Padageshwar Sunkara, MD, MMCi, FACP, FHM

The COVID-19 pandemic is one of the defining moments in history for this generation’s health care leaders. In 2019, most of us wrongly assumed that this virus would be similar to the past viral epidemics and pandemics such as 2002 severe acute respiratory syndrome–CoV in Asia, 2009 H1N1 influenza in the United States, 2012 Middle East respiratory syndrome–CoV in Saudi Arabia, and 2014-2016 Ebola in West Africa. Moreover, we understood that the 50% fatality rate of Ebola, a single-stranded RNA virus, was deadly on the continent of Africa, but its transmission was through direct contact with blood or other bodily fluids. Hence, the infectivity of Ebola to the general public was lower than SARS-CoV-2, which is spread by respiratory droplets and contact routes in addition to being the virus that causes COVID-19.¹ Many of us did not expect that SARS-CoV-2, a single-stranded RNA virus consisting of 32 kilobytes, would reach the shores of the United States from the Hubei province of China, the northern Lombardy region of Italy, or other initial hotspots. We could not imagine its effects would be so devastating from an economic and medical perspective. Until it did.

The first reported case of SARS-CoV-2 was on Jan. 20, 2020 in Snohomish County, Wash., and the first known death from COVID-19 occurred on Feb. 6, 2020 in Santa Clara County, Calif.^2,3 Since then, the United States has lost over 135,000 people from COVID-19 with death(s) reported in every state and the highest number of overall deaths of any country in the world.⁴ At the beginning of 2020, at our institution, Wake Forest Baptist Health System in Winston-Salem, N.C., we began preparing for the wave, surge, or tsunami of inpatients that was coming. Plans were afoot to increase our staff, even perhaps by hiring out-of-state physicians and nurses if needed, and every possible bed was considered within the system. It was not an if, but rather a when, as to the arrival of COVID-19.

Epidemiologists and biostatisticians developed predictive COVID-19 models so that health care leaders could plan accordingly, especially those patients that required critical care or inpatient medical care. These predictive models have been used across the globe and can be categorized into three groups: Susceptible-Exposed-Infectious-Recovered, Agent-Based, and Curve Fitting Extrapolation.⁵ Our original predictions were based on the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation model from Washington state (Curve Fitting Extrapolation). It creates projections from COVID-19 mortality data and assumes a 3% infection rate. Other health systems in our region used the COVID-19 Hospital Impact Model for Epidemics–University of Pennsylvania model. It pins its suppositions on hospitalized COVID-19 patients, regional infection rates, and hospital market shares. Lastly, the agent-based mode, such as the Global Epidemic and Mobility Project, takes simulated populations and forecasts the spread of SARS-CoV-2 anchoring on the interplay of individuals and groups. The assumptions are created secondary to the interactions of people, time, health care interventions, and public health policies.

Based on these predictive simulations, health systems have spent countless hours of planning and have utilized resources for the anticipated needs related to beds, ventilators, supplies, and staffing. Frontline staff were retrained how to don and doff personal protective equipment. Our teams were ready if we saw a wave of 250, a surge of 500, or a tsunami of 750 COVID-19 inpatients. We were prepared to run into the fire fully knowing the personal risks and consequences.

But, as yet, the tsunami in North Carolina has never come. On April 21, 2020, the COVID-19 mortality data in North Carolina peaked at 34 deaths, with the total number of deaths standing at 1,510 as of July 13, 2020.⁶ A surge did not hit our institutional shores at Wake Forest Baptist Health. As we looked through the proverbial back window and hear about the tsunami in Houston, Texas, we are very thankful that the tsunami turned out to be a small wave so far in North Carolina. We are grateful that there were fewer deaths than expected. The dust is settling now and the question, spoken or unspoken, is: “How could we be so wrong with our predictions?”

Models have strengths and weaknesses and none are perfect.⁷ There is an old aphorism in statistics that is often attributed to George Box that says: “All models are wrong but some are useful.”⁸ Predictions and projections are good, but not perfect. Our measurements and tests should not only be accurate, but also be as precise as possible.⁹ Moreover, the assumptions we make should be on solid ground. Since the beginning of the pandemic, there may have been undercounts and delays in reporting. The assumptions of the effects of social distancing may have been inaccurate. Just as important, the lack of early testing in our pandemic and the relatively limited testing currently available provide challenges not only in attributing past deaths to COVID-19, but also with planning and public health measures. To be fair, the tsunami that turned out to be a small wave in North Carolina may be caused by the strong leadership from politicians, public health officials, and health system leaders for their stay-at-home decree and vigorous public health measures in our state.

Some of the health systems in the United States have created “reemergence plans” to care for those patients who have stayed at home for the past several months. Elective surgeries and procedures have begun in different regions of the United States and will likely continue reopening into the late summer. Nevertheless, challenges and opportunities continue to abound during these difficult times of COVID-19. The tsunamis or surges will continue to occur in the United States and the premature reopening of some of the public places and businesses have not helped our collective efforts. In addition, the personal costs have been and will be immeasurable. Many of us have lost loved ones, been laid off, or face mental health crises because of the social isolation and false news.

COVID-19 is here to stay and will be with us for the foreseeable future. Health care providers have been literally risking their lives to serve the public and we will continue to do so. Hitting the target of needed inpatient beds and critical care beds is critically important and is tough without accurate data. We simply have inadequate and unreliable data of COVID-19 incidence and prevalence rates in the communities that we serve. More available testing would allow frontline health care providers and health care leaders to match hospital demand to supply, at individual hospitals and within the health care system. Moreover, contact tracing capabilities would give us the opportunity to isolate individuals and extinguish population-based hotspots.

