Chief complaint: Homicidal. Assessing violence risk

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Chief complaint: Homicidal. Assessing violence risk

Mr. F, age 35, is homeless and has a history of cocaine and alcohol use disorders. He is admitted voluntarily to the psychiatric unit because he has homicidal thoughts toward Ms. S, who works in the shelter where he has been staying. Mr. F reports that he is thinking of killing Ms. S if he is discharged because she has been rude to him. He states that he has access to several firearms, but he will not disclose the location. He has been diagnosed with unspecified depressive disorder and exhibited antisocial personality disorder traits. He is being treated with sertraline. However, his mood appears to be relatively stable, except for occasional angry verbal outbursts. The outbursts have been related to intrusive peers or staff turning the television off for group meetings. Mr. F has been joking with peers, eating well, and sleeping appropriately. He reports no suicidal thoughts and has not been physically violent on the unit. However, Mr. F has had a history of violence since his teenage years. He has been incarcerated twice for assault and once for drug possession.

How would you approach assessing and managing Mr. F’s risk for violence?

We all have encountered a patient similar to Mr. F on the psychiatric unit or in the emergency department—a patient who makes violent threats and appears angry, intimidating, manipulative, and/or demanding, despite exhibiting no evidence of mania or psychosis. This patient often has a history of substance abuse and a lifelong pattern of viewing violence as an acceptable way of addressing life’s problems. Many psychiatrists suspect that more time on the inpatient unit is unlikely to reduce this patient’s risk of violence. Why? Because the violence risk does not stem from a treatable mental illness. Further, psychiatrists may be apprehensive about this patient’s potential for violence after discharge and their liability in the event of a bad outcome. No one wants their name associated with a headline that reads “Psychiatrist discharged man less than 24 hours before he killed 3 people.”

The purported relationship between mental illness and violence often is sensationalized in the media. However, research reveals that the vast majority of violence is in fact not due to symptoms of mental illness.1,2 A common clinical challenge in psychiatry involves evaluating individuals at elevated risk of violence and determining how to address their risk factors for violence. When the risk is primarily due to psychosis and can be reduced with antipsychotic medication, the job is easy. But how should we proceed when the risk stems from factors other than mental illness?

This article reviews risk factors for violence, discusses targeted violence against a specific victim, and offers practical tips for assessing and managing risk, particularly when the risk for violence is not due to mental illness.

Violence and mental illness: A tenuous link

Violence is a major public health concern in the United States. Although in recent years the rates of homicide and aggravated assault have decreased dramatically, there are approximately 16,000 homicides annually in the United States, and more than 1.6 million injuries from assaults treated in emergency departments each year.3 Homicide continues to be one of the leading causes of death among teenagers and young adults.4

The most effective methods of preventing widespread violence are public health approaches, such as parent- and family-focused programs, early childhood education, programs in school, and public policy changes.3 However, as psychiatrists, we are routinely asked to assess the risk of violence for an individual patient and devise strategies to mitigate violence risk.

Continue to: Although certain mental illnesses...

 

 

Although certain mental illnesses increase the relative risk of violence (compared with people without mental illness),5,6 recent studies suggest that mental illness plays only a “minor role in explaining violence in populations.”7 It is estimated that as little as 4% of the violence in the United States can be attributed to mental illness.1 According to a 1998 meta-analysis of 48 studies of criminal recidivism, the risk factors for violent recidivism were “almost identical” among offenders who had a mental disorder and those who did not.8

Approaches to assessing violence risk

Psychiatrists can assess the risk of future violence via 3 broad approaches.9,10

Unaided clinical judgment is when a mental health professional estimates violence risk based on his or her own experience and intuition, with knowledge of violence risk factors, but without the use of structured tools.

Actuarial tools are statistical models that use formulae to show relationships between data (risk factors) and outcomes (violence).10,11

Continue to: Structured professional judgment

 

 

Structured professional judgment is a hybrid of unaided clinical judgment and actuarial methods. Structured professional judgment tools help the evaluator identify empirically established risk factors. Once the information is collected, it is combined with clinical judgment in decision making.9,10 There are now more than 200 structured tools available for assessing violence risk in criminal justice and forensic mental health populations.12

Clinical judgment, although commonly used in practice, is less accurate than actuarial tools or structured professional judgment.10,11 In general, risk assessment tools offer moderate levels of accuracy in categorizing people at low risk vs high risk.5,13 The tools have better ability to accurately categorize individuals at low risk, compared with high risk, where false positives are common.12,14

Two types of risk factors

Risk factors for violence are commonly categorized as static or dynamic factors. Static factors are historical factors that cannot be changed with intervention (eg, age, sex, history of abuse). Dynamic factors can be changed with intervention (eg, substance abuse).15

Static risk factors. The best predictor of future violence is past violent behavior.5,16,17 Violence risk increases with each prior episode of violence.5 Prior arrests for any crime, especially if the individual was a juvenile at the time of arrest for his or her first violent offense, increase future violence risk.5 Other important static violence risk factors include demographic factors such as age, sex, and socioeconomic status. Swanson et al6 reviewed a large pool of data (approximately 10,000 respondents) from the Epidemiologic Catchment Area survey. Being young, male, and of low socioeconomic status were all associated with violence in the community.6 The highest-risk age group for violence is age 15 to 24.5 Males perpetrate violence in the community at a rate 10 times that of females.18 However, among individuals with severe mental illness, men and women have similar rates of violence.19,20 Unstable employment,21 less education,22 low intelligence,16 and a history of a significant head injury5 also are risk factors for violence.5

Continue to: Being abused as a child...

 

 

Being abused as a child, witnessing violence in the home,5,16 and growing up with an unstable parental situation (eg, parental loss or separation) has been linked to violence.16,23,24 Early disruptive behavior in childhood (eg, fighting, lying and stealing, truancy, and school problems) increases violence risk.21,23

Personality factors are important static risk factors for violence. Antisocial personality disorder is the most common personality disorder linked with violence.17 Several studies consistently show psychopathy to be a strong predictor of both violence and criminal behavior.5,25 A psychopath is a person who lacks empathy and close relationships, behaves impulsively, has superficially charming qualities, and is primarily interested in self-gratification.26 Harris et al27 studied 169 released forensic patients and found that 77% of the psychopaths (according to Psychopathy Checklist-Revised [PCL-R] scores) violently recidivated. In contrast, only 21% of the non-psychopaths violently recidivated.27

Other personality factors associated with violence include a predisposition toward feelings of anger and hatred (as opposed to empathy, anxiety, or guilt, which may reduce risk), hostile attributional biases (a tendency to interpret benign behavior of others as intentionally antagonistic), violent fantasies, poor anger control, and impulsivity.5 Although personality factors tend to be longstanding and more difficult to modify, in the outpatient setting, therapeutic efforts can be made to modify hostile attribution biases, poor anger control, and impulsive behavior.

Dynamic risk factors. Substance abuse is strongly associated with violence.6,17 The prevalence of violence is 12 times greater among individuals with alcohol use disorder and 16 times greater among individuals with other substance use disorders, compared with those with no such diagnoses.5,6

Continue to: Steadman et al...

 

 

Steadman et al28 compared 1,136 adult patients with mental disorders discharged from psychiatric hospitals with 519 individuals living in the same neighborhoods as the hospitalized patients. They found that the prevalence of violence among discharged patients without substance abuse was “statistically indistinguishable” from the prevalence of violence among community members, in the same neighborhood, who did not have symptoms of substance abuse.28 Swanson et al6 found that the combination of a mental disorder plus an alcohol or substance use disorder substantially increased the risk of violence.

Other dynamic risk factors for violence include mental illness symptoms such as psychosis, especially threat/control-override delusions, where the individual believes that they are being threatened or controlled by an external force.17

Contextual factors to consider in violence risk assessments include current stressors, lack of social support, availability of weapons, access to drugs and alcohol, and the presence of similar circumstances that led to violent behavior in the past.5

How to assess the risk of targeted violence

Targeted violence is a predatory act of violence intentionally committed against a preselected person, group of people, or place.29 Due to the low base rates of these incidents, targeted violence is difficult to study.7,30 These risk assessments require a more specialized approach.

Continue to: In their 1999 article...

 

 

In their 1999 article, Borum et al30 discussed threat assessment strategies utilized by the U.S. Secret Service and recommended investigating “pathways of ideas and behaviors that may lead to violent action.” Borum et al30 summarized 3 fundamental principles of threat assessment (Table 130).

What to do when violence risk is not due to mental illness

Based on the information in Mr. F’s case scenario, it is likely that his homicidal ideation is not due to mental illness. Despite this, several risk factors for violence are present. Where do we go from here?

Scott and Resnick17 recommend considering the concept of dangerousness as 5 components (Table 217). When this model of dangerousness is applied to Mr. F’s case, one can see that the magnitude of the harm is great because of threatened homicide. With regard to the imminence of the harm, it would help to clarify whether Mr. F plans to kill Ms. S immediately after discharge, or sometime in the next few months. Is his threat contingent on further provocations by Ms. S? Alternatively, does he intend to kill her for past grievances, regardless of further perceived insults?

Next, the frequency of a behavior relates to how often Mr. F has been aggressive in the past. The severity of his past aggression is also important. What is the most violent act he has ever done? Situational factors in this case include Mr. F’s access to weapons, financial problems, housing problems, and access to drugs and alcohol.17 Mr. F should be asked about what situations previously provoked his violent behavior. Consider how similar the present conditions are to past conditions to which Mr. F responded violently.5 The likelihood that a homicide will occur should take into account Mr. F’s risk factors for violence, as well as the seriousness of his intent to cause harm.

Continue to: Consider using a structured tool...

 

 

Consider using a structured tool, such as the Classification of Violence Risk, to help identify Mr. F’s risk factors for violence, or some other formal method to ensure that the proper data are collected. Violence risk assessments are more accurate when structured risk assessment tools are used, compared with clinical judgment alone.

It is important to review collateral sources of information. In Mr. F’s case, useful collateral sources may include his criminal docket (usually available online), past medical records, information from the shelter where he lives, and, potentially, friends or family.

Because Mr. F is making threats of targeted violence, be sure to ask about attack-related behaviors (Table 130).

Regarding the seriousness of Mr. F’s intent to cause harm, it may be helpful to ask him the following questions:

  1. How likely are you to carry out this act of violence?
  2. Do you have a plan? Have you taken any steps toward this plan?
  3. Do you see other, nonviolent solutions to this problem?
  4. What do you hope that we can do for you to help with this problem?

Continue to: Mr. F's answers...

 

 

Mr. F’s answers may suggest the possibility of a hidden agenda. Some patients express homicidal thoughts in order to stay in the hospital. If Mr. F expresses threats that are contingent on discharge and declines to engage in problem-solving discussions, this would cast doubt on the genuineness of his threat. However, doubt about the genuineness of the threat alone is not sufficient to simply discharge Mr. F. Assessment of his intent needs to be considered with other relevant risk factors, risk reduction strategies, and any Tarasoff duties that may apply.

In addition to risk factors, consider mitigating factors. For example, does Mr. F express concern over prison time as a reason to not engage in violence? It would be more ominous if Mr. F says that he does not care if he goes to prison because life is lousy being homeless and unemployed. At this point, an estimation can be made regarding whether Mr. F is a low-, moderate-, or high-risk of violence.

The next step is to organize Mr. F’s risk factors into static (historical) and dynamic (subject to intervention) factors. This will be helpful in formulating a strategy to manage risk because continued hospitalization can only address dynamic risk factors. Often in these cases, the static risk factors are far more numerous than the dynamic risk factors.

Once the data are collected and organized, the final step is to devise a risk management strategy. Some interventions, such as substance use treatment, will be straightforward. A mood-stabilizing medication could be considered, if clinically appropriate, to help reduce aggression and irritability.31 Efforts should be made to eliminate Mr. F’s access to firearms; however, in this case, it sounds unlikely that he will cooperate with those efforts. Ultimately, you may find yourself with a list of risk factors that are unlikely to be altered with further hospitalization, particularly if Mr. F’s homicidal thoughts and intent are due to antisocial personality traits.

Continue to: In that case...

 

 

In that case, the most important step will be to carry out your duty to warn/protect others prior to Mr. F’s discharge. Most states either require or permit mental health professionals to take reasonable steps to protect victims from violence when certain conditions are present, such as an explicit threat or identifiable victim (see Related Resources).

Once dynamic risk factors have been addressed, and duty to warn/protect is carried out, if there is no further clinical indication for hospitalization, it would be appropriate to discharge Mr. F. Continued homicidal threats stemming from antisocial personality traits, in the absence of a treatable mental illness (or other modifiable risk factors for violence that can be actively addressed), is not a reason for continued hospitalization. It may be useful to obtain a second opinion from a colleague in such scenarios. A second opinion may offer additional risk management ideas. In the event of a bad outcome, this will also help to show that the decision to discharge the patient was not taken lightly.

The psychiatrist should document a thoughtful risk assessment, the strategies that were implemented to reduce risk, the details of the warning, and the reasoning why continued hospitalization was not indicated (Table 3).

CASE CONTINUED

Decision to discharge

In Mr. F’s case, the treating psychiatrist determined that Mr. F’s risk of violence toward Ms. S was moderate. The psychiatrist identified several static risk factors for violence that raised Mr. F’s risk, but also noted that Mr. F’s threats were likely a manipulative effort to prolong his hospital stay. The psychiatrist carried out his duty to protect by notifying police and Ms. S of the nature of the threat prior to Mr. F’s discharge. The unit social worker helped Mr. F schedule an intake appointment for a substance use disorder treatment facility. Mr. F ultimately stated that he no longer experienced homicidal ideas once a bed was secured for him in a substance use treatment program. The psychiatrist carefully documented Mr. F’s risk assessment and the reasons why Mr. F’s risk would not be significantly altered by further inpatient hospitalization. Mr. F was discharged, and Ms. S remained unharmed.

Continue to: Bottom Line

 

 

Bottom Line

Use a structured approach to identify risk factors for violence. Address dynamic risk factors, including access to weapons. Carry out the duty to warn/protect if applicable. Document your decisions and actions carefully, and then discharge the patient if clinically indicated. Do not be “held hostage” by a patient’s homicidal ideation.

Related Resources

  • Dolan M, Doyle M. Violence risk prediction. Clinical and actuarial measures and the role of the psychopathy checklist. Br J Psychiatry. 2000;177:303-311.
  • Douglas KS, Hart SD, Webster CD, et al. HCR-20V3: Assessing risk of violence–user guide. Burnaby, Canada: Mental Health, Law, and Policy Institute, Simon Fraser University; 2013.
  • National Conference of State Legislatures. Mental health professionals’ duty to warn. http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/mental-health-professionals-duty-to-warn.aspx. Published September 28, 2015.

Drug Brand Names

Sertraline • Zoloft

References

1. Skeem J, Kennealy P, Monahan J, et al. Psychosis uncommonly and inconsistently precedes violence among high-risk individuals. Clin Psychol Sci. 2016;4(1):40-49.
2. McGinty E, Frattaroli S, Appelbaum PS, et al. Using research evidence to reframe the policy debate around mental illness and guns: process and recommendations. Am J Public Health. 2014;104(11):e22-e26.
3. Sumner SA, Mercy JA, Dahlberg LL, et al. Violence in the United States: status, challenges, and opportunities. JAMA. 2015;314(5):478-488.
4. Heron M. Deaths: leading causes for 2014. Natl Vital Stat Rep. 2016;65(5):1-96.
5. Borum R, Swartz M, Swanson J. Assessing and managing violence risk in clinical practice. J Prac Psychiatry Behav Health. 1996;2(4):205-215.
6. Swanson JW, Holzer CE 3rd, Ganju VK, et al. Violence and psychiatric disorder in the community: Evidence from the epidemiologic catchment area surveys. Hosp Community Psychiatry. 1990;41(7):761-770.
7. Swanson JW. Explaining rare acts of violence: the limits of evidence from population research. Psychiatr Serv. 2011;62(11):1369-1371.
8. Bonta J, Law M, Hanson K. The prediction of criminal and violent recidivism among mentally disordered offenders: a meta-analysis. Psychol Bull. 1998;123(2):123-142.
9. Monahan J. The inclusion of biological risk factors in violence risk assessments. In: Singh I, Sinnott-Armstrong W, Savulescu J, eds. Bioprediction, biomarkers, and bad behavior: scientific, legal, and ethical implications. New York, NY: Oxford University Press; 2014:57-76.
10. Murray J, Thomson ME. Clinical judgement in violence risk assessment. Eur J Psychol. 2010;6(1):128-149.
11. Mossman D. Violence risk: is clinical judgment enough? Current Psychiatry. 2008;7(6):66-72.
12. Douglas T, Pugh J, Singh I, et al. Risk assessment tools in criminal justice and forensic psychiatry: the need for better data. Eur Psychiatry. 2017;42:134-137.
13. Dolan M, Doyle M. Violence risk prediction. Clinical and actuarial measures and the role of the psychopathy checklist. Br J Psychiatry. 2000;177:303-311.
14. Fazel S, Singh J, Doll H, et al. Use of risk assessment instruments to predict violence and antisocial behaviour in 73 samples involving 24 827 people: systematic review and meta-analysis. BMJ. 2012;345:e4692. doi: 10.1136/bmj.e4692.
15. National Collaborating Centre for Mental Health (UK). Violence and aggression: short- term management in mental health, health, and community settings: updated edition. London: British Psychological Society; 2015. NICE Guideline, No 10.
16. Klassen D, O’Connor WA. Predicting violence in schizophrenic and non-schizophrenic patients: a prospective study. J Community Psychol. 1988;16(2):217-227.
17. Scott C, Resnick P. Clinical assessment of aggression and violence. In: Rosner R, Scott C, eds. Principles and practice of forensic psychiatry, 3rd ed. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press; 2017:623-631.
18. Tardiff K, Sweillam A. Assault, suicide, and mental illness. Arch Gen Psychiatry. 1980;37(2):164-169.
19. Lidz CW, Mulvey EP, Gardner W. The accuracy of predictions of violence to others. JAMA. 1993;269(8):1007-1011.
20. Newhill CE, Mulvey EP, Lidz CW. Characteristics of violence in the community by female patients seen in a psychiatric emergency service. Psychiatric Serv. 1995;46(8):785-789.
21. Mulvey E, Lidz C. Clinical considerations in the prediction of dangerousness in mental patients. Clin Psychol Rev. 1984;4(4):379-401.
22. Link BG, Andrews H, Cullen FT. The violent and illegal behavior of mental patients reconsidered. Am Sociol Rev. 1992;57(3):275-292.
23. Harris GT, Rice ME, Quinsey VL. Violent recidivism of mentally disordered offenders: the development of a statistical prediction instrument. Crim Justice and Behav. 1993;20(4):315-335.
24. Klassen D, O’Connor W. Demographic and case history variables in risk assessment. In: Monahan J, Steadman H, eds. Violence and mental disorder: developments in risk assessment. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press; 1994:229-257.
25. Hart SD, Hare RD, Forth AE. Psychopathy as a risk marker for violence: development and validation of a screening version of the revised Psychopathy Checklist. In: Monahan J, Steadman HJ, eds. Violence and mental disorder: developments in risk assessment. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press; 1994:81-98.
26. Cleckley H. The mask of sanity. St. Louis, MO: Mosby; 1941.
27. Harris GT, Rice ME, Cormier CA. Psychopathy and violent recidivism. Law Hum Behav. 1991;15(6):625-637.
28. Steadman HJ, Mulvey EP, Monahan J. Violence by people discharged from acute psychiatric inpatient facilities and by others in the same neighborhoods. Arch Gen Psychiatry. 1998;55:393-401.
29. Meloy JR, White SG, Hart S. Workplace assessment of targeted violence risk: the development and reliability of the WAVR-21. J Forensic Sci. 2013;58(5):1353-1358.
30. Borum R, Fein R, Vossekuil B, et al. Threat assessment: defining an approach for evaluating risk of targeted violence. Behav Sci Law. 1999;17(3):323-337.
31. Tyrer P, Bateman AW. Drug treatment for personality disorders. Adv Psychiatr Treat. 2004;10(5):389-398.

