Russell B. Lemle, PhD

“What if VA health care goes away?” That was the headline of a July 6, 2023, Disabled American Veterans news article to its members. The question was not hypothetical. Legislation currently under consideration by the US Congress may make it a strong probability.  

The US Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs recently held a hearing to discuss 2 bills that would drastically reshape the provision of private health care services through the Veterans Community Care Program. An unprecedented coalition of 10 organizations—made up of US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) nurses, psychologists, physicians, dentists, social workers, optometrists, physician assistants, and nurse anesthetists, as well as the American Psychological Association, the Military and Veterans Committee of the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry and the Veterans Healthcare Policy Institute—came together in a unified statement for the record highlighting how these proposed policies would open a Pandora’s box that could forever eliminate the Veterans Health Administration as we know it.

Over the past decade—and especially following the passage of the Maintaining Internal Systems and Strengthening Integrated Outside Networks (MISSION) Act—there has been a surge of veterans gaining eligibility for private care if a VA medical facility is too far away, does not offer the needed care, or the wait time for an appointment is too long.

figure_1_2.jpg

Testifying before the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs hearing last year, Miguel LaPuz, MD, MBA, then the acting Deputy Under Secretary for Health at the VA, warned that “VA is rapidly approaching a point where half of all care available in both settings is provided through community care.” He cautioned that leaders were bracing for “the potential of a spiral effect.”

Care that is rendered to veterans in the community must, of course, be paid for. When those community costs began to soar at the start of the Community Care program, Congress bailed out the VA by allocating extra funds. Today, escalating costs are drawn from local VA facility budgets. And to guarantee that private sector care is paid for out of VA facility funds, legislators are introducing language, such as in the Veterans Healthcare Freedom Act, which states: “No additional funds are authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section and the amendments made by this section, and this section and the amendments made by this section shall be carried out using amounts otherwise made available to the Veterans Health Administration.” The anticipated vicious cycle looms. More money pouring into the private sector will force reductions and closures of in-house VA staff, programs, clinics, and units. This will cause more veterans to obtain care in the community, which will further drain more money out of VA facilities, leading to more reductions, etc. Rural areas will likely be hit hardest.

The VA is nearing the tipping point of this ever-descending spiral. And that is even without expanding eligibility further. Three provisions in this pair of bills could, on their own, drastically open eligibility, eliminate remaining guardrails, and push VA over the edge:

(1) Veteran preference. Tucked into the HEALTH Act, introduced by the ranking Republican Member, Jerry Moran of Kansas, is language which would require VA to consider a “veteran’s preference” for obtaining their health care in the private sector.

This stipulation violates the intent of the VA MISSION Act. When MISSION passed, there was bipartisan agreement that the Community Care Program was meant, in numerous Senators’ words, to “supplement, not supplant” VA health care. A veteran would be offered the option of receiving health care outside of the VA under 6 narrowly defined criteria. Legislators understood that veterans would get the option to choose whether to receive care in the private sector or the VA if, and only if, they qualified under the 6 eligibility rules. As a well-researched document coauthored by Disabled American Veterans, Paralyzed Veterans of America, and the Veterans of Foreign Wars stated, “veteran convenience or preference” should never be used as a sole reason for referral.

Explicitly adding preference for the first time will create the expectation among veterans and lawmakers of a new allowance. Were this to pass, every veteran—100%—would become eligible for referral to the private sector, kicking off an unstoppable drainage of VA budget resources and threatening its viability. Hopefully, the Senate will follow the lead of the US House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs which, last week, amended its its own community care bill by deleting “veteran preference” as a possible new eligibility criterion.

(2) Self-referral. Also being deliberated is the Making Community Care Work for Veterans Act, a draft bill authored by the US Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs Democratic Chairman Senator Jon Tester of Montana. It calls for allowing self-initiated routine vaccinations and routine vision/hearing services in the community.

On the surface, Tester’s bill focuses on only a tiny sliver of care. But once self-referral is permitted for a few services, private sector interests will, in no time, push the door wide open and add more services to which veterans can self-refer. Testimony at the hearing confirmed that prediction, as the Veterans of Foreign Wars and America’s Warrior Partnership stated there is no reason to limit self-referral to only eye and ear examinations. They proposed that self-referral should extend to mental health, substance use, podiatry, prosthetics, laboratory services, dermatology, and diabetes. Like other perilous sections of these bills, seemingly innocuous language would quickly lead to crippling impacts.

(3) Pilot program for unfettered access. The HEALTH Act contains another provision in which veterans would be allowed to receive outpatient care without VA referral, authorization, or oversight. An enrolled veteran could simply make an appointment with any Veterans Community Care Program mental health or substance use disorder practitioner for care for any duration of time. VA’s only role would be to pay the invoice. Private sector interests have been pressing this sort of program for years, and when it was carefully studied by the Commission on Care, the costs were estimated to be 2 to 3 times the existing system. That would come from a combination of fee-for-service reimbursement structures that abet overuse and higher overall costs in the private sector. Were the pilot to pass, VA would convert from its primary role as a system providing health care to an insurance carrier.

In the name of offering more choices, health care options will diminish for veterans. When VA programs/clinics/facilities close, veterans—especially service-connected veterans who depend on VA for high-quality care tailored to their needs—will lose those choices. Moreover, a downsized VA will make it nearly impossible for the VA to continue to research veterans’ complex health conditions, educate future health care professionals (the majority of whom train at VA medical centers), or fulfill its Fourth Mission as a backup for national emergencies.

Senate Committee members indicated their intention to combine provisions of the Moran and Tester bills into a larger compromise bill in September. Legislators must slow down, contemplate the ramifications, and set aside the stipulations noted above. What is needed first is a projection of future veterans’ authorizations for community care (under current eligibility criteria and also with these new allowances), how much money would that pull out of VA facilities, and what is the tipping point of a doom cycle.

In the meantime, there are smart solutions to ensure veterans can access high-quality care, as Disabled American Veterans testified at the hearing: By “investing in VA's health care infrastructure and staffing… this is particularly true for veterans who live in rural and remote areas where VA is most likely to be a stable, long-term health care option for veterans.”

The VA administers the most successful health care system in the country. As a recent summary of research confirmed yet again, the quality of care delivered by the VA is as good as or better than the care veterans receive from VA-paid community care or the general public obtains through private care. There will always be a supplemental role for the community to play when VA cannot provide care in a timely or convenient manner. But community care must be fixed in ways that never starves VA facilities of essential funding. If there ever were a time to stand up for the sake of our veterans and the long-term viability of the VA, it is now.

“What if VA health care goes away?” That was the headline of a July 6, 2023, Disabled American Veterans news article to its members. The question was not hypothetical. Legislation currently under consideration by the US Congress may make it a strong probability.  

The US Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs recently held a hearing to discuss 2 bills that would drastically reshape the provision of private health care services through the Veterans Community Care Program. An unprecedented coalition of 10 organizations—made up of US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) nurses, psychologists, physicians, dentists, social workers, optometrists, physician assistants, and nurse anesthetists, as well as the American Psychological Association, the Military and Veterans Committee of the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry and the Veterans Healthcare Policy Institute—came together in a unified statement for the record highlighting how these proposed policies would open a Pandora’s box that could forever eliminate the Veterans Health Administration as we know it.

Over the past decade—and especially following the passage of the Maintaining Internal Systems and Strengthening Integrated Outside Networks (MISSION) Act—there has been a surge of veterans gaining eligibility for private care if a VA medical facility is too far away, does not offer the needed care, or the wait time for an appointment is too long.

figure_1_2.jpg

Testifying before the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs hearing last year, Miguel LaPuz, MD, MBA, then the acting Deputy Under Secretary for Health at the VA, warned that “VA is rapidly approaching a point where half of all care available in both settings is provided through community care.” He cautioned that leaders were bracing for “the potential of a spiral effect.”

Care that is rendered to veterans in the community must, of course, be paid for. When those community costs began to soar at the start of the Community Care program, Congress bailed out the VA by allocating extra funds. Today, escalating costs are drawn from local VA facility budgets. And to guarantee that private sector care is paid for out of VA facility funds, legislators are introducing language, such as in the Veterans Healthcare Freedom Act, which states: “No additional funds are authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section and the amendments made by this section, and this section and the amendments made by this section shall be carried out using amounts otherwise made available to the Veterans Health Administration.” The anticipated vicious cycle looms. More money pouring into the private sector will force reductions and closures of in-house VA staff, programs, clinics, and units. This will cause more veterans to obtain care in the community, which will further drain more money out of VA facilities, leading to more reductions, etc. Rural areas will likely be hit hardest.

The VA is nearing the tipping point of this ever-descending spiral. And that is even without expanding eligibility further. Three provisions in this pair of bills could, on their own, drastically open eligibility, eliminate remaining guardrails, and push VA over the edge:

(1) Veteran preference. Tucked into the HEALTH Act, introduced by the ranking Republican Member, Jerry Moran of Kansas, is language which would require VA to consider a “veteran’s preference” for obtaining their health care in the private sector.

This stipulation violates the intent of the VA MISSION Act. When MISSION passed, there was bipartisan agreement that the Community Care Program was meant, in numerous Senators’ words, to “supplement, not supplant” VA health care. A veteran would be offered the option of receiving health care outside of the VA under 6 narrowly defined criteria. Legislators understood that veterans would get the option to choose whether to receive care in the private sector or the VA if, and only if, they qualified under the 6 eligibility rules. As a well-researched document coauthored by Disabled American Veterans, Paralyzed Veterans of America, and the Veterans of Foreign Wars stated, “veteran convenience or preference” should never be used as a sole reason for referral.

Explicitly adding preference for the first time will create the expectation among veterans and lawmakers of a new allowance. Were this to pass, every veteran—100%—would become eligible for referral to the private sector, kicking off an unstoppable drainage of VA budget resources and threatening its viability. Hopefully, the Senate will follow the lead of the US House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs which, last week, amended its its own community care bill by deleting “veteran preference” as a possible new eligibility criterion.

(2) Self-referral. Also being deliberated is the Making Community Care Work for Veterans Act, a draft bill authored by the US Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs Democratic Chairman Senator Jon Tester of Montana. It calls for allowing self-initiated routine vaccinations and routine vision/hearing services in the community.

On the surface, Tester’s bill focuses on only a tiny sliver of care. But once self-referral is permitted for a few services, private sector interests will, in no time, push the door wide open and add more services to which veterans can self-refer. Testimony at the hearing confirmed that prediction, as the Veterans of Foreign Wars and America’s Warrior Partnership stated there is no reason to limit self-referral to only eye and ear examinations. They proposed that self-referral should extend to mental health, substance use, podiatry, prosthetics, laboratory services, dermatology, and diabetes. Like other perilous sections of these bills, seemingly innocuous language would quickly lead to crippling impacts.

(3) Pilot program for unfettered access. The HEALTH Act contains another provision in which veterans would be allowed to receive outpatient care without VA referral, authorization, or oversight. An enrolled veteran could simply make an appointment with any Veterans Community Care Program mental health or substance use disorder practitioner for care for any duration of time. VA’s only role would be to pay the invoice. Private sector interests have been pressing this sort of program for years, and when it was carefully studied by the Commission on Care, the costs were estimated to be 2 to 3 times the existing system. That would come from a combination of fee-for-service reimbursement structures that abet overuse and higher overall costs in the private sector. Were the pilot to pass, VA would convert from its primary role as a system providing health care to an insurance carrier.

In the name of offering more choices, health care options will diminish for veterans. When VA programs/clinics/facilities close, veterans—especially service-connected veterans who depend on VA for high-quality care tailored to their needs—will lose those choices. Moreover, a downsized VA will make it nearly impossible for the VA to continue to research veterans’ complex health conditions, educate future health care professionals (the majority of whom train at VA medical centers), or fulfill its Fourth Mission as a backup for national emergencies.

Senate Committee members indicated their intention to combine provisions of the Moran and Tester bills into a larger compromise bill in September. Legislators must slow down, contemplate the ramifications, and set aside the stipulations noted above. What is needed first is a projection of future veterans’ authorizations for community care (under current eligibility criteria and also with these new allowances), how much money would that pull out of VA facilities, and what is the tipping point of a doom cycle.

In the meantime, there are smart solutions to ensure veterans can access high-quality care, as Disabled American Veterans testified at the hearing: By “investing in VA's health care infrastructure and staffing… this is particularly true for veterans who live in rural and remote areas where VA is most likely to be a stable, long-term health care option for veterans.”

The VA administers the most successful health care system in the country. As a recent summary of research confirmed yet again, the quality of care delivered by the VA is as good as or better than the care veterans receive from VA-paid community care or the general public obtains through private care. There will always be a supplemental role for the community to play when VA cannot provide care in a timely or convenient manner. But community care must be fixed in ways that never starves VA facilities of essential funding. If there ever were a time to stand up for the sake of our veterans and the long-term viability of the VA, it is now.

“What if VA health care goes away?” That was the headline of a July 6, 2023, Disabled American Veterans news article to its members. The question was not hypothetical. Legislation currently under consideration by the US Congress may make it a strong probability.  

The US Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs recently held a hearing to discuss 2 bills that would drastically reshape the provision of private health care services through the Veterans Community Care Program. An unprecedented coalition of 10 organizations—made up of US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) nurses, psychologists, physicians, dentists, social workers, optometrists, physician assistants, and nurse anesthetists, as well as the American Psychological Association, the Military and Veterans Committee of the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry and the Veterans Healthcare Policy Institute—came together in a unified statement for the record highlighting how these proposed policies would open a Pandora’s box that could forever eliminate the Veterans Health Administration as we know it.

Over the past decade—and especially following the passage of the Maintaining Internal Systems and Strengthening Integrated Outside Networks (MISSION) Act—there has been a surge of veterans gaining eligibility for private care if a VA medical facility is too far away, does not offer the needed care, or the wait time for an appointment is too long.

figure_1_2.jpg

Testifying before the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs hearing last year, Miguel LaPuz, MD, MBA, then the acting Deputy Under Secretary for Health at the VA, warned that “VA is rapidly approaching a point where half of all care available in both settings is provided through community care.” He cautioned that leaders were bracing for “the potential of a spiral effect.”

Care that is rendered to veterans in the community must, of course, be paid for. When those community costs began to soar at the start of the Community Care program, Congress bailed out the VA by allocating extra funds. Today, escalating costs are drawn from local VA facility budgets. And to guarantee that private sector care is paid for out of VA facility funds, legislators are introducing language, such as in the Veterans Healthcare Freedom Act, which states: “No additional funds are authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section and the amendments made by this section, and this section and the amendments made by this section shall be carried out using amounts otherwise made available to the Veterans Health Administration.” The anticipated vicious cycle looms. More money pouring into the private sector will force reductions and closures of in-house VA staff, programs, clinics, and units. This will cause more veterans to obtain care in the community, which will further drain more money out of VA facilities, leading to more reductions, etc. Rural areas will likely be hit hardest.

The VA is nearing the tipping point of this ever-descending spiral. And that is even without expanding eligibility further. Three provisions in this pair of bills could, on their own, drastically open eligibility, eliminate remaining guardrails, and push VA over the edge:

(1) Veteran preference. Tucked into the HEALTH Act, introduced by the ranking Republican Member, Jerry Moran of Kansas, is language which would require VA to consider a “veteran’s preference” for obtaining their health care in the private sector.

This stipulation violates the intent of the VA MISSION Act. When MISSION passed, there was bipartisan agreement that the Community Care Program was meant, in numerous Senators’ words, to “supplement, not supplant” VA health care. A veteran would be offered the option of receiving health care outside of the VA under 6 narrowly defined criteria. Legislators understood that veterans would get the option to choose whether to receive care in the private sector or the VA if, and only if, they qualified under the 6 eligibility rules. As a well-researched document coauthored by Disabled American Veterans, Paralyzed Veterans of America, and the Veterans of Foreign Wars stated, “veteran convenience or preference” should never be used as a sole reason for referral.

Explicitly adding preference for the first time will create the expectation among veterans and lawmakers of a new allowance. Were this to pass, every veteran—100%—would become eligible for referral to the private sector, kicking off an unstoppable drainage of VA budget resources and threatening its viability. Hopefully, the Senate will follow the lead of the US House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs which, last week, amended its its own community care bill by deleting “veteran preference” as a possible new eligibility criterion.

(2) Self-referral. Also being deliberated is the Making Community Care Work for Veterans Act, a draft bill authored by the US Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs Democratic Chairman Senator Jon Tester of Montana. It calls for allowing self-initiated routine vaccinations and routine vision/hearing services in the community.

On the surface, Tester’s bill focuses on only a tiny sliver of care. But once self-referral is permitted for a few services, private sector interests will, in no time, push the door wide open and add more services to which veterans can self-refer. Testimony at the hearing confirmed that prediction, as the Veterans of Foreign Wars and America’s Warrior Partnership stated there is no reason to limit self-referral to only eye and ear examinations. They proposed that self-referral should extend to mental health, substance use, podiatry, prosthetics, laboratory services, dermatology, and diabetes. Like other perilous sections of these bills, seemingly innocuous language would quickly lead to crippling impacts.

(3) Pilot program for unfettered access. The HEALTH Act contains another provision in which veterans would be allowed to receive outpatient care without VA referral, authorization, or oversight. An enrolled veteran could simply make an appointment with any Veterans Community Care Program mental health or substance use disorder practitioner for care for any duration of time. VA’s only role would be to pay the invoice. Private sector interests have been pressing this sort of program for years, and when it was carefully studied by the Commission on Care, the costs were estimated to be 2 to 3 times the existing system. That would come from a combination of fee-for-service reimbursement structures that abet overuse and higher overall costs in the private sector. Were the pilot to pass, VA would convert from its primary role as a system providing health care to an insurance carrier.

In the name of offering more choices, health care options will diminish for veterans. When VA programs/clinics/facilities close, veterans—especially service-connected veterans who depend on VA for high-quality care tailored to their needs—will lose those choices. Moreover, a downsized VA will make it nearly impossible for the VA to continue to research veterans’ complex health conditions, educate future health care professionals (the majority of whom train at VA medical centers), or fulfill its Fourth Mission as a backup for national emergencies.

