Nandita Mitra, PhD

Physicians face growing pressure to reduce their use of “low value” care—services that provide either little to no benefit, little benefit relative to cost, or outsized potential harm compared to benefit. One emerging policy solution for deterring such services is to financially penalize physicians who prescribe them.^1,2

Physicians’ willingness to support such policies may depend on who they believe benefits from reductions in low-value care. In previous studies of cancer screening, the more that primary care physicians felt that the money saved from cost-containment efforts went to insurance company profits rather than to patients, the less willing they were to use less expensive cancer screening approaches.³

Similarly, physicians may be more likely to support financial penalty policies if they perceive that the benefits from reducing low-value care accrue to patients (eg, lower out-of-pocket costs) rather than insurers or hospitals (eg, profits and salaries of their leaders). If present, such perceptions could inform incentive design. We explored the hypothesis that support of financial penalties for low-value care would be associated with where physicians thought the money goes.

METHODS

Study Sample

By using a panel of internists maintained by the American College of Physicians, we conducted a randomized, web-based survey among 484 physicians who were either internal medicine residents or internal medicine physicians practicing hospital medicine.

Survey Instrument

Respondents used a 5-point scale (“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”) to indicate their agreement with a policy that financially penalizes physicians for prescribing services that provide few benefits to patients. Respondents were asked to simultaneously consider the following hospital medicine services, deemed to be low value based on medical evidence and consensus guidelines⁴: (1) placing, and leaving in, urinary catheters for urine output monitoring in noncritically ill patients, (2) ordering continuous telemetry monitoring for nonintensive care unit patients without a protocol governing continuation, and (3) prescribing stress ulcer prophylaxis for medical patients not at a high risk for gastrointestinal complications. Policy support was defined as “somewhat” or “strongly” agreeing with the policy. As part of another study of this physician cohort, this question varied in how the harm of low-value services was framed: either as harm to patients, to society, or to hospitals and insurers as institutions. Respondent characteristics were balanced across survey versions, and for the current analysis, we pooled responses across all versions.

All other questions in the survey, described in detail elsewhere,⁵ were identical for all respondents. For this analysis, we focused on a question that asked physicians to assume that reducing these services saves money without harming the quality of care and to rate on a 4-point scale (“none” to “a lot”) how much of the money saved would ultimately go to the following 6 nonmutually exclusive areas: (a) other healthcare services for patients, (b) reduced charges to patients’ employers or insurers, (c) reduced out-of-pocket costs for patients, (d) salaries and bonuses for physicians, (e) salaries and profits for insurance companies and their leaders, and (f) salaries and profits for hospitals and/or health systems and their leaders.

Based on the positive correlation identified between the first 4 items (a to d) and negative correlation with the other 2 items (e and f), we reverse-coded the latter 2 and summed all 6 into a single-outcome scale, effectively representing the degree to which the money saved from reducing low-value services accrues generally to patients or physicians instead of to hospitals, insurance companies, and their leaders. The Cronbach alpha for the scale was 0.74, indicating acceptable reliability. Based on scale responses, we dichotomized respondents at the median into those who believe that the money saved from reducing low-value services would accrue as benefits to patients or physicians and those who believe benefits accrue to insurance companies or hospitals and/or health systems and their leaders. The protocol was exempted by the University of Pennsylvania Institutional Review Board.

 

Statistical Analysis

We used a χ² test and multivariable logistic regression analysis to evaluate the association between policy support and physician beliefs about who benefits from reductions in low-value care. A χ² test and a Kruskal-Wallis test were also used to evaluate the association between other respondent characteristics and beliefs about who benefits from reductions in low-value care. Analyses were performed by using Stata version 14.1 (StataCorp, College Station, TX). Tests of significance were 2-tailed at an alpha of .05.

RESULTS

Compared with nonrespondents, the 187 physicians who responded (39% response rate) were more likely to be female (30% vs 26%, P = 0.001), older (mean age 41 vs 36 years old, P < 0.001), and practicing clinicians rather than internal medicine residents (87% vs 69%, P < 0.001). Twenty-one percent reported that their personal compensation was tied to cost incentives.

Overall, respondents believed that more of any money saved from reducing low-value services would go to profits and leadership salaries for insurance companies and hospitals and/or health systems rather than to patients (panel A of Figure). Few respondents felt that the money saved would ultimately go toward physician compensation.

Physician beliefs about where the majority of any money saved goes were associated with policy support (panel B of Figure). Among those who did not support penalties, 52% believed that the majority of any money saved would go to salaries and profits for insurance companies and their leaders, and 39% believed it would go to salaries and profits for hospitals and/or health systems and their leaders, compared to 35% (P = 0.02) and 32% (P = 0.37), respectively, among physicians who supported penalties.

Sixty-six percent of physicians who supported penalties believed that benefits from reducing low-value care accrue to patients or physicians, compared to 39% among those not supporting penalties (P < 0.001). In multivariable analyses, policy support was associated with the belief that the money saved from reducing low-value services would accrue as benefits to patients or physicians rather than as salaries and profits for insurance companies or hospitals and/or health systems and their leaders (Table). There were no statistically significant associations between respondent age, gender, or professional status and beliefs about who benefits from reductions in low-value care.

DISCUSSION

Despite ongoing efforts to highlight how reducing low-value care benefits patients, physicians in our sample did not believe that much of the money saved would benefit patients.

This result may reflect that while some care patterns are considered low value because they provide little benefit at a high cost, others yield potential harm, regardless of cost. For example, limiting stress ulcer prophylaxis largely aims to avoid clinical harm (eg, adverse drug effects and nosocomial infections). Limiting telemetric monitoring largely aims to reduce costly care that provides only limited benefit. Therefore, the nature of potential benefit to patients is very different—improved clinical outcomes in the former and potential cost savings in the latter. Future studies could separately assess physician attitudes about these 2 different definitions of low-value services.

Our study also demonstrates that the more physicians believe that much of any money saved goes to the profits and salaries of insurance companies, hospitals and/or health systems, and their leaders rather than to patients, the less likely they are to support policies financially penalizing physicians for prescribing low-value services.

Our study does not address why physicians have the beliefs that they have, but a likely explanation, at least in part, is that financial flows in healthcare are complex and tangled. Indeed, a clear understanding of who actually benefits is so hard to determine that these stated beliefs may really derive from views of power or justice rather than from some understanding of funds flow. Whether or not ideological attitudes underlie these expressed beliefs, policymakers and healthcare institutions might be advised to increase transparency about how cost savings are realized and whom they benefit.

Our analysis has limitations. Although it provides insight into where physicians believe relative amounts of money saved go with respect to 6 common options, the study did not include an exhaustive list of possibilities. The response rate also limits the representativeness of our results. Additionally, the study design prevents conclusions about causality; we cannot determine whether the belief that savings go to insurance companies and their executives is what reduces physicians’ enthusiasm for penalties, whether the causal association is in the opposite direction, or whether the 2 factors are linked in another way.

Nonetheless, our findings are consistent with a sense of healthcare justice in which physicians support penalties imposed on themselves only if the resulting benefits accrue to patients rather than to corporate or organizational interests. Effective physician penalties will likely need to address the belief that insurers and provider organizations stand to gain more than patients when low-value care services are reduced.

 

Disclosure 

Drs. Liao, Schapira, Mitra, and Weissman have no conflicts to disclose. Dr. Navathe serves as advisor to Navvis and Company, Navigant Inc., Lynx Medical, Indegene Inc., and Sutherland Global Services and receives an honorarium from Elsevier Press, none of which have relationship to this manuscript. Dr. Asch is a partner and partial owner of VAL Health, which has no relationship to this manuscript.

Funding

This work was supported by The Leonard Davis Institute of Health Economics at the University of Pennsylvania, which had no role in the study design, data collection, analysis, or interpretation of results.

Physicians face growing pressure to reduce their use of “low value” care—services that provide either little to no benefit, little benefit relative to cost, or outsized potential harm compared to benefit. One emerging policy solution for deterring such services is to financially penalize physicians who prescribe them.^1,2

Physicians’ willingness to support such policies may depend on who they believe benefits from reductions in low-value care. In previous studies of cancer screening, the more that primary care physicians felt that the money saved from cost-containment efforts went to insurance company profits rather than to patients, the less willing they were to use less expensive cancer screening approaches.³

Similarly, physicians may be more likely to support financial penalty policies if they perceive that the benefits from reducing low-value care accrue to patients (eg, lower out-of-pocket costs) rather than insurers or hospitals (eg, profits and salaries of their leaders). If present, such perceptions could inform incentive design. We explored the hypothesis that support of financial penalties for low-value care would be associated with where physicians thought the money goes.

METHODS

Study Sample

By using a panel of internists maintained by the American College of Physicians, we conducted a randomized, web-based survey among 484 physicians who were either internal medicine residents or internal medicine physicians practicing hospital medicine.