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Adrienne Saxton, MD
Assistant Professor Department of Psychiatry
Case Western Reserve University School of Medicine
Cleveland, Ohio

Phillip Resnick, MD
Forensic Psychiatry Section Editor Current Psychiatry
Professor Department of Psychiatry
Case Western Reserve University School of Medicine
Cleveland, Ohio

Stephen Noffsinger, MD
Associate Professor
Department of Psychiatry
Case Western Reserve University School of Medicine
Cleveland, Ohio

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Adrienne Saxton, MD
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Case Western Reserve University School of Medicine
Cleveland, Ohio

Phillip Resnick, MD
Forensic Psychiatry Section Editor Current Psychiatry
Professor Department of Psychiatry
Case Western Reserve University School of Medicine
Cleveland, Ohio

Stephen Noffsinger, MD
Associate Professor
Department of Psychiatry
Case Western Reserve University School of Medicine
Cleveland, Ohio

Disclosures
The authors report no financial relationships with any company whose products are mentioned in this article or with manufacturers of competing products.

Author and Disclosure Information

Adrienne Saxton, MD
Assistant Professor Department of Psychiatry
Case Western Reserve University School of Medicine
Cleveland, Ohio

Phillip Resnick, MD
Forensic Psychiatry Section Editor Current Psychiatry
Professor Department of Psychiatry
Case Western Reserve University School of Medicine
Cleveland, Ohio

Stephen Noffsinger, MD
Associate Professor
Department of Psychiatry
Case Western Reserve University School of Medicine
Cleveland, Ohio

Disclosures
The authors report no financial relationships with any company whose products are mentioned in this article or with manufacturers of competing products.

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Mr. F, age 35, is homeless and has a history of cocaine and alcohol use disorders. He is admitted voluntarily to the psychiatric unit because he has homicidal thoughts toward Ms. S, who works in the shelter where he has been staying. Mr. F reports that he is thinking of killing Ms. S if he is discharged because she has been rude to him. He states that he has access to several firearms, but he will not disclose the location. He has been diagnosed with unspecified depressive disorder and exhibited antisocial personality disorder traits. He is being treated with sertraline. However, his mood appears to be relatively stable, except for occasional angry verbal outbursts. The outbursts have been related to intrusive peers or staff turning the television off for group meetings. Mr. F has been joking with peers, eating well, and sleeping appropriately. He reports no suicidal thoughts and has not been physically violent on the unit. However, Mr. F has had a history of violence since his teenage years. He has been incarcerated twice for assault and once for drug possession.

How would you approach assessing and managing Mr. F’s risk for violence?

We all have encountered a patient similar to Mr. F on the psychiatric unit or in the emergency department—a patient who makes violent threats and appears angry, intimidating, manipulative, and/or demanding, despite exhibiting no evidence of mania or psychosis. This patient often has a history of substance abuse and a lifelong pattern of viewing violence as an acceptable way of addressing life’s problems. Many psychiatrists suspect that more time on the inpatient unit is unlikely to reduce this patient’s risk of violence. Why? Because the violence risk does not stem from a treatable mental illness. Further, psychiatrists may be apprehensive about this patient’s potential for violence after discharge and their liability in the event of a bad outcome. No one wants their name associated with a headline that reads “Psychiatrist discharged man less than 24 hours before he killed 3 people.”

The purported relationship between mental illness and violence often is sensationalized in the media. However, research reveals that the vast majority of violence is in fact not due to symptoms of mental illness.1,2 A common clinical challenge in psychiatry involves evaluating individuals at elevated risk of violence and determining how to address their risk factors for violence. When the risk is primarily due to psychosis and can be reduced with antipsychotic medication, the job is easy. But how should we proceed when the risk stems from factors other than mental illness?

This article reviews risk factors for violence, discusses targeted violence against a specific victim, and offers practical tips for assessing and managing risk, particularly when the risk for violence is not due to mental illness.

Violence and mental illness: A tenuous link

Violence is a major public health concern in the United States. Although in recent years the rates of homicide and aggravated assault have decreased dramatically, there are approximately 16,000 homicides annually in the United States, and more than 1.6 million injuries from assaults treated in emergency departments each year.3 Homicide continues to be one of the leading causes of death among teenagers and young adults.4

The most effective methods of preventing widespread violence are public health approaches, such as parent- and family-focused programs, early childhood education, programs in school, and public policy changes.3 However, as psychiatrists, we are routinely asked to assess the risk of violence for an individual patient and devise strategies to mitigate violence risk.

Continue to: Although certain mental illnesses...

 

 

Although certain mental illnesses increase the relative risk of violence (compared with people without mental illness),5,6 recent studies suggest that mental illness plays only a “minor role in explaining violence in populations.”7 It is estimated that as little as 4% of the violence in the United States can be attributed to mental illness.1 According to a 1998 meta-analysis of 48 studies of criminal recidivism, the risk factors for violent recidivism were “almost identical” among offenders who had a mental disorder and those who did not.8

Approaches to assessing violence risk

Psychiatrists can assess the risk of future violence via 3 broad approaches.9,10

Unaided clinical judgment is when a mental health professional estimates violence risk based on his or her own experience and intuition, with knowledge of violence risk factors, but without the use of structured tools.

Actuarial tools are statistical models that use formulae to show relationships between data (risk factors) and outcomes (violence).10,11

Continue to: Structured professional judgment

 

 

Structured professional judgment is a hybrid of unaided clinical judgment and actuarial methods. Structured professional judgment tools help the evaluator identify empirically established risk factors. Once the information is collected, it is combined with clinical judgment in decision making.9,10 There are now more than 200 structured tools available for assessing violence risk in criminal justice and forensic mental health populations.12

Clinical judgment, although commonly used in practice, is less accurate than actuarial tools or structured professional judgment.10,11 In general, risk assessment tools offer moderate levels of accuracy in categorizing people at low risk vs high risk.5,13 The tools have better ability to accurately categorize individuals at low risk, compared with high risk, where false positives are common.12,14

Two types of risk factors

Risk factors for violence are commonly categorized as static or dynamic factors. Static factors are historical factors that cannot be changed with intervention (eg, age, sex, history of abuse). Dynamic factors can be changed with intervention (eg, substance abuse).15

Static risk factors. The best predictor of future violence is past violent behavior.5,16,17 Violence risk increases with each prior episode of violence.5 Prior arrests for any crime, especially if the individual was a juvenile at the time of arrest for his or her first violent offense, increase future violence risk.5 Other important static violence risk factors include demographic factors such as age, sex, and socioeconomic status. Swanson et al6 reviewed a large pool of data (approximately 10,000 respondents) from the Epidemiologic Catchment Area survey. Being young, male, and of low socioeconomic status were all associated with violence in the community.6 The highest-risk age group for violence is age 15 to 24.5 Males perpetrate violence in the community at a rate 10 times that of females.18 However, among individuals with severe mental illness, men and women have similar rates of violence.19,20 Unstable employment,21 less education,22 low intelligence,16 and a history of a significant head injury5 also are risk factors for violence.5

Continue to: Being abused as a child...

 

 

Being abused as a child, witnessing violence in the home,5,16 and growing up with an unstable parental situation (eg, parental loss or separation) has been linked to violence.16,23,24 Early disruptive behavior in childhood (eg, fighting, lying and stealing, truancy, and school problems) increases violence risk.21,23

Personality factors are important static risk factors for violence. Antisocial personality disorder is the most common personality disorder linked with violence.17 Several studies consistently show psychopathy to be a strong predictor of both violence and criminal behavior.5,25 A psychopath is a person who lacks empathy and close relationships, behaves impulsively, has superficially charming qualities, and is primarily interested in self-gratification.26 Harris et al27 studied 169 released forensic patients and found that 77% of the psychopaths (according to Psychopathy Checklist-Revised [PCL-R] scores) violently recidivated. In contrast, only 21% of the non-psychopaths violently recidivated.27

Other personality factors associated with violence include a predisposition toward feelings of anger and hatred (as opposed to empathy, anxiety, or guilt, which may reduce risk), hostile attributional biases (a tendency to interpret benign behavior of others as intentionally antagonistic), violent fantasies, poor anger control, and impulsivity.5 Although personality factors tend to be longstanding and more difficult to modify, in the outpatient setting, therapeutic efforts can be made to modify hostile attribution biases, poor anger control, and impulsive behavior.

Dynamic risk factors. Substance abuse is strongly associated with violence.6,17 The prevalence of violence is 12 times greater among individuals with alcohol use disorder and 16 times greater among individuals with other substance use disorders, compared with those with no such diagnoses.5,6

Continue to: Steadman et al...

 

 

Steadman et al28 compared 1,136 adult patients with mental disorders discharged from psychiatric hospitals with 519 individuals living in the same neighborhoods as the hospitalized patients. They found that the prevalence of violence among discharged patients without substance abuse was “statistically indistinguishable” from the prevalence of violence among community members, in the same neighborhood, who did not have symptoms of substance abuse.28 Swanson et al6 found that the combination of a mental disorder plus an alcohol or substance use disorder substantially increased the risk of violence.

Other dynamic risk factors for violence include mental illness symptoms such as psychosis, especially threat/control-override delusions, where the individual believes that they are being threatened or controlled by an external force.17

Contextual factors to consider in violence risk assessments include current stressors, lack of social support, availability of weapons, access to drugs and alcohol, and the presence of similar circumstances that led to violent behavior in the past.5

How to assess the risk of targeted violence

Targeted violence is a predatory act of violence intentionally committed against a preselected person, group of people, or place.29 Due to the low base rates of these incidents, targeted violence is difficult to study.7,30 These risk assessments require a more specialized approach.

Continue to: In their 1999 article...

 

 

In their 1999 article, Borum et al30 discussed threat assessment strategies utilized by the U.S. Secret Service and recommended investigating “pathways of ideas and behaviors that may lead to violent action.” Borum et al30 summarized 3 fundamental principles of threat assessment (Table 130).

What to do when violence risk is not due to mental illness

Based on the information in Mr. F’s case scenario, it is likely that his homicidal ideation is not due to mental illness. Despite this, several risk factors for violence are present. Where do we go from here?

Scott and Resnick17 recommend considering the concept of dangerousness as 5 components (Table 217). When this model of dangerousness is applied to Mr. F’s case, one can see that the magnitude of the harm is great because of threatened homicide. With regard to the imminence of the harm, it would help to clarify whether Mr. F plans to kill Ms. S immediately after discharge, or sometime in the next few months. Is his threat contingent on further provocations by Ms. S? Alternatively, does he intend to kill her for past grievances, regardless of further perceived insults?

Next, the frequency of a behavior relates to how often Mr. F has been aggressive in the past. The severity of his past aggression is also important. What is the most violent act he has ever done? Situational factors in this case include Mr. F’s access to weapons, financial problems, housing problems, and access to drugs and alcohol.17 Mr. F should be asked about what situations previously provoked his violent behavior. Consider how similar the present conditions are to past conditions to which Mr. F responded violently.5 The likelihood that a homicide will occur should take into account Mr. F’s risk factors for violence, as well as the seriousness of his intent to cause harm.

Continue to: Consider using a structured tool...

 

 

Consider using a structured tool, such as the Classification of Violence Risk, to help identify Mr. F’s risk factors for violence, or some other formal method to ensure that the proper data are collected. Violence risk assessments are more accurate when structured risk assessment tools are used, compared with clinical judgment alone.

It is important to review collateral sources of information. In Mr. F’s case, useful collateral sources may include his criminal docket (usually available online), past medical records, information from the shelter where he lives, and, potentially, friends or family.

Because Mr. F is making threats of targeted violence, be sure to ask about attack-related behaviors (Table 130).

Regarding the seriousness of Mr. F’s intent to cause harm, it may be helpful to ask him the following questions:

  1. How likely are you to carry out this act of violence?
  2. Do you have a plan? Have you taken any steps toward this plan?
  3. Do you see other, nonviolent solutions to this problem?
  4. What do you hope that we can do for you to help with this problem?

Continue to: Mr. F's answers...

 

 

Mr. F’s answers may suggest the possibility of a hidden agenda. Some patients express homicidal thoughts in order to stay in the hospital. If Mr. F expresses threats that are contingent on discharge and declines to engage in problem-solving discussions, this would cast doubt on the genuineness of his threat. However, doubt about the genuineness of the threat alone is not sufficient to simply discharge Mr. F. Assessment of his intent needs to be considered with other relevant risk factors, risk reduction strategies, and any Tarasoff duties that may apply.

In addition to risk factors, consider mitigating factors. For example, does Mr. F express concern over prison time as a reason to not engage in violence? It would be more ominous if Mr. F says that he does not care if he goes to prison because life is lousy being homeless and unemployed. At this point, an estimation can be made regarding whether Mr. F is a low-, moderate-, or high-risk of violence.

The next step is to organize Mr. F’s risk factors into static (historical) and dynamic (subject to intervention) factors. This will be helpful in formulating a strategy to manage risk because continued hospitalization can only address dynamic risk factors. Often in these cases, the static risk factors are far more numerous than the dynamic risk factors.

Once the data are collected and organized, the final step is to devise a risk management strategy. Some interventions, such as substance use treatment, will be straightforward. A mood-stabilizing medication could be considered, if clinically appropriate, to help reduce aggression and irritability.31 Efforts should be made to eliminate Mr. F’s access to firearms; however, in this case, it sounds unlikely that he will cooperate with those efforts. Ultimately, you may find yourself with a list of risk factors that are unlikely to be altered with further hospitalization, particularly if Mr. F’s homicidal thoughts and intent are due to antisocial personality traits.

Continue to: In that case...

 

 

In that case, the most important step will be to carry out your duty to warn/protect others prior to Mr. F’s discharge. Most states either require or permit mental health professionals to take reasonable steps to protect victims from violence when certain conditions are present, such as an explicit threat or identifiable victim (see Related Resources).

Once dynamic risk factors have been addressed, and duty to warn/protect is carried out, if there is no further clinical indication for hospitalization, it would be appropriate to discharge Mr. F. Continued homicidal threats stemming from antisocial personality traits, in the absence of a treatable mental illness (or other modifiable risk factors for violence that can be actively addressed), is not a reason for continued hospitalization. It may be useful to obtain a second opinion from a colleague in such scenarios. A second opinion may offer additional risk management ideas. In the event of a bad outcome, this will also help to show that the decision to discharge the patient was not taken lightly.

The psychiatrist should document a thoughtful risk assessment, the strategies that were implemented to reduce risk, the details of the warning, and the reasoning why continued hospitalization was not indicated (Table 3).

CASE CONTINUED

Decision to discharge

In Mr. F’s case, the treating psychiatrist determined that Mr. F’s risk of violence toward Ms. S was moderate. The psychiatrist identified several static risk factors for violence that raised Mr. F’s risk, but also noted that Mr. F’s threats were likely a manipulative effort to prolong his hospital stay. The psychiatrist carried out his duty to protect by notifying police and Ms. S of the nature of the threat prior to Mr. F’s discharge. The unit social worker helped Mr. F schedule an intake appointment for a substance use disorder treatment facility. Mr. F ultimately stated that he no longer experienced homicidal ideas once a bed was secured for him in a substance use treatment program. The psychiatrist carefully documented Mr. F’s risk assessment and the reasons why Mr. F’s risk would not be significantly altered by further inpatient hospitalization. Mr. F was discharged, and Ms. S remained unharmed.

Continue to: Bottom Line

 

 

Bottom Line

Use a structured approach to identify risk factors for violence. Address dynamic risk factors, including access to weapons. Carry out the duty to warn/protect if applicable. Document your decisions and actions carefully, and then discharge the patient if clinically indicated. Do not be “held hostage” by a patient’s homicidal ideation.