We may have seen the first wave, but other waves of COVID-19 in North Carolina are sure to come. Since the partial reopening of North Carolina on May 8, 2020, coupled with pockets of nonadherence to social distancing and mask wearing, we expect a second wave sooner rather than later. Interestingly, daily new lab-confirmed COVID-19 cases in North Carolina have been on the rise, with the highest one-day total occurring on June 12, 2020 with 1,768 cases reported.⁶ As a result, North Carolina Gov. Roy Cooper and Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, Dr. Mandy Cohen, placed a temporary pause on the Phase 2 reopening plan and mandated masks in public on June 24, 2020. It is unclear whether these intermittent daily spikes in lab-confirmed COVID-19 cases are a foreshadowing of our next wave, surge, or tsunami, or just an anomaly. Only time will tell, but as Jim Kim, MD, PhD, has stated so well, there is still time for social distancing, contact tracing, testing, isolation, and treatment.¹⁰ There is still time for us, for our loved ones, for our hospital systems, and for our public health system.

Dr. Huang is the executive medical director and service line director of general medicine and hospital medicine within the Wake Forest Baptist Health System and associate professor of internal medicine at Wake Forest School of Medicine. Dr. Lippert is assistant professor of internal medicine at Wake Forest School of Medicine. Mr. Payne is the associate vice president of Wake Forest Baptist Health. He is responsible for engineering, facilities planning & design as well as environmental health and safety departments. Dr. Pariyadath is comedical director of the Patient Flow Operations Center which facilitates patient placement throughout the Wake Forest Baptist Health system. He is also the associate medical director for the adult emergency department. Dr. Sunkara is assistant professor of internal medicine at Wake Forest School of Medicine. He is the medical director for hospital medicine units and the newly established PUI unit.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Julie Freischlag, MD; Kevin High, MD, MS; Gary Rosenthal, MD; Wayne Meredith, MD;Russ Howerton, MD; Mike Waid, Andrea Fernandez, MD; Brian Hiestand, MD; the Wake Forest Baptist Health System COVID-19 task force, the Operations Center, and the countless frontline staff at all five hospitals within the Wake Forest Baptist Health System.

References

1. World Health Organization. Modes of transmission of virus causing COVID-19: Implications for IPC precaution recommendations. 2020 June 30. https://www.who.int/news-room/commentaries/detail/modes-of-transmission-of-virus-causing-covid-19-implications-for-ipc-precaution-recommendations.

2. Holshue et al. First case of 2019 novel coronavirus in the United States. N Engl J Med. 2020;382: 929-36.

3. Fuller T, Baker M. Coronavirus death in California came weeks before first known U.S. death. New York Times. 2020 Apr 22. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/22/us/coronavirus-first-united-states-death.html.

4. Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center. https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/us-map. Accessed 2020 May 28.

5. Michaud J et al. COVID-19 models: Can they tell us what we want to know? 2020 April 16. https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-policy-watch/covid-19-models.

6. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-in-us.html. Accessed 2020 June 30.

7. Jewell N et al. Caution warranted: Using the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation Model for predicting the course of the COVID-19 pandemic. Ann Intern Med. 2020;173:1-3.

8. Box G. Science and statistics. J Am Stat Assoc. 1972;71:791-9.

9. Shapiro DE. The interpretation of diagnostic tests. Stat Methods Med Res. 1999;8:113-34.

10. Kim J. It is not too late to go on the offense against the coronavirus. The New Yorker. 2020 Apr 20. https://www.newyorker.com/science/medical-dispatch/its-not-too-late-to-go-on-offense-against-the-coronavirus.

The COVID-19 pandemic is one of the defining moments in history for this generation’s health care leaders. In 2019, most of us wrongly assumed that this virus would be similar to the past viral epidemics and pandemics such as 2002 severe acute respiratory syndrome–CoV in Asia, 2009 H1N1 influenza in the United States, 2012 Middle East respiratory syndrome–CoV in Saudi Arabia, and 2014-2016 Ebola in West Africa. Moreover, we understood that the 50% fatality rate of Ebola, a single-stranded RNA virus, was deadly on the continent of Africa, but its transmission was through direct contact with blood or other bodily fluids. Hence, the infectivity of Ebola to the general public was lower than SARS-CoV-2, which is spread by respiratory droplets and contact routes in addition to being the virus that causes COVID-19.¹ Many of us did not expect that SARS-CoV-2, a single-stranded RNA virus consisting of 32 kilobytes, would reach the shores of the United States from the Hubei province of China, the northern Lombardy region of Italy, or other initial hotspots. We could not imagine its effects would be so devastating from an economic and medical perspective. Until it did.

The first reported case of SARS-CoV-2 was on Jan. 20, 2020 in Snohomish County, Wash., and the first known death from COVID-19 occurred on Feb. 6, 2020 in Santa Clara County, Calif.^2,3 Since then, the United States has lost over 135,000 people from COVID-19 with death(s) reported in every state and the highest number of overall deaths of any country in the world.⁴ At the beginning of 2020, at our institution, Wake Forest Baptist Health System in Winston-Salem, N.C., we began preparing for the wave, surge, or tsunami of inpatients that was coming. Plans were afoot to increase our staff, even perhaps by hiring out-of-state physicians and nurses if needed, and every possible bed was considered within the system. It was not an if, but rather a when, as to the arrival of COVID-19.

Epidemiologists and biostatisticians developed predictive COVID-19 models so that health care leaders could plan accordingly, especially those patients that required critical care or inpatient medical care. These predictive models have been used across the globe and can be categorized into three groups: Susceptible-Exposed-Infectious-Recovered, Agent-Based, and Curve Fitting Extrapolation.⁵ Our original predictions were based on the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation model from Washington state (Curve Fitting Extrapolation). It creates projections from COVID-19 mortality data and assumes a 3% infection rate. Other health systems in our region used the COVID-19 Hospital Impact Model for Epidemics–University of Pennsylvania model. It pins its suppositions on hospitalized COVID-19 patients, regional infection rates, and hospital market shares. Lastly, the agent-based mode, such as the Global Epidemic and Mobility Project, takes simulated populations and forecasts the spread of SARS-CoV-2 anchoring on the interplay of individuals and groups. The assumptions are created secondary to the interactions of people, time, health care interventions, and public health policies.

Based on these predictive simulations, health systems have spent countless hours of planning and have utilized resources for the anticipated needs related to beds, ventilators, supplies, and staffing. Frontline staff were retrained how to don and doff personal protective equipment. Our teams were ready if we saw a wave of 250, a surge of 500, or a tsunami of 750 COVID-19 inpatients. We were prepared to run into the fire fully knowing the personal risks and consequences.