Survey Instrument

Respondents used a 5-point scale (“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”) to indicate their agreement with a policy that financially penalizes physicians for prescribing services that provide few benefits to patients. Respondents were asked to simultaneously consider the following hospital medicine services, deemed to be low value based on medical evidence and consensus guidelines⁴: (1) placing, and leaving in, urinary catheters for urine output monitoring in noncritically ill patients, (2) ordering continuous telemetry monitoring for nonintensive care unit patients without a protocol governing continuation, and (3) prescribing stress ulcer prophylaxis for medical patients not at a high risk for gastrointestinal complications. Policy support was defined as “somewhat” or “strongly” agreeing with the policy. As part of another study of this physician cohort, this question varied in how the harm of low-value services was framed: either as harm to patients, to society, or to hospitals and insurers as institutions. Respondent characteristics were balanced across survey versions, and for the current analysis, we pooled responses across all versions.

All other questions in the survey, described in detail elsewhere,⁵ were identical for all respondents. For this analysis, we focused on a question that asked physicians to assume that reducing these services saves money without harming the quality of care and to rate on a 4-point scale (“none” to “a lot”) how much of the money saved would ultimately go to the following 6 nonmutually exclusive areas: (a) other healthcare services for patients, (b) reduced charges to patients’ employers or insurers, (c) reduced out-of-pocket costs for patients, (d) salaries and bonuses for physicians, (e) salaries and profits for insurance companies and their leaders, and (f) salaries and profits for hospitals and/or health systems and their leaders.

Based on the positive correlation identified between the first 4 items (a to d) and negative correlation with the other 2 items (e and f), we reverse-coded the latter 2 and summed all 6 into a single-outcome scale, effectively representing the degree to which the money saved from reducing low-value services accrues generally to patients or physicians instead of to hospitals, insurance companies, and their leaders. The Cronbach alpha for the scale was 0.74, indicating acceptable reliability. Based on scale responses, we dichotomized respondents at the median into those who believe that the money saved from reducing low-value services would accrue as benefits to patients or physicians and those who believe benefits accrue to insurance companies or hospitals and/or health systems and their leaders. The protocol was exempted by the University of Pennsylvania Institutional Review Board.

 

Statistical Analysis

We used a χ² test and multivariable logistic regression analysis to evaluate the association between policy support and physician beliefs about who benefits from reductions in low-value care. A χ² test and a Kruskal-Wallis test were also used to evaluate the association between other respondent characteristics and beliefs about who benefits from reductions in low-value care. Analyses were performed by using Stata version 14.1 (StataCorp, College Station, TX). Tests of significance were 2-tailed at an alpha of .05.

RESULTS

Compared with nonrespondents, the 187 physicians who responded (39% response rate) were more likely to be female (30% vs 26%, P = 0.001), older (mean age 41 vs 36 years old, P < 0.001), and practicing clinicians rather than internal medicine residents (87% vs 69%, P < 0.001). Twenty-one percent reported that their personal compensation was tied to cost incentives.

Overall, respondents believed that more of any money saved from reducing low-value services would go to profits and leadership salaries for insurance companies and hospitals and/or health systems rather than to patients (panel A of Figure). Few respondents felt that the money saved would ultimately go toward physician compensation.

Physician beliefs about where the majority of any money saved goes were associated with policy support (panel B of Figure). Among those who did not support penalties, 52% believed that the majority of any money saved would go to salaries and profits for insurance companies and their leaders, and 39% believed it would go to salaries and profits for hospitals and/or health systems and their leaders, compared to 35% (P = 0.02) and 32% (P = 0.37), respectively, among physicians who supported penalties.

Sixty-six percent of physicians who supported penalties believed that benefits from reducing low-value care accrue to patients or physicians, compared to 39% among those not supporting penalties (P < 0.001). In multivariable analyses, policy support was associated with the belief that the money saved from reducing low-value services would accrue as benefits to patients or physicians rather than as salaries and profits for insurance companies or hospitals and/or health systems and their leaders (Table). There were no statistically significant associations between respondent age, gender, or professional status and beliefs about who benefits from reductions in low-value care.

DISCUSSION

Despite ongoing efforts to highlight how reducing low-value care benefits patients, physicians in our sample did not believe that much of the money saved would benefit patients.

This result may reflect that while some care patterns are considered low value because they provide little benefit at a high cost, others yield potential harm, regardless of cost. For example, limiting stress ulcer prophylaxis largely aims to avoid clinical harm (eg, adverse drug effects and nosocomial infections). Limiting telemetric monitoring largely aims to reduce costly care that provides only limited benefit. Therefore, the nature of potential benefit to patients is very different—improved clinical outcomes in the former and potential cost savings in the latter. Future studies could separately assess physician attitudes about these 2 different definitions of low-value services.

Our study also demonstrates that the more physicians believe that much of any money saved goes to the profits and salaries of insurance companies, hospitals and/or health systems, and their leaders rather than to patients, the less likely they are to support policies financially penalizing physicians for prescribing low-value services.

Our study does not address why physicians have the beliefs that they have, but a likely explanation, at least in part, is that financial flows in healthcare are complex and tangled. Indeed, a clear understanding of who actually benefits is so hard to determine that these stated beliefs may really derive from views of power or justice rather than from some understanding of funds flow. Whether or not ideological attitudes underlie these expressed beliefs, policymakers and healthcare institutions might be advised to increase transparency about how cost savings are realized and whom they benefit.

Our analysis has limitations. Although it provides insight into where physicians believe relative amounts of money saved go with respect to 6 common options, the study did not include an exhaustive list of possibilities. The response rate also limits the representativeness of our results. Additionally, the study design prevents conclusions about causality; we cannot determine whether the belief that savings go to insurance companies and their executives is what reduces physicians’ enthusiasm for penalties, whether the causal association is in the opposite direction, or whether the 2 factors are linked in another way.

Nonetheless, our findings are consistent with a sense of healthcare justice in which physicians support penalties imposed on themselves only if the resulting benefits accrue to patients rather than to corporate or organizational interests. Effective physician penalties will likely need to address the belief that insurers and provider organizations stand to gain more than patients when low-value care services are reduced.

 

Disclosure 

Drs. Liao, Schapira, Mitra, and Weissman have no conflicts to disclose. Dr. Navathe serves as advisor to Navvis and Company, Navigant Inc., Lynx Medical, Indegene Inc., and Sutherland Global Services and receives an honorarium from Elsevier Press, none of which have relationship to this manuscript. Dr. Asch is a partner and partial owner of VAL Health, which has no relationship to this manuscript.

Funding

This work was supported by The Leonard Davis Institute of Health Economics at the University of Pennsylvania, which had no role in the study design, data collection, analysis, or interpretation of results.

Physicians face growing pressure to reduce their use of “low value” care—services that provide either little to no benefit, little benefit relative to cost, or outsized potential harm compared to benefit. One emerging policy solution for deterring such services is to financially penalize physicians who prescribe them.^1,2

Physicians’ willingness to support such policies may depend on who they believe benefits from reductions in low-value care. In previous studies of cancer screening, the more that primary care physicians felt that the money saved from cost-containment efforts went to insurance company profits rather than to patients, the less willing they were to use less expensive cancer screening approaches.³

Similarly, physicians may be more likely to support financial penalty policies if they perceive that the benefits from reducing low-value care accrue to patients (eg, lower out-of-pocket costs) rather than insurers or hospitals (eg, profits and salaries of their leaders). If present, such perceptions could inform incentive design. We explored the hypothesis that support of financial penalties for low-value care would be associated with where physicians thought the money goes.

METHODS

Study Sample

By using a panel of internists maintained by the American College of Physicians, we conducted a randomized, web-based survey among 484 physicians who were either internal medicine residents or internal medicine physicians practicing hospital medicine.

Survey Instrument

Respondents used a 5-point scale (“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”) to indicate their agreement with a policy that financially penalizes physicians for prescribing services that provide few benefits to patients. Respondents were asked to simultaneously consider the following hospital medicine services, deemed to be low value based on medical evidence and consensus guidelines⁴: (1) placing, and leaving in, urinary catheters for urine output monitoring in noncritically ill patients, (2) ordering continuous telemetry monitoring for nonintensive care unit patients without a protocol governing continuation, and (3) prescribing stress ulcer prophylaxis for medical patients not at a high risk for gastrointestinal complications. Policy support was defined as “somewhat” or “strongly” agreeing with the policy. As part of another study of this physician cohort, this question varied in how the harm of low-value services was framed: either as harm to patients, to society, or to hospitals and insurers as institutions. Respondent characteristics were balanced across survey versions, and for the current analysis, we pooled responses across all versions.

All other questions in the survey, described in detail elsewhere,⁵ were identical for all respondents. For this analysis, we focused on a question that asked physicians to assume that reducing these services saves money without harming the quality of care and to rate on a 4-point scale (“none” to “a lot”) how much of the money saved would ultimately go to the following 6 nonmutually exclusive areas: (a) other healthcare services for patients, (b) reduced charges to patients’ employers or insurers, (c) reduced out-of-pocket costs for patients, (d) salaries and bonuses for physicians, (e) salaries and profits for insurance companies and their leaders, and (f) salaries and profits for hospitals and/or health systems and their leaders.

Based on the positive correlation identified between the first 4 items (a to d) and negative correlation with the other 2 items (e and f), we reverse-coded the latter 2 and summed all 6 into a single-outcome scale, effectively representing the degree to which the money saved from reducing low-value services accrues generally to patients or physicians instead of to hospitals, insurance companies, and their leaders. The Cronbach alpha for the scale was 0.74, indicating acceptable reliability. Based on scale responses, we dichotomized respondents at the median into those who believe that the money saved from reducing low-value services would accrue as benefits to patients or physicians and those who believe benefits accrue to insurance companies or hospitals and/or health systems and their leaders. The protocol was exempted by the University of Pennsylvania Institutional Review Board.