Related Resources

  • Dolan M, Doyle M. Violence risk prediction. Clinical and actuarial measures and the role of the psychopathy checklist. Br J Psychiatry. 2000;177:303-311.
  • Douglas KS, Hart SD, Webster CD, et al. HCR-20V3: Assessing risk of violence–user guide. Burnaby, Canada: Mental Health, Law, and Policy Institute, Simon Fraser University; 2013.
  • National Conference of State Legislatures. Mental health professionals’ duty to warn. http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/mental-health-professionals-duty-to-warn.aspx. Published September 28, 2015.

Drug Brand Names

Sertraline • Zoloft

Mr. F, age 35, is homeless and has a history of cocaine and alcohol use disorders. He is admitted voluntarily to the psychiatric unit because he has homicidal thoughts toward Ms. S, who works in the shelter where he has been staying. Mr. F reports that he is thinking of killing Ms. S if he is discharged because she has been rude to him. He states that he has access to several firearms, but he will not disclose the location. He has been diagnosed with unspecified depressive disorder and exhibited antisocial personality disorder traits. He is being treated with sertraline. However, his mood appears to be relatively stable, except for occasional angry verbal outbursts. The outbursts have been related to intrusive peers or staff turning the television off for group meetings. Mr. F has been joking with peers, eating well, and sleeping appropriately. He reports no suicidal thoughts and has not been physically violent on the unit. However, Mr. F has had a history of violence since his teenage years. He has been incarcerated twice for assault and once for drug possession.

How would you approach assessing and managing Mr. F’s risk for violence?

We all have encountered a patient similar to Mr. F on the psychiatric unit or in the emergency department—a patient who makes violent threats and appears angry, intimidating, manipulative, and/or demanding, despite exhibiting no evidence of mania or psychosis. This patient often has a history of substance abuse and a lifelong pattern of viewing violence as an acceptable way of addressing life’s problems. Many psychiatrists suspect that more time on the inpatient unit is unlikely to reduce this patient’s risk of violence. Why? Because the violence risk does not stem from a treatable mental illness. Further, psychiatrists may be apprehensive about this patient’s potential for violence after discharge and their liability in the event of a bad outcome. No one wants their name associated with a headline that reads “Psychiatrist discharged man less than 24 hours before he killed 3 people.”

The purported relationship between mental illness and violence often is sensationalized in the media. However, research reveals that the vast majority of violence is in fact not due to symptoms of mental illness.1,2 A common clinical challenge in psychiatry involves evaluating individuals at elevated risk of violence and determining how to address their risk factors for violence. When the risk is primarily due to psychosis and can be reduced with antipsychotic medication, the job is easy. But how should we proceed when the risk stems from factors other than mental illness?

This article reviews risk factors for violence, discusses targeted violence against a specific victim, and offers practical tips for assessing and managing risk, particularly when the risk for violence is not due to mental illness.

Violence and mental illness: A tenuous link

Violence is a major public health concern in the United States. Although in recent years the rates of homicide and aggravated assault have decreased dramatically, there are approximately 16,000 homicides annually in the United States, and more than 1.6 million injuries from assaults treated in emergency departments each year.3 Homicide continues to be one of the leading causes of death among teenagers and young adults.4

The most effective methods of preventing widespread violence are public health approaches, such as parent- and family-focused programs, early childhood education, programs in school, and public policy changes.3 However, as psychiatrists, we are routinely asked to assess the risk of violence for an individual patient and devise strategies to mitigate violence risk.

Continue to: Although certain mental illnesses...

 

 

Although certain mental illnesses increase the relative risk of violence (compared with people without mental illness),5,6 recent studies suggest that mental illness plays only a “minor role in explaining violence in populations.”7 It is estimated that as little as 4% of the violence in the United States can be attributed to mental illness.1 According to a 1998 meta-analysis of 48 studies of criminal recidivism, the risk factors for violent recidivism were “almost identical” among offenders who had a mental disorder and those who did not.8

Approaches to assessing violence risk

Psychiatrists can assess the risk of future violence via 3 broad approaches.9,10

Unaided clinical judgment is when a mental health professional estimates violence risk based on his or her own experience and intuition, with knowledge of violence risk factors, but without the use of structured tools.

Actuarial tools are statistical models that use formulae to show relationships between data (risk factors) and outcomes (violence).10,11

Continue to: Structured professional judgment

 

 

Structured professional judgment is a hybrid of unaided clinical judgment and actuarial methods. Structured professional judgment tools help the evaluator identify empirically established risk factors. Once the information is collected, it is combined with clinical judgment in decision making.9,10 There are now more than 200 structured tools available for assessing violence risk in criminal justice and forensic mental health populations.12

Clinical judgment, although commonly used in practice, is less accurate than actuarial tools or structured professional judgment.10,11 In general, risk assessment tools offer moderate levels of accuracy in categorizing people at low risk vs high risk.5,13 The tools have better ability to accurately categorize individuals at low risk, compared with high risk, where false positives are common.12,14

Two types of risk factors

Risk factors for violence are commonly categorized as static or dynamic factors. Static factors are historical factors that cannot be changed with intervention (eg, age, sex, history of abuse). Dynamic factors can be changed with intervention (eg, substance abuse).15

Static risk factors. The best predictor of future violence is past violent behavior.5,16,17 Violence risk increases with each prior episode of violence.5 Prior arrests for any crime, especially if the individual was a juvenile at the time of arrest for his or her first violent offense, increase future violence risk.5 Other important static violence risk factors include demographic factors such as age, sex, and socioeconomic status. Swanson et al6 reviewed a large pool of data (approximately 10,000 respondents) from the Epidemiologic Catchment Area survey. Being young, male, and of low socioeconomic status were all associated with violence in the community.6 The highest-risk age group for violence is age 15 to 24.5 Males perpetrate violence in the community at a rate 10 times that of females.18 However, among individuals with severe mental illness, men and women have similar rates of violence.19,20 Unstable employment,21 less education,22 low intelligence,16 and a history of a significant head injury5 also are risk factors for violence.5

Continue to: Being abused as a child...

 

 

Being abused as a child, witnessing violence in the home,5,16 and growing up with an unstable parental situation (eg, parental loss or separation) has been linked to violence.16,23,24 Early disruptive behavior in childhood (eg, fighting, lying and stealing, truancy, and school problems) increases violence risk.21,23

Personality factors are important static risk factors for violence. Antisocial personality disorder is the most common personality disorder linked with violence.17 Several studies consistently show psychopathy to be a strong predictor of both violence and criminal behavior.5,25 A psychopath is a person who lacks empathy and close relationships, behaves impulsively, has superficially charming qualities, and is primarily interested in self-gratification.26 Harris et al27 studied 169 released forensic patients and found that 77% of the psychopaths (according to Psychopathy Checklist-Revised [PCL-R] scores) violently recidivated. In contrast, only 21% of the non-psychopaths violently recidivated.27

Other personality factors associated with violence include a predisposition toward feelings of anger and hatred (as opposed to empathy, anxiety, or guilt, which may reduce risk), hostile attributional biases (a tendency to interpret benign behavior of others as intentionally antagonistic), violent fantasies, poor anger control, and impulsivity.5 Although personality factors tend to be longstanding and more difficult to modify, in the outpatient setting, therapeutic efforts can be made to modify hostile attribution biases, poor anger control, and impulsive behavior.

Dynamic risk factors. Substance abuse is strongly associated with violence.6,17 The prevalence of violence is 12 times greater among individuals with alcohol use disorder and 16 times greater among individuals with other substance use disorders, compared with those with no such diagnoses.5,6

Continue to: Steadman et al...

 

 

Steadman et al28 compared 1,136 adult patients with mental disorders discharged from psychiatric hospitals with 519 individuals living in the same neighborhoods as the hospitalized patients. They found that the prevalence of violence among discharged patients without substance abuse was “statistically indistinguishable” from the prevalence of violence among community members, in the same neighborhood, who did not have symptoms of substance abuse.28 Swanson et al6 found that the combination of a mental disorder plus an alcohol or substance use disorder substantially increased the risk of violence.

Other dynamic risk factors for violence include mental illness symptoms such as psychosis, especially threat/control-override delusions, where the individual believes that they are being threatened or controlled by an external force.17

Contextual factors to consider in violence risk assessments include current stressors, lack of social support, availability of weapons, access to drugs and alcohol, and the presence of similar circumstances that led to violent behavior in the past.5

How to assess the risk of targeted violence

Targeted violence is a predatory act of violence intentionally committed against a preselected person, group of people, or place.29 Due to the low base rates of these incidents, targeted violence is difficult to study.7,30 These risk assessments require a more specialized approach.

Continue to: In their 1999 article...

 

 

In their 1999 article, Borum et al30 discussed threat assessment strategies utilized by the U.S. Secret Service and recommended investigating “pathways of ideas and behaviors that may lead to violent action.” Borum et al30 summarized 3 fundamental principles of threat assessment (Table 130).

What to do when violence risk is not due to mental illness

Based on the information in Mr. F’s case scenario, it is likely that his homicidal ideation is not due to mental illness. Despite this, several risk factors for violence are present. Where do we go from here?

Scott and Resnick17 recommend considering the concept of dangerousness as 5 components (Table 217). When this model of dangerousness is applied to Mr. F’s case, one can see that the magnitude of the harm is great because of threatened homicide. With regard to the imminence of the harm, it would help to clarify whether Mr. F plans to kill Ms. S immediately after discharge, or sometime in the next few months. Is his threat contingent on further provocations by Ms. S? Alternatively, does he intend to kill her for past grievances, regardless of further perceived insults?

Next, the frequency of a behavior relates to how often Mr. F has been aggressive in the past. The severity of his past aggression is also important. What is the most violent act he has ever done? Situational factors in this case include Mr. F’s access to weapons, financial problems, housing problems, and access to drugs and alcohol.17 Mr. F should be asked about what situations previously provoked his violent behavior. Consider how similar the present conditions are to past conditions to which Mr. F responded violently.5 The likelihood that a homicide will occur should take into account Mr. F’s risk factors for violence, as well as the seriousness of his intent to cause harm.

Continue to: Consider using a structured tool...

 

 

Consider using a structured tool, such as the Classification of Violence Risk, to help identify Mr. F’s risk factors for violence, or some other formal method to ensure that the proper data are collected. Violence risk assessments are more accurate when structured risk assessment tools are used, compared with clinical judgment alone.

It is important to review collateral sources of information. In Mr. F’s case, useful collateral sources may include his criminal docket (usually available online), past medical records, information from the shelter where he lives, and, potentially, friends or family.

Because Mr. F is making threats of targeted violence, be sure to ask about attack-related behaviors (Table 130).

Regarding the seriousness of Mr. F’s intent to cause harm, it may be helpful to ask him the following questions:

  1. How likely are you to carry out this act of violence?
  2. Do you have a plan? Have you taken any steps toward this plan?
  3. Do you see other, nonviolent solutions to this problem?
  4. What do you hope that we can do for you to help with this problem?

Continue to: Mr. F's answers...

 

 

Mr. F’s answers may suggest the possibility of a hidden agenda. Some patients express homicidal thoughts in order to stay in the hospital. If Mr. F expresses threats that are contingent on discharge and declines to engage in problem-solving discussions, this would cast doubt on the genuineness of his threat. However, doubt about the genuineness of the threat alone is not sufficient to simply discharge Mr. F. Assessment of his intent needs to be considered with other relevant risk factors, risk reduction strategies, and any Tarasoff duties that may apply.

In addition to risk factors, consider mitigating factors. For example, does Mr. F express concern over prison time as a reason to not engage in violence? It would be more ominous if Mr. F says that he does not care if he goes to prison because life is lousy being homeless and unemployed. At this point, an estimation can be made regarding whether Mr. F is a low-, moderate-, or high-risk of violence.

The next step is to organize Mr. F’s risk factors into static (historical) and dynamic (subject to intervention) factors. This will be helpful in formulating a strategy to manage risk because continued hospitalization can only address dynamic risk factors. Often in these cases, the static risk factors are far more numerous than the dynamic risk factors.

Once the data are collected and organized, the final step is to devise a risk management strategy. Some interventions, such as substance use treatment, will be straightforward. A mood-stabilizing medication could be considered, if clinically appropriate, to help reduce aggression and irritability.31 Efforts should be made to eliminate Mr. F’s access to firearms; however, in this case, it sounds unlikely that he will cooperate with those efforts. Ultimately, you may find yourself with a list of risk factors that are unlikely to be altered with further hospitalization, particularly if Mr. F’s homicidal thoughts and intent are due to antisocial personality traits.

Continue to: In that case...

 

 

In that case, the most important step will be to carry out your duty to warn/protect others prior to Mr. F’s discharge. Most states either require or permit mental health professionals to take reasonable steps to protect victims from violence when certain conditions are present, such as an explicit threat or identifiable victim (see Related Resources).

Once dynamic risk factors have been addressed, and duty to warn/protect is carried out, if there is no further clinical indication for hospitalization, it would be appropriate to discharge Mr. F. Continued homicidal threats stemming from antisocial personality traits, in the absence of a treatable mental illness (or other modifiable risk factors for violence that can be actively addressed), is not a reason for continued hospitalization. It may be useful to obtain a second opinion from a colleague in such scenarios. A second opinion may offer additional risk management ideas. In the event of a bad outcome, this will also help to show that the decision to discharge the patient was not taken lightly.

The psychiatrist should document a thoughtful risk assessment, the strategies that were implemented to reduce risk, the details of the warning, and the reasoning why continued hospitalization was not indicated (Table 3).

CASE CONTINUED

Decision to discharge

In Mr. F’s case, the treating psychiatrist determined that Mr. F’s risk of violence toward Ms. S was moderate. The psychiatrist identified several static risk factors for violence that raised Mr. F’s risk, but also noted that Mr. F’s threats were likely a manipulative effort to prolong his hospital stay. The psychiatrist carried out his duty to protect by notifying police and Ms. S of the nature of the threat prior to Mr. F’s discharge. The unit social worker helped Mr. F schedule an intake appointment for a substance use disorder treatment facility. Mr. F ultimately stated that he no longer experienced homicidal ideas once a bed was secured for him in a substance use treatment program. The psychiatrist carefully documented Mr. F’s risk assessment and the reasons why Mr. F’s risk would not be significantly altered by further inpatient hospitalization. Mr. F was discharged, and Ms. S remained unharmed.

Continue to: Bottom Line

 

 

Bottom Line

Use a structured approach to identify risk factors for violence. Address dynamic risk factors, including access to weapons. Carry out the duty to warn/protect if applicable. Document your decisions and actions carefully, and then discharge the patient if clinically indicated. Do not be “held hostage” by a patient’s homicidal ideation.

Related Resources

  • Dolan M, Doyle M. Violence risk prediction. Clinical and actuarial measures and the role of the psychopathy checklist. Br J Psychiatry. 2000;177:303-311.
  • Douglas KS, Hart SD, Webster CD, et al. HCR-20V3: Assessing risk of violence–user guide. Burnaby, Canada: Mental Health, Law, and Policy Institute, Simon Fraser University; 2013.
  • National Conference of State Legislatures. Mental health professionals’ duty to warn. http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/mental-health-professionals-duty-to-warn.aspx. Published September 28, 2015.

Drug Brand Names

Sertraline • Zoloft

References

1. Skeem J, Kennealy P, Monahan J, et al. Psychosis uncommonly and inconsistently precedes violence among high-risk individuals. Clin Psychol Sci. 2016;4(1):40-49.
2. McGinty E, Frattaroli S, Appelbaum PS, et al. Using research evidence to reframe the policy debate around mental illness and guns: process and recommendations. Am J Public Health. 2014;104(11):e22-e26.
3. Sumner SA, Mercy JA, Dahlberg LL, et al. Violence in the United States: status, challenges, and opportunities. JAMA. 2015;314(5):478-488.
4. Heron M. Deaths: leading causes for 2014. Natl Vital Stat Rep. 2016;65(5):1-96.
5. Borum R, Swartz M, Swanson J. Assessing and managing violence risk in clinical practice. J Prac Psychiatry Behav Health. 1996;2(4):205-215.
6. Swanson JW, Holzer CE 3rd, Ganju VK, et al. Violence and psychiatric disorder in the community: Evidence from the epidemiologic catchment area surveys. Hosp Community Psychiatry. 1990;41(7):761-770.
7. Swanson JW. Explaining rare acts of violence: the limits of evidence from population research. Psychiatr Serv. 2011;62(11):1369-1371.
8. Bonta J, Law M, Hanson K. The prediction of criminal and violent recidivism among mentally disordered offenders: a meta-analysis. Psychol Bull. 1998;123(2):123-142.
9. Monahan J. The inclusion of biological risk factors in violence risk assessments. In: Singh I, Sinnott-Armstrong W, Savulescu J, eds. Bioprediction, biomarkers, and bad behavior: scientific, legal, and ethical implications. New York, NY: Oxford University Press; 2014:57-76.
10. Murray J, Thomson ME. Clinical judgement in violence risk assessment. Eur J Psychol. 2010;6(1):128-149.
11. Mossman D. Violence risk: is clinical judgment enough? Current Psychiatry. 2008;7(6):66-72.
12. Douglas T, Pugh J, Singh I, et al. Risk assessment tools in criminal justice and forensic psychiatry: the need for better data. Eur Psychiatry. 2017;42:134-137.
13. Dolan M, Doyle M. Violence risk prediction. Clinical and actuarial measures and the role of the psychopathy checklist. Br J Psychiatry. 2000;177:303-311.
14. Fazel S, Singh J, Doll H, et al. Use of risk assessment instruments to predict violence and antisocial behaviour in 73 samples involving 24 827 people: systematic review and meta-analysis. BMJ. 2012;345:e4692. doi: 10.1136/bmj.e4692.
15. National Collaborating Centre for Mental Health (UK). Violence and aggression: short- term management in mental health, health, and community settings: updated edition. London: British Psychological Society; 2015. NICE Guideline, No 10.
16. Klassen D, O’Connor WA. Predicting violence in schizophrenic and non-schizophrenic patients: a prospective study. J Community Psychol. 1988;16(2):217-227.
17. Scott C, Resnick P. Clinical assessment of aggression and violence. In: Rosner R, Scott C, eds. Principles and practice of forensic psychiatry, 3rd ed. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press; 2017:623-631.
18. Tardiff K, Sweillam A. Assault, suicide, and mental illness. Arch Gen Psychiatry. 1980;37(2):164-169.
19. Lidz CW, Mulvey EP, Gardner W. The accuracy of predictions of violence to others. JAMA. 1993;269(8):1007-1011.
20. Newhill CE, Mulvey EP, Lidz CW. Characteristics of violence in the community by female patients seen in a psychiatric emergency service. Psychiatric Serv. 1995;46(8):785-789.
21. Mulvey E, Lidz C. Clinical considerations in the prediction of dangerousness in mental patients. Clin Psychol Rev. 1984;4(4):379-401.
22. Link BG, Andrews H, Cullen FT. The violent and illegal behavior of mental patients reconsidered. Am Sociol Rev. 1992;57(3):275-292.
23. Harris GT, Rice ME, Quinsey VL. Violent recidivism of mentally disordered offenders: the development of a statistical prediction instrument. Crim Justice and Behav. 1993;20(4):315-335.
24. Klassen D, O’Connor W. Demographic and case history variables in risk assessment. In: Monahan J, Steadman H, eds. Violence and mental disorder: developments in risk assessment. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press; 1994:229-257.
25. Hart SD, Hare RD, Forth AE. Psychopathy as a risk marker for violence: development and validation of a screening version of the revised Psychopathy Checklist. In: Monahan J, Steadman HJ, eds. Violence and mental disorder: developments in risk assessment. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press; 1994:81-98.
26. Cleckley H. The mask of sanity. St. Louis, MO: Mosby; 1941.
27. Harris GT, Rice ME, Cormier CA. Psychopathy and violent recidivism. Law Hum Behav. 1991;15(6):625-637.
28. Steadman HJ, Mulvey EP, Monahan J. Violence by people discharged from acute psychiatric inpatient facilities and by others in the same neighborhoods. Arch Gen Psychiatry. 1998;55:393-401.
29. Meloy JR, White SG, Hart S. Workplace assessment of targeted violence risk: the development and reliability of the WAVR-21. J Forensic Sci. 2013;58(5):1353-1358.
30. Borum R, Fein R, Vossekuil B, et al. Threat assessment: defining an approach for evaluating risk of targeted violence. Behav Sci Law. 1999;17(3):323-337.
31. Tyrer P, Bateman AW. Drug treatment for personality disorders. Adv Psychiatr Treat. 2004;10(5):389-398.