But, as yet, the tsunami in North Carolina has never come. On April 21, 2020, the COVID-19 mortality data in North Carolina peaked at 34 deaths, with the total number of deaths standing at 1,510 as of July 13, 2020.⁶ A surge did not hit our institutional shores at Wake Forest Baptist Health. As we looked through the proverbial back window and hear about the tsunami in Houston, Texas, we are very thankful that the tsunami turned out to be a small wave so far in North Carolina. We are grateful that there were fewer deaths than expected. The dust is settling now and the question, spoken or unspoken, is: “How could we be so wrong with our predictions?”

Models have strengths and weaknesses and none are perfect.⁷ There is an old aphorism in statistics that is often attributed to George Box that says: “All models are wrong but some are useful.”⁸ Predictions and projections are good, but not perfect. Our measurements and tests should not only be accurate, but also be as precise as possible.⁹ Moreover, the assumptions we make should be on solid ground. Since the beginning of the pandemic, there may have been undercounts and delays in reporting. The assumptions of the effects of social distancing may have been inaccurate. Just as important, the lack of early testing in our pandemic and the relatively limited testing currently available provide challenges not only in attributing past deaths to COVID-19, but also with planning and public health measures. To be fair, the tsunami that turned out to be a small wave in North Carolina may be caused by the strong leadership from politicians, public health officials, and health system leaders for their stay-at-home decree and vigorous public health measures in our state.

Some of the health systems in the United States have created “reemergence plans” to care for those patients who have stayed at home for the past several months. Elective surgeries and procedures have begun in different regions of the United States and will likely continue reopening into the late summer. Nevertheless, challenges and opportunities continue to abound during these difficult times of COVID-19. The tsunamis or surges will continue to occur in the United States and the premature reopening of some of the public places and businesses have not helped our collective efforts. In addition, the personal costs have been and will be immeasurable. Many of us have lost loved ones, been laid off, or face mental health crises because of the social isolation and false news.

COVID-19 is here to stay and will be with us for the foreseeable future. Health care providers have been literally risking their lives to serve the public and we will continue to do so. Hitting the target of needed inpatient beds and critical care beds is critically important and is tough without accurate data. We simply have inadequate and unreliable data of COVID-19 incidence and prevalence rates in the communities that we serve. More available testing would allow frontline health care providers and health care leaders to match hospital demand to supply, at individual hospitals and within the health care system. Moreover, contact tracing capabilities would give us the opportunity to isolate individuals and extinguish population-based hotspots.

We may have seen the first wave, but other waves of COVID-19 in North Carolina are sure to come. Since the partial reopening of North Carolina on May 8, 2020, coupled with pockets of nonadherence to social distancing and mask wearing, we expect a second wave sooner rather than later. Interestingly, daily new lab-confirmed COVID-19 cases in North Carolina have been on the rise, with the highest one-day total occurring on June 12, 2020 with 1,768 cases reported.⁶ As a result, North Carolina Gov. Roy Cooper and Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, Dr. Mandy Cohen, placed a temporary pause on the Phase 2 reopening plan and mandated masks in public on June 24, 2020. It is unclear whether these intermittent daily spikes in lab-confirmed COVID-19 cases are a foreshadowing of our next wave, surge, or tsunami, or just an anomaly. Only time will tell, but as Jim Kim, MD, PhD, has stated so well, there is still time for social distancing, contact tracing, testing, isolation, and treatment.¹⁰ There is still time for us, for our loved ones, for our hospital systems, and for our public health system.

Dr. Huang is the executive medical director and service line director of general medicine and hospital medicine within the Wake Forest Baptist Health System and associate professor of internal medicine at Wake Forest School of Medicine. Dr. Lippert is assistant professor of internal medicine at Wake Forest School of Medicine. Mr. Payne is the associate vice president of Wake Forest Baptist Health. He is responsible for engineering, facilities planning & design as well as environmental health and safety departments. Dr. Pariyadath is comedical director of the Patient Flow Operations Center which facilitates patient placement throughout the Wake Forest Baptist Health system. He is also the associate medical director for the adult emergency department. Dr. Sunkara is assistant professor of internal medicine at Wake Forest School of Medicine. He is the medical director for hospital medicine units and the newly established PUI unit.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Julie Freischlag, MD; Kevin High, MD, MS; Gary Rosenthal, MD; Wayne Meredith, MD;Russ Howerton, MD; Mike Waid, Andrea Fernandez, MD; Brian Hiestand, MD; the Wake Forest Baptist Health System COVID-19 task force, the Operations Center, and the countless frontline staff at all five hospitals within the Wake Forest Baptist Health System.

References

1. World Health Organization. Modes of transmission of virus causing COVID-19: Implications for IPC precaution recommendations. 2020 June 30. https://www.who.int/news-room/commentaries/detail/modes-of-transmission-of-virus-causing-covid-19-implications-for-ipc-precaution-recommendations.

2. Holshue et al. First case of 2019 novel coronavirus in the United States. N Engl J Med. 2020;382: 929-36.

3. Fuller T, Baker M. Coronavirus death in California came weeks before first known U.S. death. New York Times. 2020 Apr 22. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/22/us/coronavirus-first-united-states-death.html.

4. Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center. https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/us-map. Accessed 2020 May 28.

5. Michaud J et al. COVID-19 models: Can they tell us what we want to know? 2020 April 16. https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-policy-watch/covid-19-models.

6. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-in-us.html. Accessed 2020 June 30.

7. Jewell N et al. Caution warranted: Using the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation Model for predicting the course of the COVID-19 pandemic. Ann Intern Med. 2020;173:1-3.

8. Box G. Science and statistics. J Am Stat Assoc. 1972;71:791-9.

9. Shapiro DE. The interpretation of diagnostic tests. Stat Methods Med Res. 1999;8:113-34.

10. Kim J. It is not too late to go on the offense against the coronavirus. The New Yorker. 2020 Apr 20. https://www.newyorker.com/science/medical-dispatch/its-not-too-late-to-go-on-offense-against-the-coronavirus.