 

Statistical Analysis

We used a χ² test and multivariable logistic regression analysis to evaluate the association between policy support and physician beliefs about who benefits from reductions in low-value care. A χ² test and a Kruskal-Wallis test were also used to evaluate the association between other respondent characteristics and beliefs about who benefits from reductions in low-value care. Analyses were performed by using Stata version 14.1 (StataCorp, College Station, TX). Tests of significance were 2-tailed at an alpha of .05.

RESULTS

Compared with nonrespondents, the 187 physicians who responded (39% response rate) were more likely to be female (30% vs 26%, P = 0.001), older (mean age 41 vs 36 years old, P < 0.001), and practicing clinicians rather than internal medicine residents (87% vs 69%, P < 0.001). Twenty-one percent reported that their personal compensation was tied to cost incentives.

Overall, respondents believed that more of any money saved from reducing low-value services would go to profits and leadership salaries for insurance companies and hospitals and/or health systems rather than to patients (panel A of Figure). Few respondents felt that the money saved would ultimately go toward physician compensation.

Physician beliefs about where the majority of any money saved goes were associated with policy support (panel B of Figure). Among those who did not support penalties, 52% believed that the majority of any money saved would go to salaries and profits for insurance companies and their leaders, and 39% believed it would go to salaries and profits for hospitals and/or health systems and their leaders, compared to 35% (P = 0.02) and 32% (P = 0.37), respectively, among physicians who supported penalties.

Sixty-six percent of physicians who supported penalties believed that benefits from reducing low-value care accrue to patients or physicians, compared to 39% among those not supporting penalties (P < 0.001). In multivariable analyses, policy support was associated with the belief that the money saved from reducing low-value services would accrue as benefits to patients or physicians rather than as salaries and profits for insurance companies or hospitals and/or health systems and their leaders (Table). There were no statistically significant associations between respondent age, gender, or professional status and beliefs about who benefits from reductions in low-value care.

DISCUSSION

Despite ongoing efforts to highlight how reducing low-value care benefits patients, physicians in our sample did not believe that much of the money saved would benefit patients.

This result may reflect that while some care patterns are considered low value because they provide little benefit at a high cost, others yield potential harm, regardless of cost. For example, limiting stress ulcer prophylaxis largely aims to avoid clinical harm (eg, adverse drug effects and nosocomial infections). Limiting telemetric monitoring largely aims to reduce costly care that provides only limited benefit. Therefore, the nature of potential benefit to patients is very different—improved clinical outcomes in the former and potential cost savings in the latter. Future studies could separately assess physician attitudes about these 2 different definitions of low-value services.

Our study also demonstrates that the more physicians believe that much of any money saved goes to the profits and salaries of insurance companies, hospitals and/or health systems, and their leaders rather than to patients, the less likely they are to support policies financially penalizing physicians for prescribing low-value services.

Our study does not address why physicians have the beliefs that they have, but a likely explanation, at least in part, is that financial flows in healthcare are complex and tangled. Indeed, a clear understanding of who actually benefits is so hard to determine that these stated beliefs may really derive from views of power or justice rather than from some understanding of funds flow. Whether or not ideological attitudes underlie these expressed beliefs, policymakers and healthcare institutions might be advised to increase transparency about how cost savings are realized and whom they benefit.

Our analysis has limitations. Although it provides insight into where physicians believe relative amounts of money saved go with respect to 6 common options, the study did not include an exhaustive list of possibilities. The response rate also limits the representativeness of our results. Additionally, the study design prevents conclusions about causality; we cannot determine whether the belief that savings go to insurance companies and their executives is what reduces physicians’ enthusiasm for penalties, whether the causal association is in the opposite direction, or whether the 2 factors are linked in another way.

Nonetheless, our findings are consistent with a sense of healthcare justice in which physicians support penalties imposed on themselves only if the resulting benefits accrue to patients rather than to corporate or organizational interests. Effective physician penalties will likely need to address the belief that insurers and provider organizations stand to gain more than patients when low-value care services are reduced.

 

Disclosure 

Drs. Liao, Schapira, Mitra, and Weissman have no conflicts to disclose. Dr. Navathe serves as advisor to Navvis and Company, Navigant Inc., Lynx Medical, Indegene Inc., and Sutherland Global Services and receives an honorarium from Elsevier Press, none of which have relationship to this manuscript. Dr. Asch is a partner and partial owner of VAL Health, which has no relationship to this manuscript.

Funding

This work was supported by The Leonard Davis Institute of Health Economics at the University of Pennsylvania, which had no role in the study design, data collection, analysis, or interpretation of results.

Given growing incentives to reduce readmission rates, predischarge checklists and bundles have recommended that inpatient providers schedule postdischarge follow-up visits (PDFVs) for their hospitalized patients.^1-4 PDFVs have been linked to lower readmission rates in patients with chronic conditions, including congestive heart failure, psychiatric illnesses, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.^5-8 In contrast, the impact of PDFVs on readmissions in hospitalized general medicine populations has been mixed.^9-12 Beyond the presence or absence of PDFVs, it may be a patient’s inability to keep scheduled PDFVs that contributes more strongly to preventable readmissions.¹¹

This challenge, dealing with the 12% to 37% of patients who miss their visits (“no-shows”), is not new.^13-17 In high-risk patient populations, such as those with substance abuse, diabetes, or human immunodeficiency virus, no-shows (NSs) have been linked to poorer short-term and long-term clinical outcomes.^16,18-20 Additionally, NSs pose a challenge for outpatient clinics and the healthcare system at large. The financial cost of NSs ranges from approximately $200 per patient in 2 analyses to $7 million in cumulative lost revenue per year at 1 large academic health system.^13,17,21 As such, increasing attendance at PDFVs is a potential target for improving both patient outcomes and clinic productivity.

Most prior PDFV research has focused on readmission risk rather than PDFV attendance as the primary outcome.^5-12 However, given the patient-oriented benefits of attending PDFVs and the clinic-oriented benefits of avoiding vacant time slots, NS PDFVs represent an important missed opportunity for our healthcare delivery system. To our knowledge, risk factors for PDFV nonattendance have not yet been systematically studied. The aim of our study was to analyze PDFV nonattendance, particularly NSs and same-day cancellations (SDCs), for hospitalizations and clinics within our healthcare system.

METHODS

Study Design

We conducted an observational cohort study of adult patients from 10 medical units at the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania (a 789-bed quaternary-care hospital within an urban, academic medical system) who were scheduled with at least 1 PDFV. Specifically, the patients included in our analysis were hospitalized on general internal medicine services or medical subspecialty services with discharge dates between April 1, 2014, and March 31, 2015. Hospitalizations included in our study had at least 1 PDFV scheduled with an outpatient provider affiliated with the University of Pennsylvania Health System (UPHS). PDFVs scheduled with unaffiliated providers were not examined.

Each PDFV was requested by a patient’s inpatient care team. Once the care team had determined that a PDFV was clinically warranted, a member of the team (generally a resident, advanced practice provider, medical student, or designee) either called the UPHS clinic to schedule an appointment time or e-mailed the outpatient UPHS provider directly to facilitate a more urgent PDFV appointment time. Once a PDFV time was confirmed, PDFV details (ie, date, time, location, and phone number) were electronically entered into the patient’s discharge instructions by the inpatient care team. At the time of discharge, nurses reviewed these instructions with their patients. All patients left the hospital with a physical copy of these instructions. As part of routine care at our institution, patients then received automated telephone reminders from their UPHS-affiliated outpatient clinic 48 hours prior to each PDFV.

Data Collection

Our study was determined to meet criteria for quality improvement by the University of Pennsylvania’s Institutional Review Board. We used our healthcare system’s integrated electronic medical record system to track the dates of initial PDFV requests, the dates of hospitalization, and actual PDFV dates. PDFVs were included if the appointment request was made while a patient was hospitalized, including the day of discharge. Our study methodology only allowed us to investigate PDFVs scheduled with UPHS outpatient providers. We did not review discharge instructions or survey non-UPHS clinics to quantify visits scheduled with other providers, for example, community health centers or external private practices.

Exclusion criteria included the following: (1) office visits with nonproviders, for example, scheduled diagnostic procedures or pharmacist appointments for warfarin dosing; (2) visits cancelled by inpatient providers prior to discharge; (3) visits for patients not otherwise eligible for UPHS outpatient care because of insurance reasons; and (4) visits scheduled for dates after a patient’s death. Our motivation for the third exclusion criterion was the infrequent and irregular process by which PDFVs were authorized for these patients. These patients and their characteristics are described in Supplementary Table 1 in more detail.