References

1. Skeem J, Kennealy P, Monahan J, et al. Psychosis uncommonly and inconsistently precedes violence among high-risk individuals. Clin Psychol Sci. 2016;4(1):40-49.
2. McGinty E, Frattaroli S, Appelbaum PS, et al. Using research evidence to reframe the policy debate around mental illness and guns: process and recommendations. Am J Public Health. 2014;104(11):e22-e26.
3. Sumner SA, Mercy JA, Dahlberg LL, et al. Violence in the United States: status, challenges, and opportunities. JAMA. 2015;314(5):478-488.
4. Heron M. Deaths: leading causes for 2014. Natl Vital Stat Rep. 2016;65(5):1-96.
5. Borum R, Swartz M, Swanson J. Assessing and managing violence risk in clinical practice. J Prac Psychiatry Behav Health. 1996;2(4):205-215.
6. Swanson JW, Holzer CE 3rd, Ganju VK, et al. Violence and psychiatric disorder in the community: Evidence from the epidemiologic catchment area surveys. Hosp Community Psychiatry. 1990;41(7):761-770.
7. Swanson JW. Explaining rare acts of violence: the limits of evidence from population research. Psychiatr Serv. 2011;62(11):1369-1371.
8. Bonta J, Law M, Hanson K. The prediction of criminal and violent recidivism among mentally disordered offenders: a meta-analysis. Psychol Bull. 1998;123(2):123-142.
9. Monahan J. The inclusion of biological risk factors in violence risk assessments. In: Singh I, Sinnott-Armstrong W, Savulescu J, eds. Bioprediction, biomarkers, and bad behavior: scientific, legal, and ethical implications. New York, NY: Oxford University Press; 2014:57-76.
10. Murray J, Thomson ME. Clinical judgement in violence risk assessment. Eur J Psychol. 2010;6(1):128-149.
11. Mossman D. Violence risk: is clinical judgment enough? Current Psychiatry. 2008;7(6):66-72.
12. Douglas T, Pugh J, Singh I, et al. Risk assessment tools in criminal justice and forensic psychiatry: the need for better data. Eur Psychiatry. 2017;42:134-137.
13. Dolan M, Doyle M. Violence risk prediction. Clinical and actuarial measures and the role of the psychopathy checklist. Br J Psychiatry. 2000;177:303-311.
14. Fazel S, Singh J, Doll H, et al. Use of risk assessment instruments to predict violence and antisocial behaviour in 73 samples involving 24 827 people: systematic review and meta-analysis. BMJ. 2012;345:e4692. doi: 10.1136/bmj.e4692.
15. National Collaborating Centre for Mental Health (UK). Violence and aggression: short- term management in mental health, health, and community settings: updated edition. London: British Psychological Society; 2015. NICE Guideline, No 10.
16. Klassen D, O’Connor WA. Predicting violence in schizophrenic and non-schizophrenic patients: a prospective study. J Community Psychol. 1988;16(2):217-227.
17. Scott C, Resnick P. Clinical assessment of aggression and violence. In: Rosner R, Scott C, eds. Principles and practice of forensic psychiatry, 3rd ed. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press; 2017:623-631.
18. Tardiff K, Sweillam A. Assault, suicide, and mental illness. Arch Gen Psychiatry. 1980;37(2):164-169.
19. Lidz CW, Mulvey EP, Gardner W. The accuracy of predictions of violence to others. JAMA. 1993;269(8):1007-1011.
20. Newhill CE, Mulvey EP, Lidz CW. Characteristics of violence in the community by female patients seen in a psychiatric emergency service. Psychiatric Serv. 1995;46(8):785-789.
21. Mulvey E, Lidz C. Clinical considerations in the prediction of dangerousness in mental patients. Clin Psychol Rev. 1984;4(4):379-401.
22. Link BG, Andrews H, Cullen FT. The violent and illegal behavior of mental patients reconsidered. Am Sociol Rev. 1992;57(3):275-292.
23. Harris GT, Rice ME, Quinsey VL. Violent recidivism of mentally disordered offenders: the development of a statistical prediction instrument. Crim Justice and Behav. 1993;20(4):315-335.
24. Klassen D, O’Connor W. Demographic and case history variables in risk assessment. In: Monahan J, Steadman H, eds. Violence and mental disorder: developments in risk assessment. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press; 1994:229-257.
25. Hart SD, Hare RD, Forth AE. Psychopathy as a risk marker for violence: development and validation of a screening version of the revised Psychopathy Checklist. In: Monahan J, Steadman HJ, eds. Violence and mental disorder: developments in risk assessment. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press; 1994:81-98.
26. Cleckley H. The mask of sanity. St. Louis, MO: Mosby; 1941.
27. Harris GT, Rice ME, Cormier CA. Psychopathy and violent recidivism. Law Hum Behav. 1991;15(6):625-637.
28. Steadman HJ, Mulvey EP, Monahan J. Violence by people discharged from acute psychiatric inpatient facilities and by others in the same neighborhoods. Arch Gen Psychiatry. 1998;55:393-401.
29. Meloy JR, White SG, Hart S. Workplace assessment of targeted violence risk: the development and reliability of the WAVR-21. J Forensic Sci. 2013;58(5):1353-1358.
30. Borum R, Fein R, Vossekuil B, et al. Threat assessment: defining an approach for evaluating risk of targeted violence. Behav Sci Law. 1999;17(3):323-337.
31. Tyrer P, Bateman AW. Drug treatment for personality disorders. Adv Psychiatr Treat. 2004;10(5):389-398.

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What stalking victims need to restore their mental and somatic health

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What stalking victims need to restore their mental and somatic health

The obsessive pursuit of another has long been described in fiction and the scientific literature, but was conceptualized as “stalking” only rela­tively recently—first, under the guise of celebrity stalking and, later, as a public health issue recognized as affecting the general population. A useful working definition of stalking is “… the willful, malicious, and repeated fol­lowing of and harassing of another person that threatens his/her safety.”1

Stalking victims report numerous, severe, life-changing effects from being stalked, including physical, social, and psychological harm. They typically experience mood, anxi­ety, and posttraumatic stress symptoms that require prompt evaluation and treatment.


Prevalence and other characteristics
Stalking and its subsequent victimization are common. Here are statistics:
   • in the United States, approximately 1 million women and 370,000 men are stalked annually
   • women are 3 times more likely to be stalked than raped2
   • lifetime prevalence of stalking victimization is 20% (women, 23.5%; men, 10.5%)
   • 75% of stalking victims are women
   • 77% of stalking emerges from a prior acquaintance, including 49% that originated in a romantic relationship
   • 33% of stalking encounters eventually lead to physical violence; slightly >10% of encounters lead to sexual violence
   • stalking persists for an extended period; on average, almost 2 years.3


Penalties. Stalking can result in interven­tion by the criminal justice system. Legal sanctions levied on the perpetrator vary, depending on (among other variables) the severity of stalking; type of stalking; motive of the stalker; and the strength of incriminating evidence. Surprisingly, the outcome of the perpetrator’s prosecution (arrest, conviction, length of sentence) is unrelated to whether the victim reported continued stalking at follow-up.4,5

What are the symptoms and the dam­age? Given the intrusive nature of stalking behaviors and the extended period during which stalking persists, victims typically experience harmful psychological effects that range from subclinical symptoms to overt psychiatric disorders.

Stalking can have a profound impact on the victim and result in numerous psycho­logical symptoms that become the focus of clinical attention. The typically chronic nature of stalking probably plays a signifi­cant role in its contributions to its victims’ psychological distress.6 Melton7 found that the most common adverse effect of stalk­ing was related to the emotional impact of being stalked—with victims feeling scared, depressed, humiliated, embarrassed, dis­trustful of others, and angry or hateful.

Stalking victims report traumatic stress, hypervigilance, excessive fear, and anxiety coupled with disruptions in employment and social interactions.8 Many report hav­ing become highly distrustful or suspicious (44%); fearful (42%); nervous (31%); angry (27%); paranoid (36%); and depressed (21%). In general, victims have elevated scores on the Trauma Symptom Checklist.9

Stalking in the setting of intimate part­ner abuse is associated with harmful out­comes for the victim. These include repeat physical violence, psychological distress, and impaired physical or mental health, or both.3,7,10

Stalking victims who are female; had a prior relationship with the stalker; have experienced a greater variety of stalking behaviors; are divorced or separated; and have received government assistance were found to be more likely to experience mul­tiple negative outcomes from stalking.11

Effects on mental health. Stalking victims have a higher incidence of mental disorders and comorbid illnesses compared with the general population,12 with the most robust associations identified between stalking victimization, major depressive disorder, and panic disorder. Stalking contributes to symptoms of posttraumatic stress disor­der,13 and there is an association between posttraumatic stress and poor general health.14 Stalking victims report higher cur­rent use of psychotropic medications.12

Victims who blame themselves for being stalked report a significantly higher severity of depression, anxiety, and post­traumatic stress symptoms. Those who ruminate more about the stalking expe­rience, or who explicitly emphasize the terror of stalking to a greater extent, also report a significantly higher severity of symptoms.15

Spitzberg3 reported that stalking victim­ization has several possible effects on vic­tims (Table 1).



Coping by movement.
Victims might attempt to cope with stalking through sev­eral means,2 including:
   • moving away—trying to avoid contact with the stalker
   • moving with—negotiating a more acceptable form of relationship with the stalker
   • moving against—attempting to harm, constrain, or punish the stalker
   • moving inward—seeking self-control or self-actualization
   • moving outward—seeking the assis­tance of others.

The degree of a victim’s symptoms corre­lates partially with the severity of stalking. However, other variables play a crucial role in explaining the level of distress among stalking victims15; these include the types of coping strategies adopted by victims. Self-blame, catastrophizing, and rumination are significantly associated with malad­justment; on the other hand, positive reap­praisal—thoughts of attaching a positive meaning to the event, in terms of personal growth—is associated with greater psycho­logical adjustment.

 

 

The more stalking a victim experiences (and, presumably, experiences greater dis­tress), the greater the variety of coping strat­egies she (he) employs.16


How should stalking victims be treated?
Stalking victims are an underserved popu­lation. Practitioners often are unsure how to address stalking; furthermore, available treatments can be ineffective.

There is a great deal of variability in what professionals who work with stalk­ing victims believe is appropriate practice. Services provided to victims vary widely,17 and the field has not yet come to a consen­sus on best practices.16

Proceed case by case. Practitioners must understand the nuances of each case to con­sider what might work at a particular point in time, and information from victims can help guide decision-making.16 Evidence suggests that stalking victims can feel frus­trated in their attempt to seek help, particu­larly from the criminal justice system; it is possible that such bad experiences may dis­suade them from seeking help later.5,8,18 It is worth noting that, as the frequency of stalk­ing decreases for any given victim, her (his) perception of safety increases and distress diminishes.16

Few communities have attempted to address systemically the problem of stalk­ing. Existing anti-stalking programs have focused on the criminal justice aspects of intervention,8 with less emphasis on treat­ing victims.

Some stalking victims rely on friends and family for support and assistance, but research shows that most reach out to agen­cies for assistance and, generally, seek help from multiple sources.18 Typically, stalking victims are served by 2 types of victim ser­vice organizations:
   • specialized, small, private and non­profit agencies (eg, domestic violence shelters, rape crisis centers, victims’ rights advocacy organizations)
   • small units housed in police depart­ments and prosecutors’ offices.17

Note: When victims seek services at criminal justice agencies, they may be feel­ing particularly unsafe and distressed. This underscores the importance of co-locating victim service providers and criminal jus­tice agencies.16

Stalking victims might benefit from multi-disciplinary team consultation, including input from psychiatric, psy­chotherapeutic, and law enforcement or security professionals. Key priorities for practitioners to address with stalking vic­tims are given in Table 2.19

Stalking behavior does not significantly decrease when victims are in contact with victim services.16 Practitioners can integrate this prospect into their understanding of stalking when they work with victims: That is, it is likely that the problem will not go away quickly, even with intervention.

Victims’ needs remain great and broad-based. Spence-Diehl et al17 conducted a survey of service providers for stalking victims, evaluating the needs of those vic­tims and the response of their communities. Some of their recommendations for better meeting victims’ needs are in Table 3.16



Keeping victims at the center
Several authors have written about the need to return to a victim-centered model of care. This approach (1) puts the vic­tim’s understanding of her (his) situation at the center of victim assistance work and (2) views service providers as consultants in the decision-making process.20,21 The victim-centered approach to treatment, in which the client has a greater voice and degree of control over interventions, is associated with positive outcomes.22,23

At the heart of a client-centered model of victim assistance is the provider’s abil­ity to listen to a victim’s story and respond in a nonjudgmental manner. This approach honors the victim’s circumstances and her personal understanding of risk.21
 

Bottom Line
Stalking victims are a distinctive population, experiencing numerous emotional, physical, and social effects of their stalking over an extended period. Services to treat this underserved population need to be further developed. A multifaceted approach to treating victims incorporates psychological, somatic, and practical interventions, and a victim-centered approach is associated with better outcomes.
 

Related Resources
• Harmon RB, O’Connor M. Forcier A, et al. The impact of anti-stalking training on front line service providers: using the anti-stalking training evaluation protocol (ASTEP). J Forensic Science. 2004;49(5):1050-1055.
• Spitzberg BH, Cupach WR. The state of the art of stalking: tak­ing stock of the emerging literature. Aggression and Violence Behavior. 2007;12(1):64-86.
 

Disclosure
The author reports no financial relationships with any company whose products are mentioned in this article or with manufacturers of competing products.

References


1. Meloy JR, Gothard S. Demographic and clinical comparison of obsessional followers and offenders with mental disorders. Am J Psychiatry. 1995;152(2):258-263.
2. Tjaden P, Thoennes N. Stalking in America: findings from the National Violence Against Women Survey. National Institute of Justice and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/169592.pdf. Published April 1998. Accessed March 25, 2015.
3. Spitzberg BH. The tactical topography of stalking victimization and management. Trauma, Violence, & Abuse. 2002;3(4):261-288.
4. McFarlane J, Willson P, Lemmey D, et al. Women filing assault charges on an intimate partner: criminal justice outcome and future violence experienced. Violence Against Women. 2000;6(4):396-408.
5. Melton HC. Stalking in the context of domestic violence: findings on the criminal justice system. Women & Criminal Justice. 2004;15:33-58.
6. Davies KE, Frieze IH. Research on stalking: what do we know and where do we go? Violence Vict. 2000;15(4):473-487.
7. Melton HC. Stalking in the context of intimate partner abuse: in the victims’ words. Feminist Criminology. 2007;2(4):346-363.
8. Spence-Diehl E. Intensive case management for victims of stalking: a pilot test evaluation. Brief Treatment Crisis Intervention. 2004;4(4):323-341.
9. Brewster MP. An exploration of the experiences and needs of former intimate stalking victims: final report submitted to the National Institute of Justice. West Chester, PA: West Chester University; 1997.
10. Logan TK, Shannon L, Cole J, et al. The impact of differential patterns of physical violence and stalking on mental health and help-seeking among women with protective orders. Violence Against Women. 2006;12(9):866-886.
11. Johnson MC, Kercher GA. Identifying predictors of negative psychological reactions to stalking victimization. J Interpers Violence. 2009;24(5):866-882.
12. Kuehner C, Gass P, Dressing H. Increased risk of mental disorders among lifetime victims of stalking—findings from a community study. Eur Psychiatry. 2007;22(3):142-145.
13. Basile KC, Arias I, Desai S, et al. The differential association of intimate partner physical, sexual, psychological, and stalking violence and post-traumatic stress symptoms in a nationally representative sample of women. J Traumatic Stress. 2004;17(5):413-421.
14. Kamphuis JH, Emmelkamp PM. Traumatic distress among support-seeking female victims of stalking. Am J Psychiatry. 2001;158(5):795-798.
15. Kraaij V, Arensman E, Garnefski N, et al. The role of cognitive coping in female victims of stalking. J Interpers Violence. 2007;22(12):1603-1612.
16. Bennett Cattaneo L, Cho S, Botuck S. Describing intimate partner stalking over time: an effort to inform victim-centered service provision. J Interpers Violence. 2011;26(17):3428-3454.
17. Spence-Diehl E, Potocky-Tripodi M. Victims of stalking: a study of service needs as perceived by victim services practitioners. J Interpers Violence. 2001;16(1):86-94.
18. Galeazzi GM, Buc˘ar-Ruc˘man A, DeFazio L, et al. Experiences of stalking victims and requests for help in three European countries. A survey. European Journal of Criminal Policy Research. 2009;15:243-260.
19. McEwan T, Purcell R. Assessing and surviving stalkers. Presented at: 45th Annual Meeting of American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law; October 2014; Chicago IL.
20. Cattaneo LB, Goodman LA. New directions in IPV risk assessment: an empowerment approach to risk management. In: Kendall-Tackett K, Giacomoni S, eds. Intimate partner violence. Kingston, NJ: Civic Research Institute; 2007:1-17.
21. Goodman LA, Epstein D. Listening to battered women: a survivor-centered approach to advocacy, mental health, and justice. Washington DC: American Psychological Association; 2008.
22. Cattaneo LB, Goodman LA. Through the lens of jurisprudence: the relationship between empowerment in the court system and well-being for intimate partner violence victims. J Interpers Violence. 2010;25(3):481-502.
23. Zweig JM, Burt MR. Predicting women’s perceptions of domestic violence and sexual assault agency helpfulness: what matters to program clients? Violence Against Women. 2007;13(11):1149-1178.

