sound but also more coherent to the patient. This in turn can lead to an improved treatment alliance and buy-in from the patient. Assisting a patient in sorting out and understanding the vast arrays of diagnostic labels they may hear throughout their treatment can serve as a tool for psychoeducation, empowerment, and control over their own care and themselves.

How should a provider practice de-diagnosing? Based on the work of Reeve, et al.,⁷ on the principles crucial to deprescribing, and subsequent research by Gupta and Cahill,⁸ we compiled a list of considerations for practitioners wishing to engage in this type of work with their patients.
 

Choose the right time. While insurance companies require diagnostic findings from the first visit, abrupt de-diagnosing for the sake of simplifying the record from that first visit could be detrimental. Patients can become attached to and find meaning in their diagnostic labels. This was exemplified with the removal of Asperger’s syndrome from the DSM-5.⁹ Acute symptomatology may be an opportune time to revisit the core pathology of a patient, or a poor time for a patient to have this discussion.

Compile a list of all the patient’s diagnoses. Our initial visits are often illuminated when patients enumerate the vast number of diagnoses they have been given by different providers. Patients will often list half a dozen diagnoses. The patterns often follow life courses with ADHD, conduct disorder, and learning disability in childhood; with anxiety, depression, and/or bipolar disorder in early adulthood; to complicated grief, depression with pseudodementia, and neurocognitive disorders in older adults. Yet patients rarely appreciate the temporary or episodic nature of mental disorders and instead accumulate diagnoses at each change of provider.

Initiate discussion with the patient. It is meaningful to see if patients resonate with the question, “Do you ever feel like every psychiatrist you have seen has given you a different diagnosis?” In our experience, patients’ reactions to this question usually exemplify the problematic nature of the vast array of diagnoses our patients are given. The majority of them are unable to confidently explain the meaning of those diagnoses, the context in which they were given, or their significance. This simple exercise has a powerful effect on raising awareness to patients of the problematic nature of polydiagnosing.

Introduce de-diagnosing. The engagement of patients in the diagnostic process has a significant effect. Reviewing not only diagnostic criteria but also nosology and debates in our understanding of diagnoses can provide patients with further engagement in their care. A simple review of the debate of the bereavement exclusion may permit a patient to not only understand the complexity, but also the changing nature of diagnoses. Suddenly, they are no longer bystanders, but informed participants in their care.

Identify diagnoses most appropriate for removal. Contradictory diagnoses are common in the clinical settings we work in. We routinely see patients carrying multiple mood diagnoses, despite our diagnostic systems not permitting one to have both unipolar and bipolar depression. Superfluous diagnoses are also frequent, with patients receiving depressive, or anxious labels when in an acute state of psychosis or mania. This is exemplified by patients suffering from thought blocking and receiving cognitive or attention-related diagnoses. Concurrent yet different diagnoses are also common in patients with a different list of diagnoses by their primary care provider, their therapist, and their psychiatrist. This is particularly problematic as it forces the patient to alternate their thinking or choose between their providers.

Create a new narrative for the patient. Once diagnoses are explained, clarified, and understood, patients with the help of their providers can reexamine their life story under a new and simplified construct. This process often leads to a less confusing sense of self, an increased dedication to the treatment process, whether behavioral, social, psychological, or pharmacologic.

Consider deprescribing. With a more straightforward and more grounded list of diagnoses (or simply one diagnosis), we find the process of deprescribing to be simpler and more engaging for patients. For example, patients can clearly understand the lack of necessity of an antipsychotic prescription for a resolved substance-induced psychosis. Patients are more engaged in their care, leading to improved medication compliance and less attachment to discontinued medications.

Monitor and adapt. One should of course reevaluate diagnoses as the course of illness provides us with additional information. However, we suggest waiting for a manic episode to emerge prior to diagnosing bipolar rather than suggesting the diagnosis because a patient was wearing red shoes, spoke multiple languages, had multiple degrees and was creative.¹⁰ The contextual basis and progression of the symptoms should lead to continual reassessment of diagnoses.

Physicians are aware of the balance between Occam’s razor, which promotes the simplest single explanation for a problem, versus Hickam’s dictum that reminds us that patients can have as many diseases as they please. However, similarly to polypharmacy, “polydiagnosing” has negative effects. While the field of psychiatry’s advancing knowledge may encourage providers to diagnose their patients with the growing number of diagnoses, patients still need and benefit from a coherent and clear medical narrative. Psychiatry would be wise to recognize this concerning trend, in its attempt at rectifying polypharmacy.

Dr. Badre is a clinical and forensic psychiatrist in San Diego. He holds teaching positions at the University of California, San Diego, and the University of San Diego. He teaches medical education, psychopharmacology, ethics in psychiatry, and correctional care. Dr. Badre can be reached at his website, BadreMD.com. He has no conflicts of interest. Dr. Lehman is a professor of psychiatry at the University of California, San Diego. He is codirector of all acute and intensive psychiatric treatment at the Veterans Affairs Medical Center in San Diego, where he practices clinical psychiatry. He has no conflicts of interest.

References

1. Gupta S & Cahill JD. A prescription for “deprescribing” in psychiatry. Psychiatr Serv. 2016 Aug 1;67(8):904-7. doi: 10.1176/appi.ps.201500359.

2. Schuckit MA. Comorbidity between substance use disorders and psychiatric conditions. Addiction. 2006 Sep;101 Suppl 1:76-88. doi: 10.1111/j.1360-0443.2006.01592.x.

3. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition, Text Revision (DSM-5-TR). American Psychiatric Association, 2022. https://psychiatry.org/psychiatrists/practice/dsm.

4. Kendler KS. An historical framework for psychiatric nosology. Psychol Med. 2009 Dec;39(12):1935-41. doi: 10.1017/S0033291709005753.

5. Regier DA et al. DSM-5 field trials in the United States and Canada. Am J Psychiatry. 2013 Jan;170(1):59-70. doi: 10.1176/appi.ajp.2012.12070999.

6. Bhattacharya R et al. When good news is bad news: psychological impact of false-positive diagnosis of HIV. AIDS Care. 2008 May;20(5):560-4. doi: 10.1080/09540120701867206.

7. Reeve E et al. Review of deprescribing processes and development of an evidence‐based, patient‐centred deprescribing process. Br J Clin Pharmacol. 2014 Oct;78(4):738-47. doi: 10.1111/bcp.12386.

8. Gupta S and Cahill JD. A prescription for “deprescribing” in psychiatry.

9. Solomon M. “On the appearance and disappearance of Asperger’s syndrome” in Kendler and Parnas (eds.) Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry IV: Classification of Psychiatric Illness. Oxford University Press, 2017. doi: 10.1093/med/9780198796022.003.0023.

10. Akiskal HS. Searching for behavioral indicators of bipolar II in patients presenting with major depressive episodes: The “red sign,” the “rule of three,” and other biographic signs of temperamental extravagance, activation, and hypomania. J Affect Disord. 2005 Feb;84(2-3):279-90. doi: 10.1016/j.jad.2004.06.002.

In 2016, Gupta and Cahill challenged the field of psychiatry to reexamine prescribing patterns.¹ They warned against the use of polypharmacy when not attached to improved patient functioning. They were concerned with the limited evidence for polypharmacy as well as DSM diagnostic criteria. In their inspiring article, they described a process of deprescribing.

In an effort to study and practice their recommendations, we have noticed a lack of literature examining the elimination of diagnostic labels. While there have been some studies looking at comorbidity, especially with substance use disorders,² there is a paucity of scientific evidence on patients with numerous diagnoses. Yet our practices are filled with patients who have been labeled with multiple conflicting or redundant diagnoses throughout their lives depending on the setting or the orientation of the practitioner.

The DSM-5 warns against diagnosing disorders when “the occurrence … is not better explained by” another disorder.³ A mix of diagnoses creates confusion for patients as well as clinicians trying to sort through their reported psychiatric histories.

A routine example would include a patient presenting for an initial evaluation and stating “I’ve been diagnosed as manic-depressive, high anxiety, split personality, posttraumatic stress, insomnia, ADD, and depression.” A review of the medical record will reveal a list of diagnoses, including bipolar II, generalized anxiety disorder, borderline personality disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, unspecified insomnia, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and major depressive disorder. The medication list includes lamotrigine, valproic acid, citalopram, bupropion, buspirone, prazosin, methylphenidate, clonazepam, hydroxyzine, and low-dose quetiapine at night as needed.

This is an example of polypharmacy treating multiple, and at times conflicting, diagnoses. While an extreme case, in our experience, cases like this are not uncommon. It was actually in our efforts to examine deprescribing that we noticed this quandary. When inquiring about patients on many psychotropic medications, we often receive this retort: the patient is only prescribed one medication per disorder. Some providers have the belief that multiple disorders justify multiple medications, and that this tautological thinking legitimizes polypharmacy.

A patient who has varying moods, some fears, a fluctuating temperament, past traumas, occasional difficulty sleeping, intermittent inattention, and some sadness may be given all the diagnoses listed above and the resulting medication list. The multiplication of diagnoses, “polydiagnosing,” is a convenient justification for future polypharmacy. A lack of careful assessment and thinking in the application of new diagnoses permits the use of increasing numbers of pharmacological agents. A constellation of symptoms of anxiety, concentration deficits, affective dysregulation, and psychosis may justify the combination of benzodiazepines, stimulants, mood stabilizers, and antipsychotics, while a patient with “just” schizophrenia who is sometimes sad, scared, or distracted is more likely to be kept on just one medication, likely an antipsychotic.

Contrary to most medical disorders (for example, tuberculosis) but similar to others (for example, chronic pain), psychiatric disorders are based on the opinion of a “modest number of ‘expert’ classifications.”⁴ While the broad categories of disorders are justifiable, individual diagnoses are burdened with high rates of comorbidity; lack of treatment specificity; and evidence that distinct syndromes share a genetic basis. Those concerns were exemplified in the study examining the inter-rater reliability of DSM-5 diagnoses, where many disorders were found to have questionable validity.⁵

A psychiatric diagnosis should be based on biological, psychological, and social factors, which align with our understanding of the natural course of an illness. A patient presenting with transient symptoms of sadness in the context of significant social factors like homelessness and/or significant biological factors associated with schizophrenia should not reflexively receive an additional diagnosis of a depressive disorder. A patient reporting poor concentration in the context of a manic episode should not receive an additional diagnosis of attention-deficit disorder. An older patient with depression on multiple antipsychotics for adjunctive treatment should not necessarily receive a diagnosis of cognitive disorder at the first sign of memory problems.

The cavalier and inconsistent use of diagnoses renders the patients with no clear narrative of who they are. They end up integrating the varying providers’ opinions as a cacophony of labels of unclear significance. Many patients have contradictory diagnoses like major depressive disorder and bipolar disorder, or schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder. Those inaccurate diagnoses could not only lead to treatment mistakes, but also psychological harm.⁶

A clearer diagnostic picture is not only more scientifically sound but also more coherent to the patient. This in turn can lead to an improved treatment alliance and buy-in from the patient. Assisting a patient in sorting out and understanding the vast arrays of diagnostic labels they may hear throughout their treatment can serve as a tool for psychoeducation, empowerment, and control over their own care and themselves.

How should a provider practice de-diagnosing? Based on the work of Reeve, et al.,⁷ on the principles crucial to deprescribing, and subsequent research by Gupta and Cahill,⁸ we compiled a list of considerations for practitioners wishing to engage in this type of work with their patients.
 

Choose the right time. While insurance companies require diagnostic findings from the first visit, abrupt de-diagnosing for the sake of simplifying the record from that first visit could be detrimental. Patients can become attached to and find meaning in their diagnostic labels. This was exemplified with the removal of Asperger’s syndrome from the DSM-5.⁹ Acute symptomatology may be an opportune time to revisit the core pathology of a patient, or a poor time for a patient to have this discussion.

Compile a list of all the patient’s diagnoses. Our initial visits are often illuminated when patients enumerate the vast number of diagnoses they have been given by different providers. Patients will often list half a dozen diagnoses. The patterns often follow life courses with ADHD, conduct disorder, and learning disability in childhood; with anxiety, depression, and/or bipolar disorder in early adulthood; to complicated grief, depression with pseudodementia, and neurocognitive disorders in older adults. Yet patients rarely appreciate the temporary or episodic nature of mental disorders and instead accumulate diagnoses at each change of provider.

Initiate discussion with the patient. It is meaningful to see if patients resonate with the question, “Do you ever feel like every psychiatrist you have seen has given you a different diagnosis?” In our experience, patients’ reactions to this question usually exemplify the problematic nature of the vast array of diagnoses our patients are given. The majority of them are unable to confidently explain the meaning of those diagnoses, the context in which they were given, or their significance. This simple exercise has a powerful effect on raising awareness to patients of the problematic nature of polydiagnosing.

Introduce de-diagnosing. The engagement of patients in the diagnostic process has a significant effect. Reviewing not only diagnostic criteria but also nosology and debates in our understanding of diagnoses can provide patients with further engagement in their care. A simple review of the debate of the bereavement exclusion may permit a patient to not only understand the complexity, but also the changing nature of diagnoses. Suddenly, they are no longer bystanders, but informed participants in their care.