The COVID-19 pandemic is one of the defining moments in history for this generation’s health care leaders. In 2019, most of us wrongly assumed that this virus would be similar to the past viral epidemics and pandemics such as 2002 severe acute respiratory syndrome–CoV in Asia, 2009 H1N1 influenza in the United States, 2012 Middle East respiratory syndrome–CoV in Saudi Arabia, and 2014-2016 Ebola in West Africa. Moreover, we understood that the 50% fatality rate of Ebola, a single-stranded RNA virus, was deadly on the continent of Africa, but its transmission was through direct contact with blood or other bodily fluids. Hence, the infectivity of Ebola to the general public was lower than SARS-CoV-2, which is spread by respiratory droplets and contact routes in addition to being the virus that causes COVID-19.¹ Many of us did not expect that SARS-CoV-2, a single-stranded RNA virus consisting of 32 kilobytes, would reach the shores of the United States from the Hubei province of China, the northern Lombardy region of Italy, or other initial hotspots. We could not imagine its effects would be so devastating from an economic and medical perspective. Until it did.

The first reported case of SARS-CoV-2 was on Jan. 20, 2020 in Snohomish County, Wash., and the first known death from COVID-19 occurred on Feb. 6, 2020 in Santa Clara County, Calif.^2,3 Since then, the United States has lost over 135,000 people from COVID-19 with death(s) reported in every state and the highest number of overall deaths of any country in the world.⁴ At the beginning of 2020, at our institution, Wake Forest Baptist Health System in Winston-Salem, N.C., we began preparing for the wave, surge, or tsunami of inpatients that was coming. Plans were afoot to increase our staff, even perhaps by hiring out-of-state physicians and nurses if needed, and every possible bed was considered within the system. It was not an if, but rather a when, as to the arrival of COVID-19.

Epidemiologists and biostatisticians developed predictive COVID-19 models so that health care leaders could plan accordingly, especially those patients that required critical care or inpatient medical care. These predictive models have been used across the globe and can be categorized into three groups: Susceptible-Exposed-Infectious-Recovered, Agent-Based, and Curve Fitting Extrapolation.⁵ Our original predictions were based on the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation model from Washington state (Curve Fitting Extrapolation). It creates projections from COVID-19 mortality data and assumes a 3% infection rate. Other health systems in our region used the COVID-19 Hospital Impact Model for Epidemics–University of Pennsylvania model. It pins its suppositions on hospitalized COVID-19 patients, regional infection rates, and hospital market shares. Lastly, the agent-based mode, such as the Global Epidemic and Mobility Project, takes simulated populations and forecasts the spread of SARS-CoV-2 anchoring on the interplay of individuals and groups. The assumptions are created secondary to the interactions of people, time, health care interventions, and public health policies.

Based on these predictive simulations, health systems have spent countless hours of planning and have utilized resources for the anticipated needs related to beds, ventilators, supplies, and staffing. Frontline staff were retrained how to don and doff personal protective equipment. Our teams were ready if we saw a wave of 250, a surge of 500, or a tsunami of 750 COVID-19 inpatients. We were prepared to run into the fire fully knowing the personal risks and consequences.

But, as yet, the tsunami in North Carolina has never come. On April 21, 2020, the COVID-19 mortality data in North Carolina peaked at 34 deaths, with the total number of deaths standing at 1,510 as of July 13, 2020.⁶ A surge did not hit our institutional shores at Wake Forest Baptist Health. As we looked through the proverbial back window and hear about the tsunami in Houston, Texas, we are very thankful that the tsunami turned out to be a small wave so far in North Carolina. We are grateful that there were fewer deaths than expected. The dust is settling now and the question, spoken or unspoken, is: “How could we be so wrong with our predictions?”

Models have strengths and weaknesses and none are perfect.⁷ There is an old aphorism in statistics that is often attributed to George Box that says: “All models are wrong but some are useful.”⁸ Predictions and projections are good, but not perfect. Our measurements and tests should not only be accurate, but also be as precise as possible.⁹ Moreover, the assumptions we make should be on solid ground. Since the beginning of the pandemic, there may have been undercounts and delays in reporting. The assumptions of the effects of social distancing may have been inaccurate. Just as important, the lack of early testing in our pandemic and the relatively limited testing currently available provide challenges not only in attributing past deaths to COVID-19, but also with planning and public health measures. To be fair, the tsunami that turned out to be a small wave in North Carolina may be caused by the strong leadership from politicians, public health officials, and health system leaders for their stay-at-home decree and vigorous public health measures in our state.

Some of the health systems in the United States have created “reemergence plans” to care for those patients who have stayed at home for the past several months. Elective surgeries and procedures have begun in different regions of the United States and will likely continue reopening into the late summer. Nevertheless, challenges and opportunities continue to abound during these difficult times of COVID-19. The tsunamis or surges will continue to occur in the United States and the premature reopening of some of the public places and businesses have not helped our collective efforts. In addition, the personal costs have been and will be immeasurable. Many of us have lost loved ones, been laid off, or face mental health crises because of the social isolation and false news.

COVID-19 is here to stay and will be with us for the foreseeable future. Health care providers have been literally risking their lives to serve the public and we will continue to do so. Hitting the target of needed inpatient beds and critical care beds is critically important and is tough without accurate data. We simply have inadequate and unreliable data of COVID-19 incidence and prevalence rates in the communities that we serve. More available testing would allow frontline health care providers and health care leaders to match hospital demand to supply, at individual hospitals and within the health care system. Moreover, contact tracing capabilities would give us the opportunity to isolate individuals and extinguish population-based hotspots.