For each PDFV, we recorded age, gender, race, insurance status, driving distance, length of stay for index hospitalization, discharging service (general internal medicine vs subspecialty), postdischarge disposition (home, home with home care services such as nursing or physical therapy, or facility), the number of PDFVs scheduled per index hospitalization, PDFV specialty type (oncologic subspecialty, nononcologic medical subspecialty, nononcologic surgical subspecialty, primary care, or other specialty), PDFV season, and PDFV lead time (the number of days between the discharge date and PDFV). We consolidated oncologic specialties into 1 group given the integrated nature of our healthcare system’s comprehensive cancer center. “Other” PDFV specialty subtypes are described in Supplementary Table 2. Driving distances between patient postal codes and our hospital were calculated using Excel VBA Master (Salt Lake City, Utah) and were subsequently categorized into patient-level quartiles for further analysis. For cancelled PDFVs, we collected dates of cancellation relative to the date of the appointment itself.

 

Study Outcomes

The primary study outcome was PDFV attendance. Each PDFV’s status was categorized by outpatient clinic staff as attended, cancelled, or NS. For cancelled appointments, cancellation dates and reasons (if entered by clinic representatives) were collected. In keeping with prior studies investigating outpatient nonattendance,we calculated collective NS/SDC rates for the variables listed above.^17,22-25 We additionally calculated NS/SDC and attendance-as-scheduled rates stratified by the number of PDFVs per patient to assess for a “high-utilizer” effect with regard to PDFV attendance.

Statistical Analysis

We used multivariable mixed-effects regression with a logit link to assess associations between age, gender, race, insurance, driving distance quartile, length of stay, discharging service, postdischarge disposition, the number of PDFVs per hospitalization, PDFV specialty type, PDFV season, PDFV lead time, and our NS/SDC outcome. The mixed-effects approach was used to account for correlation structures induced by patients who had multiple visits and for patients with multiple hospitalizations. Specifically, our model specified 2 levels of nesting (PDFVs nested within each hospitalization, which were nested within each patient) to obtain appropriate standard error estimates for our adjusted odds ratios (ORs). Correlation matrices and multivariable variance inflation factors were used to assess collinearity among the predictor variables. These assessments did not indicate strong collinearity; hence, all predictors were included in the model. Only driving distance had a small amount of missing data (0.18% of driving distances were unavailable), so multiple imputation was not undertaken. Analyses were performed using R version 3.3.1 (R Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria).

RESULTS

Baseline Characteristics

During the 1-year study period, there were 11,829 discrete hospitalizations in medical units at our hospital. Of these hospitalizations, 6136 (52%) had at least 1 UPHS-affiliated PDFV meeting our inclusion and exclusion criteria, as detailed in the Figure. Across these hospitalizations, 9258 PDFVs were scheduled on behalf of 4653 patients. Demographic characteristics for these patients, hospitalizations, and visits are detailed in Table 1. The median age of patients in our cohort was 61 years old (interquartile range [IQR] 49-70, range 18-101). The median driving distance was 17 miles (IQR 4.3-38.8, range 0-2891). For hospitalizations, the median length of stay was 5 days (IQR 3-10, range 0-97). The median PDFV lead time, which is defined as the number of days between discharge and PDFV, was 12 days (IQR 6-23, range 1-60). Overall, 41% of patients (n = 1927) attended all of their PDFVs as scheduled; Supplementary Figure 1 lists patient-level PDFV attendance-as-scheduled percentages in more detail.

Incidence of NSs and SDCs

Twenty-five percent of PDFVs (n = 2303) were ultimately NS/SDCs; this included 1658 NSs (18% of all appointments) and 645 SDCs (7% of all appointments). Fifty-two percent of PDFVs (n = 4847) were kept as scheduled, while 23% (n = 2108) were cancelled before the day of the visit. Of the 2558 cancellations with valid cancellation dates, 49% (n = 1252) were cancelled 2 or fewer days beforehand, as shown in Supplementary Figure 2.

In Table 2, we show unadjusted NS/SDC rates and adjusted NS/SDC ORs based on patient and hospitalization characteristics. NS/SDC appointments were more likely to occur in patients who were black (adjusted OR 1.94, 95% confidence interval [CI], 1.63-2.32) or Medicaid insured (OR 1.41, 95% CI, 1.19-1.67). In contrast, NS/SDC appointments were less likely in elderly patients (age ≥65 years: OR 0.39, 95% CI, 0.31-0.49) and patients who lived further away (furthest quartile of driving distance: OR 0.65, 95% CI, 0.52-–0.81). Longer hospitalizations were associated with higher NS/SDC rates (length of stay ≥15 days: OR 1.51, 95% CI, 1.22-1.88). In contrast, discharges from subspecialty services (OR 0.79, 95% CI, 0.68-0.93) had independently lower NS/SDC rates. Compared to discharges to home without services, NS/SDC rates were higher with discharges to home with services (OR 1.32, 95% CI, 1.01-1.36) and with discharges to facilities (OR 2.10, 95% CI, 1.70-2.60).

The presence of exactly 2 PDFVs per hospitalization was also associated with higher NS/SDC rates (OR 1.17, 95% CI, 1.01-1.36), compared to a single PDFV per hospitalization; however, the presence of more than 2 PDFVs per hospitalization was associated with lower NS/SDC rates (OR 0.82, 95% CI, 0.69-0.98). A separate analysis (data not shown) of potential high utilizers revealed a 15% NS/SDC rate for the top 0.5% of patients (median: 18 PDFVs each) and an 18% NS/SDC rate for the top 1% of patients (median: 14 PDFVs each) with regard to the numbers of PDFVs scheduled, compared to the 25% overall NS/SDC rate for all patients.

NS/SDC rates and adjusted ORs with regard to individual PDFV characteristics are displayed in Table 3. Nononcologic visits had higher NS/SDC rates than oncologic visits; for example, the NS/SDC rate for primary care visits was 39% (OR 2.62, 95% CI, 2.03-3.38), compared to 12% for oncologic visits. Appointments in the “other” specialty category also had high nonattendance rates, as further described in Supplementary Table B. Summertime appointments were more likely to be attended (OR 0.81, 95% CI, 0.68-0.97) compared to those in the spring. PDFV lead time (the time interval between the discharge date and appointment date) was not associated with changes in visit attendance.

 

DISCUSSION

PDFVs were scheduled on patients’ behalf for more than half of all medical hospitalizations at our institution, a rate that is consistent with previous studies.^10,11,26 However, 1 in 4 of these PDFVs resulted in a NS/SDC. This figure contrasts sharply with our institution’s 10% overall NS/SDC rate for all outpatient visits (S. Schlegel, written communication, July 2016). In our study, patients who were younger, black, or Medicaid insured were more likely to miss their follow-up visits. Patients who lived farther from the study hospital had lower NS/SDC rates, which is consistent with another study of a low-income, urban patient population.²⁷ In contrast, patients with longer lengths of stay, discharges with home care services, or discharges to another facility were more likely to miss their PDFVs. Reasons for this are likely multifactorial, including readmission to a hospital or feeling too unwell to leave home to attend PDFVs. Insurance policies regarding ambulance reimbursement and outpatient billing can cause confusion and may have contributed to higher NS/SDC rates for facility-bound patients.^28,29

When comparing PDFV characteristics themselves, oncologic visits had the lowest NS/SDC incidence of any group analyzed in our study. This may be related to the inherent life-altering nature of a cancer diagnosis or our cancer center’s use of patient navigators.^23,30 In contrast, primary care clinics suffered from NS/SDC rates approaching 40%, which is a concerning finding given the importance of primary care coordination in the posthospitalization period.^9,31 Why are primary care appointments so commonly missed? Some studies suggest that forgetting about a primary care appointment is a leading reason.^15,32,33 For PDFVs, this phenomenon may be augmented because the visits are not scheduled by patients themselves. Additionally, patients may paradoxically undervalue the benefit of an all-encompassing primary care visit, compared to a PDFV focused on a specific problem, (eg, a cardiology follow-up appointment for a patient with congestive heart failure). In particular, patients with limited health literacy may potentially undervalue the capabilities of their primary care clinics.^34,35

The low absolute number of primary care PDFVs (only 8% of all visits) scheduled for patients at our hospital was an unexpected finding. This low percentage is likely a function of the patient population hospitalized at our large, urban quaternary-care facility. First, an unknown number of patients may have had PDFVs manually scheduled with primary care providers external to our health system; these PDFVs were not captured within our study. Second, 71% of the hospitalizations in our study occurred in subspecialty services, for which specific primary care follow-up may not be as urgent. Supporting this fact, further analysis of the 6136 hospitalizations in our study (data not shown) revealed that 28% of the hospitalizations in general internal medicine were scheduled with at least 1 primary care PDFV as opposed to only 5% of subspecialty-service hospitalizations.

In contrast to several previous studies of outpatient nonattendance,we did not find that visits scheduled for time points further in the future were more likely to be missed.^{14,24,25,36,37} Unlike other appointments, it may be that PDFV lead time does not affect attendance because of the unique manner in which PDFV times are scheduled and conveyed to patients. Unlike other appointments, patients do not schedule PDFVs themselves but instead learn about their PDFV dates as part of a large set of discharge instructions. This practice may result in poor recall of PDFV dates in recently hospitalized patients³⁸, regardless of the lead time between discharge and the visit itself.