Senate Committee members indicated their intention to combine provisions of the Moran and Tester bills into a larger compromise bill in September. Legislators must slow down, contemplate the ramifications, and set aside the stipulations noted above. What is needed first is a projection of future veterans’ authorizations for community care (under current eligibility criteria and also with these new allowances), how much money would that pull out of VA facilities, and what is the tipping point of a doom cycle.

In the meantime, there are smart solutions to ensure veterans can access high-quality care, as Disabled American Veterans testified at the hearing: By “investing in VA's health care infrastructure and staffing… this is particularly true for veterans who live in rural and remote areas where VA is most likely to be a stable, long-term health care option for veterans.”

The VA administers the most successful health care system in the country. As a recent summary of research confirmed yet again, the quality of care delivered by the VA is as good as or better than the care veterans receive from VA-paid community care or the general public obtains through private care. There will always be a supplemental role for the community to play when VA cannot provide care in a timely or convenient manner. But community care must be fixed in ways that never starves VA facilities of essential funding. If there ever were a time to stand up for the sake of our veterans and the long-term viability of the VA, it is now.

The VA MISSION Act of 2018 expanded options for veterans to receive government-paid health care from private sector community health care practitioners. The act tasked the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to develop rules that determine eligibility for outside care based on appointment wait times or distance to the nearest VA facility. As a part of those standards, VA opted not to include the availability of VA telehealth in its wait time calculations—a decision that we believe was a gross misjudgment with far-reaching consequences for veterans. Excluding telehealth from the guidelines has unnecessarily restricted veterans’ access to high-quality health care and has squandered large sums of taxpayer dollars.

The VA has reviewed its initial MISSION Act eligibility standards and proposed a correction that recognizes telehealth as a valid means of providing health care to veterans who prefer that option.¹ Telehealth may not have been an essential component of health care before the COVID-19 pandemic, but now it is clear that the best action VA can take is to swiftly enact its recommended change, stipulating that both VA telehealth and in-person health care constitute access to treatment. If implemented, this correction would save taxpayers an astronomical sum—according to a VA reportto Congress, about $1.1 billion in fiscal year 2021 alone.² The cost savings from this proposed correction is reason enough to implement it. But just as importantly, increased use of VA telehealth also means higher quality, quicker, and more convenient care for veterans.

The VA is the recognized world leader in providing telehealth that is effective, timely, and veteran centric. Veterans across the country have access to telehealth services in more than 30 specialties.³ To ensure accessibility, the VA has established partnerships with major mobile broadband carriers so that veterans can receive telehealth at home without additional charges.⁴ The VA project Accessing Telehealth through Local Area Stations (ATLAS) brings VA telehealth to areas where existing internet infrastructure may not be adequate to support video telehealth. ATLAS is a collaboration with private organizations, including Veterans of Foreign Wars, The American Legion, and Walmart.⁴The agency also provides tablets to veterans who might not have access to telehealth, fostering higher access and patient satisfaction.⁴

The VA can initiate telehealth care rapidly. The “Anywhere to Anywhere” VA Health Care initiative and telecare hubs eliminate geographic constraints, allowing clinicians to provide team-based services across county and state lines to veterans’ homes and communities.

VA’s telehealth effort maximizes convenience for veterans. It reduces travel time, travel expenses, depletion of sick leave, and the need for childcare. Veterans with posttraumatic stress disorder or military sexual trauma who are triggered by traffic and waiting rooms, those with mobility issues, or those facing the stigma of mental health treatment often prefer to receive care in the familiarity of their home. Nonetheless, any veteran who desires an in-person appointment would continue to have that option under the proposed VA rule change.

VA telehealth is often used for mental health care, using the same evidence-based psychotherapies that VA has championed and are superior to that available in the private sector.^5,6 This advantage is largely due to VA’s rigorous training, consultation, case review, care delivery, measurement standards, and integrated care model. In a recent survey of veterans engaged in mental health care, 80% reported that VA virtual care via video and/or telephone is as helpful or more helpful than in‐person services.⁷And yet, because of existing regulations, VA telemental health (TMH) does not qualify as access, resulting in hundreds of thousands of TMH visits being outsourced yearly to community practitioners that could be quickly and beneficially furnished by VA clinicians.

Telehealth has been shown to be as clinically effective as in-person care. A recent review of 38 meta-analyses covering telehealth with 10 medical disciplines found that for all disciplines, telehealth was as effective, if not more so, than conventional care.⁸ And because the likelihood of not showing up for telehealth appointments is lower than for in-person appointments, continuity of care is uninterrupted, and health care outcomes are improved.

Telehealth is health care. The VA must end the double standard that has handicapped it from including telehealth availability in determinations of eligibility for community care. The VA has voiced its intention to seek stakeholder input before implementing its proposed correction. The change is long overdue. It will save the VA a billion dollars annually while ensuring that veterans have quicker access to better treatment.

The VA MISSION Act of 2018 expanded options for veterans to receive government-paid health care from private sector community health care practitioners. The act tasked the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to develop rules that determine eligibility for outside care based on appointment wait times or distance to the nearest VA facility. As a part of those standards, VA opted not to include the availability of VA telehealth in its wait time calculations—a decision that we believe was a gross misjudgment with far-reaching consequences for veterans. Excluding telehealth from the guidelines has unnecessarily restricted veterans’ access to high-quality health care and has squandered large sums of taxpayer dollars.

The VA has reviewed its initial MISSION Act eligibility standards and proposed a correction that recognizes telehealth as a valid means of providing health care to veterans who prefer that option.¹ Telehealth may not have been an essential component of health care before the COVID-19 pandemic, but now it is clear that the best action VA can take is to swiftly enact its recommended change, stipulating that both VA telehealth and in-person health care constitute access to treatment. If implemented, this correction would save taxpayers an astronomical sum—according to a VA reportto Congress, about $1.1 billion in fiscal year 2021 alone.² The cost savings from this proposed correction is reason enough to implement it. But just as importantly, increased use of VA telehealth also means higher quality, quicker, and more convenient care for veterans.

The VA is the recognized world leader in providing telehealth that is effective, timely, and veteran centric. Veterans across the country have access to telehealth services in more than 30 specialties.³ To ensure accessibility, the VA has established partnerships with major mobile broadband carriers so that veterans can receive telehealth at home without additional charges.⁴ The VA project Accessing Telehealth through Local Area Stations (ATLAS) brings VA telehealth to areas where existing internet infrastructure may not be adequate to support video telehealth. ATLAS is a collaboration with private organizations, including Veterans of Foreign Wars, The American Legion, and Walmart.⁴The agency also provides tablets to veterans who might not have access to telehealth, fostering higher access and patient satisfaction.⁴

The VA can initiate telehealth care rapidly. The “Anywhere to Anywhere” VA Health Care initiative and telecare hubs eliminate geographic constraints, allowing clinicians to provide team-based services across county and state lines to veterans’ homes and communities.

VA’s telehealth effort maximizes convenience for veterans. It reduces travel time, travel expenses, depletion of sick leave, and the need for childcare. Veterans with posttraumatic stress disorder or military sexual trauma who are triggered by traffic and waiting rooms, those with mobility issues, or those facing the stigma of mental health treatment often prefer to receive care in the familiarity of their home. Nonetheless, any veteran who desires an in-person appointment would continue to have that option under the proposed VA rule change.

VA telehealth is often used for mental health care, using the same evidence-based psychotherapies that VA has championed and are superior to that available in the private sector.^5,6 This advantage is largely due to VA’s rigorous training, consultation, case review, care delivery, measurement standards, and integrated care model. In a recent survey of veterans engaged in mental health care, 80% reported that VA virtual care via video and/or telephone is as helpful or more helpful than in‐person services.⁷And yet, because of existing regulations, VA telemental health (TMH) does not qualify as access, resulting in hundreds of thousands of TMH visits being outsourced yearly to community practitioners that could be quickly and beneficially furnished by VA clinicians.

Telehealth has been shown to be as clinically effective as in-person care. A recent review of 38 meta-analyses covering telehealth with 10 medical disciplines found that for all disciplines, telehealth was as effective, if not more so, than conventional care.⁸ And because the likelihood of not showing up for telehealth appointments is lower than for in-person appointments, continuity of care is uninterrupted, and health care outcomes are improved.

Telehealth is health care. The VA must end the double standard that has handicapped it from including telehealth availability in determinations of eligibility for community care. The VA has voiced its intention to seek stakeholder input before implementing its proposed correction. The change is long overdue. It will save the VA a billion dollars annually while ensuring that veterans have quicker access to better treatment.

The VA MISSION Act of 2018 expanded options for veterans to receive government-paid health care from private sector community health care practitioners. The act tasked the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to develop rules that determine eligibility for outside care based on appointment wait times or distance to the nearest VA facility. As a part of those standards, VA opted not to include the availability of VA telehealth in its wait time calculations—a decision that we believe was a gross misjudgment with far-reaching consequences for veterans. Excluding telehealth from the guidelines has unnecessarily restricted veterans’ access to high-quality health care and has squandered large sums of taxpayer dollars.

The VA has reviewed its initial MISSION Act eligibility standards and proposed a correction that recognizes telehealth as a valid means of providing health care to veterans who prefer that option.¹ Telehealth may not have been an essential component of health care before the COVID-19 pandemic, but now it is clear that the best action VA can take is to swiftly enact its recommended change, stipulating that both VA telehealth and in-person health care constitute access to treatment. If implemented, this correction would save taxpayers an astronomical sum—according to a VA reportto Congress, about $1.1 billion in fiscal year 2021 alone.² The cost savings from this proposed correction is reason enough to implement it. But just as importantly, increased use of VA telehealth also means higher quality, quicker, and more convenient care for veterans.

The VA is the recognized world leader in providing telehealth that is effective, timely, and veteran centric. Veterans across the country have access to telehealth services in more than 30 specialties.³ To ensure accessibility, the VA has established partnerships with major mobile broadband carriers so that veterans can receive telehealth at home without additional charges.⁴ The VA project Accessing Telehealth through Local Area Stations (ATLAS) brings VA telehealth to areas where existing internet infrastructure may not be adequate to support video telehealth. ATLAS is a collaboration with private organizations, including Veterans of Foreign Wars, The American Legion, and Walmart.⁴The agency also provides tablets to veterans who might not have access to telehealth, fostering higher access and patient satisfaction.⁴

The VA can initiate telehealth care rapidly. The “Anywhere to Anywhere” VA Health Care initiative and telecare hubs eliminate geographic constraints, allowing clinicians to provide team-based services across county and state lines to veterans’ homes and communities.

VA’s telehealth effort maximizes convenience for veterans. It reduces travel time, travel expenses, depletion of sick leave, and the need for childcare. Veterans with posttraumatic stress disorder or military sexual trauma who are triggered by traffic and waiting rooms, those with mobility issues, or those facing the stigma of mental health treatment often prefer to receive care in the familiarity of their home. Nonetheless, any veteran who desires an in-person appointment would continue to have that option under the proposed VA rule change.

VA telehealth is often used for mental health care, using the same evidence-based psychotherapies that VA has championed and are superior to that available in the private sector.^5,6 This advantage is largely due to VA’s rigorous training, consultation, case review, care delivery, measurement standards, and integrated care model. In a recent survey of veterans engaged in mental health care, 80% reported that VA virtual care via video and/or telephone is as helpful or more helpful than in‐person services.⁷And yet, because of existing regulations, VA telemental health (TMH) does not qualify as access, resulting in hundreds of thousands of TMH visits being outsourced yearly to community practitioners that could be quickly and beneficially furnished by VA clinicians.

Telehealth has been shown to be as clinically effective as in-person care. A recent review of 38 meta-analyses covering telehealth with 10 medical disciplines found that for all disciplines, telehealth was as effective, if not more so, than conventional care.⁸ And because the likelihood of not showing up for telehealth appointments is lower than for in-person appointments, continuity of care is uninterrupted, and health care outcomes are improved.

Telehealth is health care. The VA must end the double standard that has handicapped it from including telehealth availability in determinations of eligibility for community care. The VA has voiced its intention to seek stakeholder input before implementing its proposed correction. The change is long overdue. It will save the VA a billion dollars annually while ensuring that veterans have quicker access to better treatment.

In February, the US House of Representatives hurriedly passed the Stopping Home Office Work’s Unproductive Problems (SHOW UP) Act, H.R. 139, a bill that calls into question the contributions of federal employees allowed to work from home and resets telework policies to those in place in 2019. Its author, House Oversight Committee Chairman James Comer (R, Kentucky) claimed that this change was necessary because the expansion of federal telework during the COVID-19 pandemic “has crippled the ability of agencies to get their jobs done and created backlogs.” His targets included the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), where, he charged, “veterans have been unable…to obtain care they have earned.” He added, “it’s hard to argue that teleworking has helped the VA.” 

While oversight of government programs is an authority of Congress, the SHOW UP Act is based on unsubstantiated assumptions of dereliction. It also disregards the devastating impact the proposed changes will have on veterans’ ability to receive care and inaccurately implies improving it. As the Senate considers the bill, they should take heed of these and other facts involving this often misunderstood form of labor.

COVID-19 irrevocably transformed the use of virtual care within the VA and across the world. Even as the pandemic subsides, public and private health care systems have continued to use telework-centered telehealth far above prepandemic levels, especially for mental health and primary care. Employers, including the VA, capitalize on telework for its benefits to both consumers and the workforce. For consumers, research supports the clinical effectiveness of telemental health service, as well as its cost-effectiveness and consumer satisfaction. On the workforce side, research has documented heightened productivity, lower distractibility, and higher job satisfaction among counselors who shifted to remote work.

Remote work also serves as a key tool in attracting and retaining a qualified workforce. As one VA service chief explained, “I am having enough trouble competing with the private sector, where extensive telework is now the norm. If telework options were rolled back, the private sector will have a field day picking off my best staff.” These comments are consistent with the data. McKinsey’s American Opportunity Survey shows that Americans have embraced remote work and want more of it. Recent data from Gallup show that 6 of 10 currently exclusively remote employees would be extremely likely to change companies if they lost their remote flexibility. Further, Gallup data show that when an employee’s location preference does not match their current work location, burnout rises, and engagement drops.   

Between 2019 and 2023, the VA’s telework expansion is what has enabled it to meet the growing demand for mental health services. VA is keeping pace by having 2 or more clinicians rotate between home and a shared VA office. Forcing these hybrid practitioners to work full time at VA facilities would drastically reduce the number of patients they can care for. There simply are not enough offices on crammed VA grounds to house staff who telework today. The net result would be that fewer appointments would be available, creating longer wait times. And that is just for existing patients. It does not factor in the expected influx due to new veteran eligibility made possible by the toxic exposures PACT Act.

Here is another good example of crucial VA telework: With the advent of the 988 Suicide & Crisis Lifeline, VA is adding more than 1000 new Veterans Crisis Line responders. All these new positions are remote. The SHOW UP Act would inhibit this expansion of lifesaving programs.

Veterans want more, not fewer, telehealth options. At a House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs hearing this past September, the VA reported that most veterans would prefer to receive mental health services virtually than to have to commute to a VA medical center or clinic. Telehealth benefits veterans in meaningful ways, including that it reduces their travel time, travel expense, depletion of sick leave, and need for childcare. Veterans with posttraumatic stress disorder, military sexual trauma, those with mobility issues, or those who struggle with the stigma of mental health treatment may prefer the familiarity of their own homes for care. Virtual options also relieve a patient’s need to enter a hospital and be unnecessarily exposed to contagious viruses. That’s safer not only for veterans but also for VA staff.

Finally, virtual care improves treatment. Research has revealed that the likelihood of missing telehealth appointments is lower than for in-person appointments. When patients miss appointments, continuity of care is disrupted, and health care outcomes are diminished. 

The pandemic is receding, but the advantages of telework-centered virtual care are greater than ever. Political representatives who want to show up for veterans should do everything in their power to expand—not cut—VA’s ability to authorize working from home.

In February, the US House of Representatives hurriedly passed the Stopping Home Office Work’s Unproductive Problems (SHOW UP) Act, H.R. 139, a bill that calls into question the contributions of federal employees allowed to work from home and resets telework policies to those in place in 2019. Its author, House Oversight Committee Chairman James Comer (R, Kentucky) claimed that this change was necessary because the expansion of federal telework during the COVID-19 pandemic “has crippled the ability of agencies to get their jobs done and created backlogs.” His targets included the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), where, he charged, “veterans have been unable…to obtain care they have earned.” He added, “it’s hard to argue that teleworking has helped the VA.” 

While oversight of government programs is an authority of Congress, the SHOW UP Act is based on unsubstantiated assumptions of dereliction. It also disregards the devastating impact the proposed changes will have on veterans’ ability to receive care and inaccurately implies improving it. As the Senate considers the bill, they should take heed of these and other facts involving this often misunderstood form of labor.

COVID-19 irrevocably transformed the use of virtual care within the VA and across the world. Even as the pandemic subsides, public and private health care systems have continued to use telework-centered telehealth far above prepandemic levels, especially for mental health and primary care. Employers, including the VA, capitalize on telework for its benefits to both consumers and the workforce. For consumers, research supports the clinical effectiveness of telemental health service, as well as its cost-effectiveness and consumer satisfaction. On the workforce side, research has documented heightened productivity, lower distractibility, and higher job satisfaction among counselors who shifted to remote work.

Remote work also serves as a key tool in attracting and retaining a qualified workforce. As one VA service chief explained, “I am having enough trouble competing with the private sector, where extensive telework is now the norm. If telework options were rolled back, the private sector will have a field day picking off my best staff.” These comments are consistent with the data. McKinsey’s American Opportunity Survey shows that Americans have embraced remote work and want more of it. Recent data from Gallup show that 6 of 10 currently exclusively remote employees would be extremely likely to change companies if they lost their remote flexibility. Further, Gallup data show that when an employee’s location preference does not match their current work location, burnout rises, and engagement drops.   

Between 2019 and 2023, the VA’s telework expansion is what has enabled it to meet the growing demand for mental health services. VA is keeping pace by having 2 or more clinicians rotate between home and a shared VA office. Forcing these hybrid practitioners to work full time at VA facilities would drastically reduce the number of patients they can care for. There simply are not enough offices on crammed VA grounds to house staff who telework today. The net result would be that fewer appointments would be available, creating longer wait times. And that is just for existing patients. It does not factor in the expected influx due to new veteran eligibility made possible by the toxic exposures PACT Act.