We may have seen the first wave, but other waves of COVID-19 in North Carolina are sure to come. Since the partial reopening of North Carolina on May 8, 2020, coupled with pockets of nonadherence to social distancing and mask wearing, we expect a second wave sooner rather than later. Interestingly, daily new lab-confirmed COVID-19 cases in North Carolina have been on the rise, with the highest one-day total occurring on June 12, 2020 with 1,768 cases reported.⁶ As a result, North Carolina Gov. Roy Cooper and Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, Dr. Mandy Cohen, placed a temporary pause on the Phase 2 reopening plan and mandated masks in public on June 24, 2020. It is unclear whether these intermittent daily spikes in lab-confirmed COVID-19 cases are a foreshadowing of our next wave, surge, or tsunami, or just an anomaly. Only time will tell, but as Jim Kim, MD, PhD, has stated so well, there is still time for social distancing, contact tracing, testing, isolation, and treatment.¹⁰ There is still time for us, for our loved ones, for our hospital systems, and for our public health system.

Dr. Huang is the executive medical director and service line director of general medicine and hospital medicine within the Wake Forest Baptist Health System and associate professor of internal medicine at Wake Forest School of Medicine. Dr. Lippert is assistant professor of internal medicine at Wake Forest School of Medicine. Mr. Payne is the associate vice president of Wake Forest Baptist Health. He is responsible for engineering, facilities planning & design as well as environmental health and safety departments. Dr. Pariyadath is comedical director of the Patient Flow Operations Center which facilitates patient placement throughout the Wake Forest Baptist Health system. He is also the associate medical director for the adult emergency department. Dr. Sunkara is assistant professor of internal medicine at Wake Forest School of Medicine. He is the medical director for hospital medicine units and the newly established PUI unit.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Julie Freischlag, MD; Kevin High, MD, MS; Gary Rosenthal, MD; Wayne Meredith, MD;Russ Howerton, MD; Mike Waid, Andrea Fernandez, MD; Brian Hiestand, MD; the Wake Forest Baptist Health System COVID-19 task force, the Operations Center, and the countless frontline staff at all five hospitals within the Wake Forest Baptist Health System.

References

1. World Health Organization. Modes of transmission of virus causing COVID-19: Implications for IPC precaution recommendations. 2020 June 30. https://www.who.int/news-room/commentaries/detail/modes-of-transmission-of-virus-causing-covid-19-implications-for-ipc-precaution-recommendations.

2. Holshue et al. First case of 2019 novel coronavirus in the United States. N Engl J Med. 2020;382: 929-36.

3. Fuller T, Baker M. Coronavirus death in California came weeks before first known U.S. death. New York Times. 2020 Apr 22. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/22/us/coronavirus-first-united-states-death.html.

4. Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center. https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/us-map. Accessed 2020 May 28.

5. Michaud J et al. COVID-19 models: Can they tell us what we want to know? 2020 April 16. https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-policy-watch/covid-19-models.

6. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-in-us.html. Accessed 2020 June 30.

7. Jewell N et al. Caution warranted: Using the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation Model for predicting the course of the COVID-19 pandemic. Ann Intern Med. 2020;173:1-3.

8. Box G. Science and statistics. J Am Stat Assoc. 1972;71:791-9.

9. Shapiro DE. The interpretation of diagnostic tests. Stat Methods Med Res. 1999;8:113-34.

10. Kim J. It is not too late to go on the offense against the coronavirus. The New Yorker. 2020 Apr 20. https://www.newyorker.com/science/medical-dispatch/its-not-too-late-to-go-on-offense-against-the-coronavirus.

The current coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic shocked the world with its rapid spread despite stringent containment efforts, and it continues to wreak havoc. The surrounding uncertainty due to the novelty of this virus has prompted significant investigation to determine proper containment, treatment, and eradication efforts.^1,2 In addition, health care facilities are facing surge capacity issues and a shortage of resources resulting in lower quality care for patients and putting health care workers (HCWs) at risk for infection.^3,4

While there is a lot of emerging clinical and basic science research in this area, there has been inconsistent guidance in regard to the containment and prevention of spread in health care systems. An initiative to minimize HCW exposure risk and to provide the highest quality care to patients was implemented by the Section of Hospital Medicine at our large academic medical center. We used a hospital medicine medical-surgical unit and converted it into a Person Under Investigation (PUI) unit for patients suspected of COVID-19.
 

Unit goals

• Deliver dedicated, comprehensive, and high-quality care to our PUI patients suspected of COVID-19.
• Minimize cross contamination with healthy patients on other hospital units.
• Provide clear and direct communications with our HCWs.
• Educate HCWs on optimal donning and doffing techniques.
• Minimize our HCW exposure risk.
• Efficiently use our personal protective equipment (PPE) supply.

Unit and team characteristics

We used a preexisting 24-bed hospital medicine medical-surgical unit with a dyad rounding model of an attending physician and advanced practice provider (APP). Other team members include a designated care coordinator (social worker/case manager), pharmacist, respiratory therapist, physical/occupational therapist, speech language pathologist, unit medical director, and nurse manager. A daily multidisciplinary huddle with all the team members was held to discuss the care of the PUI patients.

Administrative leadership

A COVID-19 task force composed of the medical director of clinical operations from the Section of Hospital Medicine, infectious disease, infection prevention, and several other important stakeholders conducted a daily conference call. This call allowed for the dissemination of information, including any treatment updates based on literature review or care processes. This information was then relayed to the HCWs following the meeting through the PUI unit medical director and nurse manager, who also facilitated feedback from the HCWs to the COVID-19 task force during the daily conference call. (See Figure 1.)

Courtesy Dr. Sunkara, Dr. Lippert, Dr. Morris, and Dr. Huang

Patient flow

Hospital medicine was designated as the default service for all PUI patients suspected of COVID-19 and confirmed COVID-19 cases requiring hospitalization. These patients were admitted to this PUI unit directly from the emergency department (ED), or as transfers from outside institutions with assistance from our patient placement specialist team. Those patients admitted from our ED were tested for COVID-19 prior to arriving on the unit. Other suspected COVID-19 patients arriving as transfers from outside institutions were screened by the patient placement specialist team asking the following questions about the patient:

• “Has the patient had a fever or cough and been in contact with a laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 patient?”
• “Has the patient had a fever and cough?”

If the answer to either screening question was “yes,” then the patient was accepted to the PUI unit and tested upon arrival. Lastly, patients who were found to be COVID-19 positive at the outside institution, but who required transfer for other clinical reasons, were placed on this PUI unit as well.