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The obsessive pursuit of another has long been described in fiction and the scientific literature, but was conceptualized as “stalking” only rela­tively recently—first, under the guise of celebrity stalking and, later, as a public health issue recognized as affecting the general population. A useful working definition of stalking is “… the willful, malicious, and repeated fol­lowing of and harassing of another person that threatens his/her safety.”1

Stalking victims report numerous, severe, life-changing effects from being stalked, including physical, social, and psychological harm. They typically experience mood, anxi­ety, and posttraumatic stress symptoms that require prompt evaluation and treatment.


Prevalence and other characteristics
Stalking and its subsequent victimization are common. Here are statistics:
   • in the United States, approximately 1 million women and 370,000 men are stalked annually
   • women are 3 times more likely to be stalked than raped2
   • lifetime prevalence of stalking victimization is 20% (women, 23.5%; men, 10.5%)
   • 75% of stalking victims are women
   • 77% of stalking emerges from a prior acquaintance, including 49% that originated in a romantic relationship
   • 33% of stalking encounters eventually lead to physical violence; slightly >10% of encounters lead to sexual violence
   • stalking persists for an extended period; on average, almost 2 years.3


Penalties. Stalking can result in interven­tion by the criminal justice system. Legal sanctions levied on the perpetrator vary, depending on (among other variables) the severity of stalking; type of stalking; motive of the stalker; and the strength of incriminating evidence. Surprisingly, the outcome of the perpetrator’s prosecution (arrest, conviction, length of sentence) is unrelated to whether the victim reported continued stalking at follow-up.4,5

What are the symptoms and the dam­age? Given the intrusive nature of stalking behaviors and the extended period during which stalking persists, victims typically experience harmful psychological effects that range from subclinical symptoms to overt psychiatric disorders.

Stalking can have a profound impact on the victim and result in numerous psycho­logical symptoms that become the focus of clinical attention. The typically chronic nature of stalking probably plays a signifi­cant role in its contributions to its victims’ psychological distress.6 Melton7 found that the most common adverse effect of stalk­ing was related to the emotional impact of being stalked—with victims feeling scared, depressed, humiliated, embarrassed, dis­trustful of others, and angry or hateful.

Stalking victims report traumatic stress, hypervigilance, excessive fear, and anxiety coupled with disruptions in employment and social interactions.8 Many report hav­ing become highly distrustful or suspicious (44%); fearful (42%); nervous (31%); angry (27%); paranoid (36%); and depressed (21%). In general, victims have elevated scores on the Trauma Symptom Checklist.9

Stalking in the setting of intimate part­ner abuse is associated with harmful out­comes for the victim. These include repeat physical violence, psychological distress, and impaired physical or mental health, or both.3,7,10

Stalking victims who are female; had a prior relationship with the stalker; have experienced a greater variety of stalking behaviors; are divorced or separated; and have received government assistance were found to be more likely to experience mul­tiple negative outcomes from stalking.11

Effects on mental health. Stalking victims have a higher incidence of mental disorders and comorbid illnesses compared with the general population,12 with the most robust associations identified between stalking victimization, major depressive disorder, and panic disorder. Stalking contributes to symptoms of posttraumatic stress disor­der,13 and there is an association between posttraumatic stress and poor general health.14 Stalking victims report higher cur­rent use of psychotropic medications.12

Victims who blame themselves for being stalked report a significantly higher severity of depression, anxiety, and post­traumatic stress symptoms. Those who ruminate more about the stalking expe­rience, or who explicitly emphasize the terror of stalking to a greater extent, also report a significantly higher severity of symptoms.15

Spitzberg3 reported that stalking victim­ization has several possible effects on vic­tims (Table 1).



Coping by movement.
Victims might attempt to cope with stalking through sev­eral means,2 including:
   • moving away—trying to avoid contact with the stalker
   • moving with—negotiating a more acceptable form of relationship with the stalker
   • moving against—attempting to harm, constrain, or punish the stalker
   • moving inward—seeking self-control or self-actualization
   • moving outward—seeking the assis­tance of others.

The degree of a victim’s symptoms corre­lates partially with the severity of stalking. However, other variables play a crucial role in explaining the level of distress among stalking victims15; these include the types of coping strategies adopted by victims. Self-blame, catastrophizing, and rumination are significantly associated with malad­justment; on the other hand, positive reap­praisal—thoughts of attaching a positive meaning to the event, in terms of personal growth—is associated with greater psycho­logical adjustment.

 

 

The more stalking a victim experiences (and, presumably, experiences greater dis­tress), the greater the variety of coping strat­egies she (he) employs.16


How should stalking victims be treated?
Stalking victims are an underserved popu­lation. Practitioners often are unsure how to address stalking; furthermore, available treatments can be ineffective.

There is a great deal of variability in what professionals who work with stalk­ing victims believe is appropriate practice. Services provided to victims vary widely,17 and the field has not yet come to a consen­sus on best practices.16

Proceed case by case. Practitioners must understand the nuances of each case to con­sider what might work at a particular point in time, and information from victims can help guide decision-making.16 Evidence suggests that stalking victims can feel frus­trated in their attempt to seek help, particu­larly from the criminal justice system; it is possible that such bad experiences may dis­suade them from seeking help later.5,8,18 It is worth noting that, as the frequency of stalk­ing decreases for any given victim, her (his) perception of safety increases and distress diminishes.16

Few communities have attempted to address systemically the problem of stalk­ing. Existing anti-stalking programs have focused on the criminal justice aspects of intervention,8 with less emphasis on treat­ing victims.

Some stalking victims rely on friends and family for support and assistance, but research shows that most reach out to agen­cies for assistance and, generally, seek help from multiple sources.18 Typically, stalking victims are served by 2 types of victim ser­vice organizations:
   • specialized, small, private and non­profit agencies (eg, domestic violence shelters, rape crisis centers, victims’ rights advocacy organizations)
   • small units housed in police depart­ments and prosecutors’ offices.17

Note: When victims seek services at criminal justice agencies, they may be feel­ing particularly unsafe and distressed. This underscores the importance of co-locating victim service providers and criminal jus­tice agencies.16

Stalking victims might benefit from multi-disciplinary team consultation, including input from psychiatric, psy­chotherapeutic, and law enforcement or security professionals. Key priorities for practitioners to address with stalking vic­tims are given in Table 2.19

Stalking behavior does not significantly decrease when victims are in contact with victim services.16 Practitioners can integrate this prospect into their understanding of stalking when they work with victims: That is, it is likely that the problem will not go away quickly, even with intervention.

Victims’ needs remain great and broad-based. Spence-Diehl et al17 conducted a survey of service providers for stalking victims, evaluating the needs of those vic­tims and the response of their communities. Some of their recommendations for better meeting victims’ needs are in Table 3.16



Keeping victims at the center
Several authors have written about the need to return to a victim-centered model of care. This approach (1) puts the vic­tim’s understanding of her (his) situation at the center of victim assistance work and (2) views service providers as consultants in the decision-making process.20,21 The victim-centered approach to treatment, in which the client has a greater voice and degree of control over interventions, is associated with positive outcomes.22,23

At the heart of a client-centered model of victim assistance is the provider’s abil­ity to listen to a victim’s story and respond in a nonjudgmental manner. This approach honors the victim’s circumstances and her personal understanding of risk.21
 

Bottom Line
Stalking victims are a distinctive population, experiencing numerous emotional, physical, and social effects of their stalking over an extended period. Services to treat this underserved population need to be further developed. A multifaceted approach to treating victims incorporates psychological, somatic, and practical interventions, and a victim-centered approach is associated with better outcomes.
 

Related Resources
• Harmon RB, O’Connor M. Forcier A, et al. The impact of anti-stalking training on front line service providers: using the anti-stalking training evaluation protocol (ASTEP). J Forensic Science. 2004;49(5):1050-1055.
• Spitzberg BH, Cupach WR. The state of the art of stalking: tak­ing stock of the emerging literature. Aggression and Violence Behavior. 2007;12(1):64-86.
 

Disclosure
The author reports no financial relationships with any company whose products are mentioned in this article or with manufacturers of competing products.

The obsessive pursuit of another has long been described in fiction and the scientific literature, but was conceptualized as “stalking” only rela­tively recently—first, under the guise of celebrity stalking and, later, as a public health issue recognized as affecting the general population. A useful working definition of stalking is “… the willful, malicious, and repeated fol­lowing of and harassing of another person that threatens his/her safety.”1

Stalking victims report numerous, severe, life-changing effects from being stalked, including physical, social, and psychological harm. They typically experience mood, anxi­ety, and posttraumatic stress symptoms that require prompt evaluation and treatment.


Prevalence and other characteristics
Stalking and its subsequent victimization are common. Here are statistics:
   • in the United States, approximately 1 million women and 370,000 men are stalked annually
   • women are 3 times more likely to be stalked than raped2
   • lifetime prevalence of stalking victimization is 20% (women, 23.5%; men, 10.5%)
   • 75% of stalking victims are women
   • 77% of stalking emerges from a prior acquaintance, including 49% that originated in a romantic relationship
   • 33% of stalking encounters eventually lead to physical violence; slightly >10% of encounters lead to sexual violence
   • stalking persists for an extended period; on average, almost 2 years.3


Penalties. Stalking can result in interven­tion by the criminal justice system. Legal sanctions levied on the perpetrator vary, depending on (among other variables) the severity of stalking; type of stalking; motive of the stalker; and the strength of incriminating evidence. Surprisingly, the outcome of the perpetrator’s prosecution (arrest, conviction, length of sentence) is unrelated to whether the victim reported continued stalking at follow-up.4,5

What are the symptoms and the dam­age? Given the intrusive nature of stalking behaviors and the extended period during which stalking persists, victims typically experience harmful psychological effects that range from subclinical symptoms to overt psychiatric disorders.

Stalking can have a profound impact on the victim and result in numerous psycho­logical symptoms that become the focus of clinical attention. The typically chronic nature of stalking probably plays a signifi­cant role in its contributions to its victims’ psychological distress.6 Melton7 found that the most common adverse effect of stalk­ing was related to the emotional impact of being stalked—with victims feeling scared, depressed, humiliated, embarrassed, dis­trustful of others, and angry or hateful.

Stalking victims report traumatic stress, hypervigilance, excessive fear, and anxiety coupled with disruptions in employment and social interactions.8 Many report hav­ing become highly distrustful or suspicious (44%); fearful (42%); nervous (31%); angry (27%); paranoid (36%); and depressed (21%). In general, victims have elevated scores on the Trauma Symptom Checklist.9

Stalking in the setting of intimate part­ner abuse is associated with harmful out­comes for the victim. These include repeat physical violence, psychological distress, and impaired physical or mental health, or both.3,7,10

Stalking victims who are female; had a prior relationship with the stalker; have experienced a greater variety of stalking behaviors; are divorced or separated; and have received government assistance were found to be more likely to experience mul­tiple negative outcomes from stalking.11

Effects on mental health. Stalking victims have a higher incidence of mental disorders and comorbid illnesses compared with the general population,12 with the most robust associations identified between stalking victimization, major depressive disorder, and panic disorder. Stalking contributes to symptoms of posttraumatic stress disor­der,13 and there is an association between posttraumatic stress and poor general health.14 Stalking victims report higher cur­rent use of psychotropic medications.12

Victims who blame themselves for being stalked report a significantly higher severity of depression, anxiety, and post­traumatic stress symptoms. Those who ruminate more about the stalking expe­rience, or who explicitly emphasize the terror of stalking to a greater extent, also report a significantly higher severity of symptoms.15

Spitzberg3 reported that stalking victim­ization has several possible effects on vic­tims (Table 1).



Coping by movement.
Victims might attempt to cope with stalking through sev­eral means,2 including:
   • moving away—trying to avoid contact with the stalker
   • moving with—negotiating a more acceptable form of relationship with the stalker
   • moving against—attempting to harm, constrain, or punish the stalker
   • moving inward—seeking self-control or self-actualization
   • moving outward—seeking the assis­tance of others.

The degree of a victim’s symptoms corre­lates partially with the severity of stalking. However, other variables play a crucial role in explaining the level of distress among stalking victims15; these include the types of coping strategies adopted by victims. Self-blame, catastrophizing, and rumination are significantly associated with malad­justment; on the other hand, positive reap­praisal—thoughts of attaching a positive meaning to the event, in terms of personal growth—is associated with greater psycho­logical adjustment.

 

 

The more stalking a victim experiences (and, presumably, experiences greater dis­tress), the greater the variety of coping strat­egies she (he) employs.16


How should stalking victims be treated?
Stalking victims are an underserved popu­lation. Practitioners often are unsure how to address stalking; furthermore, available treatments can be ineffective.

There is a great deal of variability in what professionals who work with stalk­ing victims believe is appropriate practice. Services provided to victims vary widely,17 and the field has not yet come to a consen­sus on best practices.16

Proceed case by case. Practitioners must understand the nuances of each case to con­sider what might work at a particular point in time, and information from victims can help guide decision-making.16 Evidence suggests that stalking victims can feel frus­trated in their attempt to seek help, particu­larly from the criminal justice system; it is possible that such bad experiences may dis­suade them from seeking help later.5,8,18 It is worth noting that, as the frequency of stalk­ing decreases for any given victim, her (his) perception of safety increases and distress diminishes.16

Few communities have attempted to address systemically the problem of stalk­ing. Existing anti-stalking programs have focused on the criminal justice aspects of intervention,8 with less emphasis on treat­ing victims.

Some stalking victims rely on friends and family for support and assistance, but research shows that most reach out to agen­cies for assistance and, generally, seek help from multiple sources.18 Typically, stalking victims are served by 2 types of victim ser­vice organizations:
   • specialized, small, private and non­profit agencies (eg, domestic violence shelters, rape crisis centers, victims’ rights advocacy organizations)
   • small units housed in police depart­ments and prosecutors’ offices.17

Note: When victims seek services at criminal justice agencies, they may be feel­ing particularly unsafe and distressed. This underscores the importance of co-locating victim service providers and criminal jus­tice agencies.16

Stalking victims might benefit from multi-disciplinary team consultation, including input from psychiatric, psy­chotherapeutic, and law enforcement or security professionals. Key priorities for practitioners to address with stalking vic­tims are given in Table 2.19

Stalking behavior does not significantly decrease when victims are in contact with victim services.16 Practitioners can integrate this prospect into their understanding of stalking when they work with victims: That is, it is likely that the problem will not go away quickly, even with intervention.

Victims’ needs remain great and broad-based. Spence-Diehl et al17 conducted a survey of service providers for stalking victims, evaluating the needs of those vic­tims and the response of their communities. Some of their recommendations for better meeting victims’ needs are in Table 3.16



Keeping victims at the center
Several authors have written about the need to return to a victim-centered model of care. This approach (1) puts the vic­tim’s understanding of her (his) situation at the center of victim assistance work and (2) views service providers as consultants in the decision-making process.20,21 The victim-centered approach to treatment, in which the client has a greater voice and degree of control over interventions, is associated with positive outcomes.22,23

At the heart of a client-centered model of victim assistance is the provider’s abil­ity to listen to a victim’s story and respond in a nonjudgmental manner. This approach honors the victim’s circumstances and her personal understanding of risk.21
 

Bottom Line
Stalking victims are a distinctive population, experiencing numerous emotional, physical, and social effects of their stalking over an extended period. Services to treat this underserved population need to be further developed. A multifaceted approach to treating victims incorporates psychological, somatic, and practical interventions, and a victim-centered approach is associated with better outcomes.
 

Related Resources
• Harmon RB, O’Connor M. Forcier A, et al. The impact of anti-stalking training on front line service providers: using the anti-stalking training evaluation protocol (ASTEP). J Forensic Science. 2004;49(5):1050-1055.
• Spitzberg BH, Cupach WR. The state of the art of stalking: tak­ing stock of the emerging literature. Aggression and Violence Behavior. 2007;12(1):64-86.
 

Disclosure
The author reports no financial relationships with any company whose products are mentioned in this article or with manufacturers of competing products.