Supplementary Table 1 details a 51% NS/SDC rate for the small number of PDFVs (n = 65) that were excluded a priori from our analysis because of general ineligibility for UPHS outpatient care. We specifically chose to exclude this population because of the infrequent and irregular process by which these PDFVs were authorized on a case-by-case basis, typically via active engagement by our hospital’s social work department. We did not study this population further but postulate that the 51% NS/SDC rate may reflect other social determinants of health that contribute to appointment nonadherence in a predominantly uninsured population.

Beyond their effect on patient outcomes, improving PDFV-related processes has the potential to boost both inpatient and outpatient provider satisfaction. From the standpoint of frontline inpatient providers (often resident physicians), calling outpatient clinics to request PDFVs is viewed as 1 of the top 5 administrative tasks that interfere with house staff education.³⁹ Future interventions that involve patients in the PDFV scheduling process may improve inpatient workflow while simultaneously engaging patients in their own care. For example, asking clinic representatives to directly schedule PDFVs with hospitalized patients, either by phone or in person, has been shown in pilot studies to improve PDFV attendance and decrease readmissions.^40-42 Conversely, NS/SDC visits harm outpatient provider productivity and decrease provider availability for other patients.^13,17,43 Strategies to mitigate the impact of unfilled appointment slots (eg, deliberately overbooking time slots in advance) carry their own risks, including provider burnout.⁴⁴ As such, preventing NSs may be superior to curing their adverse impacts. Many such strategies exist in the ambulatory setting,^13,43,45 for example, better communication with patients through texting or goal-directed, personalized phone reminders.^46-48Our study methodology has several limitations. Most importantly, we were unable to measure PDFVs made with providers unaffiliated with UPHS. As previously noted, our low proportion of primary care PDFVs may specifically reflect patients with primary care providers outside of our health system. Similarly, our low percentage of Medicaid patients receiving PDFVs may be related to follow-up visits with nonaffiliated community health centers. We were unable to measure patient acuity and health literacy as potential predictors of NS/SDC rates. Driving distances were calculated from patient postal codes to our hospital, not to individual outpatient clinics. However, the majority of our hospital-affiliated clinics are located adjacent to our hospital; additionally, we grouped driving distances into quartiles for our analysis. We had initially attempted to differentiate between clinic-initiated and patient-initiated cancellations, but unfortunately, we found that the data were too unreliable to be used for further analysis (outlined in Supplementary Table 3). Lastly, because we studied patients in medical units at a single large, urban, academic center, our results are not generalizable to other settings (eg, community hospitals, hospitals with smaller networks of outpatient providers, or patients being discharged from surgical services or observation units).

 

CONCLUSION

Given national efforts to enhance postdischarge transitions of care, we aimed to analyze attendance at provider-scheduled PDFV appointments. Our finding that 25% of PDFVs resulted in NS/SDCs raises both questions and opportunities for inpatient and outpatient providers. Further research is needed to understand why so many patients miss their PDFVs, and we should work as a field to develop creative solutions to improve PDFV scheduling and attendance.

Acknowledgments

The authors acknowledge Marie Synnestvedt, PhD, and Manik Chhabra, MD, for their assistance with data gathering and statistical analysis. They also acknowledge Allison DeKosky, MD, Michael Serpa, BS, Michael McFall, and Scott Schlegel, MBA, for their assistance with researching this topic. They did not receive external compensation for their assistance outside of their usual salary support.

DISCLOSURE

Nothing to report.

Given growing incentives to reduce readmission rates, predischarge checklists and bundles have recommended that inpatient providers schedule postdischarge follow-up visits (PDFVs) for their hospitalized patients.^1-4 PDFVs have been linked to lower readmission rates in patients with chronic conditions, including congestive heart failure, psychiatric illnesses, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.^5-8 In contrast, the impact of PDFVs on readmissions in hospitalized general medicine populations has been mixed.^9-12 Beyond the presence or absence of PDFVs, it may be a patient’s inability to keep scheduled PDFVs that contributes more strongly to preventable readmissions.¹¹

This challenge, dealing with the 12% to 37% of patients who miss their visits (“no-shows”), is not new.^13-17 In high-risk patient populations, such as those with substance abuse, diabetes, or human immunodeficiency virus, no-shows (NSs) have been linked to poorer short-term and long-term clinical outcomes.^16,18-20 Additionally, NSs pose a challenge for outpatient clinics and the healthcare system at large. The financial cost of NSs ranges from approximately $200 per patient in 2 analyses to $7 million in cumulative lost revenue per year at 1 large academic health system.^13,17,21 As such, increasing attendance at PDFVs is a potential target for improving both patient outcomes and clinic productivity.

Most prior PDFV research has focused on readmission risk rather than PDFV attendance as the primary outcome.^5-12 However, given the patient-oriented benefits of attending PDFVs and the clinic-oriented benefits of avoiding vacant time slots, NS PDFVs represent an important missed opportunity for our healthcare delivery system. To our knowledge, risk factors for PDFV nonattendance have not yet been systematically studied. The aim of our study was to analyze PDFV nonattendance, particularly NSs and same-day cancellations (SDCs), for hospitalizations and clinics within our healthcare system.

METHODS

Study Design

We conducted an observational cohort study of adult patients from 10 medical units at the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania (a 789-bed quaternary-care hospital within an urban, academic medical system) who were scheduled with at least 1 PDFV. Specifically, the patients included in our analysis were hospitalized on general internal medicine services or medical subspecialty services with discharge dates between April 1, 2014, and March 31, 2015. Hospitalizations included in our study had at least 1 PDFV scheduled with an outpatient provider affiliated with the University of Pennsylvania Health System (UPHS). PDFVs scheduled with unaffiliated providers were not examined.

Each PDFV was requested by a patient’s inpatient care team. Once the care team had determined that a PDFV was clinically warranted, a member of the team (generally a resident, advanced practice provider, medical student, or designee) either called the UPHS clinic to schedule an appointment time or e-mailed the outpatient UPHS provider directly to facilitate a more urgent PDFV appointment time. Once a PDFV time was confirmed, PDFV details (ie, date, time, location, and phone number) were electronically entered into the patient’s discharge instructions by the inpatient care team. At the time of discharge, nurses reviewed these instructions with their patients. All patients left the hospital with a physical copy of these instructions. As part of routine care at our institution, patients then received automated telephone reminders from their UPHS-affiliated outpatient clinic 48 hours prior to each PDFV.

Data Collection

Our study was determined to meet criteria for quality improvement by the University of Pennsylvania’s Institutional Review Board. We used our healthcare system’s integrated electronic medical record system to track the dates of initial PDFV requests, the dates of hospitalization, and actual PDFV dates. PDFVs were included if the appointment request was made while a patient was hospitalized, including the day of discharge. Our study methodology only allowed us to investigate PDFVs scheduled with UPHS outpatient providers. We did not review discharge instructions or survey non-UPHS clinics to quantify visits scheduled with other providers, for example, community health centers or external private practices.

Exclusion criteria included the following: (1) office visits with nonproviders, for example, scheduled diagnostic procedures or pharmacist appointments for warfarin dosing; (2) visits cancelled by inpatient providers prior to discharge; (3) visits for patients not otherwise eligible for UPHS outpatient care because of insurance reasons; and (4) visits scheduled for dates after a patient’s death. Our motivation for the third exclusion criterion was the infrequent and irregular process by which PDFVs were authorized for these patients. These patients and their characteristics are described in Supplementary Table 1 in more detail.

For each PDFV, we recorded age, gender, race, insurance status, driving distance, length of stay for index hospitalization, discharging service (general internal medicine vs subspecialty), postdischarge disposition (home, home with home care services such as nursing or physical therapy, or facility), the number of PDFVs scheduled per index hospitalization, PDFV specialty type (oncologic subspecialty, nononcologic medical subspecialty, nononcologic surgical subspecialty, primary care, or other specialty), PDFV season, and PDFV lead time (the number of days between the discharge date and PDFV). We consolidated oncologic specialties into 1 group given the integrated nature of our healthcare system’s comprehensive cancer center. “Other” PDFV specialty subtypes are described in Supplementary Table 2. Driving distances between patient postal codes and our hospital were calculated using Excel VBA Master (Salt Lake City, Utah) and were subsequently categorized into patient-level quartiles for further analysis. For cancelled PDFVs, we collected dates of cancellation relative to the date of the appointment itself.

 

Study Outcomes

The primary study outcome was PDFV attendance. Each PDFV’s status was categorized by outpatient clinic staff as attended, cancelled, or NS. For cancelled appointments, cancellation dates and reasons (if entered by clinic representatives) were collected. In keeping with prior studies investigating outpatient nonattendance,we calculated collective NS/SDC rates for the variables listed above.^17,22-25 We additionally calculated NS/SDC and attendance-as-scheduled rates stratified by the number of PDFVs per patient to assess for a “high-utilizer” effect with regard to PDFV attendance.