Mechanisms to efficiently utilize PPE and mitigate HCW exposure risk

Our objectives are reducing the number of HCWs encountering PUI patients, reducing the number of encounters the HCWs have with PUI patients, and reducing the amount of time HCWs spent with PUI patients.

First, we maintained a log outside each patient’s room to track the details of staff encounters. Second, there was only one medical provider (either the attending physician or APP) assigned to each patient to limit personnel exposure. Third, we removed all learners (e.g. residents and students) from this unit. Fourth, we limited the number of entries into patient rooms to only critical staff directly involved in patient care (e.g. dietary and other ancillary staff were not allowed to enter the rooms) and provided updates to the patients by calling into the rooms. In addition, care coordination, pharmacy, and other staff members also utilized the same approach of calling into the room to speak with the patient regarding updates to minimize the duration of time spent in the room. Furthermore, our medical providers – with the help of the pharmacist and nursing – timed a patient’s medications to help reduce the number of entries into the room.

Other things to consider for your PUI unit

There are several ideas that were not implemented in our PUI unit, but something to consider for your PUI unit, including:

• The use of elongated intravenous (IV) tubing, such that the IV poles and pumps were stationed outside the patient’s room, would be useful in reducing the amount of PPE required as well as HCW exposure to the patient.
• Having designated chest radiography, computed tomography, and magnetic resonance imaging scanners for these PUI patients to help minimize contamination with our non-PUI patients and to standardize the cleaning process.
• Supply our HCWs with designated scrubs at the beginning of their shifts, such that they can discard them at the end of their shifts for decontamination/sterilization purposes. This would help reduce HCWs fear of potentially exposing their families at home.
• Supply our HCWs with a designated place to stay, such as a hotel or other living quarters, to reduce HCWs fear of potentially exposing their families at home.
• Although we encouraged providers and staff to utilize designated phones to conduct patient history and review of systems information-gathering, to decrease the time spent in the room, the availability of more sophisticated audiovisual equipment could also improve the quality of the interview.

Conclusions

The increasing incidence in suspected COVID-19 patients has led to significant strain on health care systems of the world along with the associated economic and social crisis. Some health care facilities are facing surge capacity issues and inadequate resources, while others are facing a humanitarian crisis. Overall, we are all being affected by this pandemic, but are most concerned about its effects on our HCWs and our patients.

To address the concerns of low-quality care to our patients and anxiety levels among HCWs, we created this dedicated PUI unit in an effort to provide high-quality care for these suspected (and confirmed) COVID-19 patients and to maintain clear direct and constant communication with our HCWs.
 

Dr. Sunkara (psunkara@wakehealth.edu) is assistant professor of internal medicine at Wake Forest School of Medicine, Winston-Salem, N.C. He is the medical director for Hospital Medicine Units and the newly established PUI Unit, and is the corresponding author for this article. Dr. Lippert (wlippert@wakehealth.edu) is assistant professor of internal medicine at Wake Forest School of Medicine. Dr. Morris (chrmorri@wakehealth.edu) is a PGY-3 internal medicine resident at Wake Forest School of Medicine. Dr. Huang (chuang@wakehealth.edu) is associate professor of internal medicine at Wake Forest School of Medicine.

References

1. Food and Drug Administration. Recommendations for investigational COVID-19 convalescent plasma. 2020 Apr 8.

2. Fauci AS et al. Covid-19 – Navigating the uncharted. N Engl J Med. 2020 Feb 28. doi: 10.1056/NEJMe2002387. 3. Emanuel EJ et al. Fair allocation of scarce medical resources in the time of Covid-19. N Engl J Med. 2020 Mar 23. doi: 10.1056/NEJMsb2005114.

4. Li Ran et al. Risk factors of healthcare workers with corona virus disease 2019: A retrospective cohort study in a designated hospital of Wuhan in China. Clin Infect Dis. 2020 Mar 17. doi: 10.1093/cid/ciaa287.

5. Krein SL et al. Identification and characterization of failures in infectious agent transmission precaution practices in hospitals: A qualitative study. JAMA Intern Med. 2018;178(8):1016-57. doi: 10.1001/jamainternmed.2018.1898.

The current coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic shocked the world with its rapid spread despite stringent containment efforts, and it continues to wreak havoc. The surrounding uncertainty due to the novelty of this virus has prompted significant investigation to determine proper containment, treatment, and eradication efforts.^1,2 In addition, health care facilities are facing surge capacity issues and a shortage of resources resulting in lower quality care for patients and putting health care workers (HCWs) at risk for infection.^3,4

While there is a lot of emerging clinical and basic science research in this area, there has been inconsistent guidance in regard to the containment and prevention of spread in health care systems. An initiative to minimize HCW exposure risk and to provide the highest quality care to patients was implemented by the Section of Hospital Medicine at our large academic medical center. We used a hospital medicine medical-surgical unit and converted it into a Person Under Investigation (PUI) unit for patients suspected of COVID-19.
 

Unit goals

• Deliver dedicated, comprehensive, and high-quality care to our PUI patients suspected of COVID-19.
• Minimize cross contamination with healthy patients on other hospital units.
• Provide clear and direct communications with our HCWs.
• Educate HCWs on optimal donning and doffing techniques.
• Minimize our HCW exposure risk.
• Efficiently use our personal protective equipment (PPE) supply.

Unit and team characteristics

We used a preexisting 24-bed hospital medicine medical-surgical unit with a dyad rounding model of an attending physician and advanced practice provider (APP). Other team members include a designated care coordinator (social worker/case manager), pharmacist, respiratory therapist, physical/occupational therapist, speech language pathologist, unit medical director, and nurse manager. A daily multidisciplinary huddle with all the team members was held to discuss the care of the PUI patients.

Administrative leadership

A COVID-19 task force composed of the medical director of clinical operations from the Section of Hospital Medicine, infectious disease, infection prevention, and several other important stakeholders conducted a daily conference call. This call allowed for the dissemination of information, including any treatment updates based on literature review or care processes. This information was then relayed to the HCWs following the meeting through the PUI unit medical director and nurse manager, who also facilitated feedback from the HCWs to the COVID-19 task force during the daily conference call. (See Figure 1.)