Here is another good example of crucial VA telework: With the advent of the 988 Suicide & Crisis Lifeline, VA is adding more than 1000 new Veterans Crisis Line responders. All these new positions are remote. The SHOW UP Act would inhibit this expansion of lifesaving programs.

Veterans want more, not fewer, telehealth options. At a House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs hearing this past September, the VA reported that most veterans would prefer to receive mental health services virtually than to have to commute to a VA medical center or clinic. Telehealth benefits veterans in meaningful ways, including that it reduces their travel time, travel expense, depletion of sick leave, and need for childcare. Veterans with posttraumatic stress disorder, military sexual trauma, those with mobility issues, or those who struggle with the stigma of mental health treatment may prefer the familiarity of their own homes for care. Virtual options also relieve a patient’s need to enter a hospital and be unnecessarily exposed to contagious viruses. That’s safer not only for veterans but also for VA staff.

Finally, virtual care improves treatment. Research has revealed that the likelihood of missing telehealth appointments is lower than for in-person appointments. When patients miss appointments, continuity of care is disrupted, and health care outcomes are diminished. 

The pandemic is receding, but the advantages of telework-centered virtual care are greater than ever. Political representatives who want to show up for veterans should do everything in their power to expand—not cut—VA’s ability to authorize working from home.

In February, the US House of Representatives hurriedly passed the Stopping Home Office Work’s Unproductive Problems (SHOW UP) Act, H.R. 139, a bill that calls into question the contributions of federal employees allowed to work from home and resets telework policies to those in place in 2019. Its author, House Oversight Committee Chairman James Comer (R, Kentucky) claimed that this change was necessary because the expansion of federal telework during the COVID-19 pandemic “has crippled the ability of agencies to get their jobs done and created backlogs.” His targets included the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), where, he charged, “veterans have been unable…to obtain care they have earned.” He added, “it’s hard to argue that teleworking has helped the VA.” 

While oversight of government programs is an authority of Congress, the SHOW UP Act is based on unsubstantiated assumptions of dereliction. It also disregards the devastating impact the proposed changes will have on veterans’ ability to receive care and inaccurately implies improving it. As the Senate considers the bill, they should take heed of these and other facts involving this often misunderstood form of labor.

COVID-19 irrevocably transformed the use of virtual care within the VA and across the world. Even as the pandemic subsides, public and private health care systems have continued to use telework-centered telehealth far above prepandemic levels, especially for mental health and primary care. Employers, including the VA, capitalize on telework for its benefits to both consumers and the workforce. For consumers, research supports the clinical effectiveness of telemental health service, as well as its cost-effectiveness and consumer satisfaction. On the workforce side, research has documented heightened productivity, lower distractibility, and higher job satisfaction among counselors who shifted to remote work.

Remote work also serves as a key tool in attracting and retaining a qualified workforce. As one VA service chief explained, “I am having enough trouble competing with the private sector, where extensive telework is now the norm. If telework options were rolled back, the private sector will have a field day picking off my best staff.” These comments are consistent with the data. McKinsey’s American Opportunity Survey shows that Americans have embraced remote work and want more of it. Recent data from Gallup show that 6 of 10 currently exclusively remote employees would be extremely likely to change companies if they lost their remote flexibility. Further, Gallup data show that when an employee’s location preference does not match their current work location, burnout rises, and engagement drops.   

Between 2019 and 2023, the VA’s telework expansion is what has enabled it to meet the growing demand for mental health services. VA is keeping pace by having 2 or more clinicians rotate between home and a shared VA office. Forcing these hybrid practitioners to work full time at VA facilities would drastically reduce the number of patients they can care for. There simply are not enough offices on crammed VA grounds to house staff who telework today. The net result would be that fewer appointments would be available, creating longer wait times. And that is just for existing patients. It does not factor in the expected influx due to new veteran eligibility made possible by the toxic exposures PACT Act.

Here is another good example of crucial VA telework: With the advent of the 988 Suicide & Crisis Lifeline, VA is adding more than 1000 new Veterans Crisis Line responders. All these new positions are remote. The SHOW UP Act would inhibit this expansion of lifesaving programs.

Veterans want more, not fewer, telehealth options. At a House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs hearing this past September, the VA reported that most veterans would prefer to receive mental health services virtually than to have to commute to a VA medical center or clinic. Telehealth benefits veterans in meaningful ways, including that it reduces their travel time, travel expense, depletion of sick leave, and need for childcare. Veterans with posttraumatic stress disorder, military sexual trauma, those with mobility issues, or those who struggle with the stigma of mental health treatment may prefer the familiarity of their own homes for care. Virtual options also relieve a patient’s need to enter a hospital and be unnecessarily exposed to contagious viruses. That’s safer not only for veterans but also for VA staff.

Finally, virtual care improves treatment. Research has revealed that the likelihood of missing telehealth appointments is lower than for in-person appointments. When patients miss appointments, continuity of care is disrupted, and health care outcomes are diminished. 

The pandemic is receding, but the advantages of telework-centered virtual care are greater than ever. Political representatives who want to show up for veterans should do everything in their power to expand—not cut—VA’s ability to authorize working from home.

For years, the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has painstakingly labored to track, research, and address veteran suicide. Their exceptional work was dealt an unwarranted blow a month ago with the publication of an incomplete report entitled Operation Deep Dive (OpDD). The $3.9 million study from America’s Warrior Partnership (AWP) examined death data of former service members in 8 states between 2014 and 2018. The interim report criticized the VA for minimizing the extent of veteran suicide, asserting, “former service members take their own lives each year at a rate approximately 2.4 times greater than previously reported by the VA.”

The sensational results were accepted at face value and immediately garnered negative nationwide headlines, with lawmakers, media outlets, and veterans rushing to impugn the VA. Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs Ranking Republican Member Jerry Moran of Kansas opined, “The disparity between the numbers of veteran suicides reported by the VA and [OpDD] is concerning. We need an honest assessment of the scope of the problem.” A U.S. Medicine headline stated “VA undercounted thousands of veteran suicides. [OpDD] posited daily suicide rate is 240% higher.” Fox News declared, “Veterans committing suicide at rate 2 times higher than VA data show: study,” as did Military Times, “Veterans suicide rate may be double federal estimates, study suggests.”

Disturbingly, those who echoed AWP’s claims got the story backward. It’s AWP, not VA, whose suicide data and conclusions are faulty.

For starters, the VA data encompasses veterans across all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the US Virgin Islands. In contrast, AWP inferred national veteran suicide figures based on partial, skewed data. As delineated by researchers in an in-press Military Medicine letter to the Editor, 7 of the 8 states sampled (Alabama, Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, and Oregon) had suicide rates above the national average for the years under investigation. This factor alone overinflates AWP’s purported suicide numbers.

Additionally, AWP altered the definition of “taking one’s life” and then misapplied that designation. Conventionally, the term refers to suicide, but AWP used it to also include nonnatural deaths assessed by coroners and medical examiners as accidental or undetermined. Two examples of this self-injury mortality (SIM) are opioid overdoses and single-driver car crash deaths. AWP added suicides and SIMs to derive a total number of veterans who took their life and falsely contrasted that aggregate against the VA count of suicides. That’s like comparing the whole category of fruit to the subcategory of apples.

AWP should be applauded for drawing attention to and accounting for accidental and undetermined deaths. However, the standard protocol is to consider SIMs distinctly from suicides. Among the many reasons for precise labeling is so that grieving family members aren’t mistakenly informed that their loved one died by suicide. VA conveys the rate of veteran overdose deaths in separate reports, for example, the Veteran Drug Overdose Mortality, 2010-2019 publication. Those numbers were ignored in AWP’s calculations.

AWP was neglectful in another way. The second phase of the project—a deep examination of community-level factors preceding suicides and nonnatural deaths—began in 2019. This information was collected and analyzed through sociocultural death investigation (SDI) interviews of 3 to 4 family members, friends, and colleagues of the deceased. SDIs consisted of 19 factors, such as history of the veteran’s mental health problems, social connectedness, finances, group memberships, and access to firearms. However, the interim report omitted the preliminary analysis of these factors, which AWP stated would be made available this year.

OpDD conclusions were so unfounded that AWP’s analytic research partner, the University of Alabama, distanced itself from the interim report. “We were not consulted on the released figures,” Dr. Karl Hamner, the University of Alabama principal investigator on the study, told me. “We did not make any conclusions and we don’t endorse the reported findings about national rates or numbers per day. Nor did we make any statements about the VA’s data.”

As it happens, the VA’s 2022 National Veteran Suicide Prevention Annual Report was issued the same week as the OpDD report. VA found that veteran suicides decreased by 9.7% over the last 2 years, nearly twice the decrease for nonveterans. Yet, in a contemporaneous hearing of the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, AWP’s President and CEO Jim Lorraine testified that the progress preventing veteran suicide was “a disgrace” and “a failure.” He misattributed that it was VA (not AWP) that “must be more open and transparent about their data.”

Unsupported denigration of the VA tarnishes its reputation, undermining veterans’ trust in the health care system and increasing barriers to seeking needed services. More broadly, it fortifies those forces who wish to redirect allocations away from VA and towards non-VA veterans’ entities like AWP. The media and other stakeholders must take a lesson about getting the story straight before reflexively amplifying false accusations about the VA. Veterans deserve better.

For years, the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has painstakingly labored to track, research, and address veteran suicide. Their exceptional work was dealt an unwarranted blow a month ago with the publication of an incomplete report entitled Operation Deep Dive (OpDD). The $3.9 million study from America’s Warrior Partnership (AWP) examined death data of former service members in 8 states between 2014 and 2018. The interim report criticized the VA for minimizing the extent of veteran suicide, asserting, “former service members take their own lives each year at a rate approximately 2.4 times greater than previously reported by the VA.”

The sensational results were accepted at face value and immediately garnered negative nationwide headlines, with lawmakers, media outlets, and veterans rushing to impugn the VA. Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs Ranking Republican Member Jerry Moran of Kansas opined, “The disparity between the numbers of veteran suicides reported by the VA and [OpDD] is concerning. We need an honest assessment of the scope of the problem.” A U.S. Medicine headline stated “VA undercounted thousands of veteran suicides. [OpDD] posited daily suicide rate is 240% higher.” Fox News declared, “Veterans committing suicide at rate 2 times higher than VA data show: study,” as did Military Times, “Veterans suicide rate may be double federal estimates, study suggests.”

Disturbingly, those who echoed AWP’s claims got the story backward. It’s AWP, not VA, whose suicide data and conclusions are faulty.

For starters, the VA data encompasses veterans across all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the US Virgin Islands. In contrast, AWP inferred national veteran suicide figures based on partial, skewed data. As delineated by researchers in an in-press Military Medicine letter to the Editor, 7 of the 8 states sampled (Alabama, Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, and Oregon) had suicide rates above the national average for the years under investigation. This factor alone overinflates AWP’s purported suicide numbers.

Additionally, AWP altered the definition of “taking one’s life” and then misapplied that designation. Conventionally, the term refers to suicide, but AWP used it to also include nonnatural deaths assessed by coroners and medical examiners as accidental or undetermined. Two examples of this self-injury mortality (SIM) are opioid overdoses and single-driver car crash deaths. AWP added suicides and SIMs to derive a total number of veterans who took their life and falsely contrasted that aggregate against the VA count of suicides. That’s like comparing the whole category of fruit to the subcategory of apples.

AWP should be applauded for drawing attention to and accounting for accidental and undetermined deaths. However, the standard protocol is to consider SIMs distinctly from suicides. Among the many reasons for precise labeling is so that grieving family members aren’t mistakenly informed that their loved one died by suicide. VA conveys the rate of veteran overdose deaths in separate reports, for example, the Veteran Drug Overdose Mortality, 2010-2019 publication. Those numbers were ignored in AWP’s calculations.

AWP was neglectful in another way. The second phase of the project—a deep examination of community-level factors preceding suicides and nonnatural deaths—began in 2019. This information was collected and analyzed through sociocultural death investigation (SDI) interviews of 3 to 4 family members, friends, and colleagues of the deceased. SDIs consisted of 19 factors, such as history of the veteran’s mental health problems, social connectedness, finances, group memberships, and access to firearms. However, the interim report omitted the preliminary analysis of these factors, which AWP stated would be made available this year.

OpDD conclusions were so unfounded that AWP’s analytic research partner, the University of Alabama, distanced itself from the interim report. “We were not consulted on the released figures,” Dr. Karl Hamner, the University of Alabama principal investigator on the study, told me. “We did not make any conclusions and we don’t endorse the reported findings about national rates or numbers per day. Nor did we make any statements about the VA’s data.”

As it happens, the VA’s 2022 National Veteran Suicide Prevention Annual Report was issued the same week as the OpDD report. VA found that veteran suicides decreased by 9.7% over the last 2 years, nearly twice the decrease for nonveterans. Yet, in a contemporaneous hearing of the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, AWP’s President and CEO Jim Lorraine testified that the progress preventing veteran suicide was “a disgrace” and “a failure.” He misattributed that it was VA (not AWP) that “must be more open and transparent about their data.”

Unsupported denigration of the VA tarnishes its reputation, undermining veterans’ trust in the health care system and increasing barriers to seeking needed services. More broadly, it fortifies those forces who wish to redirect allocations away from VA and towards non-VA veterans’ entities like AWP. The media and other stakeholders must take a lesson about getting the story straight before reflexively amplifying false accusations about the VA. Veterans deserve better.

For years, the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has painstakingly labored to track, research, and address veteran suicide. Their exceptional work was dealt an unwarranted blow a month ago with the publication of an incomplete report entitled Operation Deep Dive (OpDD). The $3.9 million study from America’s Warrior Partnership (AWP) examined death data of former service members in 8 states between 2014 and 2018. The interim report criticized the VA for minimizing the extent of veteran suicide, asserting, “former service members take their own lives each year at a rate approximately 2.4 times greater than previously reported by the VA.”

The sensational results were accepted at face value and immediately garnered negative nationwide headlines, with lawmakers, media outlets, and veterans rushing to impugn the VA. Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs Ranking Republican Member Jerry Moran of Kansas opined, “The disparity between the numbers of veteran suicides reported by the VA and [OpDD] is concerning. We need an honest assessment of the scope of the problem.” A U.S. Medicine headline stated “VA undercounted thousands of veteran suicides. [OpDD] posited daily suicide rate is 240% higher.” Fox News declared, “Veterans committing suicide at rate 2 times higher than VA data show: study,” as did Military Times, “Veterans suicide rate may be double federal estimates, study suggests.”

Disturbingly, those who echoed AWP’s claims got the story backward. It’s AWP, not VA, whose suicide data and conclusions are faulty.

For starters, the VA data encompasses veterans across all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the US Virgin Islands. In contrast, AWP inferred national veteran suicide figures based on partial, skewed data. As delineated by researchers in an in-press Military Medicine letter to the Editor, 7 of the 8 states sampled (Alabama, Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, and Oregon) had suicide rates above the national average for the years under investigation. This factor alone overinflates AWP’s purported suicide numbers.

Additionally, AWP altered the definition of “taking one’s life” and then misapplied that designation. Conventionally, the term refers to suicide, but AWP used it to also include nonnatural deaths assessed by coroners and medical examiners as accidental or undetermined. Two examples of this self-injury mortality (SIM) are opioid overdoses and single-driver car crash deaths. AWP added suicides and SIMs to derive a total number of veterans who took their life and falsely contrasted that aggregate against the VA count of suicides. That’s like comparing the whole category of fruit to the subcategory of apples.

AWP should be applauded for drawing attention to and accounting for accidental and undetermined deaths. However, the standard protocol is to consider SIMs distinctly from suicides. Among the many reasons for precise labeling is so that grieving family members aren’t mistakenly informed that their loved one died by suicide. VA conveys the rate of veteran overdose deaths in separate reports, for example, the Veteran Drug Overdose Mortality, 2010-2019 publication. Those numbers were ignored in AWP’s calculations.

AWP was neglectful in another way. The second phase of the project—a deep examination of community-level factors preceding suicides and nonnatural deaths—began in 2019. This information was collected and analyzed through sociocultural death investigation (SDI) interviews of 3 to 4 family members, friends, and colleagues of the deceased. SDIs consisted of 19 factors, such as history of the veteran’s mental health problems, social connectedness, finances, group memberships, and access to firearms. However, the interim report omitted the preliminary analysis of these factors, which AWP stated would be made available this year.

OpDD conclusions were so unfounded that AWP’s analytic research partner, the University of Alabama, distanced itself from the interim report. “We were not consulted on the released figures,” Dr. Karl Hamner, the University of Alabama principal investigator on the study, told me. “We did not make any conclusions and we don’t endorse the reported findings about national rates or numbers per day. Nor did we make any statements about the VA’s data.”

As it happens, the VA’s 2022 National Veteran Suicide Prevention Annual Report was issued the same week as the OpDD report. VA found that veteran suicides decreased by 9.7% over the last 2 years, nearly twice the decrease for nonveterans. Yet, in a contemporaneous hearing of the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, AWP’s President and CEO Jim Lorraine testified that the progress preventing veteran suicide was “a disgrace” and “a failure.” He misattributed that it was VA (not AWP) that “must be more open and transparent about their data.”

Unsupported denigration of the VA tarnishes its reputation, undermining veterans’ trust in the health care system and increasing barriers to seeking needed services. More broadly, it fortifies those forces who wish to redirect allocations away from VA and towards non-VA veterans’ entities like AWP. The media and other stakeholders must take a lesson about getting the story straight before reflexively amplifying false accusations about the VA. Veterans deserve better.

In 2014, amidst stories of delays at Veterans Health Administration facilities, Congress established the Veterans Choice Program, which expanded access to private sector health care practitioners. When the program expired in 2018, lawmakers replaced it with the Veterans Community Care Program (VCCP) as part of the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Maintaining Internal Systems and Strengthening Integrated Outside Networks Act (38 USC § 1703 MISSION Act). Since then, the VCCP has grown exponentially; 34% of current veteran health care visits are with private clinicians.

Along with broader private sector access, the MISSION Act also mandated the creation of quality-of-care standards for both VA and VCCP, and stipulated that data be compiled and made available to “provide covered veterans relevant comparative information to make informed decisions regarding their health care.” Two-and-a-half years later, data about the quality of VCCP care remains largely unknown.