Statistical Analysis

We used multivariable mixed-effects regression with a logit link to assess associations between age, gender, race, insurance, driving distance quartile, length of stay, discharging service, postdischarge disposition, the number of PDFVs per hospitalization, PDFV specialty type, PDFV season, PDFV lead time, and our NS/SDC outcome. The mixed-effects approach was used to account for correlation structures induced by patients who had multiple visits and for patients with multiple hospitalizations. Specifically, our model specified 2 levels of nesting (PDFVs nested within each hospitalization, which were nested within each patient) to obtain appropriate standard error estimates for our adjusted odds ratios (ORs). Correlation matrices and multivariable variance inflation factors were used to assess collinearity among the predictor variables. These assessments did not indicate strong collinearity; hence, all predictors were included in the model. Only driving distance had a small amount of missing data (0.18% of driving distances were unavailable), so multiple imputation was not undertaken. Analyses were performed using R version 3.3.1 (R Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria).

RESULTS

Baseline Characteristics

During the 1-year study period, there were 11,829 discrete hospitalizations in medical units at our hospital. Of these hospitalizations, 6136 (52%) had at least 1 UPHS-affiliated PDFV meeting our inclusion and exclusion criteria, as detailed in the Figure. Across these hospitalizations, 9258 PDFVs were scheduled on behalf of 4653 patients. Demographic characteristics for these patients, hospitalizations, and visits are detailed in Table 1. The median age of patients in our cohort was 61 years old (interquartile range [IQR] 49-70, range 18-101). The median driving distance was 17 miles (IQR 4.3-38.8, range 0-2891). For hospitalizations, the median length of stay was 5 days (IQR 3-10, range 0-97). The median PDFV lead time, which is defined as the number of days between discharge and PDFV, was 12 days (IQR 6-23, range 1-60). Overall, 41% of patients (n = 1927) attended all of their PDFVs as scheduled; Supplementary Figure 1 lists patient-level PDFV attendance-as-scheduled percentages in more detail.

Incidence of NSs and SDCs

Twenty-five percent of PDFVs (n = 2303) were ultimately NS/SDCs; this included 1658 NSs (18% of all appointments) and 645 SDCs (7% of all appointments). Fifty-two percent of PDFVs (n = 4847) were kept as scheduled, while 23% (n = 2108) were cancelled before the day of the visit. Of the 2558 cancellations with valid cancellation dates, 49% (n = 1252) were cancelled 2 or fewer days beforehand, as shown in Supplementary Figure 2.

In Table 2, we show unadjusted NS/SDC rates and adjusted NS/SDC ORs based on patient and hospitalization characteristics. NS/SDC appointments were more likely to occur in patients who were black (adjusted OR 1.94, 95% confidence interval [CI], 1.63-2.32) or Medicaid insured (OR 1.41, 95% CI, 1.19-1.67). In contrast, NS/SDC appointments were less likely in elderly patients (age ≥65 years: OR 0.39, 95% CI, 0.31-0.49) and patients who lived further away (furthest quartile of driving distance: OR 0.65, 95% CI, 0.52-–0.81). Longer hospitalizations were associated with higher NS/SDC rates (length of stay ≥15 days: OR 1.51, 95% CI, 1.22-1.88). In contrast, discharges from subspecialty services (OR 0.79, 95% CI, 0.68-0.93) had independently lower NS/SDC rates. Compared to discharges to home without services, NS/SDC rates were higher with discharges to home with services (OR 1.32, 95% CI, 1.01-1.36) and with discharges to facilities (OR 2.10, 95% CI, 1.70-2.60).

The presence of exactly 2 PDFVs per hospitalization was also associated with higher NS/SDC rates (OR 1.17, 95% CI, 1.01-1.36), compared to a single PDFV per hospitalization; however, the presence of more than 2 PDFVs per hospitalization was associated with lower NS/SDC rates (OR 0.82, 95% CI, 0.69-0.98). A separate analysis (data not shown) of potential high utilizers revealed a 15% NS/SDC rate for the top 0.5% of patients (median: 18 PDFVs each) and an 18% NS/SDC rate for the top 1% of patients (median: 14 PDFVs each) with regard to the numbers of PDFVs scheduled, compared to the 25% overall NS/SDC rate for all patients.

NS/SDC rates and adjusted ORs with regard to individual PDFV characteristics are displayed in Table 3. Nononcologic visits had higher NS/SDC rates than oncologic visits; for example, the NS/SDC rate for primary care visits was 39% (OR 2.62, 95% CI, 2.03-3.38), compared to 12% for oncologic visits. Appointments in the “other” specialty category also had high nonattendance rates, as further described in Supplementary Table B. Summertime appointments were more likely to be attended (OR 0.81, 95% CI, 0.68-0.97) compared to those in the spring. PDFV lead time (the time interval between the discharge date and appointment date) was not associated with changes in visit attendance.

 

DISCUSSION

PDFVs were scheduled on patients’ behalf for more than half of all medical hospitalizations at our institution, a rate that is consistent with previous studies.^10,11,26 However, 1 in 4 of these PDFVs resulted in a NS/SDC. This figure contrasts sharply with our institution’s 10% overall NS/SDC rate for all outpatient visits (S. Schlegel, written communication, July 2016). In our study, patients who were younger, black, or Medicaid insured were more likely to miss their follow-up visits. Patients who lived farther from the study hospital had lower NS/SDC rates, which is consistent with another study of a low-income, urban patient population.²⁷ In contrast, patients with longer lengths of stay, discharges with home care services, or discharges to another facility were more likely to miss their PDFVs. Reasons for this are likely multifactorial, including readmission to a hospital or feeling too unwell to leave home to attend PDFVs. Insurance policies regarding ambulance reimbursement and outpatient billing can cause confusion and may have contributed to higher NS/SDC rates for facility-bound patients.^28,29

When comparing PDFV characteristics themselves, oncologic visits had the lowest NS/SDC incidence of any group analyzed in our study. This may be related to the inherent life-altering nature of a cancer diagnosis or our cancer center’s use of patient navigators.^23,30 In contrast, primary care clinics suffered from NS/SDC rates approaching 40%, which is a concerning finding given the importance of primary care coordination in the posthospitalization period.^9,31 Why are primary care appointments so commonly missed? Some studies suggest that forgetting about a primary care appointment is a leading reason.^15,32,33 For PDFVs, this phenomenon may be augmented because the visits are not scheduled by patients themselves. Additionally, patients may paradoxically undervalue the benefit of an all-encompassing primary care visit, compared to a PDFV focused on a specific problem, (eg, a cardiology follow-up appointment for a patient with congestive heart failure). In particular, patients with limited health literacy may potentially undervalue the capabilities of their primary care clinics.^34,35

The low absolute number of primary care PDFVs (only 8% of all visits) scheduled for patients at our hospital was an unexpected finding. This low percentage is likely a function of the patient population hospitalized at our large, urban quaternary-care facility. First, an unknown number of patients may have had PDFVs manually scheduled with primary care providers external to our health system; these PDFVs were not captured within our study. Second, 71% of the hospitalizations in our study occurred in subspecialty services, for which specific primary care follow-up may not be as urgent. Supporting this fact, further analysis of the 6136 hospitalizations in our study (data not shown) revealed that 28% of the hospitalizations in general internal medicine were scheduled with at least 1 primary care PDFV as opposed to only 5% of subspecialty-service hospitalizations.

In contrast to several previous studies of outpatient nonattendance,we did not find that visits scheduled for time points further in the future were more likely to be missed.^{14,24,25,36,37} Unlike other appointments, it may be that PDFV lead time does not affect attendance because of the unique manner in which PDFV times are scheduled and conveyed to patients. Unlike other appointments, patients do not schedule PDFVs themselves but instead learn about their PDFV dates as part of a large set of discharge instructions. This practice may result in poor recall of PDFV dates in recently hospitalized patients³⁸, regardless of the lead time between discharge and the visit itself.

Supplementary Table 1 details a 51% NS/SDC rate for the small number of PDFVs (n = 65) that were excluded a priori from our analysis because of general ineligibility for UPHS outpatient care. We specifically chose to exclude this population because of the infrequent and irregular process by which these PDFVs were authorized on a case-by-case basis, typically via active engagement by our hospital’s social work department. We did not study this population further but postulate that the 51% NS/SDC rate may reflect other social determinants of health that contribute to appointment nonadherence in a predominantly uninsured population.

Beyond their effect on patient outcomes, improving PDFV-related processes has the potential to boost both inpatient and outpatient provider satisfaction. From the standpoint of frontline inpatient providers (often resident physicians), calling outpatient clinics to request PDFVs is viewed as 1 of the top 5 administrative tasks that interfere with house staff education.³⁹ Future interventions that involve patients in the PDFV scheduling process may improve inpatient workflow while simultaneously engaging patients in their own care. For example, asking clinic representatives to directly schedule PDFVs with hospitalized patients, either by phone or in person, has been shown in pilot studies to improve PDFV attendance and decrease readmissions.^40-42 Conversely, NS/SDC visits harm outpatient provider productivity and decrease provider availability for other patients.^13,17,43 Strategies to mitigate the impact of unfilled appointment slots (eg, deliberately overbooking time slots in advance) carry their own risks, including provider burnout.⁴⁴ As such, preventing NSs may be superior to curing their adverse impacts. Many such strategies exist in the ambulatory setting,^13,43,45 for example, better communication with patients through texting or goal-directed, personalized phone reminders.^46-48Our study methodology has several limitations. Most importantly, we were unable to measure PDFVs made with providers unaffiliated with UPHS. As previously noted, our low proportion of primary care PDFVs may specifically reflect patients with primary care providers outside of our health system. Similarly, our low percentage of Medicaid patients receiving PDFVs may be related to follow-up visits with nonaffiliated community health centers. We were unable to measure patient acuity and health literacy as potential predictors of NS/SDC rates. Driving distances were calculated from patient postal codes to our hospital, not to individual outpatient clinics. However, the majority of our hospital-affiliated clinics are located adjacent to our hospital; additionally, we grouped driving distances into quartiles for our analysis. We had initially attempted to differentiate between clinic-initiated and patient-initiated cancellations, but unfortunately, we found that the data were too unreliable to be used for further analysis (outlined in Supplementary Table 3). Lastly, because we studied patients in medical units at a single large, urban, academic center, our results are not generalizable to other settings (eg, community hospitals, hospitals with smaller networks of outpatient providers, or patients being discharged from surgical services or observation units).