Identify diagnoses most appropriate for removal. Contradictory diagnoses are common in the clinical settings we work in. We routinely see patients carrying multiple mood diagnoses, despite our diagnostic systems not permitting one to have both unipolar and bipolar depression. Superfluous diagnoses are also frequent, with patients receiving depressive, or anxious labels when in an acute state of psychosis or mania. This is exemplified by patients suffering from thought blocking and receiving cognitive or attention-related diagnoses. Concurrent yet different diagnoses are also common in patients with a different list of diagnoses by their primary care provider, their therapist, and their psychiatrist. This is particularly problematic as it forces the patient to alternate their thinking or choose between their providers.

Create a new narrative for the patient. Once diagnoses are explained, clarified, and understood, patients with the help of their providers can reexamine their life story under a new and simplified construct. This process often leads to a less confusing sense of self, an increased dedication to the treatment process, whether behavioral, social, psychological, or pharmacologic.

Consider deprescribing. With a more straightforward and more grounded list of diagnoses (or simply one diagnosis), we find the process of deprescribing to be simpler and more engaging for patients. For example, patients can clearly understand the lack of necessity of an antipsychotic prescription for a resolved substance-induced psychosis. Patients are more engaged in their care, leading to improved medication compliance and less attachment to discontinued medications.

Monitor and adapt. One should of course reevaluate diagnoses as the course of illness provides us with additional information. However, we suggest waiting for a manic episode to emerge prior to diagnosing bipolar rather than suggesting the diagnosis because a patient was wearing red shoes, spoke multiple languages, had multiple degrees and was creative.¹⁰ The contextual basis and progression of the symptoms should lead to continual reassessment of diagnoses.

Physicians are aware of the balance between Occam’s razor, which promotes the simplest single explanation for a problem, versus Hickam’s dictum that reminds us that patients can have as many diseases as they please. However, similarly to polypharmacy, “polydiagnosing” has negative effects. While the field of psychiatry’s advancing knowledge may encourage providers to diagnose their patients with the growing number of diagnoses, patients still need and benefit from a coherent and clear medical narrative. Psychiatry would be wise to recognize this concerning trend, in its attempt at rectifying polypharmacy.

Dr. Badre is a clinical and forensic psychiatrist in San Diego. He holds teaching positions at the University of California, San Diego, and the University of San Diego. He teaches medical education, psychopharmacology, ethics in psychiatry, and correctional care. Dr. Badre can be reached at his website, BadreMD.com. He has no conflicts of interest. Dr. Lehman is a professor of psychiatry at the University of California, San Diego. He is codirector of all acute and intensive psychiatric treatment at the Veterans Affairs Medical Center in San Diego, where he practices clinical psychiatry. He has no conflicts of interest.

References

1. Gupta S & Cahill JD. A prescription for “deprescribing” in psychiatry. Psychiatr Serv. 2016 Aug 1;67(8):904-7. doi: 10.1176/appi.ps.201500359.

2. Schuckit MA. Comorbidity between substance use disorders and psychiatric conditions. Addiction. 2006 Sep;101 Suppl 1:76-88. doi: 10.1111/j.1360-0443.2006.01592.x.

3. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition, Text Revision (DSM-5-TR). American Psychiatric Association, 2022. https://psychiatry.org/psychiatrists/practice/dsm.

4. Kendler KS. An historical framework for psychiatric nosology. Psychol Med. 2009 Dec;39(12):1935-41. doi: 10.1017/S0033291709005753.

5. Regier DA et al. DSM-5 field trials in the United States and Canada. Am J Psychiatry. 2013 Jan;170(1):59-70. doi: 10.1176/appi.ajp.2012.12070999.

6. Bhattacharya R et al. When good news is bad news: psychological impact of false-positive diagnosis of HIV. AIDS Care. 2008 May;20(5):560-4. doi: 10.1080/09540120701867206.

7. Reeve E et al. Review of deprescribing processes and development of an evidence‐based, patient‐centred deprescribing process. Br J Clin Pharmacol. 2014 Oct;78(4):738-47. doi: 10.1111/bcp.12386.

8. Gupta S and Cahill JD. A prescription for “deprescribing” in psychiatry.

9. Solomon M. “On the appearance and disappearance of Asperger’s syndrome” in Kendler and Parnas (eds.) Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry IV: Classification of Psychiatric Illness. Oxford University Press, 2017. doi: 10.1093/med/9780198796022.003.0023.

10. Akiskal HS. Searching for behavioral indicators of bipolar II in patients presenting with major depressive episodes: The “red sign,” the “rule of three,” and other biographic signs of temperamental extravagance, activation, and hypomania. J Affect Disord. 2005 Feb;84(2-3):279-90. doi: 10.1016/j.jad.2004.06.002.

In 2016, Gupta and Cahill challenged the field of psychiatry to reexamine prescribing patterns.¹ They warned against the use of polypharmacy when not attached to improved patient functioning. They were concerned with the limited evidence for polypharmacy as well as DSM diagnostic criteria. In their inspiring article, they described a process of deprescribing.

In an effort to study and practice their recommendations, we have noticed a lack of literature examining the elimination of diagnostic labels. While there have been some studies looking at comorbidity, especially with substance use disorders,² there is a paucity of scientific evidence on patients with numerous diagnoses. Yet our practices are filled with patients who have been labeled with multiple conflicting or redundant diagnoses throughout their lives depending on the setting or the orientation of the practitioner.

The DSM-5 warns against diagnosing disorders when “the occurrence … is not better explained by” another disorder.³ A mix of diagnoses creates confusion for patients as well as clinicians trying to sort through their reported psychiatric histories.

A routine example would include a patient presenting for an initial evaluation and stating “I’ve been diagnosed as manic-depressive, high anxiety, split personality, posttraumatic stress, insomnia, ADD, and depression.” A review of the medical record will reveal a list of diagnoses, including bipolar II, generalized anxiety disorder, borderline personality disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, unspecified insomnia, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and major depressive disorder. The medication list includes lamotrigine, valproic acid, citalopram, bupropion, buspirone, prazosin, methylphenidate, clonazepam, hydroxyzine, and low-dose quetiapine at night as needed.

This is an example of polypharmacy treating multiple, and at times conflicting, diagnoses. While an extreme case, in our experience, cases like this are not uncommon. It was actually in our efforts to examine deprescribing that we noticed this quandary. When inquiring about patients on many psychotropic medications, we often receive this retort: the patient is only prescribed one medication per disorder. Some providers have the belief that multiple disorders justify multiple medications, and that this tautological thinking legitimizes polypharmacy.

A patient who has varying moods, some fears, a fluctuating temperament, past traumas, occasional difficulty sleeping, intermittent inattention, and some sadness may be given all the diagnoses listed above and the resulting medication list. The multiplication of diagnoses, “polydiagnosing,” is a convenient justification for future polypharmacy. A lack of careful assessment and thinking in the application of new diagnoses permits the use of increasing numbers of pharmacological agents. A constellation of symptoms of anxiety, concentration deficits, affective dysregulation, and psychosis may justify the combination of benzodiazepines, stimulants, mood stabilizers, and antipsychotics, while a patient with “just” schizophrenia who is sometimes sad, scared, or distracted is more likely to be kept on just one medication, likely an antipsychotic.

Contrary to most medical disorders (for example, tuberculosis) but similar to others (for example, chronic pain), psychiatric disorders are based on the opinion of a “modest number of ‘expert’ classifications.”⁴ While the broad categories of disorders are justifiable, individual diagnoses are burdened with high rates of comorbidity; lack of treatment specificity; and evidence that distinct syndromes share a genetic basis. Those concerns were exemplified in the study examining the inter-rater reliability of DSM-5 diagnoses, where many disorders were found to have questionable validity.⁵

A psychiatric diagnosis should be based on biological, psychological, and social factors, which align with our understanding of the natural course of an illness. A patient presenting with transient symptoms of sadness in the context of significant social factors like homelessness and/or significant biological factors associated with schizophrenia should not reflexively receive an additional diagnosis of a depressive disorder. A patient reporting poor concentration in the context of a manic episode should not receive an additional diagnosis of attention-deficit disorder. An older patient with depression on multiple antipsychotics for adjunctive treatment should not necessarily receive a diagnosis of cognitive disorder at the first sign of memory problems.

The cavalier and inconsistent use of diagnoses renders the patients with no clear narrative of who they are. They end up integrating the varying providers’ opinions as a cacophony of labels of unclear significance. Many patients have contradictory diagnoses like major depressive disorder and bipolar disorder, or schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder. Those inaccurate diagnoses could not only lead to treatment mistakes, but also psychological harm.⁶

A clearer diagnostic picture is not only more scientifically sound but also more coherent to the patient. This in turn can lead to an improved treatment alliance and buy-in from the patient. Assisting a patient in sorting out and understanding the vast arrays of diagnostic labels they may hear throughout their treatment can serve as a tool for psychoeducation, empowerment, and control over their own care and themselves.

How should a provider practice de-diagnosing? Based on the work of Reeve, et al.,⁷ on the principles crucial to deprescribing, and subsequent research by Gupta and Cahill,⁸ we compiled a list of considerations for practitioners wishing to engage in this type of work with their patients.
 

Choose the right time. While insurance companies require diagnostic findings from the first visit, abrupt de-diagnosing for the sake of simplifying the record from that first visit could be detrimental. Patients can become attached to and find meaning in their diagnostic labels. This was exemplified with the removal of Asperger’s syndrome from the DSM-5.⁹ Acute symptomatology may be an opportune time to revisit the core pathology of a patient, or a poor time for a patient to have this discussion.

Compile a list of all the patient’s diagnoses. Our initial visits are often illuminated when patients enumerate the vast number of diagnoses they have been given by different providers. Patients will often list half a dozen diagnoses. The patterns often follow life courses with ADHD, conduct disorder, and learning disability in childhood; with anxiety, depression, and/or bipolar disorder in early adulthood; to complicated grief, depression with pseudodementia, and neurocognitive disorders in older adults. Yet patients rarely appreciate the temporary or episodic nature of mental disorders and instead accumulate diagnoses at each change of provider.

Initiate discussion with the patient. It is meaningful to see if patients resonate with the question, “Do you ever feel like every psychiatrist you have seen has given you a different diagnosis?” In our experience, patients’ reactions to this question usually exemplify the problematic nature of the vast array of diagnoses our patients are given. The majority of them are unable to confidently explain the meaning of those diagnoses, the context in which they were given, or their significance. This simple exercise has a powerful effect on raising awareness to patients of the problematic nature of polydiagnosing.

Introduce de-diagnosing. The engagement of patients in the diagnostic process has a significant effect. Reviewing not only diagnostic criteria but also nosology and debates in our understanding of diagnoses can provide patients with further engagement in their care. A simple review of the debate of the bereavement exclusion may permit a patient to not only understand the complexity, but also the changing nature of diagnoses. Suddenly, they are no longer bystanders, but informed participants in their care.

Identify diagnoses most appropriate for removal. Contradictory diagnoses are common in the clinical settings we work in. We routinely see patients carrying multiple mood diagnoses, despite our diagnostic systems not permitting one to have both unipolar and bipolar depression. Superfluous diagnoses are also frequent, with patients receiving depressive, or anxious labels when in an acute state of psychosis or mania. This is exemplified by patients suffering from thought blocking and receiving cognitive or attention-related diagnoses. Concurrent yet different diagnoses are also common in patients with a different list of diagnoses by their primary care provider, their therapist, and their psychiatrist. This is particularly problematic as it forces the patient to alternate their thinking or choose between their providers.

Create a new narrative for the patient. Once diagnoses are explained, clarified, and understood, patients with the help of their providers can reexamine their life story under a new and simplified construct. This process often leads to a less confusing sense of self, an increased dedication to the treatment process, whether behavioral, social, psychological, or pharmacologic.

Consider deprescribing. With a more straightforward and more grounded list of diagnoses (or simply one diagnosis), we find the process of deprescribing to be simpler and more engaging for patients. For example, patients can clearly understand the lack of necessity of an antipsychotic prescription for a resolved substance-induced psychosis. Patients are more engaged in their care, leading to improved medication compliance and less attachment to discontinued medications.

Monitor and adapt. One should of course reevaluate diagnoses as the course of illness provides us with additional information. However, we suggest waiting for a manic episode to emerge prior to diagnosing bipolar rather than suggesting the diagnosis because a patient was wearing red shoes, spoke multiple languages, had multiple degrees and was creative.¹⁰ The contextual basis and progression of the symptoms should lead to continual reassessment of diagnoses.

Physicians are aware of the balance between Occam’s razor, which promotes the simplest single explanation for a problem, versus Hickam’s dictum that reminds us that patients can have as many diseases as they please. However, similarly to polypharmacy, “polydiagnosing” has negative effects. While the field of psychiatry’s advancing knowledge may encourage providers to diagnose their patients with the growing number of diagnoses, patients still need and benefit from a coherent and clear medical narrative. Psychiatry would be wise to recognize this concerning trend, in its attempt at rectifying polypharmacy.