Access to Care Website 

In the lead up to the MISSION Act, the VA launched its Access to Care website, an online tool thatpublishes institutional performance data on key metrics so that veterans can make “more informed choices about where, when, and how they receive their health care.” Following the bill’s passage, the VA added a MISSION Act Quality Standards section, which includes results of 27 conventional quality measures for every VA facility. These scores are posted alongside data of regional facilities.

This trailblazing tool is exceedingly comprehensive. Yet, multiple website gaps compromise its utility for veterans deliberating whether to obtain VCCP care, including:

1. Data isn’t about VCCP care. The hospitals are selected because they are local, not whether they participate in VCCP.  Further, it appears that aggregate scores include non-VCCP facilities.
2. Missing conditions/treatments. While the website contains quality scores for an ample range of procedures, it lacks information for many conditions that disproportionately affect veterans. A veteran with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) or traumatic brain injury (TBI), for example, has no data to check.
3. Skewed comparison population. Private sector practitioners primarily treat nonveteran patients, a population that is, on average, healthier and of higher socioeconomic status when compared with VA patients. Outcomes differ, for example, when patients have coexisting mental illness or homelessness. For VCCP scores to be beneficial for comparisons, they should derive from treated veterans or be accurately risk-adjusted.
4. Tangential measures. The Institute of Medicine defined health care quality as “improvement of outcomes.” Patients considering health care options benefit from information about treatment effectiveness and symptom reduction. But because obtaining that quality data is labor intensive, proxy measures are substituted. For example, the measure advising smokers to quit is the closest the website comes to reporting on the quality of mental health care.

High-Performers

The VA initiated a second means to inform veterans about the quality of furnished care. Specifically, they guided third-party administrators (TPAs)—TriWest Healthcare Alliance and Optum—in creating algorithms designating that VCCP individual clinicians, practice groups, and hospitals can be deemed high performing providers (HPPs). The algorithms are calculated using a mix of Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set (HEDIS), Physician Quality Reporting System (PQRS), and Blue Health Intelligence (BHI) primary and specialty care measures. The designations are intended to be accessible to local VA community care schedulers to connect veterans with HPPs.

Many aspects of the HPP system are not yet public, including the measures that comprise the algorithms and when the designations will become operational. From what is publicly discoverable about HPP designations, there are crucial gaps like those on the Access to Care website. Behavioral and mental health conditions, for instance, are intentionally excluded in HPP monitoring. HPP algorithms draw from care provided to the general population; an HPP’s patient panel may contain no veterans (with their common comorbidities) at all. Most limiting, there’s no expectation that VCCP clinicians be high performing. Of the 1.2 million program clinicians treating veterans as of November 2020, only a nominal 13.4% were HPP.

After studying the HPP system, VA Partnered Evidence-based Policy Resource Center acknowledged that “it remains unclear whether the quality metrics and referral system result in higher quality of care for VA patients or whether the program improves veteran health.”

Quality of VCCP Mental Health Treatment

The MISSION Act mandated the VA to “establish standards and requirements for the provision of care by non-VA health care practitioners in clinical areas for which the Department of Veterans Affairs has special expertise, including PTSD, military sexual trauma-related conditions (MST), and TBI.” This requirement arose from a recognition that mental health care provided in the private sector pales in comparisonto the VA’s rigorous evidence-based training, consultation, case review and care delivery. For example, over 8500 VA clinicians have received training in evidence-based cognitive processing therapy and/or prolonged exposure therapy for PTSD.

The MISSION Act also mandated that VCCP providers must “fulfill training requirements established by the Secretary on how to deliver evidence-based treatments in the clinical areas for which the Department of Veterans Affairs has special expertise” before furnishing care pursuant to a contract with the VA. However, the VA elected to disregard the directive, and left it up to VCCP clinician’s discretion whether to obtain training or proficiency.

Two bills introduced in Congress in 2021 aim to uphold these vital mandates for the VCCP program. The Veterans’ Culturally Competent Care Act requires VCCP mental health practitioners to take courses on the evaluation and management of suicide, PTSD, TBI, and MST. The Lethal Means Safety Training Act aligns VCCP clinicians suicide prevention training with existing VA standards.

Recommendations to Assure the Quality of VCCP Care

With review and revision of VCCP quality standards now underway, the following remedial actions are recommended:

1. VCCP metrics must be compiled using data on veterans’ care, not the general population, and be published on the Access to Care website. This indispensable information is published on the website for VA care but not for VCCP. Unless VCCP is required to track their veterans, apples-to-apples comparisons of quality of care will remain difficult to attain. Supplemental research that directly contrasts quality of VA to VCCP care should be posted. For example, a 2021 study of enrolled veterans brought by ambulance to VA or community emergency rooms found that all 170 VA medical centers had lower comparative death rates.
2. VCCP providers should be held to the same quality standards as those applied to VA clinicians. In a 2020 critical issue update on implementation of the MISSION Act, major veterans service organizations (VSOs) recommended that competency, training, and quality standards for non-VA community clinicians must be equivalent to benchmarks expected of VA clinicians. That includes credentials, initial and follow-up training, diagnostic screening, care-delivery, and documentation standards. Enacting the Veterans’ Culturally Competent Care Act and the Lethal Means Safety Training Act would begin to meet the MISSION Act’s clear statutory language.
3. The VA and VCCP should add quality information about major diagnostic categories. This will allow veterans to make informed decisions about their personal condition. For most health diagnoses, there is no searchable listing by disorder. 
4. Quality assessments should be realigned to focus on outcome measures. For prospective patients, outcome results provide the most meaningful basis for comparing and selecting clinicians. Proxy measures may have little bearing on whether veterans receive effective care. (As Albert Einstein’s famously observed, “Not everything that can be counted counts.”). Also, the specific measures used for a clinician’s HPP designation should be delineated.
5. The VA must enforce the MISSION Act’s instruction to renew or cancel contracts based on demonstrated quality of care. As VSOs emphasized, “if the private sector is unwilling or unable to match the VA’s access and quality standards, the VA must consider whether it needs to find new community partners.”  

Seventeen billion dollars is spent yearly on purchased health care whose quality remains indeterminate. Ironclad commitments are needed from Congress and the VA to ensure that the effectiveness of, and standards for, veterans care options in the private sector match that in the VA.

In 2014, amidst stories of delays at Veterans Health Administration facilities, Congress established the Veterans Choice Program, which expanded access to private sector health care practitioners. When the program expired in 2018, lawmakers replaced it with the Veterans Community Care Program (VCCP) as part of the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Maintaining Internal Systems and Strengthening Integrated Outside Networks Act (38 USC § 1703 MISSION Act). Since then, the VCCP has grown exponentially; 34% of current veteran health care visits are with private clinicians.

Along with broader private sector access, the MISSION Act also mandated the creation of quality-of-care standards for both VA and VCCP, and stipulated that data be compiled and made available to “provide covered veterans relevant comparative information to make informed decisions regarding their health care.” Two-and-a-half years later, data about the quality of VCCP care remains largely unknown.

Access to Care Website 

In the lead up to the MISSION Act, the VA launched its Access to Care website, an online tool thatpublishes institutional performance data on key metrics so that veterans can make “more informed choices about where, when, and how they receive their health care.” Following the bill’s passage, the VA added a MISSION Act Quality Standards section, which includes results of 27 conventional quality measures for every VA facility. These scores are posted alongside data of regional facilities.

This trailblazing tool is exceedingly comprehensive. Yet, multiple website gaps compromise its utility for veterans deliberating whether to obtain VCCP care, including:

1. Data isn’t about VCCP care. The hospitals are selected because they are local, not whether they participate in VCCP.  Further, it appears that aggregate scores include non-VCCP facilities.
2. Missing conditions/treatments. While the website contains quality scores for an ample range of procedures, it lacks information for many conditions that disproportionately affect veterans. A veteran with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) or traumatic brain injury (TBI), for example, has no data to check.
3. Skewed comparison population. Private sector practitioners primarily treat nonveteran patients, a population that is, on average, healthier and of higher socioeconomic status when compared with VA patients. Outcomes differ, for example, when patients have coexisting mental illness or homelessness. For VCCP scores to be beneficial for comparisons, they should derive from treated veterans or be accurately risk-adjusted.
4. Tangential measures. The Institute of Medicine defined health care quality as “improvement of outcomes.” Patients considering health care options benefit from information about treatment effectiveness and symptom reduction. But because obtaining that quality data is labor intensive, proxy measures are substituted. For example, the measure advising smokers to quit is the closest the website comes to reporting on the quality of mental health care.

High-Performers

The VA initiated a second means to inform veterans about the quality of furnished care. Specifically, they guided third-party administrators (TPAs)—TriWest Healthcare Alliance and Optum—in creating algorithms designating that VCCP individual clinicians, practice groups, and hospitals can be deemed high performing providers (HPPs). The algorithms are calculated using a mix of Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set (HEDIS), Physician Quality Reporting System (PQRS), and Blue Health Intelligence (BHI) primary and specialty care measures. The designations are intended to be accessible to local VA community care schedulers to connect veterans with HPPs.

Many aspects of the HPP system are not yet public, including the measures that comprise the algorithms and when the designations will become operational. From what is publicly discoverable about HPP designations, there are crucial gaps like those on the Access to Care website. Behavioral and mental health conditions, for instance, are intentionally excluded in HPP monitoring. HPP algorithms draw from care provided to the general population; an HPP’s patient panel may contain no veterans (with their common comorbidities) at all. Most limiting, there’s no expectation that VCCP clinicians be high performing. Of the 1.2 million program clinicians treating veterans as of November 2020, only a nominal 13.4% were HPP.

After studying the HPP system, VA Partnered Evidence-based Policy Resource Center acknowledged that “it remains unclear whether the quality metrics and referral system result in higher quality of care for VA patients or whether the program improves veteran health.”

Quality of VCCP Mental Health Treatment

The MISSION Act mandated the VA to “establish standards and requirements for the provision of care by non-VA health care practitioners in clinical areas for which the Department of Veterans Affairs has special expertise, including PTSD, military sexual trauma-related conditions (MST), and TBI.” This requirement arose from a recognition that mental health care provided in the private sector pales in comparisonto the VA’s rigorous evidence-based training, consultation, case review and care delivery. For example, over 8500 VA clinicians have received training in evidence-based cognitive processing therapy and/or prolonged exposure therapy for PTSD.

The MISSION Act also mandated that VCCP providers must “fulfill training requirements established by the Secretary on how to deliver evidence-based treatments in the clinical areas for which the Department of Veterans Affairs has special expertise” before furnishing care pursuant to a contract with the VA. However, the VA elected to disregard the directive, and left it up to VCCP clinician’s discretion whether to obtain training or proficiency.

Two bills introduced in Congress in 2021 aim to uphold these vital mandates for the VCCP program. The Veterans’ Culturally Competent Care Act requires VCCP mental health practitioners to take courses on the evaluation and management of suicide, PTSD, TBI, and MST. The Lethal Means Safety Training Act aligns VCCP clinicians suicide prevention training with existing VA standards.

Recommendations to Assure the Quality of VCCP Care

With review and revision of VCCP quality standards now underway, the following remedial actions are recommended:

1. VCCP metrics must be compiled using data on veterans’ care, not the general population, and be published on the Access to Care website. This indispensable information is published on the website for VA care but not for VCCP. Unless VCCP is required to track their veterans, apples-to-apples comparisons of quality of care will remain difficult to attain. Supplemental research that directly contrasts quality of VA to VCCP care should be posted. For example, a 2021 study of enrolled veterans brought by ambulance to VA or community emergency rooms found that all 170 VA medical centers had lower comparative death rates.
2. VCCP providers should be held to the same quality standards as those applied to VA clinicians. In a 2020 critical issue update on implementation of the MISSION Act, major veterans service organizations (VSOs) recommended that competency, training, and quality standards for non-VA community clinicians must be equivalent to benchmarks expected of VA clinicians. That includes credentials, initial and follow-up training, diagnostic screening, care-delivery, and documentation standards. Enacting the Veterans’ Culturally Competent Care Act and the Lethal Means Safety Training Act would begin to meet the MISSION Act’s clear statutory language.
3. The VA and VCCP should add quality information about major diagnostic categories. This will allow veterans to make informed decisions about their personal condition. For most health diagnoses, there is no searchable listing by disorder. 
4. Quality assessments should be realigned to focus on outcome measures. For prospective patients, outcome results provide the most meaningful basis for comparing and selecting clinicians. Proxy measures may have little bearing on whether veterans receive effective care. (As Albert Einstein’s famously observed, “Not everything that can be counted counts.”). Also, the specific measures used for a clinician’s HPP designation should be delineated.
5. The VA must enforce the MISSION Act’s instruction to renew or cancel contracts based on demonstrated quality of care. As VSOs emphasized, “if the private sector is unwilling or unable to match the VA’s access and quality standards, the VA must consider whether it needs to find new community partners.”  

Seventeen billion dollars is spent yearly on purchased health care whose quality remains indeterminate. Ironclad commitments are needed from Congress and the VA to ensure that the effectiveness of, and standards for, veterans care options in the private sector match that in the VA.

In 2014, amidst stories of delays at Veterans Health Administration facilities, Congress established the Veterans Choice Program, which expanded access to private sector health care practitioners. When the program expired in 2018, lawmakers replaced it with the Veterans Community Care Program (VCCP) as part of the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Maintaining Internal Systems and Strengthening Integrated Outside Networks Act (38 USC § 1703 MISSION Act). Since then, the VCCP has grown exponentially; 34% of current veteran health care visits are with private clinicians.

Along with broader private sector access, the MISSION Act also mandated the creation of quality-of-care standards for both VA and VCCP, and stipulated that data be compiled and made available to “provide covered veterans relevant comparative information to make informed decisions regarding their health care.” Two-and-a-half years later, data about the quality of VCCP care remains largely unknown.

Access to Care Website 

In the lead up to the MISSION Act, the VA launched its Access to Care website, an online tool thatpublishes institutional performance data on key metrics so that veterans can make “more informed choices about where, when, and how they receive their health care.” Following the bill’s passage, the VA added a MISSION Act Quality Standards section, which includes results of 27 conventional quality measures for every VA facility. These scores are posted alongside data of regional facilities.

This trailblazing tool is exceedingly comprehensive. Yet, multiple website gaps compromise its utility for veterans deliberating whether to obtain VCCP care, including:

1. Data isn’t about VCCP care. The hospitals are selected because they are local, not whether they participate in VCCP.  Further, it appears that aggregate scores include non-VCCP facilities.
2. Missing conditions/treatments. While the website contains quality scores for an ample range of procedures, it lacks information for many conditions that disproportionately affect veterans. A veteran with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) or traumatic brain injury (TBI), for example, has no data to check.
3. Skewed comparison population. Private sector practitioners primarily treat nonveteran patients, a population that is, on average, healthier and of higher socioeconomic status when compared with VA patients. Outcomes differ, for example, when patients have coexisting mental illness or homelessness. For VCCP scores to be beneficial for comparisons, they should derive from treated veterans or be accurately risk-adjusted.
4. Tangential measures. The Institute of Medicine defined health care quality as “improvement of outcomes.” Patients considering health care options benefit from information about treatment effectiveness and symptom reduction. But because obtaining that quality data is labor intensive, proxy measures are substituted. For example, the measure advising smokers to quit is the closest the website comes to reporting on the quality of mental health care.

High-Performers

The VA initiated a second means to inform veterans about the quality of furnished care. Specifically, they guided third-party administrators (TPAs)—TriWest Healthcare Alliance and Optum—in creating algorithms designating that VCCP individual clinicians, practice groups, and hospitals can be deemed high performing providers (HPPs). The algorithms are calculated using a mix of Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set (HEDIS), Physician Quality Reporting System (PQRS), and Blue Health Intelligence (BHI) primary and specialty care measures. The designations are intended to be accessible to local VA community care schedulers to connect veterans with HPPs.

Many aspects of the HPP system are not yet public, including the measures that comprise the algorithms and when the designations will become operational. From what is publicly discoverable about HPP designations, there are crucial gaps like those on the Access to Care website. Behavioral and mental health conditions, for instance, are intentionally excluded in HPP monitoring. HPP algorithms draw from care provided to the general population; an HPP’s patient panel may contain no veterans (with their common comorbidities) at all. Most limiting, there’s no expectation that VCCP clinicians be high performing. Of the 1.2 million program clinicians treating veterans as of November 2020, only a nominal 13.4% were HPP.

After studying the HPP system, VA Partnered Evidence-based Policy Resource Center acknowledged that “it remains unclear whether the quality metrics and referral system result in higher quality of care for VA patients or whether the program improves veteran health.”

Quality of VCCP Mental Health Treatment

The MISSION Act mandated the VA to “establish standards and requirements for the provision of care by non-VA health care practitioners in clinical areas for which the Department of Veterans Affairs has special expertise, including PTSD, military sexual trauma-related conditions (MST), and TBI.” This requirement arose from a recognition that mental health care provided in the private sector pales in comparisonto the VA’s rigorous evidence-based training, consultation, case review and care delivery. For example, over 8500 VA clinicians have received training in evidence-based cognitive processing therapy and/or prolonged exposure therapy for PTSD.

The MISSION Act also mandated that VCCP providers must “fulfill training requirements established by the Secretary on how to deliver evidence-based treatments in the clinical areas for which the Department of Veterans Affairs has special expertise” before furnishing care pursuant to a contract with the VA. However, the VA elected to disregard the directive, and left it up to VCCP clinician’s discretion whether to obtain training or proficiency.

Two bills introduced in Congress in 2021 aim to uphold these vital mandates for the VCCP program. The Veterans’ Culturally Competent Care Act requires VCCP mental health practitioners to take courses on the evaluation and management of suicide, PTSD, TBI, and MST. The Lethal Means Safety Training Act aligns VCCP clinicians suicide prevention training with existing VA standards.