Courtesy Dr. Sunkara, Dr. Lippert, Dr. Morris, and Dr. Huang

Patient flow

Hospital medicine was designated as the default service for all PUI patients suspected of COVID-19 and confirmed COVID-19 cases requiring hospitalization. These patients were admitted to this PUI unit directly from the emergency department (ED), or as transfers from outside institutions with assistance from our patient placement specialist team. Those patients admitted from our ED were tested for COVID-19 prior to arriving on the unit. Other suspected COVID-19 patients arriving as transfers from outside institutions were screened by the patient placement specialist team asking the following questions about the patient:

• “Has the patient had a fever or cough and been in contact with a laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 patient?”
• “Has the patient had a fever and cough?”

If the answer to either screening question was “yes,” then the patient was accepted to the PUI unit and tested upon arrival. Lastly, patients who were found to be COVID-19 positive at the outside institution, but who required transfer for other clinical reasons, were placed on this PUI unit as well.

Mechanisms to efficiently utilize PPE and mitigate HCW exposure risk

Our objectives are reducing the number of HCWs encountering PUI patients, reducing the number of encounters the HCWs have with PUI patients, and reducing the amount of time HCWs spent with PUI patients.

First, we maintained a log outside each patient’s room to track the details of staff encounters. Second, there was only one medical provider (either the attending physician or APP) assigned to each patient to limit personnel exposure. Third, we removed all learners (e.g. residents and students) from this unit. Fourth, we limited the number of entries into patient rooms to only critical staff directly involved in patient care (e.g. dietary and other ancillary staff were not allowed to enter the rooms) and provided updates to the patients by calling into the rooms. In addition, care coordination, pharmacy, and other staff members also utilized the same approach of calling into the room to speak with the patient regarding updates to minimize the duration of time spent in the room. Furthermore, our medical providers – with the help of the pharmacist and nursing – timed a patient’s medications to help reduce the number of entries into the room.

Other things to consider for your PUI unit

There are several ideas that were not implemented in our PUI unit, but something to consider for your PUI unit, including:

• The use of elongated intravenous (IV) tubing, such that the IV poles and pumps were stationed outside the patient’s room, would be useful in reducing the amount of PPE required as well as HCW exposure to the patient.
• Having designated chest radiography, computed tomography, and magnetic resonance imaging scanners for these PUI patients to help minimize contamination with our non-PUI patients and to standardize the cleaning process.
• Supply our HCWs with designated scrubs at the beginning of their shifts, such that they can discard them at the end of their shifts for decontamination/sterilization purposes. This would help reduce HCWs fear of potentially exposing their families at home.
• Supply our HCWs with a designated place to stay, such as a hotel or other living quarters, to reduce HCWs fear of potentially exposing their families at home.
• Although we encouraged providers and staff to utilize designated phones to conduct patient history and review of systems information-gathering, to decrease the time spent in the room, the availability of more sophisticated audiovisual equipment could also improve the quality of the interview.

Conclusions

The increasing incidence in suspected COVID-19 patients has led to significant strain on health care systems of the world along with the associated economic and social crisis. Some health care facilities are facing surge capacity issues and inadequate resources, while others are facing a humanitarian crisis. Overall, we are all being affected by this pandemic, but are most concerned about its effects on our HCWs and our patients.

To address the concerns of low-quality care to our patients and anxiety levels among HCWs, we created this dedicated PUI unit in an effort to provide high-quality care for these suspected (and confirmed) COVID-19 patients and to maintain clear direct and constant communication with our HCWs.
 

Dr. Sunkara (psunkara@wakehealth.edu) is assistant professor of internal medicine at Wake Forest School of Medicine, Winston-Salem, N.C. He is the medical director for Hospital Medicine Units and the newly established PUI Unit, and is the corresponding author for this article. Dr. Lippert (wlippert@wakehealth.edu) is assistant professor of internal medicine at Wake Forest School of Medicine. Dr. Morris (chrmorri@wakehealth.edu) is a PGY-3 internal medicine resident at Wake Forest School of Medicine. Dr. Huang (chuang@wakehealth.edu) is associate professor of internal medicine at Wake Forest School of Medicine.

References

1. Food and Drug Administration. Recommendations for investigational COVID-19 convalescent plasma. 2020 Apr 8.

2. Fauci AS et al. Covid-19 – Navigating the uncharted. N Engl J Med. 2020 Feb 28. doi: 10.1056/NEJMe2002387. 3. Emanuel EJ et al. Fair allocation of scarce medical resources in the time of Covid-19. N Engl J Med. 2020 Mar 23. doi: 10.1056/NEJMsb2005114.

4. Li Ran et al. Risk factors of healthcare workers with corona virus disease 2019: A retrospective cohort study in a designated hospital of Wuhan in China. Clin Infect Dis. 2020 Mar 17. doi: 10.1093/cid/ciaa287.

5. Krein SL et al. Identification and characterization of failures in infectious agent transmission precaution practices in hospitals: A qualitative study. JAMA Intern Med. 2018;178(8):1016-57. doi: 10.1001/jamainternmed.2018.1898.

The current coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic shocked the world with its rapid spread despite stringent containment efforts, and it continues to wreak havoc. The surrounding uncertainty due to the novelty of this virus has prompted significant investigation to determine proper containment, treatment, and eradication efforts.^1,2 In addition, health care facilities are facing surge capacity issues and a shortage of resources resulting in lower quality care for patients and putting health care workers (HCWs) at risk for infection.^3,4

While there is a lot of emerging clinical and basic science research in this area, there has been inconsistent guidance in regard to the containment and prevention of spread in health care systems. An initiative to minimize HCW exposure risk and to provide the highest quality care to patients was implemented by the Section of Hospital Medicine at our large academic medical center. We used a hospital medicine medical-surgical unit and converted it into a Person Under Investigation (PUI) unit for patients suspected of COVID-19.
 

Unit goals

• Deliver dedicated, comprehensive, and high-quality care to our PUI patients suspected of COVID-19.
• Minimize cross contamination with healthy patients on other hospital units.
• Provide clear and direct communications with our HCWs.
• Educate HCWs on optimal donning and doffing techniques.
• Minimize our HCW exposure risk.
• Efficiently use our personal protective equipment (PPE) supply.