Dr. Badre is a clinical and forensic psychiatrist in San Diego. He holds teaching positions at the University of California, San Diego, and the University of San Diego. He teaches medical education, psychopharmacology, ethics in psychiatry, and correctional care. Dr. Badre can be reached at his website, BadreMD.com. He has no conflicts of interest. Dr. Lehman is a professor of psychiatry at the University of California, San Diego. He is codirector of all acute and intensive psychiatric treatment at the Veterans Affairs Medical Center in San Diego, where he practices clinical psychiatry. He has no conflicts of interest.

References

1. Gupta S & Cahill JD. A prescription for “deprescribing” in psychiatry. Psychiatr Serv. 2016 Aug 1;67(8):904-7. doi: 10.1176/appi.ps.201500359.

2. Schuckit MA. Comorbidity between substance use disorders and psychiatric conditions. Addiction. 2006 Sep;101 Suppl 1:76-88. doi: 10.1111/j.1360-0443.2006.01592.x.

3. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition, Text Revision (DSM-5-TR). American Psychiatric Association, 2022. https://psychiatry.org/psychiatrists/practice/dsm.

4. Kendler KS. An historical framework for psychiatric nosology. Psychol Med. 2009 Dec;39(12):1935-41. doi: 10.1017/S0033291709005753.

5. Regier DA et al. DSM-5 field trials in the United States and Canada. Am J Psychiatry. 2013 Jan;170(1):59-70. doi: 10.1176/appi.ajp.2012.12070999.

6. Bhattacharya R et al. When good news is bad news: psychological impact of false-positive diagnosis of HIV. AIDS Care. 2008 May;20(5):560-4. doi: 10.1080/09540120701867206.

7. Reeve E et al. Review of deprescribing processes and development of an evidence‐based, patient‐centred deprescribing process. Br J Clin Pharmacol. 2014 Oct;78(4):738-47. doi: 10.1111/bcp.12386.

8. Gupta S and Cahill JD. A prescription for “deprescribing” in psychiatry.

9. Solomon M. “On the appearance and disappearance of Asperger’s syndrome” in Kendler and Parnas (eds.) Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry IV: Classification of Psychiatric Illness. Oxford University Press, 2017. doi: 10.1093/med/9780198796022.003.0023.

10. Akiskal HS. Searching for behavioral indicators of bipolar II in patients presenting with major depressive episodes: The “red sign,” the “rule of three,” and other biographic signs of temperamental extravagance, activation, and hypomania. J Affect Disord. 2005 Feb;84(2-3):279-90. doi: 10.1016/j.jad.2004.06.002.

A trainee recently observed that psychiatrists frequently seem motivated to protect patients from emotional and internal disruption. He suggested that we often did so by validating their maladaptive perspectives regarding their impaired relationships to society and close attachments. These maneuvers were justified by referring to the need to establish a therapeutic alliance and reduce patients’ suffering.

As an example, he mentioned a patient with alcohol use disorder. The patient came in with complaints that he could not stay sober with his current level of depression. The patient also complained of a family member who was setting limits. To the trainee’s surprise, the patient was not challenged on his perceived victimhood and his fantasy that a sober life should mean a life without negative effect. Instead, the patient was validated in his anger toward the family member. In addition, his medications were adjusted, seemingly confirming to the patient that one could only ask for sobriety once life is empty of pain.

The observation of the trainee reminded us of the three great “untruths” mentioned by Greg Lukianoff and Jonathan Haidt, PhD, in their famous book, “The Coddling of the American Mind.”¹ In the book they warn against the idea of fragility – what doesn’t kill you makes you weaker; emotional reasoning – always trust your feelings; and us-versus-them thinking – life is a battle between good people and evil people. The authors compare these three great untruths with the cognitive distortions of cognitive-behavioral therapy.

We ponder the trainee’s observation that psychiatrists appear to encourage the untruths rather than challenge them. Part of psychiatric and all medical training involves learning nonjudgmental approaches to human suffering and an identification with individual needs over societal demands. Our suspicion is that a nonjudgmental approach to the understanding of the human condition generates a desire to protect patients from a moralistic shaming position. However, we wonder if, at times, psychiatry takes this approach too far.
 

Reconceptualizing shame

Shame can be a toxic presence in the overwhelmed superego of a patient, but it can serve an important role in psychic development and should not be avoided out of hand. We suggest that it can be appropriate for a patient with an alcohol use disorder to feel some shame for the harm caused by their drinking, and we question the limit of psychiatry’s current pursuit of incessant validation. As an extreme example, would modern psychiatry discourage a patient who killed someone while driving in an intoxicated state from feeling remorse and shame?

Modern psychiatry appears to have other examples of the three great untruths on display. In our work, we are often faced with patients who are prematurely placed on disability, an example of fragility. Instead of encouraging patients to return to the workforce, they are “protected” from the emotional difficulty of work. In many patients this results in a decline in functioning and worsening of psychiatric symptoms. We are also confronted with patients who define themselves by how they feel, an example of emotional reasoning. Instead of using our clinical judgments to define and assess symptoms, patients are left to decide for themselves through self-rated scales with questionable validity.2 This can result in patients having their emotional experiences not only validated when inappropriate but can also give emotional reasoning a false sense of medical legitimacy.

Finally, we commonly see patients who endlessly blame family members and others for any life difficulties, a form of us-versus-them thinking. Instead of acknowledging and then integrating life challenges to achieve recovery, patients are affirmed despite clinicians having little evidence on the veracity of the patients’ perspective. As a consequence, patients can be further isolated from their greatest source of support.

In some ways, a mindlessly validating approach in psychiatry is unexpected since the practice of psychiatry would seem to promote the development of strong attachments and resilience. After all, connections to family, employment, social institutions, and even religious worship are associated with vastly better outcomes. Those who have become alienated to these pillars of social cohesion fare much worse. One may deplore the static and at times oppressive nature of these institutions but the empirical experience of practicing psychiatry leads one to a healthy respect for the stabilizing influence they accord for individuals struggling with life’s vicissitudes, unpredictability, and loneliness. Overcoming the fear of responsibility, living up to the demands and expectations of society, and having the strength to overcome difficult emotions should be the standard goals of psychiatric treatment.

From the knowledge gained from working with patients struggling from psychic pain, we wonder how to encourage patients to pursue those adaptive approaches to life. We argue that a stoic emphasis on learning to manage one’s affective and mental response to the inevitable changes of life is key to achieving wisdom and stability in our humble lives. This perspective is a common denominator of multiple different psychotherapies. The goal is to provide patients with the ability to be in a place where they are engaged with the world in a meaningful way that is not overwhelmed by distorted, self-absorbed psychic anguish. This perspective discourages externalization as a relatively low-yield way to understand and overcome one’s problems. One identifies childhood experiences with one’s mother as a source of adult distress not for the purpose of blaming her, but for the purpose of recognizing one’s own childish motivations for making maladaptive decisions as an adult.

For many patients, the goal should be to emphasize an internal locus of control and responsibility. We should also avoid constantly relying on society and government’s role in helping the individual achieve a satisfactory life. We wonder if this endless pursuit of nonjudgment and validation corrupts the doctor-patient interaction. In other words, focusing on medical diagnoses and psychopharmacology may be a counter therapeutic maneuver that compromises a patient’s sense of autonomy and individual responsibility for their own psychic development. Psychotherapy that ends with the patient being able to identify all the traumas that led to their sorrow has simply left the patient in the role of helpless and sorrowful victim. Instead, we should allow patients to proceed to the next step, which is empowerment and transformation. From this angle, the field of psychiatry should be cautious of encouraging movements that promote victimhood and grievance as a meaningful psychic position to take in society.

Mr. Lukianoff and Dr. Haidt use cognitive therapy as an analogy throughout their books for how to confront the great untruths. They perceive those modern forms of thinking as cognitive distortions, which can be remedied using the techniques of cognitive restructuring found in cognitive-behavioral therapy. They encourage us to recognize those maladaptive thoughts, and create more accurate and adaptive ways of viewing the world – a view that would be able to grow from challenges not just survive them; a view referred to as antifragile.3 We believe that those techniques and others would certainly be of assistance in our current times. However, the first step is to recognize our problem – a problem that is not rooted in the DSM, research, or biology but in an exaggerated intention to be patient centered. We should, however, remember that, when a patient has negative schemas, being too patient centered can be encouraging to maladaptive behaviors.

In conclusion, we wonder what modern psychiatry could look like if it made a concerted effort at also treating mental illness by reinforcing the importance of individual agency and responsibility. Modern psychiatry has been so focused on describing biological symptoms needing biological treatments that we sometimes forget that having no symptom (being asymptomatic) is not the only goal. Having a fulfilling and meaningful life, which is resilient to future symptoms is just as important to patients. We seem to have entrenched ourselves so deeply in an overly basic approach of problem-solution and diagnosis-treatment paradigm. However, we don’t need to renege on modern advances to promote the patient’s strength, adaptability, and antifragility. An emphasis on patient growth can complement the medical model. We wonder what effect such an approach would have if the trainee’s patient with alcohol use disorder was instead told: “Given the suffering you have and have caused because of your alcohol use disorder, how do you plan to make changes in your life to help the treatment plan we create together?”

Dr. Lehman is a professor of psychiatry at the University of California, San Diego. He is codirector of all acute and intensive psychiatric treatment at the Veterans Affairs Medical Center in San Diego, where he practices clinical psychiatry. He also is the course director for the UCSD third-year medical student psychiatry clerkship. Dr. Badre is a clinical and forensic psychiatrist in San Diego. He holds teaching positions at UCSD and the University of San Diego. Dr. Badre can be reached at his website, BadreMD.com.

References

1. Lukianoff G, Haidt J. The Coddling of the American Mind: How Good Intentions and Bad Ideas are Setting Up a Generation for Failure. New York: Penguin Books, 2019.

2. Levis B et al. J Clin Epidemiol. 2020 Jun;122:115-128.e1.,

3. Taleb NN. Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder. Vol. 3. New York: Random House, 2012.

A trainee recently observed that psychiatrists frequently seem motivated to protect patients from emotional and internal disruption. He suggested that we often did so by validating their maladaptive perspectives regarding their impaired relationships to society and close attachments. These maneuvers were justified by referring to the need to establish a therapeutic alliance and reduce patients’ suffering.

As an example, he mentioned a patient with alcohol use disorder. The patient came in with complaints that he could not stay sober with his current level of depression. The patient also complained of a family member who was setting limits. To the trainee’s surprise, the patient was not challenged on his perceived victimhood and his fantasy that a sober life should mean a life without negative effect. Instead, the patient was validated in his anger toward the family member. In addition, his medications were adjusted, seemingly confirming to the patient that one could only ask for sobriety once life is empty of pain.

The observation of the trainee reminded us of the three great “untruths” mentioned by Greg Lukianoff and Jonathan Haidt, PhD, in their famous book, “The Coddling of the American Mind.”¹ In the book they warn against the idea of fragility – what doesn’t kill you makes you weaker; emotional reasoning – always trust your feelings; and us-versus-them thinking – life is a battle between good people and evil people. The authors compare these three great untruths with the cognitive distortions of cognitive-behavioral therapy.

We ponder the trainee’s observation that psychiatrists appear to encourage the untruths rather than challenge them. Part of psychiatric and all medical training involves learning nonjudgmental approaches to human suffering and an identification with individual needs over societal demands. Our suspicion is that a nonjudgmental approach to the understanding of the human condition generates a desire to protect patients from a moralistic shaming position. However, we wonder if, at times, psychiatry takes this approach too far.
 

Reconceptualizing shame

Shame can be a toxic presence in the overwhelmed superego of a patient, but it can serve an important role in psychic development and should not be avoided out of hand. We suggest that it can be appropriate for a patient with an alcohol use disorder to feel some shame for the harm caused by their drinking, and we question the limit of psychiatry’s current pursuit of incessant validation. As an extreme example, would modern psychiatry discourage a patient who killed someone while driving in an intoxicated state from feeling remorse and shame?

Modern psychiatry appears to have other examples of the three great untruths on display. In our work, we are often faced with patients who are prematurely placed on disability, an example of fragility. Instead of encouraging patients to return to the workforce, they are “protected” from the emotional difficulty of work. In many patients this results in a decline in functioning and worsening of psychiatric symptoms. We are also confronted with patients who define themselves by how they feel, an example of emotional reasoning. Instead of using our clinical judgments to define and assess symptoms, patients are left to decide for themselves through self-rated scales with questionable validity.2 This can result in patients having their emotional experiences not only validated when inappropriate but can also give emotional reasoning a false sense of medical legitimacy.

Finally, we commonly see patients who endlessly blame family members and others for any life difficulties, a form of us-versus-them thinking. Instead of acknowledging and then integrating life challenges to achieve recovery, patients are affirmed despite clinicians having little evidence on the veracity of the patients’ perspective. As a consequence, patients can be further isolated from their greatest source of support.