Recommendations to Assure the Quality of VCCP Care

With review and revision of VCCP quality standards now underway, the following remedial actions are recommended:

1. VCCP metrics must be compiled using data on veterans’ care, not the general population, and be published on the Access to Care website. This indispensable information is published on the website for VA care but not for VCCP. Unless VCCP is required to track their veterans, apples-to-apples comparisons of quality of care will remain difficult to attain. Supplemental research that directly contrasts quality of VA to VCCP care should be posted. For example, a 2021 study of enrolled veterans brought by ambulance to VA or community emergency rooms found that all 170 VA medical centers had lower comparative death rates.
2. VCCP providers should be held to the same quality standards as those applied to VA clinicians. In a 2020 critical issue update on implementation of the MISSION Act, major veterans service organizations (VSOs) recommended that competency, training, and quality standards for non-VA community clinicians must be equivalent to benchmarks expected of VA clinicians. That includes credentials, initial and follow-up training, diagnostic screening, care-delivery, and documentation standards. Enacting the Veterans’ Culturally Competent Care Act and the Lethal Means Safety Training Act would begin to meet the MISSION Act’s clear statutory language.
3. The VA and VCCP should add quality information about major diagnostic categories. This will allow veterans to make informed decisions about their personal condition. For most health diagnoses, there is no searchable listing by disorder. 
4. Quality assessments should be realigned to focus on outcome measures. For prospective patients, outcome results provide the most meaningful basis for comparing and selecting clinicians. Proxy measures may have little bearing on whether veterans receive effective care. (As Albert Einstein’s famously observed, “Not everything that can be counted counts.”). Also, the specific measures used for a clinician’s HPP designation should be delineated.
5. The VA must enforce the MISSION Act’s instruction to renew or cancel contracts based on demonstrated quality of care. As VSOs emphasized, “if the private sector is unwilling or unable to match the VA’s access and quality standards, the VA must consider whether it needs to find new community partners.”  

Seventeen billion dollars is spent yearly on purchased health care whose quality remains indeterminate. Ironclad commitments are needed from Congress and the VA to ensure that the effectiveness of, and standards for, veterans care options in the private sector match that in the VA.

US veterans die by suicide at a higher rate than that of the civilian population, and are more likely to use a firearm as their lethal means.¹ In 2017, 6,139 veterans died by suicide, about 17 per day.¹ Nearly as many veterans die by suicide yearly as the total aggregate number of service members killed in action during the decades-long Iraq and Afghanistan operations.² Veterans are more likely to own firearms than are civilians.³ Until June 2020, however, systemic efforts to address the use of firearms in suicide had been largely evaded, entangled in gun advocates’ assertion that veterans’ constitutional right to bear arms would be infringed.

That impasse changed with the President’s Roadmap to Empower Veterans and End the National Tragedy of Suicide (PREVENTS) task force report, released June 17, 2020.⁴ Although the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has pioneered initiatives to encourage safe firearm storage for at-risk veterans, and major public health organizations have endorsed the utility of lethal means safety strategies, the policy language of the Roadmap released by the White House is unprecedented. Lethal means safety refers to efforts aimed at increasing the time and distance needed to access suicide methods.

Among the report’s 10 recommendations, the Roadmap verified the link between, and the need to address, at-risk veterans and their access to firearms (the author was a minor consultant to a PREVENTS workgroup). The document states, “The science supporting lethal means safety is robust and compelling: enhancing safety measures specific to the availability and accessibility of potential lethal means saves lives. A key component of effective suicide prevention is voluntary reduction in the ability to access lethal means with respect to time, distance, and convenience, particularly during acute suicidal crises.”⁴ The report recommends widespread distribution of safety education materials that encourage at-risk individuals to temporarily transfer or store their guns safely, and the expansion of free or affordable options for storing weapons, among other recommendations.

This paper reviews the literature on the intersection of veterans, firearms, and suicide, then explores existing VA prevention initiatives aimed at reducing at-risk veterans’ access to lethal means and offers policy recommendations to expand efforts in the context of the PREVENTS Roadmap.

Veteran Suicide and Firearms

Firearms are, by far, the most common lethal means used by veterans who die by suicide. About 71% of male veteran suicide deaths and 43% of female veteran suicide deaths are with firearms, rates that far exceed those of nonveterans (Table).For all age groups, veterans are more likely to complete suicide by firearm than are nonveterans.⁵

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Veteran suicide and gun ownership rates are highest in rural areas.^6,7 When compared with veterans living in urban areas, veterans in rural areas are 20% more likely to die by suicide, with the excessive risk largely attributed to suicide by firearm.⁸

Access to firearms at home increases the risk of suicide. Individuals with any firearm at home are 3 times more likely to die by suicide than is a person with no firearms at home. The elevated suicide risk applies to other household members as well as the firearm owner.^9-18 Survivors of suicide attempts using firearms report that the availability of guns at home is the primary reason for their method choice.^19,20

There is a common misperception that people who are intent on suicide and are thwarted or survive an attempt using one method will try again with another.²¹ Suicidal crises often represent a conflicting wish to live or die,²² and approximately two-thirds of those who survive an attempt will never try again. About 23% reattempt nonfatally, and only 10% die by suicide.^23-25 However, people who attempt suicide with a firearm usually won’t get a chance at a new start, because 90% of such acts are fatal.²⁶

Although some suicide attempts might be contemplated or planned over an extended period, the decision is impulsive for most individuals. Surveys have found that many people who survive suicide attempts began the act only minutes or hours after making the decision to end their life.^27-30 The high-risk, acute phase of many suicidal crises arise quickly and is fleeting.

Limiting the ease by which at-risk individuals can access firearms has been shown to prevent suicide. In 2006, the overall suicide rate in Israel dropped 40% when the Israeli Defense Forces began requiring soldiers to store their firearms on base before going on weekend leave.Since then, the suicide rate has declined even further.^31,32

Delaying Access to Firearms for At-Risk Veterans

Among veterans, 45% own ≥ 1 firearms (47% male and 24% female veterans vs 30% male and 12% female nonveterans).³ Many veteran firearm owners (34% male and 13% female) store ≥ 1 gun loaded and unlocked; 44% store a firearm either loaded or unlocked. Only 23% safely store their firearms unloaded and locked at home. Storing ≥ 1 firearm loaded and unlocked is more likely among veterans who reside in rural areas, separated from service before 2002, and report personal protection as the primary reason for ownership.³³

Because evidence shows that delaying access to firearms—especially by transferring them out of the home—saves lives, many US health organizations have advocated for strategies that promote evaluation of firearm access and counseling safe storage for individuals at risk for suicide. These organizations include the US Office of the Surgeon General, National Action Alliance for Suicide Prevention, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and American Public Health Association.^34-36

Some health care systems—notably Kaiser Permanente and Henry Ford Health Systems—implemented protocols for lethal means assessment and counseling for behavioral health patients.^37,38 Washington state requires specific health professionals to enroll in suicide prevention training that includes content on the risk of imminent harm by lethal means.³⁹ California is designing a curriculum on counseling patients to reduce firearm injury for physicians and other health care practitioners (HCPs).⁴⁰

The scope of these efforts, however, pale in comparison with the VA’s comprehensive, innovative lethal means safety approach. Since 2012, VA’s Suicide Prevention Program has distributed free firearm cable locks to veterans who request them. The VA has created lethal means public service announcements, social media messages, and websites.^41-44 The VA distributes firearm and medication safe storage practice resource kits to its primary care, mental health and women’s health clinics, and Vet Centers, that include brochures, large poster cards, stickers, exam room posters, and provider pocket cards. VA developed an online lethal means safety counseling training that 20,000 VA HCPs have taken, and is moving toward a revamped mandatory training for VA’s mental health, pain, primary care, and emergency department (ED) providers and Veterans Crisis Line responders. VA offers free, individualized lethal means risk management consultation to all clinicians who work with veterans.⁴⁵ VA includes lethal means safety procedures in its National Strategy for Preventing Veteran Suicide,VA/DoD Clinical Practice Guideline,and VA Suicide Risk Evaluation and Suicide Prevention Safety Planrequired of clinicians.^46-48

The VA also added public health strategies that promote safe storage practices for veterans through a partnership with the National Shooting Sports Foundation (NSSF; the firearm industry trade association) and the American Foundation for Suicide Prevention (AFSP).⁴⁹ Collectively, these organizations cobranded an educational, training, and resource toolkit to foster community coalitions and gun retailer projects that encourage veterans to securely store firearms.⁵⁰ The VA partnered with NSSF to post billboards in 8 states, encouraging storing firearms responsibly to prevent suicide. VA invited states and cities in the Governor/Mayoral Challenge to Prevent Suicide (joint VA and Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration endeavors) to develop plans for messaging regarding enhanced lethal means safety processes. The VA collaborated with local firearm advocates in community prevention pilot projects and in a “Together with Veterans” dissemination of material and outreach to rural veterans.⁵¹ Along with AFSP, VA hosted conferences for HCPs, policy makers, and stakeholders about innovations related to lethal means safety.⁵² In May 2020, the VA cosponsored a COVID-19 suicide prevention video with the United States Concealed Carry Association, NSSF, and AFSP, including ways that the firearm industry, gun owners, and their families can help.⁵³

These programs are promising, and the Roadmap’s emphatic endorsement of lethal means safety approaches will accelerate advances. However, the Roadmap’s omissions are consequential. By focusing on population interventions, the document is silent about VA-specific or veteran-specific firearm access strategies. The means safety work of VA’s Suicide Prevention Program Office is scarcely recognized. Further, it stops short of specific legislative initiatives, making aspirational recommendations instead.

This paper will list proposed policy actions to bolster the acceptability and practice of lethal means safety with veterans. They cover an entire range of possibilities, from putting more teeth into the Roadmap’s population-wide interventions to initiatives tailored to veterans. Responsibility for leading and funding the changes would reside in a mix of Congress and state legislatures, the VA, and health system accreditation bodies. Although there is solid evidence that lethal means safety prevents suicide, it is unknown how these approaches affect firearm storage behaviors or suicide rates;therefore, the policy actions should come with federal and state funds for rigorous evaluation.⁵⁴

Recommended Actions to Further Promote Safe Storage

Develop Campaigns to Shift Cultural Norms for Firearm Storage During Crises

National campaigns have been shown to be highly effective in changing injurious behaviors. Alliances and resources with regard to lethal means safety could be assembled, including federal funds for a campaign to shift social norms for firearm storage conversations and behaviors during crises. This campaign should be modeled after the “friends don’t let friends drive drunk” and “designated driver” campaigns that empower family and friends to protect one another. Since those campaigns’ inception in 1982, two-thirds of Americans have tried to prevent someone from driving after drinking,and traffic deaths involving alcohol-impaired crashes have decreased 65%.^55,56

The comparable lethal means safety enterprise would encourage friends and family to talk with those in crisis about storing firearms safely. The campaign must use spokespersons who have strong respect and credibility among firearm owners, such as the NSSF and the United States Concealed Carry Association who have developed firearm suicide prevention websites and videos.^57,58

The emphasis is that it’s a personal strength—not a failing—to talk to friends, loved ones, or counselors about storing guns until a crisis passes. Some of the current phrasing includes: “Hey, let me hold your guns for a while,” “People who love guns, love you,” and “Have a brave conversation.” ^59-61

The national campaign should attempt to correct the inaccurate beliefs that suicide death always is the result of mental illness and is inevitable once seriously contemplated. In fact, more than half of the individuals who die by suicide have no diagnosed mental health condition.⁶² Other crises, such as with finances, relationships, or physical health, might be more contributory. These myths about suicide and mental illness weaken public and policy maker interest in solutions aimed toward accessing lethal means.

Facilitate Temporary Storage Out of the Home

The PREVENTS Roadmap Supplemental Materials concluded, “Moving firearms out of the home is generally cited as the safest, most desirable option; this can include storage with another person or at a location like a firearm range, armory, pawn shop, self-storage unit, or law enforcement agency, although state laws for firearm transfers may affect what options are legal.”⁶³ This goal could be achieved by establishing grants to gun shops and ranges to offer free lockers for voluntary safe harbor.

The creation of free community lockers was a top PREVENTS recommendation. Likewise, the congressionally chartered COVER (Creating Options for Veterans' Expedited Recovery) Commission recommended grants “to further support the development of voluntary firearm safe storage options across the country.”⁶⁴ Federal and state grants might resolve hesitations cited by retailers by covering all expenses for lockers, labor, and insurance for theft/damage/liability.^65,66 Locker use would be free to the user, eliminating all financial barriers, although it is unknown whether monetary incentives change storage behaviors. Many firearm owners report that private gun shops or ranges are more acceptable than police stations for storage. If retailers come on board, changes in cultural storage norms might be expedited. An additional benefit could be reduction of accidental firearm fatalities in the home. States that have legal impediments to returning firearms to their owners could modify laws to achieve popular acceptance.

Congress could consider funding a national, easily accessible, public online directory of locations for out-of-home firearm storage, with staff to update the site. Colorado, Maryland, and Washington have developed online maps showing locations of firearm outlets and law enforcement agencies willing to consider temporary storage.⁶⁷ A site directory for every state would simplify the process for individuals and family members seeking to temporarily and voluntarily store guns offsite during a crisis. Online directories have been backed by firearm groups,although their effect on storage behavior is not known.⁶⁸State governments should strive to make it easier to quickly transfer firearms temporarily to trusted individuals in situations of imminent suicide risk. Rapid transfer of firearms to friends or family could effectively separate lethal means from individuals during a crisis. However, some state laws that require background checks whenever a gun is transferred might delay such transfers.⁶⁹ Only a few states have legal exemptions that could expedite temporary transfers when it’s potentially lifesaving.

Improve In-Home Safe Storage Options

Out-of-home transfer of firearms might not be acceptable or feasible for some veterans. Accordingly, there is need for improved options for safer in-home storage, especially because of frequent unsafe storage practices among veterans. The VA could consider sponsoring another open-innovation Gun Safety Matters Challenge like the one it held in 2018 for in-home firearm storage technology that could prevent suicide.⁷⁰ Further innovation and bringing winning entries to market has great potential.

Require Enhanced Lethal Means Safety Standards and Training

Broader lethal means safety competence is needed, both in the VA where modest levels of training has been implemented and in the community among Veterans Community Care Program (VCCP) HCPs where it hasn’t. Oversight for enhanced standards and training—as well as of all lethal means initiatives and their program evaluations—might best be accomplished by establishing a separate VA Suicide Prevention Program lethal means safety team. Veteran firearm suicide is a significant problem that warrants its own discrete, permanent VA team (although joining with the US Department of Defense might be advantageous). The VA Suicide Prevention Program has been the industry leader and innovator in this field and should be conferred continued stewardship going forward.

The VA is moving toward requiring lethal means safety counseling training for mental health, pain, primary care, women’s health, ED providers, and Veterans Crisis Line responders.

VCCP HCPs, however, have no required training in lethal means safety counseling or even in basic suicide risk identification and intervention, and the Roadmap did not stipulate that this deficiency should be remedied. Surveys have revealed that community HCPs rarely screen or counsel their patients—even those at high risk—about firearm safety.⁷¹ A bill was introduced in Congress August 21, 2020, to expand VA suicide prevention training with firearms community input on cultural competency components and mandate that VA and VCCP providers, and some others with frequent contact with veterans, receive this training.⁷²

Training should be obligatory for VA and VCCP HCPs and trainees most likely to interface with at-risk veterans, including those working in mental health, primary care, pain, women’s health, and ED. Training also should include geriatrics, extended care, and oncology providers because most older adults who die by firearm suicide have physical health problems but no known mental illness.^73-75 Lethal means safety counseling training has been shown to improve HCPs’ knowledge about the relationship between access to lethal means and suicide, and confidence in and frequency of having lethal means safety counseling conversations.⁷⁶ Likewise, training should include peer counselors; veterans are receptive to fellow veterans raising the topic of safe storage.^56,77 If feasible, the training should include time to rehearse skills shown to motivate behavior change among patients.

The VA should aim to improve semiyearly clinical pertinence reviews and safety plans for VA and VCCP mental health providers. VA could conduct clinical pertinence reviews that ascertain whether a suicide assessment is recorded in the health record, and when a patient is at elevated risk, whether a lethal means safety assessment and plan is documented.

VA’s safety plan template, although best practice, covers only the initial steps to take when suicide potential is identified. A standard for follow-up is needed. If an at-risk patient agrees to take a safe storage action, subsequent contact HCPs need to ask and document what action was performed. This action will help ensure that at-risk patients with ready access do not fall through the cracks. This suggestion lends itself to studying changes in veterans’ storage habits after intervention.

I also recommend that health care accrediting bodies include lethal means safety assessment, counseling, and follow up as a suicide prevention standard. This recommendation applies to more than just the VA health care system and recognizes that modifying accrediting body standards is an expeditious way to drive change in health care. The accreditation standards of the Commission on Accreditation of Rehabilitation Facilities for behavioral health and opioid treatment programs, and of the Joint Commission for medical centers do not require lethal means safety assessment and intervention.^78,79

Conclusions

Suicide prevention requires a multimodal approach, and attention to firearms access must become a more salient component. The high rate of veteran suicides involving firearms requires far-reaching interventions at societal, institutional, community, family, and individual levels. With the link between ready access to firearms and suicide supported by research and now firmly recognized by the PREVENTS Roadmap, we have a fresh opportunity to reduce suicide among veterans. Efforts must move vigorously forward until it is commonplace for veterans—and anyone—at risk of suicide to voluntarily reduce immediate access to firearms.

US veterans die by suicide at a higher rate than that of the civilian population, and are more likely to use a firearm as their lethal means.¹ In 2017, 6,139 veterans died by suicide, about 17 per day.¹ Nearly as many veterans die by suicide yearly as the total aggregate number of service members killed in action during the decades-long Iraq and Afghanistan operations.² Veterans are more likely to own firearms than are civilians.³ Until June 2020, however, systemic efforts to address the use of firearms in suicide had been largely evaded, entangled in gun advocates’ assertion that veterans’ constitutional right to bear arms would be infringed.

That impasse changed with the President’s Roadmap to Empower Veterans and End the National Tragedy of Suicide (PREVENTS) task force report, released June 17, 2020.⁴ Although the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has pioneered initiatives to encourage safe firearm storage for at-risk veterans, and major public health organizations have endorsed the utility of lethal means safety strategies, the policy language of the Roadmap released by the White House is unprecedented. Lethal means safety refers to efforts aimed at increasing the time and distance needed to access suicide methods.