References


1. Meloy JR, Gothard S. Demographic and clinical comparison of obsessional followers and offenders with mental disorders. Am J Psychiatry. 1995;152(2):258-263.
2. Tjaden P, Thoennes N. Stalking in America: findings from the National Violence Against Women Survey. National Institute of Justice and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/169592.pdf. Published April 1998. Accessed March 25, 2015.
3. Spitzberg BH. The tactical topography of stalking victimization and management. Trauma, Violence, & Abuse. 2002;3(4):261-288.
4. McFarlane J, Willson P, Lemmey D, et al. Women filing assault charges on an intimate partner: criminal justice outcome and future violence experienced. Violence Against Women. 2000;6(4):396-408.
5. Melton HC. Stalking in the context of domestic violence: findings on the criminal justice system. Women & Criminal Justice. 2004;15:33-58.
6. Davies KE, Frieze IH. Research on stalking: what do we know and where do we go? Violence Vict. 2000;15(4):473-487.
7. Melton HC. Stalking in the context of intimate partner abuse: in the victims’ words. Feminist Criminology. 2007;2(4):346-363.
8. Spence-Diehl E. Intensive case management for victims of stalking: a pilot test evaluation. Brief Treatment Crisis Intervention. 2004;4(4):323-341.
9. Brewster MP. An exploration of the experiences and needs of former intimate stalking victims: final report submitted to the National Institute of Justice. West Chester, PA: West Chester University; 1997.
10. Logan TK, Shannon L, Cole J, et al. The impact of differential patterns of physical violence and stalking on mental health and help-seeking among women with protective orders. Violence Against Women. 2006;12(9):866-886.
11. Johnson MC, Kercher GA. Identifying predictors of negative psychological reactions to stalking victimization. J Interpers Violence. 2009;24(5):866-882.
12. Kuehner C, Gass P, Dressing H. Increased risk of mental disorders among lifetime victims of stalking—findings from a community study. Eur Psychiatry. 2007;22(3):142-145.
13. Basile KC, Arias I, Desai S, et al. The differential association of intimate partner physical, sexual, psychological, and stalking violence and post-traumatic stress symptoms in a nationally representative sample of women. J Traumatic Stress. 2004;17(5):413-421.
14. Kamphuis JH, Emmelkamp PM. Traumatic distress among support-seeking female victims of stalking. Am J Psychiatry. 2001;158(5):795-798.
15. Kraaij V, Arensman E, Garnefski N, et al. The role of cognitive coping in female victims of stalking. J Interpers Violence. 2007;22(12):1603-1612.
16. Bennett Cattaneo L, Cho S, Botuck S. Describing intimate partner stalking over time: an effort to inform victim-centered service provision. J Interpers Violence. 2011;26(17):3428-3454.
17. Spence-Diehl E, Potocky-Tripodi M. Victims of stalking: a study of service needs as perceived by victim services practitioners. J Interpers Violence. 2001;16(1):86-94.
18. Galeazzi GM, Buc˘ar-Ruc˘man A, DeFazio L, et al. Experiences of stalking victims and requests for help in three European countries. A survey. European Journal of Criminal Policy Research. 2009;15:243-260.
19. McEwan T, Purcell R. Assessing and surviving stalkers. Presented at: 45th Annual Meeting of American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law; October 2014; Chicago IL.
20. Cattaneo LB, Goodman LA. New directions in IPV risk assessment: an empowerment approach to risk management. In: Kendall-Tackett K, Giacomoni S, eds. Intimate partner violence. Kingston, NJ: Civic Research Institute; 2007:1-17.
21. Goodman LA, Epstein D. Listening to battered women: a survivor-centered approach to advocacy, mental health, and justice. Washington DC: American Psychological Association; 2008.
22. Cattaneo LB, Goodman LA. Through the lens of jurisprudence: the relationship between empowerment in the court system and well-being for intimate partner violence victims. J Interpers Violence. 2010;25(3):481-502.
23. Zweig JM, Burt MR. Predicting women’s perceptions of domestic violence and sexual assault agency helpfulness: what matters to program clients? Violence Against Women. 2007;13(11):1149-1178.

References


1. Meloy JR, Gothard S. Demographic and clinical comparison of obsessional followers and offenders with mental disorders. Am J Psychiatry. 1995;152(2):258-263.
2. Tjaden P, Thoennes N. Stalking in America: findings from the National Violence Against Women Survey. National Institute of Justice and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/169592.pdf. Published April 1998. Accessed March 25, 2015.
3. Spitzberg BH. The tactical topography of stalking victimization and management. Trauma, Violence, & Abuse. 2002;3(4):261-288.
4. McFarlane J, Willson P, Lemmey D, et al. Women filing assault charges on an intimate partner: criminal justice outcome and future violence experienced. Violence Against Women. 2000;6(4):396-408.
5. Melton HC. Stalking in the context of domestic violence: findings on the criminal justice system. Women & Criminal Justice. 2004;15:33-58.
6. Davies KE, Frieze IH. Research on stalking: what do we know and where do we go? Violence Vict. 2000;15(4):473-487.
7. Melton HC. Stalking in the context of intimate partner abuse: in the victims’ words. Feminist Criminology. 2007;2(4):346-363.
8. Spence-Diehl E. Intensive case management for victims of stalking: a pilot test evaluation. Brief Treatment Crisis Intervention. 2004;4(4):323-341.
9. Brewster MP. An exploration of the experiences and needs of former intimate stalking victims: final report submitted to the National Institute of Justice. West Chester, PA: West Chester University; 1997.
10. Logan TK, Shannon L, Cole J, et al. The impact of differential patterns of physical violence and stalking on mental health and help-seeking among women with protective orders. Violence Against Women. 2006;12(9):866-886.
11. Johnson MC, Kercher GA. Identifying predictors of negative psychological reactions to stalking victimization. J Interpers Violence. 2009;24(5):866-882.
12. Kuehner C, Gass P, Dressing H. Increased risk of mental disorders among lifetime victims of stalking—findings from a community study. Eur Psychiatry. 2007;22(3):142-145.
13. Basile KC, Arias I, Desai S, et al. The differential association of intimate partner physical, sexual, psychological, and stalking violence and post-traumatic stress symptoms in a nationally representative sample of women. J Traumatic Stress. 2004;17(5):413-421.
14. Kamphuis JH, Emmelkamp PM. Traumatic distress among support-seeking female victims of stalking. Am J Psychiatry. 2001;158(5):795-798.
15. Kraaij V, Arensman E, Garnefski N, et al. The role of cognitive coping in female victims of stalking. J Interpers Violence. 2007;22(12):1603-1612.
16. Bennett Cattaneo L, Cho S, Botuck S. Describing intimate partner stalking over time: an effort to inform victim-centered service provision. J Interpers Violence. 2011;26(17):3428-3454.
17. Spence-Diehl E, Potocky-Tripodi M. Victims of stalking: a study of service needs as perceived by victim services practitioners. J Interpers Violence. 2001;16(1):86-94.
18. Galeazzi GM, Buc˘ar-Ruc˘man A, DeFazio L, et al. Experiences of stalking victims and requests for help in three European countries. A survey. European Journal of Criminal Policy Research. 2009;15:243-260.
19. McEwan T, Purcell R. Assessing and surviving stalkers. Presented at: 45th Annual Meeting of American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law; October 2014; Chicago IL.
20. Cattaneo LB, Goodman LA. New directions in IPV risk assessment: an empowerment approach to risk management. In: Kendall-Tackett K, Giacomoni S, eds. Intimate partner violence. Kingston, NJ: Civic Research Institute; 2007:1-17.
21. Goodman LA, Epstein D. Listening to battered women: a survivor-centered approach to advocacy, mental health, and justice. Washington DC: American Psychological Association; 2008.
22. Cattaneo LB, Goodman LA. Through the lens of jurisprudence: the relationship between empowerment in the court system and well-being for intimate partner violence victims. J Interpers Violence. 2010;25(3):481-502.
23. Zweig JM, Burt MR. Predicting women’s perceptions of domestic violence and sexual assault agency helpfulness: what matters to program clients? Violence Against Women. 2007;13(11):1149-1178.

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Is this patient not guilty by reason of insanity?

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Is this patient not guilty by reason of insanity?

Police find Mr. B, age 45, at home after he called 911 to report that he killed his wife. Covered in blood, he confesses immediately and is holding the knife he used to stab her. Police arrest him without resistance and charge him with murder.

Three months later, Mr. B presents for a sanity evaluation. He has a history of schizoaffective disorder and has required three past psychiatric hospitalizations. Urine and serum toxicology studies the day of the killing were negative for alcohol and drugs.

Was Mr. B legally sane or insane when he committed this offense? As psychiatrists, we are often called on to assess competence to stand trial and sanity at the time of a crime. In a previous article (Current Psychiatry, June 2006), we described how to evaluate whether a mentally ill criminal court defendant is competent to stand trial. This article introduces the process for conducting a sanity evaluation.

What is sanity?

“Sanity” is a legal—not clinical—term related to a plea of “not guilty by reason of insanity.” A sanity evaluation—a mental health professional’s specialized assessment—may be entered into evidence at a criminal trial to help a judge or jury determine whether a defendant is criminally responsible for an alleged offense.

Approximately 1 in every 100 defendants charged with a felony raise an insanity defense.1 A criminal defendant who pleads not guilty by reason of insanity asserts that he committed the offense and asks the court to find him not culpable because of his mental state when the offense occurred. Competence to stand trial, by comparison, focuses on the defendant’s present mental state (Table 1).

Before starting a sanity evaluation, determine the standard that applies in the jurisdiction where the alleged offense occurred. Federal and state courts have restricted insanity standards the past 20 years. Some states, including Idaho and Nevada, abolished the insanity defense. Others adopted “guilty but mentally ill” standards, which hold mentally-ill defendants criminally responsible for their actions.2

All insanity standards require that the defendant had a mental disease or defect at the time of the offense, but the terms “mental disease” and “mental defect” do not equate with particular DSM-IV-TR “mental disorders.” Rather, courts can interpret which diagnoses qualify for determining sanity.

Courts usually rule that serious psychotic and mood disorders qualify as a mental disease and mental retardation qualifies as a mental defect. Mental disorders that usually do not qualify include personality disorders, paraphilias, and voluntary intoxication.

Table 1

How competency and sanity assessments differ

 CompetencySanity
Presence of mental illnessYesYes
Mental statusCurrent mental stateMental state at the time of the offense
Purpose of evaluationAbility to stand trialCriminal responsibility
Variation in laws by jurisdictionMinor variationGreat variation

History of insanity defense

Many early codes of law provided exceptions to criminal responsibility for the mentally ill. Modern insanity standards are based on English common law (Table 2).

Table 2

From ‘wild beast’ to ‘irresistible impulse’: Milestones in the insanity defense

StandardYearDescription
Wild beast1724Most strict standard; required total deprivation of memory and understanding
Irresistible impulse1840More liberal standard; required that “…some controlling disease was…the acting power within him which he could not resist…”
M’Naughten rule1843Required that the defendant not know the nature/quality or the wrongfulness of the offense.
American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code standard1955Combined M’Naughten Rule with irresistible impulse
Federal Insanity Defense Reform Act1984Stricter standard that dropped the irresistible impulse standard after attempted assassination of President Reagan
‘Wild beast.’ The “wild beast” standard was established in 1724 in Rex v. Arnold. Arnold, the mentally-ill defendant, was found guilty after he shot and wounded Lord Onslow. Arnold’s death sentence was reduced to life in prison after Lord Onslow himself advocated for this change.

To be found insane under the wild beast standard, the defendant had to be “totally deprived of his understanding and memory, so as to not know what he is doing, no more than an infant, a brute or a wild beast.”3

‘Irresistible impulse.’ The “irresistible impulse” standard was first used successfully in 1840 in the trial of Edward Oxford, who attempted to assassinate Queen Victoria. In Regina v. Oxford, the court recognized that “if some controlling disease was…the acting power within him which he could not resist, then he will not be responsible.”4

The M’Naughten rule—perhaps the most famous standard—was established in 1843. M’Naughten suffered from paranoid delusions that the prime minister of England was plotting against him; he planned to kill the prime minister but mistakenly killed his secretary. The examiners who evaluated M’Naughten testified that he was insane, and the jury concurred. The public and royal family were incensed, however, and appellate judges reviewed the verdict and insanity standard.

 

 

The appeals court issued the M’Naughten rule,5 by which a mentally ill defendant may be considered insane if, at the time of the act, he:

  • did not understand the nature and quality of the act
  • or did not know the wrongfulness of the act.
United States law. Based on the M’Naughten rule and the irresistible impulse standard, the American Law Institute in 1955 issued the Model Penal Code insanity standard. It stated that a defendant is not responsible for his criminal conduct if, at the time of the offense as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacked substantial capacity to:

  • appreciate the criminality of his act
  • or conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.
These standards were tightened in federal jurisdictions by the Federal Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984—a reaction to John Hinckley’s insanity acquittal after he tried to assassinate President Ronald Reagan.

How to evaluate insanity

Prepare. Review the defendant’s medical/psychiatric records and materials pertaining to the offense, including the police report and other legal or medical documents. Indications of a prior psychiatric diagnosis may support or rebut the presence of a mental disease or defect at the time account of the of the alleged offense.

To assess the defendant’s mental state at the time of the act, note any recorded observations of his or her behavior during or around that time. You may wish to collect this information from collateral sources, as well. Look for bizarre behavior or other evidence that the defendant suffered from delusions, hallucinations, or other symptoms of a severe mental disease or defect.

Police records may contain:

  • reports by witnesses, victims, and police officers about the defendant’s statements or behavior during or soon after the offense
  • a defendant’s statement to the arresting officers.
These may give insight into the defendant’s mental state.

Interview the defendant. Next, conduct a thorough standard psychiatric interview in person. Inform the defendant that the interview is not confidential, and that any information he or she provides may be included in a written report to the court or disclosed during trial testimony.

Consider psychiatric symptoms the defendant experienced during the offense, medication adherence, and use of alcohol or other mood-altering substances. Remember that voluntary intoxication does not provide grounds for an insanity defense, even in states that allow the irresistible impulse defense.

Obtain a detailed account of the event from the defendant. Look for:

  • symptoms of a mental disease or defect when the offense occurred
  • the defendant’s knowledge (or lack thereof) that the offense was wrong at that time (Table 3)
Table 3

Signs that a defendant knew an act was wrong

Efforts to avoid detectionWearing gloves or a mask during the offense
Concealing a weapon
Falsifying information (using an alias or creating a passport)
Committing the act in the dark
Disposal of evidenceWashing away blood
Removing fingerprints
Discarding the weapon
Hiding the body
Efforts to avoid apprehensionFleeing
Lying to authorities
Irresistible impulse? In jurisdictions with an irresistible impulse test, evaluate whether the defendant was able to refrain from the offense when it occurred (Table 4). Allow the defendant to provide an uninterrupted narrative of the event. Use follow-up questions to fill in gaps in the story and to determine the defendant’s motive. You may choose to confront the defendant with contradictory information obtained from collateral sources.6

Indications that the defendant was aware at the time of the offense that his actions were wrong may include:

  • behaviors during or immediately after the event, such as hiding evidence, lying to authorities, or fleeing the scene
  • a rational motive such as jealousy, revenge, or personal gain.
By contrast, psychotic justification for the offense—for example, a mother who kills her children because she believes she is saving them from the devil—may indicate that the defendant believed that the offense was wrong but morally justified.

Caveats. The defendant’s mental status during the interview may differ vastly from that at the time of the offense. Don’t be swayed if a defendant with a history of psychosis now appears symptom-free. Recent treatment may explain his or her lack of symptoms. Also be aware that the defendant may be malingering mental illness to support an insanity defense and escape criminal responsibility.7

Outcomes. Approximately 15% to 25% of criminal defendants who plead insanity are adjudicated insane. Technically, a defendant who is found legally insane has been acquitted of the offense. The insanity defense is less likely to succeed in jury than in nonjury trials.8

Although the defendant may not be punished once acquitted, he or she may be committed to a mental institution to ensure treatment compliance and protect the public.

 

 

Table 4

Irresistible impulse test for sanity: A modern interpretation

Inability to defer the act
Inability to ignore specific instructions
Must not be caused by rage or intoxication
Magnitude, likelihood, and imminence of consequences if act is not performed
Attempted alternatives to the act
Genuineness of command hallucinations and the ability to ignore them

Case continued: seeing red

When you interview Mr. B 3 months after his arrest, he is not psychotic. He says he ran out of his medications 6 months before he killed his wife and resumed taking them while in jail awaiting trial.

Mr. B relates that in the months before the offense he grew concerned that his wife was involved in “ritualistic sexual perversions” commanded by the devil. He tried to discuss this with his mother-in-law and minister but did not get a satisfactory response.

On the evening of the killing, Mr. B was particularly agitated while waiting for his wife to return home from work. She walked in wearing a red sweater, which indicated to him that she had had sex with 17 different men at work that day. To save her from eternal damnation for adultery, Mr. B believed he had to stab her 17 times before sunrise.

He becomes tearful during the interview and says he wishes he “could go back in time and fix things.”

Mr. B. shows clear evidence of a severe mental disease during the offense (psychosis, medication nonadherence) without a personality or substance use disorder.

Factors that indicate he did not know his actions were wrong at the time of the event include:

  • his delusional belief that he was saving his wife from damnation
  • lack of a rational motive
  • lack of effort to conceal the offense
  • his ready confession to 911 operators and police officers
  • his cooperation with police.
On the other hand, Mr. B knew that murder is illegal and that killing one’s wife for infidelity (whether delusional or not) is not legal. These factors suggest that Mr. B knew that his actions were wrong at the time.

Mr. B’s attempts at alternate solutions (discussions with clergy and his mother-in-law) and the perceived deadline (the need to kill his wife before sunrise to prevent damnation) indicate that he had an irresistible impulse.

Open to interpretation

As this case suggests, a defendant’s sanity or insanity is determined by many factors and is often open to interpretation. In court, the prosecution and defense aim to answer two complex questions:

  • Did the defendant suffer from a mental illness? (This may be clear in patients with schizophrenia but more difficult to determine in others, such as in substance-induced mood disorder.)
  • Did this mental illness alter the defendant’s judgment to such a degree that he or she no longer knew the offense was wrongful?
States use subtle variations in language to indicate the strictness of their standards. Some may use “know” (a stricter standard) versus “appreciate” the wrongfulness of his or her actions. This difficult concept becomes more detailed if the defendant knew the act was wrongful but had an overriding moral justification (such as Mr. B’s desire to save his wife from damnation).