In some ways, a mindlessly validating approach in psychiatry is unexpected since the practice of psychiatry would seem to promote the development of strong attachments and resilience. After all, connections to family, employment, social institutions, and even religious worship are associated with vastly better outcomes. Those who have become alienated to these pillars of social cohesion fare much worse. One may deplore the static and at times oppressive nature of these institutions but the empirical experience of practicing psychiatry leads one to a healthy respect for the stabilizing influence they accord for individuals struggling with life’s vicissitudes, unpredictability, and loneliness. Overcoming the fear of responsibility, living up to the demands and expectations of society, and having the strength to overcome difficult emotions should be the standard goals of psychiatric treatment.

From the knowledge gained from working with patients struggling from psychic pain, we wonder how to encourage patients to pursue those adaptive approaches to life. We argue that a stoic emphasis on learning to manage one’s affective and mental response to the inevitable changes of life is key to achieving wisdom and stability in our humble lives. This perspective is a common denominator of multiple different psychotherapies. The goal is to provide patients with the ability to be in a place where they are engaged with the world in a meaningful way that is not overwhelmed by distorted, self-absorbed psychic anguish. This perspective discourages externalization as a relatively low-yield way to understand and overcome one’s problems. One identifies childhood experiences with one’s mother as a source of adult distress not for the purpose of blaming her, but for the purpose of recognizing one’s own childish motivations for making maladaptive decisions as an adult.

For many patients, the goal should be to emphasize an internal locus of control and responsibility. We should also avoid constantly relying on society and government’s role in helping the individual achieve a satisfactory life. We wonder if this endless pursuit of nonjudgment and validation corrupts the doctor-patient interaction. In other words, focusing on medical diagnoses and psychopharmacology may be a counter therapeutic maneuver that compromises a patient’s sense of autonomy and individual responsibility for their own psychic development. Psychotherapy that ends with the patient being able to identify all the traumas that led to their sorrow has simply left the patient in the role of helpless and sorrowful victim. Instead, we should allow patients to proceed to the next step, which is empowerment and transformation. From this angle, the field of psychiatry should be cautious of encouraging movements that promote victimhood and grievance as a meaningful psychic position to take in society.

Mr. Lukianoff and Dr. Haidt use cognitive therapy as an analogy throughout their books for how to confront the great untruths. They perceive those modern forms of thinking as cognitive distortions, which can be remedied using the techniques of cognitive restructuring found in cognitive-behavioral therapy. They encourage us to recognize those maladaptive thoughts, and create more accurate and adaptive ways of viewing the world – a view that would be able to grow from challenges not just survive them; a view referred to as antifragile.3 We believe that those techniques and others would certainly be of assistance in our current times. However, the first step is to recognize our problem – a problem that is not rooted in the DSM, research, or biology but in an exaggerated intention to be patient centered. We should, however, remember that, when a patient has negative schemas, being too patient centered can be encouraging to maladaptive behaviors.

In conclusion, we wonder what modern psychiatry could look like if it made a concerted effort at also treating mental illness by reinforcing the importance of individual agency and responsibility. Modern psychiatry has been so focused on describing biological symptoms needing biological treatments that we sometimes forget that having no symptom (being asymptomatic) is not the only goal. Having a fulfilling and meaningful life, which is resilient to future symptoms is just as important to patients. We seem to have entrenched ourselves so deeply in an overly basic approach of problem-solution and diagnosis-treatment paradigm. However, we don’t need to renege on modern advances to promote the patient’s strength, adaptability, and antifragility. An emphasis on patient growth can complement the medical model. We wonder what effect such an approach would have if the trainee’s patient with alcohol use disorder was instead told: “Given the suffering you have and have caused because of your alcohol use disorder, how do you plan to make changes in your life to help the treatment plan we create together?”

Dr. Lehman is a professor of psychiatry at the University of California, San Diego. He is codirector of all acute and intensive psychiatric treatment at the Veterans Affairs Medical Center in San Diego, where he practices clinical psychiatry. He also is the course director for the UCSD third-year medical student psychiatry clerkship. Dr. Badre is a clinical and forensic psychiatrist in San Diego. He holds teaching positions at UCSD and the University of San Diego. Dr. Badre can be reached at his website, BadreMD.com.

References

1. Lukianoff G, Haidt J. The Coddling of the American Mind: How Good Intentions and Bad Ideas are Setting Up a Generation for Failure. New York: Penguin Books, 2019.

2. Levis B et al. J Clin Epidemiol. 2020 Jun;122:115-128.e1.,

3. Taleb NN. Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder. Vol. 3. New York: Random House, 2012.

A trainee recently observed that psychiatrists frequently seem motivated to protect patients from emotional and internal disruption. He suggested that we often did so by validating their maladaptive perspectives regarding their impaired relationships to society and close attachments. These maneuvers were justified by referring to the need to establish a therapeutic alliance and reduce patients’ suffering.

As an example, he mentioned a patient with alcohol use disorder. The patient came in with complaints that he could not stay sober with his current level of depression. The patient also complained of a family member who was setting limits. To the trainee’s surprise, the patient was not challenged on his perceived victimhood and his fantasy that a sober life should mean a life without negative effect. Instead, the patient was validated in his anger toward the family member. In addition, his medications were adjusted, seemingly confirming to the patient that one could only ask for sobriety once life is empty of pain.

The observation of the trainee reminded us of the three great “untruths” mentioned by Greg Lukianoff and Jonathan Haidt, PhD, in their famous book, “The Coddling of the American Mind.”¹ In the book they warn against the idea of fragility – what doesn’t kill you makes you weaker; emotional reasoning – always trust your feelings; and us-versus-them thinking – life is a battle between good people and evil people. The authors compare these three great untruths with the cognitive distortions of cognitive-behavioral therapy.

We ponder the trainee’s observation that psychiatrists appear to encourage the untruths rather than challenge them. Part of psychiatric and all medical training involves learning nonjudgmental approaches to human suffering and an identification with individual needs over societal demands. Our suspicion is that a nonjudgmental approach to the understanding of the human condition generates a desire to protect patients from a moralistic shaming position. However, we wonder if, at times, psychiatry takes this approach too far.
 

Reconceptualizing shame

Shame can be a toxic presence in the overwhelmed superego of a patient, but it can serve an important role in psychic development and should not be avoided out of hand. We suggest that it can be appropriate for a patient with an alcohol use disorder to feel some shame for the harm caused by their drinking, and we question the limit of psychiatry’s current pursuit of incessant validation. As an extreme example, would modern psychiatry discourage a patient who killed someone while driving in an intoxicated state from feeling remorse and shame?

Modern psychiatry appears to have other examples of the three great untruths on display. In our work, we are often faced with patients who are prematurely placed on disability, an example of fragility. Instead of encouraging patients to return to the workforce, they are “protected” from the emotional difficulty of work. In many patients this results in a decline in functioning and worsening of psychiatric symptoms. We are also confronted with patients who define themselves by how they feel, an example of emotional reasoning. Instead of using our clinical judgments to define and assess symptoms, patients are left to decide for themselves through self-rated scales with questionable validity.2 This can result in patients having their emotional experiences not only validated when inappropriate but can also give emotional reasoning a false sense of medical legitimacy.

Finally, we commonly see patients who endlessly blame family members and others for any life difficulties, a form of us-versus-them thinking. Instead of acknowledging and then integrating life challenges to achieve recovery, patients are affirmed despite clinicians having little evidence on the veracity of the patients’ perspective. As a consequence, patients can be further isolated from their greatest source of support.

In some ways, a mindlessly validating approach in psychiatry is unexpected since the practice of psychiatry would seem to promote the development of strong attachments and resilience. After all, connections to family, employment, social institutions, and even religious worship are associated with vastly better outcomes. Those who have become alienated to these pillars of social cohesion fare much worse. One may deplore the static and at times oppressive nature of these institutions but the empirical experience of practicing psychiatry leads one to a healthy respect for the stabilizing influence they accord for individuals struggling with life’s vicissitudes, unpredictability, and loneliness. Overcoming the fear of responsibility, living up to the demands and expectations of society, and having the strength to overcome difficult emotions should be the standard goals of psychiatric treatment.

From the knowledge gained from working with patients struggling from psychic pain, we wonder how to encourage patients to pursue those adaptive approaches to life. We argue that a stoic emphasis on learning to manage one’s affective and mental response to the inevitable changes of life is key to achieving wisdom and stability in our humble lives. This perspective is a common denominator of multiple different psychotherapies. The goal is to provide patients with the ability to be in a place where they are engaged with the world in a meaningful way that is not overwhelmed by distorted, self-absorbed psychic anguish. This perspective discourages externalization as a relatively low-yield way to understand and overcome one’s problems. One identifies childhood experiences with one’s mother as a source of adult distress not for the purpose of blaming her, but for the purpose of recognizing one’s own childish motivations for making maladaptive decisions as an adult.

For many patients, the goal should be to emphasize an internal locus of control and responsibility. We should also avoid constantly relying on society and government’s role in helping the individual achieve a satisfactory life. We wonder if this endless pursuit of nonjudgment and validation corrupts the doctor-patient interaction. In other words, focusing on medical diagnoses and psychopharmacology may be a counter therapeutic maneuver that compromises a patient’s sense of autonomy and individual responsibility for their own psychic development. Psychotherapy that ends with the patient being able to identify all the traumas that led to their sorrow has simply left the patient in the role of helpless and sorrowful victim. Instead, we should allow patients to proceed to the next step, which is empowerment and transformation. From this angle, the field of psychiatry should be cautious of encouraging movements that promote victimhood and grievance as a meaningful psychic position to take in society.

Mr. Lukianoff and Dr. Haidt use cognitive therapy as an analogy throughout their books for how to confront the great untruths. They perceive those modern forms of thinking as cognitive distortions, which can be remedied using the techniques of cognitive restructuring found in cognitive-behavioral therapy. They encourage us to recognize those maladaptive thoughts, and create more accurate and adaptive ways of viewing the world – a view that would be able to grow from challenges not just survive them; a view referred to as antifragile.3 We believe that those techniques and others would certainly be of assistance in our current times. However, the first step is to recognize our problem – a problem that is not rooted in the DSM, research, or biology but in an exaggerated intention to be patient centered. We should, however, remember that, when a patient has negative schemas, being too patient centered can be encouraging to maladaptive behaviors.

In conclusion, we wonder what modern psychiatry could look like if it made a concerted effort at also treating mental illness by reinforcing the importance of individual agency and responsibility. Modern psychiatry has been so focused on describing biological symptoms needing biological treatments that we sometimes forget that having no symptom (being asymptomatic) is not the only goal. Having a fulfilling and meaningful life, which is resilient to future symptoms is just as important to patients. We seem to have entrenched ourselves so deeply in an overly basic approach of problem-solution and diagnosis-treatment paradigm. However, we don’t need to renege on modern advances to promote the patient’s strength, adaptability, and antifragility. An emphasis on patient growth can complement the medical model. We wonder what effect such an approach would have if the trainee’s patient with alcohol use disorder was instead told: “Given the suffering you have and have caused because of your alcohol use disorder, how do you plan to make changes in your life to help the treatment plan we create together?”

Dr. Lehman is a professor of psychiatry at the University of California, San Diego. He is codirector of all acute and intensive psychiatric treatment at the Veterans Affairs Medical Center in San Diego, where he practices clinical psychiatry. He also is the course director for the UCSD third-year medical student psychiatry clerkship. Dr. Badre is a clinical and forensic psychiatrist in San Diego. He holds teaching positions at UCSD and the University of San Diego. Dr. Badre can be reached at his website, BadreMD.com.

References

1. Lukianoff G, Haidt J. The Coddling of the American Mind: How Good Intentions and Bad Ideas are Setting Up a Generation for Failure. New York: Penguin Books, 2019.

2. Levis B et al. J Clin Epidemiol. 2020 Jun;122:115-128.e1.,

3. Taleb NN. Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder. Vol. 3. New York: Random House, 2012.

Despite popular belief, the absence of a strong link between mental illness and violence has been well studied and established. In summary, in a small subset of patients, mental illness provides a minor increase in the risk of committing violence.¹

In part as a result of this research, police departments across the country have established programs and protocols to divert patients with mental illness out of the legal system and into mental hospitals. Instead of accepting the common refrain that mental illness is the explanation and best predictor of all atrocious behaviors, police departments have correctly referred patients with mental illness to mental hospitals. We commend those initiatives and encourage their adoption in all locales. Yet, to safeguard such programs, we would like to warn of a potential pitfall and offer possible remedies.