Among the report’s 10 recommendations, the Roadmap verified the link between, and the need to address, at-risk veterans and their access to firearms (the author was a minor consultant to a PREVENTS workgroup). The document states, “The science supporting lethal means safety is robust and compelling: enhancing safety measures specific to the availability and accessibility of potential lethal means saves lives. A key component of effective suicide prevention is voluntary reduction in the ability to access lethal means with respect to time, distance, and convenience, particularly during acute suicidal crises.”⁴ The report recommends widespread distribution of safety education materials that encourage at-risk individuals to temporarily transfer or store their guns safely, and the expansion of free or affordable options for storing weapons, among other recommendations.

This paper reviews the literature on the intersection of veterans, firearms, and suicide, then explores existing VA prevention initiatives aimed at reducing at-risk veterans’ access to lethal means and offers policy recommendations to expand efforts in the context of the PREVENTS Roadmap.

Veteran Suicide and Firearms

Firearms are, by far, the most common lethal means used by veterans who die by suicide. About 71% of male veteran suicide deaths and 43% of female veteran suicide deaths are with firearms, rates that far exceed those of nonveterans (Table).For all age groups, veterans are more likely to complete suicide by firearm than are nonveterans.⁵

fdp03709426_t.png

Veteran suicide and gun ownership rates are highest in rural areas.^6,7 When compared with veterans living in urban areas, veterans in rural areas are 20% more likely to die by suicide, with the excessive risk largely attributed to suicide by firearm.⁸

Access to firearms at home increases the risk of suicide. Individuals with any firearm at home are 3 times more likely to die by suicide than is a person with no firearms at home. The elevated suicide risk applies to other household members as well as the firearm owner.^9-18 Survivors of suicide attempts using firearms report that the availability of guns at home is the primary reason for their method choice.^19,20

There is a common misperception that people who are intent on suicide and are thwarted or survive an attempt using one method will try again with another.²¹ Suicidal crises often represent a conflicting wish to live or die,²² and approximately two-thirds of those who survive an attempt will never try again. About 23% reattempt nonfatally, and only 10% die by suicide.^23-25 However, people who attempt suicide with a firearm usually won’t get a chance at a new start, because 90% of such acts are fatal.²⁶

Although some suicide attempts might be contemplated or planned over an extended period, the decision is impulsive for most individuals. Surveys have found that many people who survive suicide attempts began the act only minutes or hours after making the decision to end their life.^27-30 The high-risk, acute phase of many suicidal crises arise quickly and is fleeting.

Limiting the ease by which at-risk individuals can access firearms has been shown to prevent suicide. In 2006, the overall suicide rate in Israel dropped 40% when the Israeli Defense Forces began requiring soldiers to store their firearms on base before going on weekend leave.Since then, the suicide rate has declined even further.^31,32

Delaying Access to Firearms for At-Risk Veterans

Among veterans, 45% own ≥ 1 firearms (47% male and 24% female veterans vs 30% male and 12% female nonveterans).³ Many veteran firearm owners (34% male and 13% female) store ≥ 1 gun loaded and unlocked; 44% store a firearm either loaded or unlocked. Only 23% safely store their firearms unloaded and locked at home. Storing ≥ 1 firearm loaded and unlocked is more likely among veterans who reside in rural areas, separated from service before 2002, and report personal protection as the primary reason for ownership.³³

Because evidence shows that delaying access to firearms—especially by transferring them out of the home—saves lives, many US health organizations have advocated for strategies that promote evaluation of firearm access and counseling safe storage for individuals at risk for suicide. These organizations include the US Office of the Surgeon General, National Action Alliance for Suicide Prevention, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and American Public Health Association.^34-36

Some health care systems—notably Kaiser Permanente and Henry Ford Health Systems—implemented protocols for lethal means assessment and counseling for behavioral health patients.^37,38 Washington state requires specific health professionals to enroll in suicide prevention training that includes content on the risk of imminent harm by lethal means.³⁹ California is designing a curriculum on counseling patients to reduce firearm injury for physicians and other health care practitioners (HCPs).⁴⁰

The scope of these efforts, however, pale in comparison with the VA’s comprehensive, innovative lethal means safety approach. Since 2012, VA’s Suicide Prevention Program has distributed free firearm cable locks to veterans who request them. The VA has created lethal means public service announcements, social media messages, and websites.^41-44 The VA distributes firearm and medication safe storage practice resource kits to its primary care, mental health and women’s health clinics, and Vet Centers, that include brochures, large poster cards, stickers, exam room posters, and provider pocket cards. VA developed an online lethal means safety counseling training that 20,000 VA HCPs have taken, and is moving toward a revamped mandatory training for VA’s mental health, pain, primary care, and emergency department (ED) providers and Veterans Crisis Line responders. VA offers free, individualized lethal means risk management consultation to all clinicians who work with veterans.⁴⁵ VA includes lethal means safety procedures in its National Strategy for Preventing Veteran Suicide,VA/DoD Clinical Practice Guideline,and VA Suicide Risk Evaluation and Suicide Prevention Safety Planrequired of clinicians.^46-48

The VA also added public health strategies that promote safe storage practices for veterans through a partnership with the National Shooting Sports Foundation (NSSF; the firearm industry trade association) and the American Foundation for Suicide Prevention (AFSP).⁴⁹ Collectively, these organizations cobranded an educational, training, and resource toolkit to foster community coalitions and gun retailer projects that encourage veterans to securely store firearms.⁵⁰ The VA partnered with NSSF to post billboards in 8 states, encouraging storing firearms responsibly to prevent suicide. VA invited states and cities in the Governor/Mayoral Challenge to Prevent Suicide (joint VA and Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration endeavors) to develop plans for messaging regarding enhanced lethal means safety processes. The VA collaborated with local firearm advocates in community prevention pilot projects and in a “Together with Veterans” dissemination of material and outreach to rural veterans.⁵¹ Along with AFSP, VA hosted conferences for HCPs, policy makers, and stakeholders about innovations related to lethal means safety.⁵² In May 2020, the VA cosponsored a COVID-19 suicide prevention video with the United States Concealed Carry Association, NSSF, and AFSP, including ways that the firearm industry, gun owners, and their families can help.⁵³

These programs are promising, and the Roadmap’s emphatic endorsement of lethal means safety approaches will accelerate advances. However, the Roadmap’s omissions are consequential. By focusing on population interventions, the document is silent about VA-specific or veteran-specific firearm access strategies. The means safety work of VA’s Suicide Prevention Program Office is scarcely recognized. Further, it stops short of specific legislative initiatives, making aspirational recommendations instead.

This paper will list proposed policy actions to bolster the acceptability and practice of lethal means safety with veterans. They cover an entire range of possibilities, from putting more teeth into the Roadmap’s population-wide interventions to initiatives tailored to veterans. Responsibility for leading and funding the changes would reside in a mix of Congress and state legislatures, the VA, and health system accreditation bodies. Although there is solid evidence that lethal means safety prevents suicide, it is unknown how these approaches affect firearm storage behaviors or suicide rates;therefore, the policy actions should come with federal and state funds for rigorous evaluation.⁵⁴

Recommended Actions to Further Promote Safe Storage

Develop Campaigns to Shift Cultural Norms for Firearm Storage During Crises

National campaigns have been shown to be highly effective in changing injurious behaviors. Alliances and resources with regard to lethal means safety could be assembled, including federal funds for a campaign to shift social norms for firearm storage conversations and behaviors during crises. This campaign should be modeled after the “friends don’t let friends drive drunk” and “designated driver” campaigns that empower family and friends to protect one another. Since those campaigns’ inception in 1982, two-thirds of Americans have tried to prevent someone from driving after drinking,and traffic deaths involving alcohol-impaired crashes have decreased 65%.^55,56

The comparable lethal means safety enterprise would encourage friends and family to talk with those in crisis about storing firearms safely. The campaign must use spokespersons who have strong respect and credibility among firearm owners, such as the NSSF and the United States Concealed Carry Association who have developed firearm suicide prevention websites and videos.^57,58

The emphasis is that it’s a personal strength—not a failing—to talk to friends, loved ones, or counselors about storing guns until a crisis passes. Some of the current phrasing includes: “Hey, let me hold your guns for a while,” “People who love guns, love you,” and “Have a brave conversation.” ^59-61

The national campaign should attempt to correct the inaccurate beliefs that suicide death always is the result of mental illness and is inevitable once seriously contemplated. In fact, more than half of the individuals who die by suicide have no diagnosed mental health condition.⁶² Other crises, such as with finances, relationships, or physical health, might be more contributory. These myths about suicide and mental illness weaken public and policy maker interest in solutions aimed toward accessing lethal means.

Facilitate Temporary Storage Out of the Home

The PREVENTS Roadmap Supplemental Materials concluded, “Moving firearms out of the home is generally cited as the safest, most desirable option; this can include storage with another person or at a location like a firearm range, armory, pawn shop, self-storage unit, or law enforcement agency, although state laws for firearm transfers may affect what options are legal.”⁶³ This goal could be achieved by establishing grants to gun shops and ranges to offer free lockers for voluntary safe harbor.

The creation of free community lockers was a top PREVENTS recommendation. Likewise, the congressionally chartered COVER (Creating Options for Veterans' Expedited Recovery) Commission recommended grants “to further support the development of voluntary firearm safe storage options across the country.”⁶⁴ Federal and state grants might resolve hesitations cited by retailers by covering all expenses for lockers, labor, and insurance for theft/damage/liability.^65,66 Locker use would be free to the user, eliminating all financial barriers, although it is unknown whether monetary incentives change storage behaviors. Many firearm owners report that private gun shops or ranges are more acceptable than police stations for storage. If retailers come on board, changes in cultural storage norms might be expedited. An additional benefit could be reduction of accidental firearm fatalities in the home. States that have legal impediments to returning firearms to their owners could modify laws to achieve popular acceptance.

Congress could consider funding a national, easily accessible, public online directory of locations for out-of-home firearm storage, with staff to update the site. Colorado, Maryland, and Washington have developed online maps showing locations of firearm outlets and law enforcement agencies willing to consider temporary storage.⁶⁷ A site directory for every state would simplify the process for individuals and family members seeking to temporarily and voluntarily store guns offsite during a crisis. Online directories have been backed by firearm groups,although their effect on storage behavior is not known.⁶⁸State governments should strive to make it easier to quickly transfer firearms temporarily to trusted individuals in situations of imminent suicide risk. Rapid transfer of firearms to friends or family could effectively separate lethal means from individuals during a crisis. However, some state laws that require background checks whenever a gun is transferred might delay such transfers.⁶⁹ Only a few states have legal exemptions that could expedite temporary transfers when it’s potentially lifesaving.

Improve In-Home Safe Storage Options

Out-of-home transfer of firearms might not be acceptable or feasible for some veterans. Accordingly, there is need for improved options for safer in-home storage, especially because of frequent unsafe storage practices among veterans. The VA could consider sponsoring another open-innovation Gun Safety Matters Challenge like the one it held in 2018 for in-home firearm storage technology that could prevent suicide.⁷⁰ Further innovation and bringing winning entries to market has great potential.

Require Enhanced Lethal Means Safety Standards and Training

Broader lethal means safety competence is needed, both in the VA where modest levels of training has been implemented and in the community among Veterans Community Care Program (VCCP) HCPs where it hasn’t. Oversight for enhanced standards and training—as well as of all lethal means initiatives and their program evaluations—might best be accomplished by establishing a separate VA Suicide Prevention Program lethal means safety team. Veteran firearm suicide is a significant problem that warrants its own discrete, permanent VA team (although joining with the US Department of Defense might be advantageous). The VA Suicide Prevention Program has been the industry leader and innovator in this field and should be conferred continued stewardship going forward.

The VA is moving toward requiring lethal means safety counseling training for mental health, pain, primary care, women’s health, ED providers, and Veterans Crisis Line responders.

VCCP HCPs, however, have no required training in lethal means safety counseling or even in basic suicide risk identification and intervention, and the Roadmap did not stipulate that this deficiency should be remedied. Surveys have revealed that community HCPs rarely screen or counsel their patients—even those at high risk—about firearm safety.⁷¹ A bill was introduced in Congress August 21, 2020, to expand VA suicide prevention training with firearms community input on cultural competency components and mandate that VA and VCCP providers, and some others with frequent contact with veterans, receive this training.⁷²

Training should be obligatory for VA and VCCP HCPs and trainees most likely to interface with at-risk veterans, including those working in mental health, primary care, pain, women’s health, and ED. Training also should include geriatrics, extended care, and oncology providers because most older adults who die by firearm suicide have physical health problems but no known mental illness.^73-75 Lethal means safety counseling training has been shown to improve HCPs’ knowledge about the relationship between access to lethal means and suicide, and confidence in and frequency of having lethal means safety counseling conversations.⁷⁶ Likewise, training should include peer counselors; veterans are receptive to fellow veterans raising the topic of safe storage.^56,77 If feasible, the training should include time to rehearse skills shown to motivate behavior change among patients.

The VA should aim to improve semiyearly clinical pertinence reviews and safety plans for VA and VCCP mental health providers. VA could conduct clinical pertinence reviews that ascertain whether a suicide assessment is recorded in the health record, and when a patient is at elevated risk, whether a lethal means safety assessment and plan is documented.

VA’s safety plan template, although best practice, covers only the initial steps to take when suicide potential is identified. A standard for follow-up is needed. If an at-risk patient agrees to take a safe storage action, subsequent contact HCPs need to ask and document what action was performed. This action will help ensure that at-risk patients with ready access do not fall through the cracks. This suggestion lends itself to studying changes in veterans’ storage habits after intervention.

I also recommend that health care accrediting bodies include lethal means safety assessment, counseling, and follow up as a suicide prevention standard. This recommendation applies to more than just the VA health care system and recognizes that modifying accrediting body standards is an expeditious way to drive change in health care. The accreditation standards of the Commission on Accreditation of Rehabilitation Facilities for behavioral health and opioid treatment programs, and of the Joint Commission for medical centers do not require lethal means safety assessment and intervention.^78,79

Conclusions

Suicide prevention requires a multimodal approach, and attention to firearms access must become a more salient component. The high rate of veteran suicides involving firearms requires far-reaching interventions at societal, institutional, community, family, and individual levels. With the link between ready access to firearms and suicide supported by research and now firmly recognized by the PREVENTS Roadmap, we have a fresh opportunity to reduce suicide among veterans. Efforts must move vigorously forward until it is commonplace for veterans—and anyone—at risk of suicide to voluntarily reduce immediate access to firearms.

US veterans die by suicide at a higher rate than that of the civilian population, and are more likely to use a firearm as their lethal means.¹ In 2017, 6,139 veterans died by suicide, about 17 per day.¹ Nearly as many veterans die by suicide yearly as the total aggregate number of service members killed in action during the decades-long Iraq and Afghanistan operations.² Veterans are more likely to own firearms than are civilians.³ Until June 2020, however, systemic efforts to address the use of firearms in suicide had been largely evaded, entangled in gun advocates’ assertion that veterans’ constitutional right to bear arms would be infringed.

That impasse changed with the President’s Roadmap to Empower Veterans and End the National Tragedy of Suicide (PREVENTS) task force report, released June 17, 2020.⁴ Although the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has pioneered initiatives to encourage safe firearm storage for at-risk veterans, and major public health organizations have endorsed the utility of lethal means safety strategies, the policy language of the Roadmap released by the White House is unprecedented. Lethal means safety refers to efforts aimed at increasing the time and distance needed to access suicide methods.

Among the report’s 10 recommendations, the Roadmap verified the link between, and the need to address, at-risk veterans and their access to firearms (the author was a minor consultant to a PREVENTS workgroup). The document states, “The science supporting lethal means safety is robust and compelling: enhancing safety measures specific to the availability and accessibility of potential lethal means saves lives. A key component of effective suicide prevention is voluntary reduction in the ability to access lethal means with respect to time, distance, and convenience, particularly during acute suicidal crises.”⁴ The report recommends widespread distribution of safety education materials that encourage at-risk individuals to temporarily transfer or store their guns safely, and the expansion of free or affordable options for storing weapons, among other recommendations.

This paper reviews the literature on the intersection of veterans, firearms, and suicide, then explores existing VA prevention initiatives aimed at reducing at-risk veterans’ access to lethal means and offers policy recommendations to expand efforts in the context of the PREVENTS Roadmap.

Veteran Suicide and Firearms

Firearms are, by far, the most common lethal means used by veterans who die by suicide. About 71% of male veteran suicide deaths and 43% of female veteran suicide deaths are with firearms, rates that far exceed those of nonveterans (Table).For all age groups, veterans are more likely to complete suicide by firearm than are nonveterans.⁵

fdp03709426_t.png

Veteran suicide and gun ownership rates are highest in rural areas.^6,7 When compared with veterans living in urban areas, veterans in rural areas are 20% more likely to die by suicide, with the excessive risk largely attributed to suicide by firearm.⁸

Access to firearms at home increases the risk of suicide. Individuals with any firearm at home are 3 times more likely to die by suicide than is a person with no firearms at home. The elevated suicide risk applies to other household members as well as the firearm owner.^9-18 Survivors of suicide attempts using firearms report that the availability of guns at home is the primary reason for their method choice.^19,20

There is a common misperception that people who are intent on suicide and are thwarted or survive an attempt using one method will try again with another.²¹ Suicidal crises often represent a conflicting wish to live or die,²² and approximately two-thirds of those who survive an attempt will never try again. About 23% reattempt nonfatally, and only 10% die by suicide.^23-25 However, people who attempt suicide with a firearm usually won’t get a chance at a new start, because 90% of such acts are fatal.²⁶

Although some suicide attempts might be contemplated or planned over an extended period, the decision is impulsive for most individuals. Surveys have found that many people who survive suicide attempts began the act only minutes or hours after making the decision to end their life.^27-30 The high-risk, acute phase of many suicidal crises arise quickly and is fleeting.