 

CONCLUSION

Given national efforts to enhance postdischarge transitions of care, we aimed to analyze attendance at provider-scheduled PDFV appointments. Our finding that 25% of PDFVs resulted in NS/SDCs raises both questions and opportunities for inpatient and outpatient providers. Further research is needed to understand why so many patients miss their PDFVs, and we should work as a field to develop creative solutions to improve PDFV scheduling and attendance.

Acknowledgments

The authors acknowledge Marie Synnestvedt, PhD, and Manik Chhabra, MD, for their assistance with data gathering and statistical analysis. They also acknowledge Allison DeKosky, MD, Michael Serpa, BS, Michael McFall, and Scott Schlegel, MBA, for their assistance with researching this topic. They did not receive external compensation for their assistance outside of their usual salary support.

DISCLOSURE

Nothing to report.

Given growing incentives to reduce readmission rates, predischarge checklists and bundles have recommended that inpatient providers schedule postdischarge follow-up visits (PDFVs) for their hospitalized patients.^1-4 PDFVs have been linked to lower readmission rates in patients with chronic conditions, including congestive heart failure, psychiatric illnesses, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.^5-8 In contrast, the impact of PDFVs on readmissions in hospitalized general medicine populations has been mixed.^9-12 Beyond the presence or absence of PDFVs, it may be a patient’s inability to keep scheduled PDFVs that contributes more strongly to preventable readmissions.¹¹

This challenge, dealing with the 12% to 37% of patients who miss their visits (“no-shows”), is not new.^13-17 In high-risk patient populations, such as those with substance abuse, diabetes, or human immunodeficiency virus, no-shows (NSs) have been linked to poorer short-term and long-term clinical outcomes.^16,18-20 Additionally, NSs pose a challenge for outpatient clinics and the healthcare system at large. The financial cost of NSs ranges from approximately $200 per patient in 2 analyses to $7 million in cumulative lost revenue per year at 1 large academic health system.^13,17,21 As such, increasing attendance at PDFVs is a potential target for improving both patient outcomes and clinic productivity.

Most prior PDFV research has focused on readmission risk rather than PDFV attendance as the primary outcome.^5-12 However, given the patient-oriented benefits of attending PDFVs and the clinic-oriented benefits of avoiding vacant time slots, NS PDFVs represent an important missed opportunity for our healthcare delivery system. To our knowledge, risk factors for PDFV nonattendance have not yet been systematically studied. The aim of our study was to analyze PDFV nonattendance, particularly NSs and same-day cancellations (SDCs), for hospitalizations and clinics within our healthcare system.

METHODS

Study Design

We conducted an observational cohort study of adult patients from 10 medical units at the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania (a 789-bed quaternary-care hospital within an urban, academic medical system) who were scheduled with at least 1 PDFV. Specifically, the patients included in our analysis were hospitalized on general internal medicine services or medical subspecialty services with discharge dates between April 1, 2014, and March 31, 2015. Hospitalizations included in our study had at least 1 PDFV scheduled with an outpatient provider affiliated with the University of Pennsylvania Health System (UPHS). PDFVs scheduled with unaffiliated providers were not examined.

Each PDFV was requested by a patient’s inpatient care team. Once the care team had determined that a PDFV was clinically warranted, a member of the team (generally a resident, advanced practice provider, medical student, or designee) either called the UPHS clinic to schedule an appointment time or e-mailed the outpatient UPHS provider directly to facilitate a more urgent PDFV appointment time. Once a PDFV time was confirmed, PDFV details (ie, date, time, location, and phone number) were electronically entered into the patient’s discharge instructions by the inpatient care team. At the time of discharge, nurses reviewed these instructions with their patients. All patients left the hospital with a physical copy of these instructions. As part of routine care at our institution, patients then received automated telephone reminders from their UPHS-affiliated outpatient clinic 48 hours prior to each PDFV.

Data Collection

Our study was determined to meet criteria for quality improvement by the University of Pennsylvania’s Institutional Review Board. We used our healthcare system’s integrated electronic medical record system to track the dates of initial PDFV requests, the dates of hospitalization, and actual PDFV dates. PDFVs were included if the appointment request was made while a patient was hospitalized, including the day of discharge. Our study methodology only allowed us to investigate PDFVs scheduled with UPHS outpatient providers. We did not review discharge instructions or survey non-UPHS clinics to quantify visits scheduled with other providers, for example, community health centers or external private practices.

Exclusion criteria included the following: (1) office visits with nonproviders, for example, scheduled diagnostic procedures or pharmacist appointments for warfarin dosing; (2) visits cancelled by inpatient providers prior to discharge; (3) visits for patients not otherwise eligible for UPHS outpatient care because of insurance reasons; and (4) visits scheduled for dates after a patient’s death. Our motivation for the third exclusion criterion was the infrequent and irregular process by which PDFVs were authorized for these patients. These patients and their characteristics are described in Supplementary Table 1 in more detail.

For each PDFV, we recorded age, gender, race, insurance status, driving distance, length of stay for index hospitalization, discharging service (general internal medicine vs subspecialty), postdischarge disposition (home, home with home care services such as nursing or physical therapy, or facility), the number of PDFVs scheduled per index hospitalization, PDFV specialty type (oncologic subspecialty, nononcologic medical subspecialty, nononcologic surgical subspecialty, primary care, or other specialty), PDFV season, and PDFV lead time (the number of days between the discharge date and PDFV). We consolidated oncologic specialties into 1 group given the integrated nature of our healthcare system’s comprehensive cancer center. “Other” PDFV specialty subtypes are described in Supplementary Table 2. Driving distances between patient postal codes and our hospital were calculated using Excel VBA Master (Salt Lake City, Utah) and were subsequently categorized into patient-level quartiles for further analysis. For cancelled PDFVs, we collected dates of cancellation relative to the date of the appointment itself.

 

Study Outcomes

The primary study outcome was PDFV attendance. Each PDFV’s status was categorized by outpatient clinic staff as attended, cancelled, or NS. For cancelled appointments, cancellation dates and reasons (if entered by clinic representatives) were collected. In keeping with prior studies investigating outpatient nonattendance,we calculated collective NS/SDC rates for the variables listed above.^17,22-25 We additionally calculated NS/SDC and attendance-as-scheduled rates stratified by the number of PDFVs per patient to assess for a “high-utilizer” effect with regard to PDFV attendance.

Statistical Analysis

We used multivariable mixed-effects regression with a logit link to assess associations between age, gender, race, insurance, driving distance quartile, length of stay, discharging service, postdischarge disposition, the number of PDFVs per hospitalization, PDFV specialty type, PDFV season, PDFV lead time, and our NS/SDC outcome. The mixed-effects approach was used to account for correlation structures induced by patients who had multiple visits and for patients with multiple hospitalizations. Specifically, our model specified 2 levels of nesting (PDFVs nested within each hospitalization, which were nested within each patient) to obtain appropriate standard error estimates for our adjusted odds ratios (ORs). Correlation matrices and multivariable variance inflation factors were used to assess collinearity among the predictor variables. These assessments did not indicate strong collinearity; hence, all predictors were included in the model. Only driving distance had a small amount of missing data (0.18% of driving distances were unavailable), so multiple imputation was not undertaken. Analyses were performed using R version 3.3.1 (R Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria).

RESULTS

Baseline Characteristics

During the 1-year study period, there were 11,829 discrete hospitalizations in medical units at our hospital. Of these hospitalizations, 6136 (52%) had at least 1 UPHS-affiliated PDFV meeting our inclusion and exclusion criteria, as detailed in the Figure. Across these hospitalizations, 9258 PDFVs were scheduled on behalf of 4653 patients. Demographic characteristics for these patients, hospitalizations, and visits are detailed in Table 1. The median age of patients in our cohort was 61 years old (interquartile range [IQR] 49-70, range 18-101). The median driving distance was 17 miles (IQR 4.3-38.8, range 0-2891). For hospitalizations, the median length of stay was 5 days (IQR 3-10, range 0-97). The median PDFV lead time, which is defined as the number of days between discharge and PDFV, was 12 days (IQR 6-23, range 1-60). Overall, 41% of patients (n = 1927) attended all of their PDFVs as scheduled; Supplementary Figure 1 lists patient-level PDFV attendance-as-scheduled percentages in more detail.