Having worked in both correctional and clinical settings, we are saddened by the similar nature of the work with respect to the management of mental illness. It should defy logic to assume the need for mental health care in our jails is in any way comparable to the one in mental hospitals. However, we have grown accustomed to seeing large numbers of our most vulnerable patients with severe mental illness accumulating in our jails and correctional facilities, which often are the largest employers of mental health clinicians. The reasons correctional institutions have become so reliant on psychiatric clinicians are vast and complex. Incarceration is tremendously destabilizing and can lead to the onset or relapse of mental illness – even in the most resilient patients. In addition, mental illness is undertreated in our communities yet inescapable in the confined settings of our jails. Furthermore, our mass incarceration problems have resulted in the most disenfranchised populations, including our patients with mental illness, becoming the targets of policies criminalizing poverty.²

To prevent furthering the process by which our correctional facilities have become the new asylums,³ law enforcement agencies have enacted a vast array of initiatives. Some include the placement of mental health staff within emergency response teams. Some include training police officers in how to talk to patients with mental illness as well as how to deescalate mental health crises. Most of the initiatives have one common goal: diverting patients with mental illness who are better treated in mental hospitals from going to jail. However, herein lies the problem: If mental illness is an explanation for only a small subset of criminal behavior, why is there a large need to divert patients with mental illness from jails to mental hospitals?

Over the past few years, psychiatrists in emergency departments have noted a concerning trend: an increase in referrals to mental hospitals by law enforcement for what appears to be a crime with only a vague or obscure link to mental illness. Most psychiatrists who regularly work in emergency departments will witness many examples. Some might be fairly benign: “They were going to arrest me for trespassing; I was yelling at a coffee shop. But when I told them that I had run out of meds, they brought me here instead.”

However, some stories are more chilling, including the case of an older male who had made threats while shooting his gun in the air and was brought to the emergency department because, as the police officer told us, “I think that he is just depressed; you guys can keep him safe till he is better.”

We applaud society’s desire to reduce the criminalization of mental illness. We think that psychiatry should be deeply involved in the attempts to resolve this problem. Furthermore, we are cognizant that the number of patients with mental illness unnecessarily imprisoned as a result of prosecutorial zealousness is a larger problem than criminals inappropriately brought to mental hospitals. However, we also are aware of the limitation of psychiatric hospitals in solving nonpsychiatric problems.

If mental illness (for the most part) does not cause violence, then when patients with or without mental illness commit a violent act, the response (for the most part) should not be a psychiatric one. Recent studies have demonstrated the need to examine criminogenic needs before psychiatric ones when attempting to reduce recidivism in all offenders, including those with mental illnesses.⁴ The emphasis on addressing psychiatric needs over criminogenic ones is misguided and not based on evidence. Yet, we appreciate the complexity of those questions and of individual cases.

Substance use disorders are emblematic of this problem. Psychiatry has now communicated the position that substance use disorders are mental illness and not a moral failing. However, are the crimes committed by individuals with substance use disorders, whether in a state of intoxication or driven by the cycles of addiction, the blameless result of mental illness? The legal system struggles with this question, trying to determine when addiction-related crimes should be referred to a diversion program or treated as a straightforward criminal prosecution. Those who favor diversion for addiction can point out that many criminal acts are associated with mitigating factors that are no less valid than is addiction.

However, those mitigating factors, such as poverty, childhood deprivation, or a violence-infused sociological milieu, cannot be found in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. As such, if those factors alone were considered, no diversion would be offered by the courts. There also can be unforeseen consequences to this bias for diversion or criminal prosecution. Violent outbursts are a recognized part of PTSD in veterans. Psychiatrists who work at Veterans Affairs can be faced with the diagnosis of PTSD being used as an excuse for violent behavior, which may, at some level be valid, but which can be dangerous in that labeling a patient with that diagnosis might lower the barriers to violent behavior by providing a ready-made explanation already internalized by the patient through unspoken, sociocultural norms.

With the awareness of the complex nature of the intersectionality of mental illness and criminality, we recommend improvements to current diversion programs. As diversion programs rightfully continue to expand across the country, we likely will see an increase in the number of referrals by police officers to our emergency departments. Some of the referrals will be considered “inappropriate” after thorough and thoughtful clinical evaluation by emergency psychiatrists. The inappropriateness might be secondary to an absence of active symptoms, an absence of correlation between the illness and the offense, or a more urgent criminogenic need.

When faced with someone who will not benefit from diversion to a psychiatric emergency department, psychiatrists should have the tools to revert the person back into the legal system. Those tools could come in many forms – law enforcement liaison, prosecution liaison, or simply the presence of officers who are mandated to wait for the approval of the clinician prior to dismissing legal charges. Whatever the solution might be for any particular locale, policy makers should not wait for adverse events to realize the potential pitfalls of the important work being done in developing our country’s diversion programs.

References

1. Swanson JW et al. Mental illness and reduction of gun violence and suicide: Bringing epidemiologic research to policy. Ann Epidemiol. 2015 May;25(5):366-76.

2. Ehrenreich B. “How America criminalized poverty.” The Guardian. 2011 Aug 10.

3. Roth A. “Prisons are the new asylums.” The Atlantic. 2018 April.

4. Latessa EJ et al. “What works (and doesn’t) in reducing recidivism.” New York: Routledge, 2015.
 

Dr. Badre is a forensic psychiatrist in San Diego and an expert in correctional mental health. He holds teaching positions at the University of California, San Diego, and the University of San Diego. Dr. Badre can be reached at his website, BadreMD.com. Dr. Lehman is an associate professor of psychiatry at the University of California, San Diego. He is codirector of all acute and intensive psychiatric treatment at the Veterans Affairs Medical Center in San Diego, where he practices clinical psychiatry. He also is the course director for the UCSD third-year medical student psychiatry clerkship.

Despite popular belief, the absence of a strong link between mental illness and violence has been well studied and established. In summary, in a small subset of patients, mental illness provides a minor increase in the risk of committing violence.¹

In part as a result of this research, police departments across the country have established programs and protocols to divert patients with mental illness out of the legal system and into mental hospitals. Instead of accepting the common refrain that mental illness is the explanation and best predictor of all atrocious behaviors, police departments have correctly referred patients with mental illness to mental hospitals. We commend those initiatives and encourage their adoption in all locales. Yet, to safeguard such programs, we would like to warn of a potential pitfall and offer possible remedies.

Having worked in both correctional and clinical settings, we are saddened by the similar nature of the work with respect to the management of mental illness. It should defy logic to assume the need for mental health care in our jails is in any way comparable to the one in mental hospitals. However, we have grown accustomed to seeing large numbers of our most vulnerable patients with severe mental illness accumulating in our jails and correctional facilities, which often are the largest employers of mental health clinicians. The reasons correctional institutions have become so reliant on psychiatric clinicians are vast and complex. Incarceration is tremendously destabilizing and can lead to the onset or relapse of mental illness – even in the most resilient patients. In addition, mental illness is undertreated in our communities yet inescapable in the confined settings of our jails. Furthermore, our mass incarceration problems have resulted in the most disenfranchised populations, including our patients with mental illness, becoming the targets of policies criminalizing poverty.²

To prevent furthering the process by which our correctional facilities have become the new asylums,³ law enforcement agencies have enacted a vast array of initiatives. Some include the placement of mental health staff within emergency response teams. Some include training police officers in how to talk to patients with mental illness as well as how to deescalate mental health crises. Most of the initiatives have one common goal: diverting patients with mental illness who are better treated in mental hospitals from going to jail. However, herein lies the problem: If mental illness is an explanation for only a small subset of criminal behavior, why is there a large need to divert patients with mental illness from jails to mental hospitals?

Over the past few years, psychiatrists in emergency departments have noted a concerning trend: an increase in referrals to mental hospitals by law enforcement for what appears to be a crime with only a vague or obscure link to mental illness. Most psychiatrists who regularly work in emergency departments will witness many examples. Some might be fairly benign: “They were going to arrest me for trespassing; I was yelling at a coffee shop. But when I told them that I had run out of meds, they brought me here instead.”

However, some stories are more chilling, including the case of an older male who had made threats while shooting his gun in the air and was brought to the emergency department because, as the police officer told us, “I think that he is just depressed; you guys can keep him safe till he is better.”

We applaud society’s desire to reduce the criminalization of mental illness. We think that psychiatry should be deeply involved in the attempts to resolve this problem. Furthermore, we are cognizant that the number of patients with mental illness unnecessarily imprisoned as a result of prosecutorial zealousness is a larger problem than criminals inappropriately brought to mental hospitals. However, we also are aware of the limitation of psychiatric hospitals in solving nonpsychiatric problems.

If mental illness (for the most part) does not cause violence, then when patients with or without mental illness commit a violent act, the response (for the most part) should not be a psychiatric one. Recent studies have demonstrated the need to examine criminogenic needs before psychiatric ones when attempting to reduce recidivism in all offenders, including those with mental illnesses.⁴ The emphasis on addressing psychiatric needs over criminogenic ones is misguided and not based on evidence. Yet, we appreciate the complexity of those questions and of individual cases.

Substance use disorders are emblematic of this problem. Psychiatry has now communicated the position that substance use disorders are mental illness and not a moral failing. However, are the crimes committed by individuals with substance use disorders, whether in a state of intoxication or driven by the cycles of addiction, the blameless result of mental illness? The legal system struggles with this question, trying to determine when addiction-related crimes should be referred to a diversion program or treated as a straightforward criminal prosecution. Those who favor diversion for addiction can point out that many criminal acts are associated with mitigating factors that are no less valid than is addiction.

However, those mitigating factors, such as poverty, childhood deprivation, or a violence-infused sociological milieu, cannot be found in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. As such, if those factors alone were considered, no diversion would be offered by the courts. There also can be unforeseen consequences to this bias for diversion or criminal prosecution. Violent outbursts are a recognized part of PTSD in veterans. Psychiatrists who work at Veterans Affairs can be faced with the diagnosis of PTSD being used as an excuse for violent behavior, which may, at some level be valid, but which can be dangerous in that labeling a patient with that diagnosis might lower the barriers to violent behavior by providing a ready-made explanation already internalized by the patient through unspoken, sociocultural norms.

With the awareness of the complex nature of the intersectionality of mental illness and criminality, we recommend improvements to current diversion programs. As diversion programs rightfully continue to expand across the country, we likely will see an increase in the number of referrals by police officers to our emergency departments. Some of the referrals will be considered “inappropriate” after thorough and thoughtful clinical evaluation by emergency psychiatrists. The inappropriateness might be secondary to an absence of active symptoms, an absence of correlation between the illness and the offense, or a more urgent criminogenic need.

When faced with someone who will not benefit from diversion to a psychiatric emergency department, psychiatrists should have the tools to revert the person back into the legal system. Those tools could come in many forms – law enforcement liaison, prosecution liaison, or simply the presence of officers who are mandated to wait for the approval of the clinician prior to dismissing legal charges. Whatever the solution might be for any particular locale, policy makers should not wait for adverse events to realize the potential pitfalls of the important work being done in developing our country’s diversion programs.

References

1. Swanson JW et al. Mental illness and reduction of gun violence and suicide: Bringing epidemiologic research to policy. Ann Epidemiol. 2015 May;25(5):366-76.

2. Ehrenreich B. “How America criminalized poverty.” The Guardian. 2011 Aug 10.

3. Roth A. “Prisons are the new asylums.” The Atlantic. 2018 April.

4. Latessa EJ et al. “What works (and doesn’t) in reducing recidivism.” New York: Routledge, 2015.
 

Dr. Badre is a forensic psychiatrist in San Diego and an expert in correctional mental health. He holds teaching positions at the University of California, San Diego, and the University of San Diego. Dr. Badre can be reached at his website, BadreMD.com. Dr. Lehman is an associate professor of psychiatry at the University of California, San Diego. He is codirector of all acute and intensive psychiatric treatment at the Veterans Affairs Medical Center in San Diego, where he practices clinical psychiatry. He also is the course director for the UCSD third-year medical student psychiatry clerkship.

Despite popular belief, the absence of a strong link between mental illness and violence has been well studied and established. In summary, in a small subset of patients, mental illness provides a minor increase in the risk of committing violence.¹

In part as a result of this research, police departments across the country have established programs and protocols to divert patients with mental illness out of the legal system and into mental hospitals. Instead of accepting the common refrain that mental illness is the explanation and best predictor of all atrocious behaviors, police departments have correctly referred patients with mental illness to mental hospitals. We commend those initiatives and encourage their adoption in all locales. Yet, to safeguard such programs, we would like to warn of a potential pitfall and offer possible remedies.

Having worked in both correctional and clinical settings, we are saddened by the similar nature of the work with respect to the management of mental illness. It should defy logic to assume the need for mental health care in our jails is in any way comparable to the one in mental hospitals. However, we have grown accustomed to seeing large numbers of our most vulnerable patients with severe mental illness accumulating in our jails and correctional facilities, which often are the largest employers of mental health clinicians. The reasons correctional institutions have become so reliant on psychiatric clinicians are vast and complex. Incarceration is tremendously destabilizing and can lead to the onset or relapse of mental illness – even in the most resilient patients. In addition, mental illness is undertreated in our communities yet inescapable in the confined settings of our jails. Furthermore, our mass incarceration problems have resulted in the most disenfranchised populations, including our patients with mental illness, becoming the targets of policies criminalizing poverty.²

To prevent furthering the process by which our correctional facilities have become the new asylums,³ law enforcement agencies have enacted a vast array of initiatives. Some include the placement of mental health staff within emergency response teams. Some include training police officers in how to talk to patients with mental illness as well as how to deescalate mental health crises. Most of the initiatives have one common goal: diverting patients with mental illness who are better treated in mental hospitals from going to jail. However, herein lies the problem: If mental illness is an explanation for only a small subset of criminal behavior, why is there a large need to divert patients with mental illness from jails to mental hospitals?