Limiting the ease by which at-risk individuals can access firearms has been shown to prevent suicide. In 2006, the overall suicide rate in Israel dropped 40% when the Israeli Defense Forces began requiring soldiers to store their firearms on base before going on weekend leave.Since then, the suicide rate has declined even further.^31,32

Delaying Access to Firearms for At-Risk Veterans

Among veterans, 45% own ≥ 1 firearms (47% male and 24% female veterans vs 30% male and 12% female nonveterans).³ Many veteran firearm owners (34% male and 13% female) store ≥ 1 gun loaded and unlocked; 44% store a firearm either loaded or unlocked. Only 23% safely store their firearms unloaded and locked at home. Storing ≥ 1 firearm loaded and unlocked is more likely among veterans who reside in rural areas, separated from service before 2002, and report personal protection as the primary reason for ownership.³³

Because evidence shows that delaying access to firearms—especially by transferring them out of the home—saves lives, many US health organizations have advocated for strategies that promote evaluation of firearm access and counseling safe storage for individuals at risk for suicide. These organizations include the US Office of the Surgeon General, National Action Alliance for Suicide Prevention, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and American Public Health Association.^34-36

Some health care systems—notably Kaiser Permanente and Henry Ford Health Systems—implemented protocols for lethal means assessment and counseling for behavioral health patients.^37,38 Washington state requires specific health professionals to enroll in suicide prevention training that includes content on the risk of imminent harm by lethal means.³⁹ California is designing a curriculum on counseling patients to reduce firearm injury for physicians and other health care practitioners (HCPs).⁴⁰

The scope of these efforts, however, pale in comparison with the VA’s comprehensive, innovative lethal means safety approach. Since 2012, VA’s Suicide Prevention Program has distributed free firearm cable locks to veterans who request them. The VA has created lethal means public service announcements, social media messages, and websites.^41-44 The VA distributes firearm and medication safe storage practice resource kits to its primary care, mental health and women’s health clinics, and Vet Centers, that include brochures, large poster cards, stickers, exam room posters, and provider pocket cards. VA developed an online lethal means safety counseling training that 20,000 VA HCPs have taken, and is moving toward a revamped mandatory training for VA’s mental health, pain, primary care, and emergency department (ED) providers and Veterans Crisis Line responders. VA offers free, individualized lethal means risk management consultation to all clinicians who work with veterans.⁴⁵ VA includes lethal means safety procedures in its National Strategy for Preventing Veteran Suicide,VA/DoD Clinical Practice Guideline,and VA Suicide Risk Evaluation and Suicide Prevention Safety Planrequired of clinicians.^46-48

The VA also added public health strategies that promote safe storage practices for veterans through a partnership with the National Shooting Sports Foundation (NSSF; the firearm industry trade association) and the American Foundation for Suicide Prevention (AFSP).⁴⁹ Collectively, these organizations cobranded an educational, training, and resource toolkit to foster community coalitions and gun retailer projects that encourage veterans to securely store firearms.⁵⁰ The VA partnered with NSSF to post billboards in 8 states, encouraging storing firearms responsibly to prevent suicide. VA invited states and cities in the Governor/Mayoral Challenge to Prevent Suicide (joint VA and Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration endeavors) to develop plans for messaging regarding enhanced lethal means safety processes. The VA collaborated with local firearm advocates in community prevention pilot projects and in a “Together with Veterans” dissemination of material and outreach to rural veterans.⁵¹ Along with AFSP, VA hosted conferences for HCPs, policy makers, and stakeholders about innovations related to lethal means safety.⁵² In May 2020, the VA cosponsored a COVID-19 suicide prevention video with the United States Concealed Carry Association, NSSF, and AFSP, including ways that the firearm industry, gun owners, and their families can help.⁵³

These programs are promising, and the Roadmap’s emphatic endorsement of lethal means safety approaches will accelerate advances. However, the Roadmap’s omissions are consequential. By focusing on population interventions, the document is silent about VA-specific or veteran-specific firearm access strategies. The means safety work of VA’s Suicide Prevention Program Office is scarcely recognized. Further, it stops short of specific legislative initiatives, making aspirational recommendations instead.

This paper will list proposed policy actions to bolster the acceptability and practice of lethal means safety with veterans. They cover an entire range of possibilities, from putting more teeth into the Roadmap’s population-wide interventions to initiatives tailored to veterans. Responsibility for leading and funding the changes would reside in a mix of Congress and state legislatures, the VA, and health system accreditation bodies. Although there is solid evidence that lethal means safety prevents suicide, it is unknown how these approaches affect firearm storage behaviors or suicide rates;therefore, the policy actions should come with federal and state funds for rigorous evaluation.⁵⁴

Recommended Actions to Further Promote Safe Storage

Develop Campaigns to Shift Cultural Norms for Firearm Storage During Crises

National campaigns have been shown to be highly effective in changing injurious behaviors. Alliances and resources with regard to lethal means safety could be assembled, including federal funds for a campaign to shift social norms for firearm storage conversations and behaviors during crises. This campaign should be modeled after the “friends don’t let friends drive drunk” and “designated driver” campaigns that empower family and friends to protect one another. Since those campaigns’ inception in 1982, two-thirds of Americans have tried to prevent someone from driving after drinking,and traffic deaths involving alcohol-impaired crashes have decreased 65%.^55,56

The comparable lethal means safety enterprise would encourage friends and family to talk with those in crisis about storing firearms safely. The campaign must use spokespersons who have strong respect and credibility among firearm owners, such as the NSSF and the United States Concealed Carry Association who have developed firearm suicide prevention websites and videos.^57,58

The emphasis is that it’s a personal strength—not a failing—to talk to friends, loved ones, or counselors about storing guns until a crisis passes. Some of the current phrasing includes: “Hey, let me hold your guns for a while,” “People who love guns, love you,” and “Have a brave conversation.” ^59-61

The national campaign should attempt to correct the inaccurate beliefs that suicide death always is the result of mental illness and is inevitable once seriously contemplated. In fact, more than half of the individuals who die by suicide have no diagnosed mental health condition.⁶² Other crises, such as with finances, relationships, or physical health, might be more contributory. These myths about suicide and mental illness weaken public and policy maker interest in solutions aimed toward accessing lethal means.

Facilitate Temporary Storage Out of the Home

The PREVENTS Roadmap Supplemental Materials concluded, “Moving firearms out of the home is generally cited as the safest, most desirable option; this can include storage with another person or at a location like a firearm range, armory, pawn shop, self-storage unit, or law enforcement agency, although state laws for firearm transfers may affect what options are legal.”⁶³ This goal could be achieved by establishing grants to gun shops and ranges to offer free lockers for voluntary safe harbor.

The creation of free community lockers was a top PREVENTS recommendation. Likewise, the congressionally chartered COVER (Creating Options for Veterans' Expedited Recovery) Commission recommended grants “to further support the development of voluntary firearm safe storage options across the country.”⁶⁴ Federal and state grants might resolve hesitations cited by retailers by covering all expenses for lockers, labor, and insurance for theft/damage/liability.^65,66 Locker use would be free to the user, eliminating all financial barriers, although it is unknown whether monetary incentives change storage behaviors. Many firearm owners report that private gun shops or ranges are more acceptable than police stations for storage. If retailers come on board, changes in cultural storage norms might be expedited. An additional benefit could be reduction of accidental firearm fatalities in the home. States that have legal impediments to returning firearms to their owners could modify laws to achieve popular acceptance.

Congress could consider funding a national, easily accessible, public online directory of locations for out-of-home firearm storage, with staff to update the site. Colorado, Maryland, and Washington have developed online maps showing locations of firearm outlets and law enforcement agencies willing to consider temporary storage.⁶⁷ A site directory for every state would simplify the process for individuals and family members seeking to temporarily and voluntarily store guns offsite during a crisis. Online directories have been backed by firearm groups,although their effect on storage behavior is not known.⁶⁸State governments should strive to make it easier to quickly transfer firearms temporarily to trusted individuals in situations of imminent suicide risk. Rapid transfer of firearms to friends or family could effectively separate lethal means from individuals during a crisis. However, some state laws that require background checks whenever a gun is transferred might delay such transfers.⁶⁹ Only a few states have legal exemptions that could expedite temporary transfers when it’s potentially lifesaving.

Improve In-Home Safe Storage Options

Out-of-home transfer of firearms might not be acceptable or feasible for some veterans. Accordingly, there is need for improved options for safer in-home storage, especially because of frequent unsafe storage practices among veterans. The VA could consider sponsoring another open-innovation Gun Safety Matters Challenge like the one it held in 2018 for in-home firearm storage technology that could prevent suicide.⁷⁰ Further innovation and bringing winning entries to market has great potential.

Require Enhanced Lethal Means Safety Standards and Training

Broader lethal means safety competence is needed, both in the VA where modest levels of training has been implemented and in the community among Veterans Community Care Program (VCCP) HCPs where it hasn’t. Oversight for enhanced standards and training—as well as of all lethal means initiatives and their program evaluations—might best be accomplished by establishing a separate VA Suicide Prevention Program lethal means safety team. Veteran firearm suicide is a significant problem that warrants its own discrete, permanent VA team (although joining with the US Department of Defense might be advantageous). The VA Suicide Prevention Program has been the industry leader and innovator in this field and should be conferred continued stewardship going forward.

The VA is moving toward requiring lethal means safety counseling training for mental health, pain, primary care, women’s health, ED providers, and Veterans Crisis Line responders.

VCCP HCPs, however, have no required training in lethal means safety counseling or even in basic suicide risk identification and intervention, and the Roadmap did not stipulate that this deficiency should be remedied. Surveys have revealed that community HCPs rarely screen or counsel their patients—even those at high risk—about firearm safety.⁷¹ A bill was introduced in Congress August 21, 2020, to expand VA suicide prevention training with firearms community input on cultural competency components and mandate that VA and VCCP providers, and some others with frequent contact with veterans, receive this training.⁷²

Training should be obligatory for VA and VCCP HCPs and trainees most likely to interface with at-risk veterans, including those working in mental health, primary care, pain, women’s health, and ED. Training also should include geriatrics, extended care, and oncology providers because most older adults who die by firearm suicide have physical health problems but no known mental illness.^73-75 Lethal means safety counseling training has been shown to improve HCPs’ knowledge about the relationship between access to lethal means and suicide, and confidence in and frequency of having lethal means safety counseling conversations.⁷⁶ Likewise, training should include peer counselors; veterans are receptive to fellow veterans raising the topic of safe storage.^56,77 If feasible, the training should include time to rehearse skills shown to motivate behavior change among patients.

The VA should aim to improve semiyearly clinical pertinence reviews and safety plans for VA and VCCP mental health providers. VA could conduct clinical pertinence reviews that ascertain whether a suicide assessment is recorded in the health record, and when a patient is at elevated risk, whether a lethal means safety assessment and plan is documented.

VA’s safety plan template, although best practice, covers only the initial steps to take when suicide potential is identified. A standard for follow-up is needed. If an at-risk patient agrees to take a safe storage action, subsequent contact HCPs need to ask and document what action was performed. This action will help ensure that at-risk patients with ready access do not fall through the cracks. This suggestion lends itself to studying changes in veterans’ storage habits after intervention.

I also recommend that health care accrediting bodies include lethal means safety assessment, counseling, and follow up as a suicide prevention standard. This recommendation applies to more than just the VA health care system and recognizes that modifying accrediting body standards is an expeditious way to drive change in health care. The accreditation standards of the Commission on Accreditation of Rehabilitation Facilities for behavioral health and opioid treatment programs, and of the Joint Commission for medical centers do not require lethal means safety assessment and intervention.^78,79

Conclusions

Suicide prevention requires a multimodal approach, and attention to firearms access must become a more salient component. The high rate of veteran suicides involving firearms requires far-reaching interventions at societal, institutional, community, family, and individual levels. With the link between ready access to firearms and suicide supported by research and now firmly recognized by the PREVENTS Roadmap, we have a fresh opportunity to reduce suicide among veterans. Efforts must move vigorously forward until it is commonplace for veterans—and anyone—at risk of suicide to voluntarily reduce immediate access to firearms.

As new standards for access dominated recent media coverage of veterans’ health care headlines, the launch of a historically unprecedented collaboration to prevent veterans’ suicide went completely unnoticed.

On January 31, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) announced a partnership with the National Shooting Sports Foundation (NSSF), a firearms industry association that works to promote, protect and preserve hunting and shooting sports, and the American Foundation for Suicide Prevention (AFSP), the nation’s largest suicide prevention organization. Together, they are developing a program that empowers communities to engage in safe firearm-storage practices. The program includes information on creating community coalitions that promote and sustain firearm safety, with an emphasis on reaching service members, veterans and their families.

This partnership represents the nation’s biggest advance in forging common ground on an issue where polarization has interfered with lifesaving initiatives. It’s a game changer.

In 2016, about 69% of veteran suicides in the US (71% among male and 41% among female veterans) resulted from a firearm injury. In comparison, the proportion of suicides resulting from a firearm injury among nonveteran adults was 48%.¹ The majority of veteran suicides occur with those who do not seek care within the VA healthcare system, which has led the VA to broaden its focus to reach all veterans.

Given the frequency of firearm use as a method of suicide, VA recognizes that suicide prevention efforts must address how veterans store their firearms. The decision to take an action to kill oneself is at times made impulsively—in just a matter of minutes. Securely storing firearms creates precious time and physical space between an individual’s period of risk and the means to act. Studies have demonstrated that delaying access to deadly means can save a life.

VA is striving to be a national leader in suicide prevention, and lethal means safety is an important component of the department’s approach. VA’s lethal means safety initiatives encourage veterans to voluntarily store their firearms safely. Key to this approach is to train mental health and peer providers in veteran-centric counseling methods while promoting resources, including a national consultation call line for both VA and community providers seeking guidance for treatment practices or engaging a veteran in care.  

Because many veterans believe that firearms must remain in their homes under all circumstances, in 2018 the VA held the first of its kind open-innovation challenge for safe firearm storage. This challenge led to the creation of numerous lifesaving product designs, which are now under development in the private sector.

The latest partnership further advances VA’s effort to ensure that lethal means safety counseling is culturally relevant, comes from a trusted source and contains no anti-firearm bias. VA respects the important role firearms play in many veterans’ lives and is committed to educating veterans and their families about safe storage of firearms in a way that is consistent with each veteran’s values and priorities.

Nothing will be more effective in diminishing suicide than correcting the false belief among many veterans that the VA wants to take away veterans’ guns. When that misperception is corrected, not only would more at-risk veterans seek out VA mental health care, but it also could become commonplace for veterans, families and friends to speak up because, “Buddies talk to buddies in crisis about safely storing guns.” This is especially important for veterans in rural areas, where the rates of firearm ownership and suicide are the highest. Joining forces with NSSF could spearhead such a shift.

The VA, NSSF and AFSP should be lauded for bridging the divide and driving this far-reaching breakthrough in firearm safety conversations and community alliances. The effort will not only save countless veterans’ lives, but also forge a path to mitigate our national tragedy of suicide.

As new standards for access dominated recent media coverage of veterans’ health care headlines, the launch of a historically unprecedented collaboration to prevent veterans’ suicide went completely unnoticed.

On January 31, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) announced a partnership with the National Shooting Sports Foundation (NSSF), a firearms industry association that works to promote, protect and preserve hunting and shooting sports, and the American Foundation for Suicide Prevention (AFSP), the nation’s largest suicide prevention organization. Together, they are developing a program that empowers communities to engage in safe firearm-storage practices. The program includes information on creating community coalitions that promote and sustain firearm safety, with an emphasis on reaching service members, veterans and their families.

This partnership represents the nation’s biggest advance in forging common ground on an issue where polarization has interfered with lifesaving initiatives. It’s a game changer.

In 2016, about 69% of veteran suicides in the US (71% among male and 41% among female veterans) resulted from a firearm injury. In comparison, the proportion of suicides resulting from a firearm injury among nonveteran adults was 48%.¹ The majority of veteran suicides occur with those who do not seek care within the VA healthcare system, which has led the VA to broaden its focus to reach all veterans.

Given the frequency of firearm use as a method of suicide, VA recognizes that suicide prevention efforts must address how veterans store their firearms. The decision to take an action to kill oneself is at times made impulsively—in just a matter of minutes. Securely storing firearms creates precious time and physical space between an individual’s period of risk and the means to act. Studies have demonstrated that delaying access to deadly means can save a life.

VA is striving to be a national leader in suicide prevention, and lethal means safety is an important component of the department’s approach. VA’s lethal means safety initiatives encourage veterans to voluntarily store their firearms safely. Key to this approach is to train mental health and peer providers in veteran-centric counseling methods while promoting resources, including a national consultation call line for both VA and community providers seeking guidance for treatment practices or engaging a veteran in care.  

Because many veterans believe that firearms must remain in their homes under all circumstances, in 2018 the VA held the first of its kind open-innovation challenge for safe firearm storage. This challenge led to the creation of numerous lifesaving product designs, which are now under development in the private sector.

The latest partnership further advances VA’s effort to ensure that lethal means safety counseling is culturally relevant, comes from a trusted source and contains no anti-firearm bias. VA respects the important role firearms play in many veterans’ lives and is committed to educating veterans and their families about safe storage of firearms in a way that is consistent with each veteran’s values and priorities.

Nothing will be more effective in diminishing suicide than correcting the false belief among many veterans that the VA wants to take away veterans’ guns. When that misperception is corrected, not only would more at-risk veterans seek out VA mental health care, but it also could become commonplace for veterans, families and friends to speak up because, “Buddies talk to buddies in crisis about safely storing guns.” This is especially important for veterans in rural areas, where the rates of firearm ownership and suicide are the highest. Joining forces with NSSF could spearhead such a shift.

The VA, NSSF and AFSP should be lauded for bridging the divide and driving this far-reaching breakthrough in firearm safety conversations and community alliances. The effort will not only save countless veterans’ lives, but also forge a path to mitigate our national tragedy of suicide.

As new standards for access dominated recent media coverage of veterans’ health care headlines, the launch of a historically unprecedented collaboration to prevent veterans’ suicide went completely unnoticed.

On January 31, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) announced a partnership with the National Shooting Sports Foundation (NSSF), a firearms industry association that works to promote, protect and preserve hunting and shooting sports, and the American Foundation for Suicide Prevention (AFSP), the nation’s largest suicide prevention organization. Together, they are developing a program that empowers communities to engage in safe firearm-storage practices. The program includes information on creating community coalitions that promote and sustain firearm safety, with an emphasis on reaching service members, veterans and their families.

This partnership represents the nation’s biggest advance in forging common ground on an issue where polarization has interfered with lifesaving initiatives. It’s a game changer.

In 2016, about 69% of veteran suicides in the US (71% among male and 41% among female veterans) resulted from a firearm injury. In comparison, the proportion of suicides resulting from a firearm injury among nonveteran adults was 48%.¹ The majority of veteran suicides occur with those who do not seek care within the VA healthcare system, which has led the VA to broaden its focus to reach all veterans.