Recent cases. Despite her plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, Andrea Yates was convicted of murder in June 2002 for drowning her five children in the bathtub of their home. Though most would agree the Texas housewife suffered from a severe mental illness, prosecutors convinced the jury that she knew the wrongfulness of her actions. An appeal was granted earlier this year, and Yates returned to court in June.

Also this year, the U.S. Supreme Court heard a case contesting Arizona’s insanity defense on grounds that it violated a defendant’s right to due process. In late June, the court sided with the state, continuing to allow each to state to establish its own insanity defense standard.

Related resources

  • American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law. www.aapl.org,
  • Giorgi-Guarnieri D, Janofsky J, Keram E, et al. AAPL practice guideline for forensic psychiatric evaluation of defendants raising the insanity defense. J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2002;30(2 suppl):S3-40.
  • Noffsinger SG, Resnick PJ. Insanity defense evaluations. Directions in Psychiatry 1999;19:325-38.
References

1. Callahan L, Meyer C, et al. Insanity defense reform in the United States-post-Hinckley. Ment Phys Disabil Law Rep 1987;11:54-9.

2. Giorgi-Guarnieri D, Janofsky J, Keram E, et al. AAPL practice guideline for forensic psychiatric evaluation of defendants raising the insanity defense. J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2002;30(2 suppl):S3-40.

3. Rex v. Arnold, 16 How. St. Tr. 695 (1724).

4. Regina v. Oxford, 9 Car. and P. 525, 546 (1840).

5. M’Naughten’s case, 8 Eng Rep. 718 (1843).

6. Resnick PJ. The detection of malingered psychosis. Psychiatr Clin North Am 1999;22:159-72.

7. Resnick PJ, Knoll J. Faking it: how to detect malingered psychosis. Current Psychiatry 2005;4(11):13-25.

8. Roger JL, Bloom JD, Manson SM. Insanity defenses: contested or concealed? Am J Psychiatry 1984;141:885-8.

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Police find Mr. B, age 45, at home after he called 911 to report that he killed his wife. Covered in blood, he confesses immediately and is holding the knife he used to stab her. Police arrest him without resistance and charge him with murder.

Three months later, Mr. B presents for a sanity evaluation. He has a history of schizoaffective disorder and has required three past psychiatric hospitalizations. Urine and serum toxicology studies the day of the killing were negative for alcohol and drugs.

Was Mr. B legally sane or insane when he committed this offense? As psychiatrists, we are often called on to assess competence to stand trial and sanity at the time of a crime. In a previous article (Current Psychiatry, June 2006), we described how to evaluate whether a mentally ill criminal court defendant is competent to stand trial. This article introduces the process for conducting a sanity evaluation.

What is sanity?

“Sanity” is a legal—not clinical—term related to a plea of “not guilty by reason of insanity.” A sanity evaluation—a mental health professional’s specialized assessment—may be entered into evidence at a criminal trial to help a judge or jury determine whether a defendant is criminally responsible for an alleged offense.

Approximately 1 in every 100 defendants charged with a felony raise an insanity defense.1 A criminal defendant who pleads not guilty by reason of insanity asserts that he committed the offense and asks the court to find him not culpable because of his mental state when the offense occurred. Competence to stand trial, by comparison, focuses on the defendant’s present mental state (Table 1).

Before starting a sanity evaluation, determine the standard that applies in the jurisdiction where the alleged offense occurred. Federal and state courts have restricted insanity standards the past 20 years. Some states, including Idaho and Nevada, abolished the insanity defense. Others adopted “guilty but mentally ill” standards, which hold mentally-ill defendants criminally responsible for their actions.2

All insanity standards require that the defendant had a mental disease or defect at the time of the offense, but the terms “mental disease” and “mental defect” do not equate with particular DSM-IV-TR “mental disorders.” Rather, courts can interpret which diagnoses qualify for determining sanity.

Courts usually rule that serious psychotic and mood disorders qualify as a mental disease and mental retardation qualifies as a mental defect. Mental disorders that usually do not qualify include personality disorders, paraphilias, and voluntary intoxication.

Table 1

How competency and sanity assessments differ

 CompetencySanity
Presence of mental illnessYesYes
Mental statusCurrent mental stateMental state at the time of the offense
Purpose of evaluationAbility to stand trialCriminal responsibility
Variation in laws by jurisdictionMinor variationGreat variation

History of insanity defense

Many early codes of law provided exceptions to criminal responsibility for the mentally ill. Modern insanity standards are based on English common law (Table 2).

Table 2

From ‘wild beast’ to ‘irresistible impulse’: Milestones in the insanity defense

StandardYearDescription
Wild beast1724Most strict standard; required total deprivation of memory and understanding
Irresistible impulse1840More liberal standard; required that “…some controlling disease was…the acting power within him which he could not resist…”
M’Naughten rule1843Required that the defendant not know the nature/quality or the wrongfulness of the offense.
American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code standard1955Combined M’Naughten Rule with irresistible impulse
Federal Insanity Defense Reform Act1984Stricter standard that dropped the irresistible impulse standard after attempted assassination of President Reagan
‘Wild beast.’ The “wild beast” standard was established in 1724 in Rex v. Arnold. Arnold, the mentally-ill defendant, was found guilty after he shot and wounded Lord Onslow. Arnold’s death sentence was reduced to life in prison after Lord Onslow himself advocated for this change.

To be found insane under the wild beast standard, the defendant had to be “totally deprived of his understanding and memory, so as to not know what he is doing, no more than an infant, a brute or a wild beast.”3

‘Irresistible impulse.’ The “irresistible impulse” standard was first used successfully in 1840 in the trial of Edward Oxford, who attempted to assassinate Queen Victoria. In Regina v. Oxford, the court recognized that “if some controlling disease was…the acting power within him which he could not resist, then he will not be responsible.”4

The M’Naughten rule—perhaps the most famous standard—was established in 1843. M’Naughten suffered from paranoid delusions that the prime minister of England was plotting against him; he planned to kill the prime minister but mistakenly killed his secretary. The examiners who evaluated M’Naughten testified that he was insane, and the jury concurred. The public and royal family were incensed, however, and appellate judges reviewed the verdict and insanity standard.

 

 

The appeals court issued the M’Naughten rule,5 by which a mentally ill defendant may be considered insane if, at the time of the act, he:

  • did not understand the nature and quality of the act
  • or did not know the wrongfulness of the act.
United States law. Based on the M’Naughten rule and the irresistible impulse standard, the American Law Institute in 1955 issued the Model Penal Code insanity standard. It stated that a defendant is not responsible for his criminal conduct if, at the time of the offense as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacked substantial capacity to:

  • appreciate the criminality of his act
  • or conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.
These standards were tightened in federal jurisdictions by the Federal Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984—a reaction to John Hinckley’s insanity acquittal after he tried to assassinate President Ronald Reagan.

How to evaluate insanity

Prepare. Review the defendant’s medical/psychiatric records and materials pertaining to the offense, including the police report and other legal or medical documents. Indications of a prior psychiatric diagnosis may support or rebut the presence of a mental disease or defect at the time account of the of the alleged offense.

To assess the defendant’s mental state at the time of the act, note any recorded observations of his or her behavior during or around that time. You may wish to collect this information from collateral sources, as well. Look for bizarre behavior or other evidence that the defendant suffered from delusions, hallucinations, or other symptoms of a severe mental disease or defect.

Police records may contain:

  • reports by witnesses, victims, and police officers about the defendant’s statements or behavior during or soon after the offense
  • a defendant’s statement to the arresting officers.
These may give insight into the defendant’s mental state.

Interview the defendant. Next, conduct a thorough standard psychiatric interview in person. Inform the defendant that the interview is not confidential, and that any information he or she provides may be included in a written report to the court or disclosed during trial testimony.

Consider psychiatric symptoms the defendant experienced during the offense, medication adherence, and use of alcohol or other mood-altering substances. Remember that voluntary intoxication does not provide grounds for an insanity defense, even in states that allow the irresistible impulse defense.

Obtain a detailed account of the event from the defendant. Look for:

  • symptoms of a mental disease or defect when the offense occurred
  • the defendant’s knowledge (or lack thereof) that the offense was wrong at that time (Table 3)
Table 3

Signs that a defendant knew an act was wrong

Efforts to avoid detectionWearing gloves or a mask during the offense
Concealing a weapon
Falsifying information (using an alias or creating a passport)
Committing the act in the dark
Disposal of evidenceWashing away blood
Removing fingerprints
Discarding the weapon
Hiding the body
Efforts to avoid apprehensionFleeing
Lying to authorities
Irresistible impulse? In jurisdictions with an irresistible impulse test, evaluate whether the defendant was able to refrain from the offense when it occurred (Table 4). Allow the defendant to provide an uninterrupted narrative of the event. Use follow-up questions to fill in gaps in the story and to determine the defendant’s motive. You may choose to confront the defendant with contradictory information obtained from collateral sources.6

Indications that the defendant was aware at the time of the offense that his actions were wrong may include:

  • behaviors during or immediately after the event, such as hiding evidence, lying to authorities, or fleeing the scene
  • a rational motive such as jealousy, revenge, or personal gain.
By contrast, psychotic justification for the offense—for example, a mother who kills her children because she believes she is saving them from the devil—may indicate that the defendant believed that the offense was wrong but morally justified.

Caveats. The defendant’s mental status during the interview may differ vastly from that at the time of the offense. Don’t be swayed if a defendant with a history of psychosis now appears symptom-free. Recent treatment may explain his or her lack of symptoms. Also be aware that the defendant may be malingering mental illness to support an insanity defense and escape criminal responsibility.7

Outcomes. Approximately 15% to 25% of criminal defendants who plead insanity are adjudicated insane. Technically, a defendant who is found legally insane has been acquitted of the offense. The insanity defense is less likely to succeed in jury than in nonjury trials.8

Although the defendant may not be punished once acquitted, he or she may be committed to a mental institution to ensure treatment compliance and protect the public.

 

 

Table 4

Irresistible impulse test for sanity: A modern interpretation

Inability to defer the act
Inability to ignore specific instructions
Must not be caused by rage or intoxication
Magnitude, likelihood, and imminence of consequences if act is not performed
Attempted alternatives to the act
Genuineness of command hallucinations and the ability to ignore them

Case continued: seeing red

When you interview Mr. B 3 months after his arrest, he is not psychotic. He says he ran out of his medications 6 months before he killed his wife and resumed taking them while in jail awaiting trial.

Mr. B relates that in the months before the offense he grew concerned that his wife was involved in “ritualistic sexual perversions” commanded by the devil. He tried to discuss this with his mother-in-law and minister but did not get a satisfactory response.

On the evening of the killing, Mr. B was particularly agitated while waiting for his wife to return home from work. She walked in wearing a red sweater, which indicated to him that she had had sex with 17 different men at work that day. To save her from eternal damnation for adultery, Mr. B believed he had to stab her 17 times before sunrise.

He becomes tearful during the interview and says he wishes he “could go back in time and fix things.”

Mr. B. shows clear evidence of a severe mental disease during the offense (psychosis, medication nonadherence) without a personality or substance use disorder.

Factors that indicate he did not know his actions were wrong at the time of the event include:

  • his delusional belief that he was saving his wife from damnation
  • lack of a rational motive
  • lack of effort to conceal the offense
  • his ready confession to 911 operators and police officers
  • his cooperation with police.
On the other hand, Mr. B knew that murder is illegal and that killing one’s wife for infidelity (whether delusional or not) is not legal. These factors suggest that Mr. B knew that his actions were wrong at the time.

Mr. B’s attempts at alternate solutions (discussions with clergy and his mother-in-law) and the perceived deadline (the need to kill his wife before sunrise to prevent damnation) indicate that he had an irresistible impulse.

Open to interpretation

As this case suggests, a defendant’s sanity or insanity is determined by many factors and is often open to interpretation. In court, the prosecution and defense aim to answer two complex questions:

  • Did the defendant suffer from a mental illness? (This may be clear in patients with schizophrenia but more difficult to determine in others, such as in substance-induced mood disorder.)
  • Did this mental illness alter the defendant’s judgment to such a degree that he or she no longer knew the offense was wrongful?
States use subtle variations in language to indicate the strictness of their standards. Some may use “know” (a stricter standard) versus “appreciate” the wrongfulness of his or her actions. This difficult concept becomes more detailed if the defendant knew the act was wrongful but had an overriding moral justification (such as Mr. B’s desire to save his wife from damnation).

Recent cases. Despite her plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, Andrea Yates was convicted of murder in June 2002 for drowning her five children in the bathtub of their home. Though most would agree the Texas housewife suffered from a severe mental illness, prosecutors convinced the jury that she knew the wrongfulness of her actions. An appeal was granted earlier this year, and Yates returned to court in June.

Also this year, the U.S. Supreme Court heard a case contesting Arizona’s insanity defense on grounds that it violated a defendant’s right to due process. In late June, the court sided with the state, continuing to allow each to state to establish its own insanity defense standard.

Related resources

  • American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law. www.aapl.org,
  • Giorgi-Guarnieri D, Janofsky J, Keram E, et al. AAPL practice guideline for forensic psychiatric evaluation of defendants raising the insanity defense. J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2002;30(2 suppl):S3-40.
  • Noffsinger SG, Resnick PJ. Insanity defense evaluations. Directions in Psychiatry 1999;19:325-38.

Police find Mr. B, age 45, at home after he called 911 to report that he killed his wife. Covered in blood, he confesses immediately and is holding the knife he used to stab her. Police arrest him without resistance and charge him with murder.

Three months later, Mr. B presents for a sanity evaluation. He has a history of schizoaffective disorder and has required three past psychiatric hospitalizations. Urine and serum toxicology studies the day of the killing were negative for alcohol and drugs.

Was Mr. B legally sane or insane when he committed this offense? As psychiatrists, we are often called on to assess competence to stand trial and sanity at the time of a crime. In a previous article (Current Psychiatry, June 2006), we described how to evaluate whether a mentally ill criminal court defendant is competent to stand trial. This article introduces the process for conducting a sanity evaluation.

What is sanity?

“Sanity” is a legal—not clinical—term related to a plea of “not guilty by reason of insanity.” A sanity evaluation—a mental health professional’s specialized assessment—may be entered into evidence at a criminal trial to help a judge or jury determine whether a defendant is criminally responsible for an alleged offense.

Approximately 1 in every 100 defendants charged with a felony raise an insanity defense.1 A criminal defendant who pleads not guilty by reason of insanity asserts that he committed the offense and asks the court to find him not culpable because of his mental state when the offense occurred. Competence to stand trial, by comparison, focuses on the defendant’s present mental state (Table 1).

Before starting a sanity evaluation, determine the standard that applies in the jurisdiction where the alleged offense occurred. Federal and state courts have restricted insanity standards the past 20 years. Some states, including Idaho and Nevada, abolished the insanity defense. Others adopted “guilty but mentally ill” standards, which hold mentally-ill defendants criminally responsible for their actions.2

All insanity standards require that the defendant had a mental disease or defect at the time of the offense, but the terms “mental disease” and “mental defect” do not equate with particular DSM-IV-TR “mental disorders.” Rather, courts can interpret which diagnoses qualify for determining sanity.

Courts usually rule that serious psychotic and mood disorders qualify as a mental disease and mental retardation qualifies as a mental defect. Mental disorders that usually do not qualify include personality disorders, paraphilias, and voluntary intoxication.

Table 1

How competency and sanity assessments differ

 CompetencySanity
Presence of mental illnessYesYes
Mental statusCurrent mental stateMental state at the time of the offense
Purpose of evaluationAbility to stand trialCriminal responsibility
Variation in laws by jurisdictionMinor variationGreat variation

History of insanity defense

Many early codes of law provided exceptions to criminal responsibility for the mentally ill. Modern insanity standards are based on English common law (Table 2).

Table 2

From ‘wild beast’ to ‘irresistible impulse’: Milestones in the insanity defense

StandardYearDescription
Wild beast1724Most strict standard; required total deprivation of memory and understanding
Irresistible impulse1840More liberal standard; required that “…some controlling disease was…the acting power within him which he could not resist…”
M’Naughten rule1843Required that the defendant not know the nature/quality or the wrongfulness of the offense.
American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code standard1955Combined M’Naughten Rule with irresistible impulse
Federal Insanity Defense Reform Act1984Stricter standard that dropped the irresistible impulse standard after attempted assassination of President Reagan
‘Wild beast.’ The “wild beast” standard was established in 1724 in Rex v. Arnold. Arnold, the mentally-ill defendant, was found guilty after he shot and wounded Lord Onslow. Arnold’s death sentence was reduced to life in prison after Lord Onslow himself advocated for this change.

To be found insane under the wild beast standard, the defendant had to be “totally deprived of his understanding and memory, so as to not know what he is doing, no more than an infant, a brute or a wild beast.”3

‘Irresistible impulse.’ The “irresistible impulse” standard was first used successfully in 1840 in the trial of Edward Oxford, who attempted to assassinate Queen Victoria. In Regina v. Oxford, the court recognized that “if some controlling disease was…the acting power within him which he could not resist, then he will not be responsible.”4

The M’Naughten rule—perhaps the most famous standard—was established in 1843. M’Naughten suffered from paranoid delusions that the prime minister of England was plotting against him; he planned to kill the prime minister but mistakenly killed his secretary. The examiners who evaluated M’Naughten testified that he was insane, and the jury concurred. The public and royal family were incensed, however, and appellate judges reviewed the verdict and insanity standard.