Over the past few years, psychiatrists in emergency departments have noted a concerning trend: an increase in referrals to mental hospitals by law enforcement for what appears to be a crime with only a vague or obscure link to mental illness. Most psychiatrists who regularly work in emergency departments will witness many examples. Some might be fairly benign: “They were going to arrest me for trespassing; I was yelling at a coffee shop. But when I told them that I had run out of meds, they brought me here instead.”

However, some stories are more chilling, including the case of an older male who had made threats while shooting his gun in the air and was brought to the emergency department because, as the police officer told us, “I think that he is just depressed; you guys can keep him safe till he is better.”

We applaud society’s desire to reduce the criminalization of mental illness. We think that psychiatry should be deeply involved in the attempts to resolve this problem. Furthermore, we are cognizant that the number of patients with mental illness unnecessarily imprisoned as a result of prosecutorial zealousness is a larger problem than criminals inappropriately brought to mental hospitals. However, we also are aware of the limitation of psychiatric hospitals in solving nonpsychiatric problems.

If mental illness (for the most part) does not cause violence, then when patients with or without mental illness commit a violent act, the response (for the most part) should not be a psychiatric one. Recent studies have demonstrated the need to examine criminogenic needs before psychiatric ones when attempting to reduce recidivism in all offenders, including those with mental illnesses.⁴ The emphasis on addressing psychiatric needs over criminogenic ones is misguided and not based on evidence. Yet, we appreciate the complexity of those questions and of individual cases.

Substance use disorders are emblematic of this problem. Psychiatry has now communicated the position that substance use disorders are mental illness and not a moral failing. However, are the crimes committed by individuals with substance use disorders, whether in a state of intoxication or driven by the cycles of addiction, the blameless result of mental illness? The legal system struggles with this question, trying to determine when addiction-related crimes should be referred to a diversion program or treated as a straightforward criminal prosecution. Those who favor diversion for addiction can point out that many criminal acts are associated with mitigating factors that are no less valid than is addiction.

However, those mitigating factors, such as poverty, childhood deprivation, or a violence-infused sociological milieu, cannot be found in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. As such, if those factors alone were considered, no diversion would be offered by the courts. There also can be unforeseen consequences to this bias for diversion or criminal prosecution. Violent outbursts are a recognized part of PTSD in veterans. Psychiatrists who work at Veterans Affairs can be faced with the diagnosis of PTSD being used as an excuse for violent behavior, which may, at some level be valid, but which can be dangerous in that labeling a patient with that diagnosis might lower the barriers to violent behavior by providing a ready-made explanation already internalized by the patient through unspoken, sociocultural norms.

With the awareness of the complex nature of the intersectionality of mental illness and criminality, we recommend improvements to current diversion programs. As diversion programs rightfully continue to expand across the country, we likely will see an increase in the number of referrals by police officers to our emergency departments. Some of the referrals will be considered “inappropriate” after thorough and thoughtful clinical evaluation by emergency psychiatrists. The inappropriateness might be secondary to an absence of active symptoms, an absence of correlation between the illness and the offense, or a more urgent criminogenic need.

When faced with someone who will not benefit from diversion to a psychiatric emergency department, psychiatrists should have the tools to revert the person back into the legal system. Those tools could come in many forms – law enforcement liaison, prosecution liaison, or simply the presence of officers who are mandated to wait for the approval of the clinician prior to dismissing legal charges. Whatever the solution might be for any particular locale, policy makers should not wait for adverse events to realize the potential pitfalls of the important work being done in developing our country’s diversion programs.

References

1. Swanson JW et al. Mental illness and reduction of gun violence and suicide: Bringing epidemiologic research to policy. Ann Epidemiol. 2015 May;25(5):366-76.

2. Ehrenreich B. “How America criminalized poverty.” The Guardian. 2011 Aug 10.

3. Roth A. “Prisons are the new asylums.” The Atlantic. 2018 April.

4. Latessa EJ et al. “What works (and doesn’t) in reducing recidivism.” New York: Routledge, 2015.
 

Dr. Badre is a forensic psychiatrist in San Diego and an expert in correctional mental health. He holds teaching positions at the University of California, San Diego, and the University of San Diego. Dr. Badre can be reached at his website, BadreMD.com. Dr. Lehman is an associate professor of psychiatry at the University of California, San Diego. He is codirector of all acute and intensive psychiatric treatment at the Veterans Affairs Medical Center in San Diego, where he practices clinical psychiatry. He also is the course director for the UCSD third-year medical student psychiatry clerkship.

Since the biological revolution in psychiatry, with the introduction of chlorpromazine in the 1950s,1 psychiatrists have been introduced to the economic questions inherent in the tension between funding psychotropic medications for the treatment of mental illness versus funding psychosocial interventions. Of course, our natural inclination is to advocate for all available treatments for our patients, but the economic realities of medical care – especially government-subsidized or regulated medical care – force us to weigh the relative advantages of these treatments and to promote our patients’ interests with a wise allocation of limited resources.

It has become common practice for the American Psychiatric Association to advocate for additional funds for both research into mental illness as well as treatment. The promotion of mental health parity and the demonization of prior authorizations are examples of our natural priorities in the debates over funding for medical care. A bias has played out in the national conversation about medical care in general regarding the right to said care, but economists understand that medical care is a limited resource and, as such, treating it as a “right,” per se, does not make sense: One has to make hard decisions about its allocation or simply leave it to the free market to make said decisions.

Recently, the government has proposed to eliminate certain psychotropic medications from their protected status within Medicare Part D. Those medications include all drugs labeled as antidepressants, antipsychotics, and anticonvulsants. As expected, the APA’s medical director has written a formal statement opposing the proposal. His statement includes warnings about suicides and overwhelmed emergency departments. He compared the mental health situation in the United States to a crisis. He described the availability of expensive and new psychotropics to be “lifesaving.”²

The goals of the APA and its leaders are honorable. We are inspired by the dedication that some psychiatrists have to advocate for us all as well as for our patients. However, we are concerned that unfounded claims are being made. We are even more troubled when those claims promote the interests of a fallible pharmaceutical industry, an industry that has opened up our field to extensive critical scrutiny over the past few years. We wonder whether a brief examination of the scientific evidence warrants the statements made by the APA.

After reviewing clinical textbooks and search engines, we were not able to find reliable and convincing evidence that newer psychotropics reduce emergency department stays or that lengths of stay in the hospital correlate with the use of newer agents. We have actually not even heard of that claim made before in any serious forum. Reviews of predictors of length of stay in psychiatric hospitals have typically included demographic factors, diagnostic factors, logistical factors such as time of day, and social factors, such as insurance status and homelessness.^3,4 We found no review mentioning the use of patented drugs as a predictor of shorter stays.

At a larger level, we are unsure that the newer psychotropics are particularly better than older ones. The Food and Drug Administration approves psychiatric medications based on superiority to placebo and not superiority to existing – and usually much cheaper – medications. Our subscription to Epocrates informs us that a 1-month supply of once-a-day brand-name Abilify, Invega, or Latuda is more than $1,000.⁵ Alternatively, a 1-month supply of generic olanzapine, risperidone, or quetiapine is available for $4 at Walmart.⁶ As famously described in the CATIE trial⁷ of patients with schizophrenia, newer antipsychotics are not particularly better than older ones. In addition, a more recent meta-analysis⁸ did not find significant differences among antipsychotics’ efficacy.

A similar analysis can be made of antidepressants without addressing debates surrounding the effectiveness of antidepressants as a class and the value of psychological interventions over chemical ones. Reviews of the literature do not suggest that newer antidepressants are more effective than older ones. A recent meta-analysis of antidepressant efficacy did not find significant differences among antidepressants and, when looking at trends, amitriptyline, a much older antidepressant, was most effective.9

The most surprising part of the APA medical director’s statement was the claim of reduced suicidality. While lithium and clozapine have some evidence for reducing the risk of suicide, the evidence that antidepressants reduce suicide is equivocal. Quite the contrary, some evidence exists that antidepressants may increase the risk of suicide,¹⁰ and we are not aware of evidence suggesting that any newer agents can reduce suicide at any higher rate. One psychiatrist has even made a career out of testifying that antidepressants increase impulsivity and suicide.¹¹

We are not politicians, and we trust the APA to have good intentions with a desire to help patients suffering from mental illness. We understand the need to advocate for any measure that provides additional resources for the treatment of mental illness. We have no doubt that a publicly funded and appropriately regulated mental health system is a wise goal from both an ethical as well as a societal perspective. The APA has an imperative to advocate for our patients with the goal to improve our society.

However, we are concerned when our field makes unfounded claims. Advocating that insurance companies and the government provide most psychotropics without prior authorization and without discrimination does not appear to be based on scientific evidence and has serious economic implications that are not being weighed in a transparent manner. Whatever funding levels the APA recommends for the treatment of mental illness, said treatments will remain a limited resource, and then it becomes a question not just of ethics but of economics. What combination of resources produce the most benefit for the most people in question? Would the increased cost of a newer psychotropic be better spent on a system with more elaborate psychosocial interventions? In making this argument, does one risk repeating the historical blunder made when, in the 1960s, long-term psychiatric hospitals were closed with the intention of replacing their costs with outpatient treatments that then never materialized?

A review of the literature does not support the claim that newer psychotropic agents are more effective from either a clinical or an economic perspective. Cost-saving measures are ethical and possibly beneficial if they permit a more justifiable allocation of resources.



Dr. Lehman is an associate professor of psychiatry at the University of California, San Diego. He is codirector of all acute and intensive psychiatric treatment at the Veterans Affairs Medical Center in San Diego, where he practices clinical psychiatry. He is also the course director for the UCSD third-year medical student psychiatry clerkship. Dr. Badre is a forensic psychiatrist in San Diego and an expert in correctional mental health. He holds teaching positions at the University of California, San Diego, and the University of San Diego. Among his writings is Chapter 7 in the new book “Critical Psychiatry: Controversies and Clinical Implications” (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2019).
 

References

1. Ann Med Psychol (Paris). 1952 Jun;110(2 1):112-7.

2. https://psychnews.psychiatryonline.org/doi/10.1176/appi.pn.2019.3b26.

3. Am J Emerg Med. 2016 Feb;34(2):133-9.

4. Eur Psychiatry. 2018 Feb;48:6-12.

5. https://online.epocrates.com/drugs. Retrieved March 3, 2019.

6. https://www.walmart.com/cp/$4-prescriptions/1078664. Retrieved March 27, 2019.

7. N Engl J Med. 2005 Sep 22;353(12):1209-23.

8. Am J Psychiatry. 2017. 174(10):927-42.

9. Lancet. 2018 Apr 7. 391(10128):P1357-66.

10. BMJ. 2009.339;b2880.

11. https://breggin.com/.

Since the biological revolution in psychiatry, with the introduction of chlorpromazine in the 1950s,1 psychiatrists have been introduced to the economic questions inherent in the tension between funding psychotropic medications for the treatment of mental illness versus funding psychosocial interventions. Of course, our natural inclination is to advocate for all available treatments for our patients, but the economic realities of medical care – especially government-subsidized or regulated medical care – force us to weigh the relative advantages of these treatments and to promote our patients’ interests with a wise allocation of limited resources.

It has become common practice for the American Psychiatric Association to advocate for additional funds for both research into mental illness as well as treatment. The promotion of mental health parity and the demonization of prior authorizations are examples of our natural priorities in the debates over funding for medical care. A bias has played out in the national conversation about medical care in general regarding the right to said care, but economists understand that medical care is a limited resource and, as such, treating it as a “right,” per se, does not make sense: One has to make hard decisions about its allocation or simply leave it to the free market to make said decisions.

Recently, the government has proposed to eliminate certain psychotropic medications from their protected status within Medicare Part D. Those medications include all drugs labeled as antidepressants, antipsychotics, and anticonvulsants. As expected, the APA’s medical director has written a formal statement opposing the proposal. His statement includes warnings about suicides and overwhelmed emergency departments. He compared the mental health situation in the United States to a crisis. He described the availability of expensive and new psychotropics to be “lifesaving.”²

The goals of the APA and its leaders are honorable. We are inspired by the dedication that some psychiatrists have to advocate for us all as well as for our patients. However, we are concerned that unfounded claims are being made. We are even more troubled when those claims promote the interests of a fallible pharmaceutical industry, an industry that has opened up our field to extensive critical scrutiny over the past few years. We wonder whether a brief examination of the scientific evidence warrants the statements made by the APA.

After reviewing clinical textbooks and search engines, we were not able to find reliable and convincing evidence that newer psychotropics reduce emergency department stays or that lengths of stay in the hospital correlate with the use of newer agents. We have actually not even heard of that claim made before in any serious forum. Reviews of predictors of length of stay in psychiatric hospitals have typically included demographic factors, diagnostic factors, logistical factors such as time of day, and social factors, such as insurance status and homelessness.^3,4 We found no review mentioning the use of patented drugs as a predictor of shorter stays.