Incidence of NSs and SDCs

Twenty-five percent of PDFVs (n = 2303) were ultimately NS/SDCs; this included 1658 NSs (18% of all appointments) and 645 SDCs (7% of all appointments). Fifty-two percent of PDFVs (n = 4847) were kept as scheduled, while 23% (n = 2108) were cancelled before the day of the visit. Of the 2558 cancellations with valid cancellation dates, 49% (n = 1252) were cancelled 2 or fewer days beforehand, as shown in Supplementary Figure 2.

In Table 2, we show unadjusted NS/SDC rates and adjusted NS/SDC ORs based on patient and hospitalization characteristics. NS/SDC appointments were more likely to occur in patients who were black (adjusted OR 1.94, 95% confidence interval [CI], 1.63-2.32) or Medicaid insured (OR 1.41, 95% CI, 1.19-1.67). In contrast, NS/SDC appointments were less likely in elderly patients (age ≥65 years: OR 0.39, 95% CI, 0.31-0.49) and patients who lived further away (furthest quartile of driving distance: OR 0.65, 95% CI, 0.52-–0.81). Longer hospitalizations were associated with higher NS/SDC rates (length of stay ≥15 days: OR 1.51, 95% CI, 1.22-1.88). In contrast, discharges from subspecialty services (OR 0.79, 95% CI, 0.68-0.93) had independently lower NS/SDC rates. Compared to discharges to home without services, NS/SDC rates were higher with discharges to home with services (OR 1.32, 95% CI, 1.01-1.36) and with discharges to facilities (OR 2.10, 95% CI, 1.70-2.60).

The presence of exactly 2 PDFVs per hospitalization was also associated with higher NS/SDC rates (OR 1.17, 95% CI, 1.01-1.36), compared to a single PDFV per hospitalization; however, the presence of more than 2 PDFVs per hospitalization was associated with lower NS/SDC rates (OR 0.82, 95% CI, 0.69-0.98). A separate analysis (data not shown) of potential high utilizers revealed a 15% NS/SDC rate for the top 0.5% of patients (median: 18 PDFVs each) and an 18% NS/SDC rate for the top 1% of patients (median: 14 PDFVs each) with regard to the numbers of PDFVs scheduled, compared to the 25% overall NS/SDC rate for all patients.

NS/SDC rates and adjusted ORs with regard to individual PDFV characteristics are displayed in Table 3. Nononcologic visits had higher NS/SDC rates than oncologic visits; for example, the NS/SDC rate for primary care visits was 39% (OR 2.62, 95% CI, 2.03-3.38), compared to 12% for oncologic visits. Appointments in the “other” specialty category also had high nonattendance rates, as further described in Supplementary Table B. Summertime appointments were more likely to be attended (OR 0.81, 95% CI, 0.68-0.97) compared to those in the spring. PDFV lead time (the time interval between the discharge date and appointment date) was not associated with changes in visit attendance.

 

DISCUSSION

PDFVs were scheduled on patients’ behalf for more than half of all medical hospitalizations at our institution, a rate that is consistent with previous studies.^10,11,26 However, 1 in 4 of these PDFVs resulted in a NS/SDC. This figure contrasts sharply with our institution’s 10% overall NS/SDC rate for all outpatient visits (S. Schlegel, written communication, July 2016). In our study, patients who were younger, black, or Medicaid insured were more likely to miss their follow-up visits. Patients who lived farther from the study hospital had lower NS/SDC rates, which is consistent with another study of a low-income, urban patient population.²⁷ In contrast, patients with longer lengths of stay, discharges with home care services, or discharges to another facility were more likely to miss their PDFVs. Reasons for this are likely multifactorial, including readmission to a hospital or feeling too unwell to leave home to attend PDFVs. Insurance policies regarding ambulance reimbursement and outpatient billing can cause confusion and may have contributed to higher NS/SDC rates for facility-bound patients.^28,29

When comparing PDFV characteristics themselves, oncologic visits had the lowest NS/SDC incidence of any group analyzed in our study. This may be related to the inherent life-altering nature of a cancer diagnosis or our cancer center’s use of patient navigators.^23,30 In contrast, primary care clinics suffered from NS/SDC rates approaching 40%, which is a concerning finding given the importance of primary care coordination in the posthospitalization period.^9,31 Why are primary care appointments so commonly missed? Some studies suggest that forgetting about a primary care appointment is a leading reason.^15,32,33 For PDFVs, this phenomenon may be augmented because the visits are not scheduled by patients themselves. Additionally, patients may paradoxically undervalue the benefit of an all-encompassing primary care visit, compared to a PDFV focused on a specific problem, (eg, a cardiology follow-up appointment for a patient with congestive heart failure). In particular, patients with limited health literacy may potentially undervalue the capabilities of their primary care clinics.^34,35

The low absolute number of primary care PDFVs (only 8% of all visits) scheduled for patients at our hospital was an unexpected finding. This low percentage is likely a function of the patient population hospitalized at our large, urban quaternary-care facility. First, an unknown number of patients may have had PDFVs manually scheduled with primary care providers external to our health system; these PDFVs were not captured within our study. Second, 71% of the hospitalizations in our study occurred in subspecialty services, for which specific primary care follow-up may not be as urgent. Supporting this fact, further analysis of the 6136 hospitalizations in our study (data not shown) revealed that 28% of the hospitalizations in general internal medicine were scheduled with at least 1 primary care PDFV as opposed to only 5% of subspecialty-service hospitalizations.

In contrast to several previous studies of outpatient nonattendance,we did not find that visits scheduled for time points further in the future were more likely to be missed.^{14,24,25,36,37} Unlike other appointments, it may be that PDFV lead time does not affect attendance because of the unique manner in which PDFV times are scheduled and conveyed to patients. Unlike other appointments, patients do not schedule PDFVs themselves but instead learn about their PDFV dates as part of a large set of discharge instructions. This practice may result in poor recall of PDFV dates in recently hospitalized patients³⁸, regardless of the lead time between discharge and the visit itself.

Supplementary Table 1 details a 51% NS/SDC rate for the small number of PDFVs (n = 65) that were excluded a priori from our analysis because of general ineligibility for UPHS outpatient care. We specifically chose to exclude this population because of the infrequent and irregular process by which these PDFVs were authorized on a case-by-case basis, typically via active engagement by our hospital’s social work department. We did not study this population further but postulate that the 51% NS/SDC rate may reflect other social determinants of health that contribute to appointment nonadherence in a predominantly uninsured population.

Beyond their effect on patient outcomes, improving PDFV-related processes has the potential to boost both inpatient and outpatient provider satisfaction. From the standpoint of frontline inpatient providers (often resident physicians), calling outpatient clinics to request PDFVs is viewed as 1 of the top 5 administrative tasks that interfere with house staff education.³⁹ Future interventions that involve patients in the PDFV scheduling process may improve inpatient workflow while simultaneously engaging patients in their own care. For example, asking clinic representatives to directly schedule PDFVs with hospitalized patients, either by phone or in person, has been shown in pilot studies to improve PDFV attendance and decrease readmissions.^40-42 Conversely, NS/SDC visits harm outpatient provider productivity and decrease provider availability for other patients.^13,17,43 Strategies to mitigate the impact of unfilled appointment slots (eg, deliberately overbooking time slots in advance) carry their own risks, including provider burnout.⁴⁴ As such, preventing NSs may be superior to curing their adverse impacts. Many such strategies exist in the ambulatory setting,^13,43,45 for example, better communication with patients through texting or goal-directed, personalized phone reminders.^46-48Our study methodology has several limitations. Most importantly, we were unable to measure PDFVs made with providers unaffiliated with UPHS. As previously noted, our low proportion of primary care PDFVs may specifically reflect patients with primary care providers outside of our health system. Similarly, our low percentage of Medicaid patients receiving PDFVs may be related to follow-up visits with nonaffiliated community health centers. We were unable to measure patient acuity and health literacy as potential predictors of NS/SDC rates. Driving distances were calculated from patient postal codes to our hospital, not to individual outpatient clinics. However, the majority of our hospital-affiliated clinics are located adjacent to our hospital; additionally, we grouped driving distances into quartiles for our analysis. We had initially attempted to differentiate between clinic-initiated and patient-initiated cancellations, but unfortunately, we found that the data were too unreliable to be used for further analysis (outlined in Supplementary Table 3). Lastly, because we studied patients in medical units at a single large, urban, academic center, our results are not generalizable to other settings (eg, community hospitals, hospitals with smaller networks of outpatient providers, or patients being discharged from surgical services or observation units).

 

CONCLUSION

Given national efforts to enhance postdischarge transitions of care, we aimed to analyze attendance at provider-scheduled PDFV appointments. Our finding that 25% of PDFVs resulted in NS/SDCs raises both questions and opportunities for inpatient and outpatient providers. Further research is needed to understand why so many patients miss their PDFVs, and we should work as a field to develop creative solutions to improve PDFV scheduling and attendance.

Acknowledgments

The authors acknowledge Marie Synnestvedt, PhD, and Manik Chhabra, MD, for their assistance with data gathering and statistical analysis. They also acknowledge Allison DeKosky, MD, Michael Serpa, BS, Michael McFall, and Scott Schlegel, MBA, for their assistance with researching this topic. They did not receive external compensation for their assistance outside of their usual salary support.

DISCLOSURE

Nothing to report.