Given the frequency of firearm use as a method of suicide, VA recognizes that suicide prevention efforts must address how veterans store their firearms. The decision to take an action to kill oneself is at times made impulsively—in just a matter of minutes. Securely storing firearms creates precious time and physical space between an individual’s period of risk and the means to act. Studies have demonstrated that delaying access to deadly means can save a life.

VA is striving to be a national leader in suicide prevention, and lethal means safety is an important component of the department’s approach. VA’s lethal means safety initiatives encourage veterans to voluntarily store their firearms safely. Key to this approach is to train mental health and peer providers in veteran-centric counseling methods while promoting resources, including a national consultation call line for both VA and community providers seeking guidance for treatment practices or engaging a veteran in care.  

Because many veterans believe that firearms must remain in their homes under all circumstances, in 2018 the VA held the first of its kind open-innovation challenge for safe firearm storage. This challenge led to the creation of numerous lifesaving product designs, which are now under development in the private sector.

The latest partnership further advances VA’s effort to ensure that lethal means safety counseling is culturally relevant, comes from a trusted source and contains no anti-firearm bias. VA respects the important role firearms play in many veterans’ lives and is committed to educating veterans and their families about safe storage of firearms in a way that is consistent with each veteran’s values and priorities.

Nothing will be more effective in diminishing suicide than correcting the false belief among many veterans that the VA wants to take away veterans’ guns. When that misperception is corrected, not only would more at-risk veterans seek out VA mental health care, but it also could become commonplace for veterans, families and friends to speak up because, “Buddies talk to buddies in crisis about safely storing guns.” This is especially important for veterans in rural areas, where the rates of firearm ownership and suicide are the highest. Joining forces with NSSF could spearhead such a shift.

The VA, NSSF and AFSP should be lauded for bridging the divide and driving this far-reaching breakthrough in firearm safety conversations and community alliances. The effort will not only save countless veterans’ lives, but also forge a path to mitigate our national tragedy of suicide.

In June 2018, the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) issued its National Strategy for Preventing Veteran Suicide, 2018-2028. Its 14 goals—many highly innovative—are “to provide a framework for identifying priorities, organizing efforts, and contributing to a national focus on Veteran suicide prevention.”¹

The National Strategy recognizes that suicide prevention requires a 3-pronged approach that includes universal, selective, and targeted strategies because “suicide cannot be prevented by any single strategy.”¹ Even so, the National Strategy does not heed this core tenet. It focuses exclusively on universal, non-VA community-based priorities and efforts. That focus causes a problem because it neglects the other strategies. It also is precarious because in the current era of VA zero sum budgets, increases in 1 domain come from decreases in another. Thus, sole prioritizing of universal community components could divert funds from extant effective VA suicide prevention programs.

Community-based engagement is unquestionably necessary to prevent suicide among all veterans. Even so, a 10-year prospective strategy should build up, not compromise, VA initiatives. The plan would be improved by explicitly bolstering VA programs that are making a vital difference.

Undercutting VA Suicide Prevention

As my recent review in Federal Practitioner documented, VA’s multiple levels of evidenced-based suicide prevention practices are pre-eminent in the field.² The VA’s innovative use of predictive analytics to identify and intervene with at-risk individuals is more advanced than anything available in the community. For older veterans who constitute the majority of veterans and the majority of veteran suicides, the VA has more comprehensive and integrated mental health care services than those found in community-based care systems. The embedding of suicide prevention coordinators at every VA facility is unparalleled.

But one would never know about such quality from the National Strategy document: The VA is barely mentioned. The report never advocates for strengthening—or even maintaining—VA’s resources, programs, and efforts. It never recommends that eligible veterans be connected to VA mental health services.

The strategy observes that employment and housing are keys that protect against suicide risk. It does not, however, call for boosting and resourcing VA’s integrated approach that wraps in social services better than does any other program. Similarly, it acknowledges the role of family involvement in mitigating risk but does not propose expanding VA treatments to improve relationship well-being, leaving these services to the private sector.

The National Strategy expands on the recent suicide prevention executive order (EO) for supporting veterans during their transition from military to civilian life. Yet the EO has no funding allocated to this critical initiative. The National Strategy has the same shortcoming. In failing to advocate for more funds to pay for vastly enhanced outreach and intervention, the plan could drain the VA of existing resources needed to maintain its high-quality, suicide prevention services.

First Step: Define the Problem

The National Strategy wisely specifies that the initial step in any suicide prevention effort should be to “define the problem. This involves collecting data to determine the ‘who,’ ‘what,’ ‘where,’ ‘when,’ and ‘how’ of suicide deaths.” Then, “identify risk and protective factors.”

Yet the report doesn’t follow its own advice. Although little is known about the 14 of 20 veterans who die by suicide daily who are not recent users of VA health services, the National Strategy foregoes the necessity of first ascertaining crucial factors, including whether those veterans were (a) eligible for VA care; (b) receiving any mental health or substance use treatment; and (c) going through life crises, etc. What’s needed before reallocating funds to community-based programs is for Congress to finance a post-suicide, case-by-case study of these veteran decedents who did not use VA.

Proceeding in this manner has 2 benefits. First, it would allow initiatives to be targeted. Second, it could preserve funds for successful VA programs that otherwise might be cut to pay for private sector programs.

A Positive Starting Point

There are many positive components of the National Strategy for Preventing Veteran Suicide that will make a difference. That said, they fall short of their potential. The following are suggestions that could strengthen the VA’s plan.

First, given the overwhelming use of firearms by veterans who die by suicide, the National Strategy acknowledges that an effective prevention policy must attend to this factor. It prudently calls for expansion of firearm safety/suicide prevention collaboration with firearm owners, firearm dealers, shooting clubs, and gun/hunting organizations. This will help ensure that lethal means safety counseling is culturally relevant, comes from a trusted source, and has no antifirearm bias.

Nothing would be more useful in diminishing suicide than correcting the false belief among many veterans that “the VA wants to take away our guns.” If that misperception were replaced with an accurate message, not only would more at-risk veterans seek out VA mental health care, more veterans/families/friends would adopt a new cultural norm akin to buddies talk to vets in crisis about safely storing guns. Establishing a workgroup with gun constituency collaborators could spearhead such a shift.

Second, although, the National Strategy emphasizes the benefits of using peer supports, peers currently express qualms that they have too little expertise intervening with this vulnerable population. Peers could be given extensive training and continued supervision in suicide prevention techniques.

Third, the National Strategy calls for expanded use of big data predictive analytics, whose initial implementation has shown great promise. However, it fails to mention that this approach depends on linked electronic health records and therefore best succeeds for at-risk veterans within VA but not in insulated community care. 

Fourth, the National Strategy recognizes that reshaping media and entertainment portrayals could help prevent veteran suicide. Yet it ignores the importance of correcting the sullied narrative about the VA. The disproportionate negative image contributes to veterans’ reticence to seek VA health care. One simple solution would be to require that service members readying to transition to civilian life be informed about the superior nature of VA mental health care. Another is to provide the media with positive VA stories more routinely.

Fifth, the National Strategy suggests that enhanced community care guidelines be developed, but it never recommends that community partners should equal VA’s standards. Those providers should be mandated to conduct the same root cause analyses and comprehensive documentation of suicide risk assessments that VA does.

Conclusion

With zero sum department budgets, the National Strategy’s exclusive priority on public health, community-based initiatives could undercut VA successes. An amended plan that explicitly supports and further strengthens successful VA suicide prevention programs is warranted.

In June 2018, the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) issued its National Strategy for Preventing Veteran Suicide, 2018-2028. Its 14 goals—many highly innovative—are “to provide a framework for identifying priorities, organizing efforts, and contributing to a national focus on Veteran suicide prevention.”¹

The National Strategy recognizes that suicide prevention requires a 3-pronged approach that includes universal, selective, and targeted strategies because “suicide cannot be prevented by any single strategy.”¹ Even so, the National Strategy does not heed this core tenet. It focuses exclusively on universal, non-VA community-based priorities and efforts. That focus causes a problem because it neglects the other strategies. It also is precarious because in the current era of VA zero sum budgets, increases in 1 domain come from decreases in another. Thus, sole prioritizing of universal community components could divert funds from extant effective VA suicide prevention programs.

Community-based engagement is unquestionably necessary to prevent suicide among all veterans. Even so, a 10-year prospective strategy should build up, not compromise, VA initiatives. The plan would be improved by explicitly bolstering VA programs that are making a vital difference.

Undercutting VA Suicide Prevention

As my recent review in Federal Practitioner documented, VA’s multiple levels of evidenced-based suicide prevention practices are pre-eminent in the field.² The VA’s innovative use of predictive analytics to identify and intervene with at-risk individuals is more advanced than anything available in the community. For older veterans who constitute the majority of veterans and the majority of veteran suicides, the VA has more comprehensive and integrated mental health care services than those found in community-based care systems. The embedding of suicide prevention coordinators at every VA facility is unparalleled.

But one would never know about such quality from the National Strategy document: The VA is barely mentioned. The report never advocates for strengthening—or even maintaining—VA’s resources, programs, and efforts. It never recommends that eligible veterans be connected to VA mental health services.

The strategy observes that employment and housing are keys that protect against suicide risk. It does not, however, call for boosting and resourcing VA’s integrated approach that wraps in social services better than does any other program. Similarly, it acknowledges the role of family involvement in mitigating risk but does not propose expanding VA treatments to improve relationship well-being, leaving these services to the private sector.

The National Strategy expands on the recent suicide prevention executive order (EO) for supporting veterans during their transition from military to civilian life. Yet the EO has no funding allocated to this critical initiative. The National Strategy has the same shortcoming. In failing to advocate for more funds to pay for vastly enhanced outreach and intervention, the plan could drain the VA of existing resources needed to maintain its high-quality, suicide prevention services.

First Step: Define the Problem

The National Strategy wisely specifies that the initial step in any suicide prevention effort should be to “define the problem. This involves collecting data to determine the ‘who,’ ‘what,’ ‘where,’ ‘when,’ and ‘how’ of suicide deaths.” Then, “identify risk and protective factors.”

Yet the report doesn’t follow its own advice. Although little is known about the 14 of 20 veterans who die by suicide daily who are not recent users of VA health services, the National Strategy foregoes the necessity of first ascertaining crucial factors, including whether those veterans were (a) eligible for VA care; (b) receiving any mental health or substance use treatment; and (c) going through life crises, etc. What’s needed before reallocating funds to community-based programs is for Congress to finance a post-suicide, case-by-case study of these veteran decedents who did not use VA.

Proceeding in this manner has 2 benefits. First, it would allow initiatives to be targeted. Second, it could preserve funds for successful VA programs that otherwise might be cut to pay for private sector programs.

A Positive Starting Point

There are many positive components of the National Strategy for Preventing Veteran Suicide that will make a difference. That said, they fall short of their potential. The following are suggestions that could strengthen the VA’s plan.

First, given the overwhelming use of firearms by veterans who die by suicide, the National Strategy acknowledges that an effective prevention policy must attend to this factor. It prudently calls for expansion of firearm safety/suicide prevention collaboration with firearm owners, firearm dealers, shooting clubs, and gun/hunting organizations. This will help ensure that lethal means safety counseling is culturally relevant, comes from a trusted source, and has no antifirearm bias.

Nothing would be more useful in diminishing suicide than correcting the false belief among many veterans that “the VA wants to take away our guns.” If that misperception were replaced with an accurate message, not only would more at-risk veterans seek out VA mental health care, more veterans/families/friends would adopt a new cultural norm akin to buddies talk to vets in crisis about safely storing guns. Establishing a workgroup with gun constituency collaborators could spearhead such a shift.

Second, although, the National Strategy emphasizes the benefits of using peer supports, peers currently express qualms that they have too little expertise intervening with this vulnerable population. Peers could be given extensive training and continued supervision in suicide prevention techniques.

Third, the National Strategy calls for expanded use of big data predictive analytics, whose initial implementation has shown great promise. However, it fails to mention that this approach depends on linked electronic health records and therefore best succeeds for at-risk veterans within VA but not in insulated community care. 

Fourth, the National Strategy recognizes that reshaping media and entertainment portrayals could help prevent veteran suicide. Yet it ignores the importance of correcting the sullied narrative about the VA. The disproportionate negative image contributes to veterans’ reticence to seek VA health care. One simple solution would be to require that service members readying to transition to civilian life be informed about the superior nature of VA mental health care. Another is to provide the media with positive VA stories more routinely.

Fifth, the National Strategy suggests that enhanced community care guidelines be developed, but it never recommends that community partners should equal VA’s standards. Those providers should be mandated to conduct the same root cause analyses and comprehensive documentation of suicide risk assessments that VA does.

Conclusion

With zero sum department budgets, the National Strategy’s exclusive priority on public health, community-based initiatives could undercut VA successes. An amended plan that explicitly supports and further strengthens successful VA suicide prevention programs is warranted.

In June 2018, the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) issued its National Strategy for Preventing Veteran Suicide, 2018-2028. Its 14 goals—many highly innovative—are “to provide a framework for identifying priorities, organizing efforts, and contributing to a national focus on Veteran suicide prevention.”¹

The National Strategy recognizes that suicide prevention requires a 3-pronged approach that includes universal, selective, and targeted strategies because “suicide cannot be prevented by any single strategy.”¹ Even so, the National Strategy does not heed this core tenet. It focuses exclusively on universal, non-VA community-based priorities and efforts. That focus causes a problem because it neglects the other strategies. It also is precarious because in the current era of VA zero sum budgets, increases in 1 domain come from decreases in another. Thus, sole prioritizing of universal community components could divert funds from extant effective VA suicide prevention programs.

Community-based engagement is unquestionably necessary to prevent suicide among all veterans. Even so, a 10-year prospective strategy should build up, not compromise, VA initiatives. The plan would be improved by explicitly bolstering VA programs that are making a vital difference.

Undercutting VA Suicide Prevention

As my recent review in Federal Practitioner documented, VA’s multiple levels of evidenced-based suicide prevention practices are pre-eminent in the field.² The VA’s innovative use of predictive analytics to identify and intervene with at-risk individuals is more advanced than anything available in the community. For older veterans who constitute the majority of veterans and the majority of veteran suicides, the VA has more comprehensive and integrated mental health care services than those found in community-based care systems. The embedding of suicide prevention coordinators at every VA facility is unparalleled.

But one would never know about such quality from the National Strategy document: The VA is barely mentioned. The report never advocates for strengthening—or even maintaining—VA’s resources, programs, and efforts. It never recommends that eligible veterans be connected to VA mental health services.

The strategy observes that employment and housing are keys that protect against suicide risk. It does not, however, call for boosting and resourcing VA’s integrated approach that wraps in social services better than does any other program. Similarly, it acknowledges the role of family involvement in mitigating risk but does not propose expanding VA treatments to improve relationship well-being, leaving these services to the private sector.

The National Strategy expands on the recent suicide prevention executive order (EO) for supporting veterans during their transition from military to civilian life. Yet the EO has no funding allocated to this critical initiative. The National Strategy has the same shortcoming. In failing to advocate for more funds to pay for vastly enhanced outreach and intervention, the plan could drain the VA of existing resources needed to maintain its high-quality, suicide prevention services.

First Step: Define the Problem

The National Strategy wisely specifies that the initial step in any suicide prevention effort should be to “define the problem. This involves collecting data to determine the ‘who,’ ‘what,’ ‘where,’ ‘when,’ and ‘how’ of suicide deaths.” Then, “identify risk and protective factors.”

Yet the report doesn’t follow its own advice. Although little is known about the 14 of 20 veterans who die by suicide daily who are not recent users of VA health services, the National Strategy foregoes the necessity of first ascertaining crucial factors, including whether those veterans were (a) eligible for VA care; (b) receiving any mental health or substance use treatment; and (c) going through life crises, etc. What’s needed before reallocating funds to community-based programs is for Congress to finance a post-suicide, case-by-case study of these veteran decedents who did not use VA.

Proceeding in this manner has 2 benefits. First, it would allow initiatives to be targeted. Second, it could preserve funds for successful VA programs that otherwise might be cut to pay for private sector programs.

A Positive Starting Point

There are many positive components of the National Strategy for Preventing Veteran Suicide that will make a difference. That said, they fall short of their potential. The following are suggestions that could strengthen the VA’s plan.

First, given the overwhelming use of firearms by veterans who die by suicide, the National Strategy acknowledges that an effective prevention policy must attend to this factor. It prudently calls for expansion of firearm safety/suicide prevention collaboration with firearm owners, firearm dealers, shooting clubs, and gun/hunting organizations. This will help ensure that lethal means safety counseling is culturally relevant, comes from a trusted source, and has no antifirearm bias.

Nothing would be more useful in diminishing suicide than correcting the false belief among many veterans that “the VA wants to take away our guns.” If that misperception were replaced with an accurate message, not only would more at-risk veterans seek out VA mental health care, more veterans/families/friends would adopt a new cultural norm akin to buddies talk to vets in crisis about safely storing guns. Establishing a workgroup with gun constituency collaborators could spearhead such a shift.

Second, although, the National Strategy emphasizes the benefits of using peer supports, peers currently express qualms that they have too little expertise intervening with this vulnerable population. Peers could be given extensive training and continued supervision in suicide prevention techniques.

Third, the National Strategy calls for expanded use of big data predictive analytics, whose initial implementation has shown great promise. However, it fails to mention that this approach depends on linked electronic health records and therefore best succeeds for at-risk veterans within VA but not in insulated community care. 

Fourth, the National Strategy recognizes that reshaping media and entertainment portrayals could help prevent veteran suicide. Yet it ignores the importance of correcting the sullied narrative about the VA. The disproportionate negative image contributes to veterans’ reticence to seek VA health care. One simple solution would be to require that service members readying to transition to civilian life be informed about the superior nature of VA mental health care. Another is to provide the media with positive VA stories more routinely.

Fifth, the National Strategy suggests that enhanced community care guidelines be developed, but it never recommends that community partners should equal VA’s standards. Those providers should be mandated to conduct the same root cause analyses and comprehensive documentation of suicide risk assessments that VA does.

Conclusion

With zero sum department budgets, the National Strategy’s exclusive priority on public health, community-based initiatives could undercut VA successes. An amended plan that explicitly supports and further strengthens successful VA suicide prevention programs is warranted.