At a larger level, we are unsure that the newer psychotropics are particularly better than older ones. The Food and Drug Administration approves psychiatric medications based on superiority to placebo and not superiority to existing – and usually much cheaper – medications. Our subscription to Epocrates informs us that a 1-month supply of once-a-day brand-name Abilify, Invega, or Latuda is more than $1,000.⁵ Alternatively, a 1-month supply of generic olanzapine, risperidone, or quetiapine is available for $4 at Walmart.⁶ As famously described in the CATIE trial⁷ of patients with schizophrenia, newer antipsychotics are not particularly better than older ones. In addition, a more recent meta-analysis⁸ did not find significant differences among antipsychotics’ efficacy.

A similar analysis can be made of antidepressants without addressing debates surrounding the effectiveness of antidepressants as a class and the value of psychological interventions over chemical ones. Reviews of the literature do not suggest that newer antidepressants are more effective than older ones. A recent meta-analysis of antidepressant efficacy did not find significant differences among antidepressants and, when looking at trends, amitriptyline, a much older antidepressant, was most effective.9

The most surprising part of the APA medical director’s statement was the claim of reduced suicidality. While lithium and clozapine have some evidence for reducing the risk of suicide, the evidence that antidepressants reduce suicide is equivocal. Quite the contrary, some evidence exists that antidepressants may increase the risk of suicide,¹⁰ and we are not aware of evidence suggesting that any newer agents can reduce suicide at any higher rate. One psychiatrist has even made a career out of testifying that antidepressants increase impulsivity and suicide.¹¹

We are not politicians, and we trust the APA to have good intentions with a desire to help patients suffering from mental illness. We understand the need to advocate for any measure that provides additional resources for the treatment of mental illness. We have no doubt that a publicly funded and appropriately regulated mental health system is a wise goal from both an ethical as well as a societal perspective. The APA has an imperative to advocate for our patients with the goal to improve our society.

However, we are concerned when our field makes unfounded claims. Advocating that insurance companies and the government provide most psychotropics without prior authorization and without discrimination does not appear to be based on scientific evidence and has serious economic implications that are not being weighed in a transparent manner. Whatever funding levels the APA recommends for the treatment of mental illness, said treatments will remain a limited resource, and then it becomes a question not just of ethics but of economics. What combination of resources produce the most benefit for the most people in question? Would the increased cost of a newer psychotropic be better spent on a system with more elaborate psychosocial interventions? In making this argument, does one risk repeating the historical blunder made when, in the 1960s, long-term psychiatric hospitals were closed with the intention of replacing their costs with outpatient treatments that then never materialized?

A review of the literature does not support the claim that newer psychotropic agents are more effective from either a clinical or an economic perspective. Cost-saving measures are ethical and possibly beneficial if they permit a more justifiable allocation of resources.



Dr. Lehman is an associate professor of psychiatry at the University of California, San Diego. He is codirector of all acute and intensive psychiatric treatment at the Veterans Affairs Medical Center in San Diego, where he practices clinical psychiatry. He is also the course director for the UCSD third-year medical student psychiatry clerkship. Dr. Badre is a forensic psychiatrist in San Diego and an expert in correctional mental health. He holds teaching positions at the University of California, San Diego, and the University of San Diego. Among his writings is Chapter 7 in the new book “Critical Psychiatry: Controversies and Clinical Implications” (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2019).
 

References

1. Ann Med Psychol (Paris). 1952 Jun;110(2 1):112-7.

2. https://psychnews.psychiatryonline.org/doi/10.1176/appi.pn.2019.3b26.

3. Am J Emerg Med. 2016 Feb;34(2):133-9.

4. Eur Psychiatry. 2018 Feb;48:6-12.

5. https://online.epocrates.com/drugs. Retrieved March 3, 2019.

6. https://www.walmart.com/cp/$4-prescriptions/1078664. Retrieved March 27, 2019.

7. N Engl J Med. 2005 Sep 22;353(12):1209-23.

8. Am J Psychiatry. 2017. 174(10):927-42.

9. Lancet. 2018 Apr 7. 391(10128):P1357-66.

10. BMJ. 2009.339;b2880.

11. https://breggin.com/.

Since the biological revolution in psychiatry, with the introduction of chlorpromazine in the 1950s,1 psychiatrists have been introduced to the economic questions inherent in the tension between funding psychotropic medications for the treatment of mental illness versus funding psychosocial interventions. Of course, our natural inclination is to advocate for all available treatments for our patients, but the economic realities of medical care – especially government-subsidized or regulated medical care – force us to weigh the relative advantages of these treatments and to promote our patients’ interests with a wise allocation of limited resources.

It has become common practice for the American Psychiatric Association to advocate for additional funds for both research into mental illness as well as treatment. The promotion of mental health parity and the demonization of prior authorizations are examples of our natural priorities in the debates over funding for medical care. A bias has played out in the national conversation about medical care in general regarding the right to said care, but economists understand that medical care is a limited resource and, as such, treating it as a “right,” per se, does not make sense: One has to make hard decisions about its allocation or simply leave it to the free market to make said decisions.

Recently, the government has proposed to eliminate certain psychotropic medications from their protected status within Medicare Part D. Those medications include all drugs labeled as antidepressants, antipsychotics, and anticonvulsants. As expected, the APA’s medical director has written a formal statement opposing the proposal. His statement includes warnings about suicides and overwhelmed emergency departments. He compared the mental health situation in the United States to a crisis. He described the availability of expensive and new psychotropics to be “lifesaving.”²

The goals of the APA and its leaders are honorable. We are inspired by the dedication that some psychiatrists have to advocate for us all as well as for our patients. However, we are concerned that unfounded claims are being made. We are even more troubled when those claims promote the interests of a fallible pharmaceutical industry, an industry that has opened up our field to extensive critical scrutiny over the past few years. We wonder whether a brief examination of the scientific evidence warrants the statements made by the APA.

After reviewing clinical textbooks and search engines, we were not able to find reliable and convincing evidence that newer psychotropics reduce emergency department stays or that lengths of stay in the hospital correlate with the use of newer agents. We have actually not even heard of that claim made before in any serious forum. Reviews of predictors of length of stay in psychiatric hospitals have typically included demographic factors, diagnostic factors, logistical factors such as time of day, and social factors, such as insurance status and homelessness.^3,4 We found no review mentioning the use of patented drugs as a predictor of shorter stays.

At a larger level, we are unsure that the newer psychotropics are particularly better than older ones. The Food and Drug Administration approves psychiatric medications based on superiority to placebo and not superiority to existing – and usually much cheaper – medications. Our subscription to Epocrates informs us that a 1-month supply of once-a-day brand-name Abilify, Invega, or Latuda is more than $1,000.⁵ Alternatively, a 1-month supply of generic olanzapine, risperidone, or quetiapine is available for $4 at Walmart.⁶ As famously described in the CATIE trial⁷ of patients with schizophrenia, newer antipsychotics are not particularly better than older ones. In addition, a more recent meta-analysis⁸ did not find significant differences among antipsychotics’ efficacy.

A similar analysis can be made of antidepressants without addressing debates surrounding the effectiveness of antidepressants as a class and the value of psychological interventions over chemical ones. Reviews of the literature do not suggest that newer antidepressants are more effective than older ones. A recent meta-analysis of antidepressant efficacy did not find significant differences among antidepressants and, when looking at trends, amitriptyline, a much older antidepressant, was most effective.9

The most surprising part of the APA medical director’s statement was the claim of reduced suicidality. While lithium and clozapine have some evidence for reducing the risk of suicide, the evidence that antidepressants reduce suicide is equivocal. Quite the contrary, some evidence exists that antidepressants may increase the risk of suicide,¹⁰ and we are not aware of evidence suggesting that any newer agents can reduce suicide at any higher rate. One psychiatrist has even made a career out of testifying that antidepressants increase impulsivity and suicide.¹¹

We are not politicians, and we trust the APA to have good intentions with a desire to help patients suffering from mental illness. We understand the need to advocate for any measure that provides additional resources for the treatment of mental illness. We have no doubt that a publicly funded and appropriately regulated mental health system is a wise goal from both an ethical as well as a societal perspective. The APA has an imperative to advocate for our patients with the goal to improve our society.

However, we are concerned when our field makes unfounded claims. Advocating that insurance companies and the government provide most psychotropics without prior authorization and without discrimination does not appear to be based on scientific evidence and has serious economic implications that are not being weighed in a transparent manner. Whatever funding levels the APA recommends for the treatment of mental illness, said treatments will remain a limited resource, and then it becomes a question not just of ethics but of economics. What combination of resources produce the most benefit for the most people in question? Would the increased cost of a newer psychotropic be better spent on a system with more elaborate psychosocial interventions? In making this argument, does one risk repeating the historical blunder made when, in the 1960s, long-term psychiatric hospitals were closed with the intention of replacing their costs with outpatient treatments that then never materialized?

A review of the literature does not support the claim that newer psychotropic agents are more effective from either a clinical or an economic perspective. Cost-saving measures are ethical and possibly beneficial if they permit a more justifiable allocation of resources.



Dr. Lehman is an associate professor of psychiatry at the University of California, San Diego. He is codirector of all acute and intensive psychiatric treatment at the Veterans Affairs Medical Center in San Diego, where he practices clinical psychiatry. He is also the course director for the UCSD third-year medical student psychiatry clerkship. Dr. Badre is a forensic psychiatrist in San Diego and an expert in correctional mental health. He holds teaching positions at the University of California, San Diego, and the University of San Diego. Among his writings is Chapter 7 in the new book “Critical Psychiatry: Controversies and Clinical Implications” (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2019).
 

References

1. Ann Med Psychol (Paris). 1952 Jun;110(2 1):112-7.

2. https://psychnews.psychiatryonline.org/doi/10.1176/appi.pn.2019.3b26.

3. Am J Emerg Med. 2016 Feb;34(2):133-9.

4. Eur Psychiatry. 2018 Feb;48:6-12.

5. https://online.epocrates.com/drugs. Retrieved March 3, 2019.

6. https://www.walmart.com/cp/$4-prescriptions/1078664. Retrieved March 27, 2019.

7. N Engl J Med. 2005 Sep 22;353(12):1209-23.

8. Am J Psychiatry. 2017. 174(10):927-42.

9. Lancet. 2018 Apr 7. 391(10128):P1357-66.

10. BMJ. 2009.339;b2880.

11. https://breggin.com/.

What does it mean to define an amalgamation of symptoms as a “psychiatric disorder?” Are psychiatric disorders an extreme variation of normative human behavior? Is human behavior simply an output phenotype of some neurologic chemical processes that become disordered in mental illness? Can depression be localized in the brain and subsequently turned on or off? If depression were to be localized in the brain, would it be an excess of a neurotransmitter, the depletion of a receptor, a malfunctioning neuron, an overactive connectome, poorly processed genetic material, or something as yet undefined? Those questions always have been present in our minds and influenced our understanding of patients, but a recent development in psychiatry raises questions about one of the few things we were historically confident about.

A part of our foundational understanding of depression was that it is not sadness, per se. One can be sad for any amount of time. It is not uncommon to feel sad for any variety of reasons, such as watching an adorable 60-second commercial for dog food.¹ Those fleeting moments of sadness can even be empowering; they remind us about the things we care about and would be sad to miss.

Sadness in oneself can demonstrate the experience of empathic sadness for others. On the contrary, depression appears to have little apparent purpose, and instead results in a maladaptive way of coping that is all-consuming and often very damaging. Depression is not a mood but a state of being, something that is not defined by how one feels but who one is or has become because of the disorder. So it comes as somewhat of a surprise when we heard that ketamine could alleviate depression in minutes.^2,3 As described by a ketamine expert, symptoms are relieved in “no less than an hour.”⁴ The surprise is not so much that a treatment would work but that improvement could be defined in such a short time frame.

Psychiatry has debated the definition of depression for its entire existence. There are many ways to tackle the concept of depression. A lot of the debate has been about the causes of depression. One example of the continued evolution of our understanding of depression is our prior categorization of depression as “exogenous” or “endogenous.”⁵ Exogenous depression was described as happening in the context of social stressors and as best treated with therapy. Endogenous depression was a supposedly truer form of depression as a disorder and was more biologically based. Patients suffering from endogenous depression were thought to have chemical abnormalities in the brain that could be alleviated by tricyclic antidepressants and subsequently SSRIs. Like many prior debates about depression, this one appears to be little discussed nowadays. A review of the use of the term “endogenous depression” in books shows an onset in the 1930s, a peak in the 1980s, and a rapid decline since.⁶

More recently, psychiatrists have defined depression using the DSM-5 criteria. Depression is thought to be the presence of at least five out of nine symptoms listed in the manual for a period of 2 weeks that cause significant distress or impairment.⁷ The DSM attempts to address criticism by providing information on its limitations and best use, and encourages clinical interpretation of symptoms. The DSM does not portray itself as a gold standard but rather as a tool for treatment planning and effective communication between peers. Furthermore, the National Institute on Mental Health is promoting an alternative understanding of depression using its own Research Domain Criteria, which attempt to provide a more objective understanding of the disorder based on biological rather than subjective correlates.