Unit and team characteristics

We used a preexisting 24-bed hospital medicine medical-surgical unit with a dyad rounding model of an attending physician and advanced practice provider (APP). Other team members include a designated care coordinator (social worker/case manager), pharmacist, respiratory therapist, physical/occupational therapist, speech language pathologist, unit medical director, and nurse manager. A daily multidisciplinary huddle with all the team members was held to discuss the care of the PUI patients.

Administrative leadership

A COVID-19 task force composed of the medical director of clinical operations from the Section of Hospital Medicine, infectious disease, infection prevention, and several other important stakeholders conducted a daily conference call. This call allowed for the dissemination of information, including any treatment updates based on literature review or care processes. This information was then relayed to the HCWs following the meeting through the PUI unit medical director and nurse manager, who also facilitated feedback from the HCWs to the COVID-19 task force during the daily conference call. (See Figure 1.)

Courtesy Dr. Sunkara, Dr. Lippert, Dr. Morris, and Dr. Huang

Patient flow

Hospital medicine was designated as the default service for all PUI patients suspected of COVID-19 and confirmed COVID-19 cases requiring hospitalization. These patients were admitted to this PUI unit directly from the emergency department (ED), or as transfers from outside institutions with assistance from our patient placement specialist team. Those patients admitted from our ED were tested for COVID-19 prior to arriving on the unit. Other suspected COVID-19 patients arriving as transfers from outside institutions were screened by the patient placement specialist team asking the following questions about the patient:

• “Has the patient had a fever or cough and been in contact with a laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 patient?”
• “Has the patient had a fever and cough?”

If the answer to either screening question was “yes,” then the patient was accepted to the PUI unit and tested upon arrival. Lastly, patients who were found to be COVID-19 positive at the outside institution, but who required transfer for other clinical reasons, were placed on this PUI unit as well.

Mechanisms to efficiently utilize PPE and mitigate HCW exposure risk

Our objectives are reducing the number of HCWs encountering PUI patients, reducing the number of encounters the HCWs have with PUI patients, and reducing the amount of time HCWs spent with PUI patients.

First, we maintained a log outside each patient’s room to track the details of staff encounters. Second, there was only one medical provider (either the attending physician or APP) assigned to each patient to limit personnel exposure. Third, we removed all learners (e.g. residents and students) from this unit. Fourth, we limited the number of entries into patient rooms to only critical staff directly involved in patient care (e.g. dietary and other ancillary staff were not allowed to enter the rooms) and provided updates to the patients by calling into the rooms. In addition, care coordination, pharmacy, and other staff members also utilized the same approach of calling into the room to speak with the patient regarding updates to minimize the duration of time spent in the room. Furthermore, our medical providers – with the help of the pharmacist and nursing – timed a patient’s medications to help reduce the number of entries into the room.

Other things to consider for your PUI unit

There are several ideas that were not implemented in our PUI unit, but something to consider for your PUI unit, including:

• The use of elongated intravenous (IV) tubing, such that the IV poles and pumps were stationed outside the patient’s room, would be useful in reducing the amount of PPE required as well as HCW exposure to the patient.
• Having designated chest radiography, computed tomography, and magnetic resonance imaging scanners for these PUI patients to help minimize contamination with our non-PUI patients and to standardize the cleaning process.
• Supply our HCWs with designated scrubs at the beginning of their shifts, such that they can discard them at the end of their shifts for decontamination/sterilization purposes. This would help reduce HCWs fear of potentially exposing their families at home.
• Supply our HCWs with a designated place to stay, such as a hotel or other living quarters, to reduce HCWs fear of potentially exposing their families at home.
• Although we encouraged providers and staff to utilize designated phones to conduct patient history and review of systems information-gathering, to decrease the time spent in the room, the availability of more sophisticated audiovisual equipment could also improve the quality of the interview.

Conclusions

The increasing incidence in suspected COVID-19 patients has led to significant strain on health care systems of the world along with the associated economic and social crisis. Some health care facilities are facing surge capacity issues and inadequate resources, while others are facing a humanitarian crisis. Overall, we are all being affected by this pandemic, but are most concerned about its effects on our HCWs and our patients.

To address the concerns of low-quality care to our patients and anxiety levels among HCWs, we created this dedicated PUI unit in an effort to provide high-quality care for these suspected (and confirmed) COVID-19 patients and to maintain clear direct and constant communication with our HCWs.
 

Dr. Sunkara (psunkara@wakehealth.edu) is assistant professor of internal medicine at Wake Forest School of Medicine, Winston-Salem, N.C. He is the medical director for Hospital Medicine Units and the newly established PUI Unit, and is the corresponding author for this article. Dr. Lippert (wlippert@wakehealth.edu) is assistant professor of internal medicine at Wake Forest School of Medicine. Dr. Morris (chrmorri@wakehealth.edu) is a PGY-3 internal medicine resident at Wake Forest School of Medicine. Dr. Huang (chuang@wakehealth.edu) is associate professor of internal medicine at Wake Forest School of Medicine.

References

1. Food and Drug Administration. Recommendations for investigational COVID-19 convalescent plasma. 2020 Apr 8.

2. Fauci AS et al. Covid-19 – Navigating the uncharted. N Engl J Med. 2020 Feb 28. doi: 10.1056/NEJMe2002387. 3. Emanuel EJ et al. Fair allocation of scarce medical resources in the time of Covid-19. N Engl J Med. 2020 Mar 23. doi: 10.1056/NEJMsb2005114.

4. Li Ran et al. Risk factors of healthcare workers with corona virus disease 2019: A retrospective cohort study in a designated hospital of Wuhan in China. Clin Infect Dis. 2020 Mar 17. doi: 10.1093/cid/ciaa287.

5. Krein SL et al. Identification and characterization of failures in infectious agent transmission precaution practices in hospitals: A qualitative study. JAMA Intern Med. 2018;178(8):1016-57. doi: 10.1001/jamainternmed.2018.1898.