The growing literature on ketamine partly hinges on the belief that depression is something that can be redefined and changed at any moment. Many trials ask patients whether their depression remains in remission in the subsequent hours, days, and weeks following administration of the drug. However, one wonders if that is even possible. If a patient’s depression is alleviated in an hour, was it really clinical depression? Is it truly in remission? Contrary to our previous understanding, is depression, in reality, a switch that can be turned off by an infusion of an N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA)–receptor antagonist? Without minimizing the suffering of patients seeking ketamine or the relief provided to patients who benefit from the treatment, we simply are pointing out that the definition of depression did not account for this reported phenomenon of relatively instantaneous relief. The seemingly miraculous effects of ketamine suggest a new paradigm where any intervention – whether chemical, social, or psychological – could turn off the devastating effects of depression in an instant.

References

1. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MpcUN6XvGmk.

2. J Clin Psychiatry. 2016 Jun;77(6):e719-25.

3. Emerg (Tehran). 2014 Winter;2(1):36-9.

4. “Is esketamine the game-changer for depression we want?” Rolling Stone. 2019 Mar 11.

5. Psychol Med. 1971;1(3):191-6.

6. https://books.google.com/ngrams.

7. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, fifth edition (DSM-5). American Psychiatric Association, 2013.

8. Am J Psychiatry. 2014 Apr;171(4):395-7.

9. “Many people taking antidepressants discover they cannot quit.” New York Times. 2018 Apr 7.

10. “Antidepressants show greatest increase in number of prescription items dispensed.” National Health Service. 2015 Jul 5.

11. “The ketamine connection.” BBC News. 2015 Jul 10.

12. Front Psychiatry. 2018 Jul 17. doi: 10.33389/fpsyt.2018.00313.

13. Am J Psychiatry. 2018 Dec 1;175(2):1205-15.
 

Dr. Badre is a forensic psychiatrist in San Diego and an expert in correctional mental health. He holds teaching positions at the University of California, San Diego, and the University of San Diego. Among his writings is Coercion and the critical psychiatrist, chapter 7 in the new book “Critical Psychiatry: Controversies and Clinical Implications” (Cham, Switzerland: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2019, pp. 155-77). Dr. Lehman is an associate professor of psychiatry at UCSD. He is codirector of all Acute and Intensive Psychiatric Treatment at the VA Medical Center in San Diego, where he practices clinical psychiatry. He also is the course director for the UCSD third-year medical student psychiatry clerkship.



*This article was updated 3/25/2019.

What does it mean to define an amalgamation of symptoms as a “psychiatric disorder?” Are psychiatric disorders an extreme variation of normative human behavior? Is human behavior simply an output phenotype of some neurologic chemical processes that become disordered in mental illness? Can depression be localized in the brain and subsequently turned on or off? If depression were to be localized in the brain, would it be an excess of a neurotransmitter, the depletion of a receptor, a malfunctioning neuron, an overactive connectome, poorly processed genetic material, or something as yet undefined? Those questions always have been present in our minds and influenced our understanding of patients, but a recent development in psychiatry raises questions about one of the few things we were historically confident about.

A part of our foundational understanding of depression was that it is not sadness, per se. One can be sad for any amount of time. It is not uncommon to feel sad for any variety of reasons, such as watching an adorable 60-second commercial for dog food.¹ Those fleeting moments of sadness can even be empowering; they remind us about the things we care about and would be sad to miss.

Sadness in oneself can demonstrate the experience of empathic sadness for others. On the contrary, depression appears to have little apparent purpose, and instead results in a maladaptive way of coping that is all-consuming and often very damaging. Depression is not a mood but a state of being, something that is not defined by how one feels but who one is or has become because of the disorder. So it comes as somewhat of a surprise when we heard that ketamine could alleviate depression in minutes.^2,3 As described by a ketamine expert, symptoms are relieved in “no less than an hour.”⁴ The surprise is not so much that a treatment would work but that improvement could be defined in such a short time frame.

Psychiatry has debated the definition of depression for its entire existence. There are many ways to tackle the concept of depression. A lot of the debate has been about the causes of depression. One example of the continued evolution of our understanding of depression is our prior categorization of depression as “exogenous” or “endogenous.”⁵ Exogenous depression was described as happening in the context of social stressors and as best treated with therapy. Endogenous depression was a supposedly truer form of depression as a disorder and was more biologically based. Patients suffering from endogenous depression were thought to have chemical abnormalities in the brain that could be alleviated by tricyclic antidepressants and subsequently SSRIs. Like many prior debates about depression, this one appears to be little discussed nowadays. A review of the use of the term “endogenous depression” in books shows an onset in the 1930s, a peak in the 1980s, and a rapid decline since.⁶

More recently, psychiatrists have defined depression using the DSM-5 criteria. Depression is thought to be the presence of at least five out of nine symptoms listed in the manual for a period of 2 weeks that cause significant distress or impairment.⁷ The DSM attempts to address criticism by providing information on its limitations and best use, and encourages clinical interpretation of symptoms. The DSM does not portray itself as a gold standard but rather as a tool for treatment planning and effective communication between peers. Furthermore, the National Institute on Mental Health is promoting an alternative understanding of depression using its own Research Domain Criteria, which attempt to provide a more objective understanding of the disorder based on biological rather than subjective correlates.

The growing literature on ketamine partly hinges on the belief that depression is something that can be redefined and changed at any moment. Many trials ask patients whether their depression remains in remission in the subsequent hours, days, and weeks following administration of the drug. However, one wonders if that is even possible. If a patient’s depression is alleviated in an hour, was it really clinical depression? Is it truly in remission? Contrary to our previous understanding, is depression, in reality, a switch that can be turned off by an infusion of an N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA)–receptor antagonist? Without minimizing the suffering of patients seeking ketamine or the relief provided to patients who benefit from the treatment, we simply are pointing out that the definition of depression did not account for this reported phenomenon of relatively instantaneous relief. The seemingly miraculous effects of ketamine suggest a new paradigm where any intervention – whether chemical, social, or psychological – could turn off the devastating effects of depression in an instant.

References

1. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MpcUN6XvGmk.

2. J Clin Psychiatry. 2016 Jun;77(6):e719-25.

3. Emerg (Tehran). 2014 Winter;2(1):36-9.

4. “Is esketamine the game-changer for depression we want?” Rolling Stone. 2019 Mar 11.

5. Psychol Med. 1971;1(3):191-6.

6. https://books.google.com/ngrams.

7. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, fifth edition (DSM-5). American Psychiatric Association, 2013.

8. Am J Psychiatry. 2014 Apr;171(4):395-7.

9. “Many people taking antidepressants discover they cannot quit.” New York Times. 2018 Apr 7.

10. “Antidepressants show greatest increase in number of prescription items dispensed.” National Health Service. 2015 Jul 5.

11. “The ketamine connection.” BBC News. 2015 Jul 10.

12. Front Psychiatry. 2018 Jul 17. doi: 10.33389/fpsyt.2018.00313.

13. Am J Psychiatry. 2018 Dec 1;175(2):1205-15.
 

Dr. Badre is a forensic psychiatrist in San Diego and an expert in correctional mental health. He holds teaching positions at the University of California, San Diego, and the University of San Diego. Among his writings is Coercion and the critical psychiatrist, chapter 7 in the new book “Critical Psychiatry: Controversies and Clinical Implications” (Cham, Switzerland: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2019, pp. 155-77). Dr. Lehman is an associate professor of psychiatry at UCSD. He is codirector of all Acute and Intensive Psychiatric Treatment at the VA Medical Center in San Diego, where he practices clinical psychiatry. He also is the course director for the UCSD third-year medical student psychiatry clerkship.



*This article was updated 3/25/2019.

What does it mean to define an amalgamation of symptoms as a “psychiatric disorder?” Are psychiatric disorders an extreme variation of normative human behavior? Is human behavior simply an output phenotype of some neurologic chemical processes that become disordered in mental illness? Can depression be localized in the brain and subsequently turned on or off? If depression were to be localized in the brain, would it be an excess of a neurotransmitter, the depletion of a receptor, a malfunctioning neuron, an overactive connectome, poorly processed genetic material, or something as yet undefined? Those questions always have been present in our minds and influenced our understanding of patients, but a recent development in psychiatry raises questions about one of the few things we were historically confident about.

A part of our foundational understanding of depression was that it is not sadness, per se. One can be sad for any amount of time. It is not uncommon to feel sad for any variety of reasons, such as watching an adorable 60-second commercial for dog food.¹ Those fleeting moments of sadness can even be empowering; they remind us about the things we care about and would be sad to miss.

Sadness in oneself can demonstrate the experience of empathic sadness for others. On the contrary, depression appears to have little apparent purpose, and instead results in a maladaptive way of coping that is all-consuming and often very damaging. Depression is not a mood but a state of being, something that is not defined by how one feels but who one is or has become because of the disorder. So it comes as somewhat of a surprise when we heard that ketamine could alleviate depression in minutes.^2,3 As described by a ketamine expert, symptoms are relieved in “no less than an hour.”⁴ The surprise is not so much that a treatment would work but that improvement could be defined in such a short time frame.

Psychiatry has debated the definition of depression for its entire existence. There are many ways to tackle the concept of depression. A lot of the debate has been about the causes of depression. One example of the continued evolution of our understanding of depression is our prior categorization of depression as “exogenous” or “endogenous.”⁵ Exogenous depression was described as happening in the context of social stressors and as best treated with therapy. Endogenous depression was a supposedly truer form of depression as a disorder and was more biologically based. Patients suffering from endogenous depression were thought to have chemical abnormalities in the brain that could be alleviated by tricyclic antidepressants and subsequently SSRIs. Like many prior debates about depression, this one appears to be little discussed nowadays. A review of the use of the term “endogenous depression” in books shows an onset in the 1930s, a peak in the 1980s, and a rapid decline since.⁶

More recently, psychiatrists have defined depression using the DSM-5 criteria. Depression is thought to be the presence of at least five out of nine symptoms listed in the manual for a period of 2 weeks that cause significant distress or impairment.⁷ The DSM attempts to address criticism by providing information on its limitations and best use, and encourages clinical interpretation of symptoms. The DSM does not portray itself as a gold standard but rather as a tool for treatment planning and effective communication between peers. Furthermore, the National Institute on Mental Health is promoting an alternative understanding of depression using its own Research Domain Criteria, which attempt to provide a more objective understanding of the disorder based on biological rather than subjective correlates.

The growing literature on ketamine partly hinges on the belief that depression is something that can be redefined and changed at any moment. Many trials ask patients whether their depression remains in remission in the subsequent hours, days, and weeks following administration of the drug. However, one wonders if that is even possible. If a patient’s depression is alleviated in an hour, was it really clinical depression? Is it truly in remission? Contrary to our previous understanding, is depression, in reality, a switch that can be turned off by an infusion of an N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA)–receptor antagonist? Without minimizing the suffering of patients seeking ketamine or the relief provided to patients who benefit from the treatment, we simply are pointing out that the definition of depression did not account for this reported phenomenon of relatively instantaneous relief. The seemingly miraculous effects of ketamine suggest a new paradigm where any intervention – whether chemical, social, or psychological – could turn off the devastating effects of depression in an instant.

References

1. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MpcUN6XvGmk.

2. J Clin Psychiatry. 2016 Jun;77(6):e719-25.

3. Emerg (Tehran). 2014 Winter;2(1):36-9.

4. “Is esketamine the game-changer for depression we want?” Rolling Stone. 2019 Mar 11.

5. Psychol Med. 1971;1(3):191-6.

6. https://books.google.com/ngrams.

7. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, fifth edition (DSM-5). American Psychiatric Association, 2013.

8. Am J Psychiatry. 2014 Apr;171(4):395-7.

9. “Many people taking antidepressants discover they cannot quit.” New York Times. 2018 Apr 7.

10. “Antidepressants show greatest increase in number of prescription items dispensed.” National Health Service. 2015 Jul 5.

11. “The ketamine connection.” BBC News. 2015 Jul 10.

12. Front Psychiatry. 2018 Jul 17. doi: 10.33389/fpsyt.2018.00313.

13. Am J Psychiatry. 2018 Dec 1;175(2):1205-15.
 

Dr. Badre is a forensic psychiatrist in San Diego and an expert in correctional mental health. He holds teaching positions at the University of California, San Diego, and the University of San Diego. Among his writings is Coercion and the critical psychiatrist, chapter 7 in the new book “Critical Psychiatry: Controversies and Clinical Implications” (Cham, Switzerland: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2019, pp. 155-77). Dr. Lehman is an associate professor of psychiatry at UCSD. He is codirector of all Acute and Intensive Psychiatric Treatment at the VA Medical Center in San Diego, where he practices clinical psychiatry. He also is the course director for the UCSD third-year medical student psychiatry clerkship.



*This article was updated 3/25/2019.