 

 

The appeals court issued the M’Naughten rule,5 by which a mentally ill defendant may be considered insane if, at the time of the act, he:

  • did not understand the nature and quality of the act
  • or did not know the wrongfulness of the act.
United States law. Based on the M’Naughten rule and the irresistible impulse standard, the American Law Institute in 1955 issued the Model Penal Code insanity standard. It stated that a defendant is not responsible for his criminal conduct if, at the time of the offense as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacked substantial capacity to:

  • appreciate the criminality of his act
  • or conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.
These standards were tightened in federal jurisdictions by the Federal Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984—a reaction to John Hinckley’s insanity acquittal after he tried to assassinate President Ronald Reagan.

How to evaluate insanity

Prepare. Review the defendant’s medical/psychiatric records and materials pertaining to the offense, including the police report and other legal or medical documents. Indications of a prior psychiatric diagnosis may support or rebut the presence of a mental disease or defect at the time account of the of the alleged offense.

To assess the defendant’s mental state at the time of the act, note any recorded observations of his or her behavior during or around that time. You may wish to collect this information from collateral sources, as well. Look for bizarre behavior or other evidence that the defendant suffered from delusions, hallucinations, or other symptoms of a severe mental disease or defect.

Police records may contain:

  • reports by witnesses, victims, and police officers about the defendant’s statements or behavior during or soon after the offense
  • a defendant’s statement to the arresting officers.
These may give insight into the defendant’s mental state.

Interview the defendant. Next, conduct a thorough standard psychiatric interview in person. Inform the defendant that the interview is not confidential, and that any information he or she provides may be included in a written report to the court or disclosed during trial testimony.

Consider psychiatric symptoms the defendant experienced during the offense, medication adherence, and use of alcohol or other mood-altering substances. Remember that voluntary intoxication does not provide grounds for an insanity defense, even in states that allow the irresistible impulse defense.

Obtain a detailed account of the event from the defendant. Look for:

  • symptoms of a mental disease or defect when the offense occurred
  • the defendant’s knowledge (or lack thereof) that the offense was wrong at that time (Table 3)
Table 3

Signs that a defendant knew an act was wrong

Efforts to avoid detectionWearing gloves or a mask during the offense
Concealing a weapon
Falsifying information (using an alias or creating a passport)
Committing the act in the dark
Disposal of evidenceWashing away blood
Removing fingerprints
Discarding the weapon
Hiding the body
Efforts to avoid apprehensionFleeing
Lying to authorities
Irresistible impulse? In jurisdictions with an irresistible impulse test, evaluate whether the defendant was able to refrain from the offense when it occurred (Table 4). Allow the defendant to provide an uninterrupted narrative of the event. Use follow-up questions to fill in gaps in the story and to determine the defendant’s motive. You may choose to confront the defendant with contradictory information obtained from collateral sources.6

Indications that the defendant was aware at the time of the offense that his actions were wrong may include:

  • behaviors during or immediately after the event, such as hiding evidence, lying to authorities, or fleeing the scene
  • a rational motive such as jealousy, revenge, or personal gain.
By contrast, psychotic justification for the offense—for example, a mother who kills her children because she believes she is saving them from the devil—may indicate that the defendant believed that the offense was wrong but morally justified.

Caveats. The defendant’s mental status during the interview may differ vastly from that at the time of the offense. Don’t be swayed if a defendant with a history of psychosis now appears symptom-free. Recent treatment may explain his or her lack of symptoms. Also be aware that the defendant may be malingering mental illness to support an insanity defense and escape criminal responsibility.7

Outcomes. Approximately 15% to 25% of criminal defendants who plead insanity are adjudicated insane. Technically, a defendant who is found legally insane has been acquitted of the offense. The insanity defense is less likely to succeed in jury than in nonjury trials.8

Although the defendant may not be punished once acquitted, he or she may be committed to a mental institution to ensure treatment compliance and protect the public.

 

 

Table 4

Irresistible impulse test for sanity: A modern interpretation

Inability to defer the act
Inability to ignore specific instructions
Must not be caused by rage or intoxication
Magnitude, likelihood, and imminence of consequences if act is not performed
Attempted alternatives to the act
Genuineness of command hallucinations and the ability to ignore them

Case continued: seeing red

When you interview Mr. B 3 months after his arrest, he is not psychotic. He says he ran out of his medications 6 months before he killed his wife and resumed taking them while in jail awaiting trial.

Mr. B relates that in the months before the offense he grew concerned that his wife was involved in “ritualistic sexual perversions” commanded by the devil. He tried to discuss this with his mother-in-law and minister but did not get a satisfactory response.

On the evening of the killing, Mr. B was particularly agitated while waiting for his wife to return home from work. She walked in wearing a red sweater, which indicated to him that she had had sex with 17 different men at work that day. To save her from eternal damnation for adultery, Mr. B believed he had to stab her 17 times before sunrise.

He becomes tearful during the interview and says he wishes he “could go back in time and fix things.”

Mr. B. shows clear evidence of a severe mental disease during the offense (psychosis, medication nonadherence) without a personality or substance use disorder.

Factors that indicate he did not know his actions were wrong at the time of the event include:

  • his delusional belief that he was saving his wife from damnation
  • lack of a rational motive
  • lack of effort to conceal the offense
  • his ready confession to 911 operators and police officers
  • his cooperation with police.
On the other hand, Mr. B knew that murder is illegal and that killing one’s wife for infidelity (whether delusional or not) is not legal. These factors suggest that Mr. B knew that his actions were wrong at the time.

Mr. B’s attempts at alternate solutions (discussions with clergy and his mother-in-law) and the perceived deadline (the need to kill his wife before sunrise to prevent damnation) indicate that he had an irresistible impulse.

Open to interpretation

As this case suggests, a defendant’s sanity or insanity is determined by many factors and is often open to interpretation. In court, the prosecution and defense aim to answer two complex questions:

  • Did the defendant suffer from a mental illness? (This may be clear in patients with schizophrenia but more difficult to determine in others, such as in substance-induced mood disorder.)
  • Did this mental illness alter the defendant’s judgment to such a degree that he or she no longer knew the offense was wrongful?
States use subtle variations in language to indicate the strictness of their standards. Some may use “know” (a stricter standard) versus “appreciate” the wrongfulness of his or her actions. This difficult concept becomes more detailed if the defendant knew the act was wrongful but had an overriding moral justification (such as Mr. B’s desire to save his wife from damnation).

Recent cases. Despite her plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, Andrea Yates was convicted of murder in June 2002 for drowning her five children in the bathtub of their home. Though most would agree the Texas housewife suffered from a severe mental illness, prosecutors convinced the jury that she knew the wrongfulness of her actions. An appeal was granted earlier this year, and Yates returned to court in June.

Also this year, the U.S. Supreme Court heard a case contesting Arizona’s insanity defense on grounds that it violated a defendant’s right to due process. In late June, the court sided with the state, continuing to allow each to state to establish its own insanity defense standard.

Related resources

  • American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law. www.aapl.org,
  • Giorgi-Guarnieri D, Janofsky J, Keram E, et al. AAPL practice guideline for forensic psychiatric evaluation of defendants raising the insanity defense. J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2002;30(2 suppl):S3-40.
  • Noffsinger SG, Resnick PJ. Insanity defense evaluations. Directions in Psychiatry 1999;19:325-38.
References

1. Callahan L, Meyer C, et al. Insanity defense reform in the United States-post-Hinckley. Ment Phys Disabil Law Rep 1987;11:54-9.

2. Giorgi-Guarnieri D, Janofsky J, Keram E, et al. AAPL practice guideline for forensic psychiatric evaluation of defendants raising the insanity defense. J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2002;30(2 suppl):S3-40.

3. Rex v. Arnold, 16 How. St. Tr. 695 (1724).

4. Regina v. Oxford, 9 Car. and P. 525, 546 (1840).

5. M’Naughten’s case, 8 Eng Rep. 718 (1843).

6. Resnick PJ. The detection of malingered psychosis. Psychiatr Clin North Am 1999;22:159-72.

7. Resnick PJ, Knoll J. Faking it: how to detect malingered psychosis. Current Psychiatry 2005;4(11):13-25.

8. Roger JL, Bloom JD, Manson SM. Insanity defenses: contested or concealed? Am J Psychiatry 1984;141:885-8.

References

1. Callahan L, Meyer C, et al. Insanity defense reform in the United States-post-Hinckley. Ment Phys Disabil Law Rep 1987;11:54-9.

2. Giorgi-Guarnieri D, Janofsky J, Keram E, et al. AAPL practice guideline for forensic psychiatric evaluation of defendants raising the insanity defense. J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2002;30(2 suppl):S3-40.

3. Rex v. Arnold, 16 How. St. Tr. 695 (1724).

4. Regina v. Oxford, 9 Car. and P. 525, 546 (1840).

5. M’Naughten’s case, 8 Eng Rep. 718 (1843).

6. Resnick PJ. The detection of malingered psychosis. Psychiatr Clin North Am 1999;22:159-72.

7. Resnick PJ, Knoll J. Faking it: how to detect malingered psychosis. Current Psychiatry 2005;4(11):13-25.

8. Roger JL, Bloom JD, Manson SM. Insanity defenses: contested or concealed? Am J Psychiatry 1984;141:885-8.

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Is this patient competent to stand trial?

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Mr. P, age 39, attacks a convenience store clerk with a knife and is charged with aggravated assault. The judge grants the defense attorney’s request that Mr. P’s competency to stand trial be evaluated. Mr. P’s medical records show paranoid schizophrenia diagnosed at age 22, multiple psychiatric hospitalizations, and chronic medication noncompliance.

You may be called on to determine capacity—such as whether a patient can provide informed consent for a medical procedure. Judges or juries make decisions about competency—often based on a psychiatrist’s opinion about a person’s capacity.

This article describes how to prepare a report stating your opinion about whether a defendant such as Mr. P is competent to stand trial.

What is competency?

The defendant’s attorney usually raises the question of whether a defendant is competent to stand trial, but a judge or prosecuting attorney also may suggest an evaluation. Defense attorneys question their clients’ competence to stand trial in approximately 8% to 15% of felony cases, and up to 50,000 defendants are referred for competency evaluations each year.1-4 Competency may be questioned when the defendant:

  • is obviously mentally ill or has a history of mental illness
  • appears to be making irrational decisions
  • has difficulty interacting with the court or defense counsel.5
The judge will order a competency evaluation by an independent psychiatrist, and the defense attorney or prosecutor may request additional evaluations.

“Competency” and “sanity” are often used together in discussions of criminal prosecution of mentally-ill defendants. This article describes evaluating competence to stand trial; we will discuss how to evaluate sanity in a future issue of Current Psychiatry.

Competency is dynamic; the law defines many types, each with a legal definition and requisite capacity. A person may be competent in one area but incompetent in another. He may be incompetent to make a decision about psychiatric hospitalization, for example, yet retain competency to give or withhold informed consent for treatment.

Evaluating competency also is dynamic, depending on the patient’s present state:

  • She might be incapable of giving informed consent for surgery while delirious but capable to make a competent decision about treatment after sensorium clears.
  • A psychotic defendant may be incompetent to stand trial initially but may be restored to competency after treatment.

The ‘dusky standard’

Courts have long recognized that the mentally ill may be incapable of defending themselves against criminal charges (Box).6 The U.S. Supreme Court in 1960 established in Dusky v. United States that the legal standard for competence to stand trial is “whether [the person] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” This standard has been adopted in principle by all states and the federal jurisdiction.7

The “Dusky standard” indicates that a defendant is incompetent to stand trial if, because of a mental illness or other condition, he is unable to:

  • understand the nature and objectives of the court proceedings
  • or assist in his defense (Table 1).
This means that mental illness alone is insufficient to establish incompetence. A mentally-ill defendant can be considered competent to stand trial if the illness does not impair his ability to understand court proceedings or assist in his defense.

Judges ultimately determine defendants’ competence to stand trial, but psychiatrists’ opinions are adopted in 90% of cases.8,9

Box

‘Mute by malice’ or ‘visitation of God’

The concept of competence to stand trial originated in 13th-century England. Persons charged with a crime were required to enter a plea in the King’s Court. Defendants who refused to enter a plea were either:

  • confined and starved (“prison forte et dure”)
  • or slowly crushed under the weight of stones (“peine forte et dure”).2

Before this punishment was exacted, the reason the alleged criminals did not enter a plea had to be determined. Defendants deemed mute by malice (intentionally withholding a plea) were subjected to the aforementioned cruelties. A defendant deemed mute by visitation of God (unable to comprehend that he was required to enter a plea because of mental illness/retardation) was spared, and a plea of not guilty was entered for him.

In the United States, a person’s right to be competent in legal proceedings is implicitly guaranteed by two constitutional amendments:

  • right to counsel (Sixth Amendment)
  • right to due process (Fourteenth Amendment).
Table 1

The ‘Dusky standard’ of competence

A defendant is incompetent to stand trial if he is:
  • unable to understand the trial’s nature and objectives
  • or unable to assist in his own defense
‘Nature and objectives’ of a trial include:
  • charges against the defendant
  • severity of the charges
  • pleas that may be entered
  • roles of courtroom personnel
  • the trial’s adversarial nature
‘Assisting in own defense’ includes ability to:
  • work with attorney
  • appreciate defendant’s role
  • understand plea bargaining
  • make rational defense decisions
  • consider using mental illness defense
  • pay attention in court
  • be free of self-defeating behavior
  • evaluate evidence and predict probable trial outcome
  • display appropriate behavior
  • give reliable account of offense
Source: Dusky v US (1960)
 

 

How to assess competency

If a judge asks you to evaluate a defendant’s competency, you need to know the standard governing competence to stand trial in the judge’s jurisdiction. All courts in the United States use the Dusky standard, but the wording varies.

Review the defendant’s case records, including court papers (with a list of charges), medical records, and psychiatric records. Then interview the defendant to thoroughly evaluate his mental status and collect a detailed psychiatric history.

If the defendant has a mental disorder, it must impair his ability to understand the proceedings or participate in his defense to result in incompetency. Sources who know the defendant (spouse, family, or friends) may provide useful collateral information.

Assessment tools. Some argue that tools designed to help determine competency can assess understanding of facts related to the trial but not ability to reason. The MacArthur Competency Assessment Tool—Criminal Adjudication is thought to assess both decisional competency and factual understanding.10 Another new tool, the Evaluation of Competency to Stand Trial-revised (ECST-R), is beginning to be used more frequently to evaluate possible malingering and case-specific information.

These tools can be purchased online through vendors such as www3.parinc.com. Though useful, these tools serve as adjuncts to the clinical interview.

In your report to the court, include relevant information from the mental status evaluation, the diagnosis, and—most important—a clear, concise opinion of the defendant’s current competence to stand trial.

Case: does Mr. P meet the standard?

During your interview, Mr. P endorses chronic auditory hallucinations telling him to harm others. He is alert and oriented to location, date, and current events. He can adequately describe courtroom proceedings and each individual’s role, noting that he had been to court before on a drug possession charge, for which he received probation.

When you ask Mr. P about his attorney, he leans in and whispers, “My attorney and my mother have a secret plan to send me to prison for the rest of my life.” He contends his attorney is telling him to claim he is “crazy” to make him “look bad” in court.

In a separate interview, you question the corrections officer who accompanied Mr. P to the evaluation. He says Mr. P refuses to see his mother and his attorney when they come to visit him in jail and takes his medications only sporadically.

Understanding court proceedings. A defendant such as Mr. P must be able to understand the charges against him, that he is on trial for those charges, and the severity of the charges. He must be able to understand the pleas he can offer (guilty, not guilty, not guilty by reason of insanity, or no contest).

The defendant also must be aware of the roles of trial participants, including defense attorney, prosecutor, witnesses, judge, and jury. He must appreciate the trial’s adversarial nature, that his attorney is acting in his best interests and defending him, and that the prosecutor is trying to convict him.

Ability to assist in defense. A defendant must be able to have logical, coherent discussions with his attorney and be free of paranoid beliefs about the attorney. He must recognize his role as the defendant and maintain no delusions that he is somehow immune to prosecution.

In cooperation with his attorney, he must be able to evaluate the evidence against him and predict the trial’s probable outcome. He must help his attorney formulate a plan for his defense and make reasonable decisions about that plan. If relevant, he must be willing to consider using a mental illness defense at trial; therefore, he must possess a reasonable amount of insight into his mental illness. He also must:

  • be able to participate with his attorney in plea bargaining and grasp the meaning and outcome of this process
  • have sufficient memory and concentration to understand the trial proceedings.
A defendant must behave appropriately in court. For a finding of incompetency, inappropriate behavior must be the result of a mental illness and not intentional disruption of the trial.

Finally, a defendant must be motivated to assist in his defense and free of self-defeating behavior. For example, severely depressed patients seeking to punish themselves by causing an unfavorable trial outcome could be considered incompetent.

Mentally ill and incompetent

Mr. P has a clear history of mental illness, the first criterion for a defendant to be considered incompetent to stand trial. He has psychotic symptoms, but these alone are insufficient to consider him incompetent. Also, having competently stood trial in the past does not necessarily mean he is competent now.

 

 

Based on the beginning of the interview, Mr. P appears to understand the nature and objectives of court proceedings. His delusions about his attorney, however, clearly would impair his ability to assist in his defense.

Reporting to the court. A forensic evaluator’s report to the court might say: “It is my opinion, with reasonable medical certainty, that although Mr. P understands the nature and objectives of the court proceedings against him, he has a significant thought disorder that currently impairs his ability to assist in his own defense. In particular, Mr. P maintains delusions (a fixed, false belief held despite evidence to the contrary) that his attorney is plotting against him.”

Treatment to restore competency. Approximately 30% of evaluated defendants are adjudicated incompetent for a variety of reasons (Table 2).11 They often are committed to a forensic mental hospital for treatment to restore competency, which occurs in up to 90% of cases.12

Mr. P will likely be committed to restore competency, which may be achieved by treating his schizophrenia.

Defendants with disorders such as dementia or mental retardation may be considered unable to be restored to competency, and their charges are dismissed or held in abeyance. They may then be involuntarily hospitalized if committed through civil proceedings.

Table 2

7 common reasons defendants are found incompetent to stand trial

  • Low intelligence or dementia impairs understanding of trial process
  • Depression and self-defeating behavior limit motivation for trial’s best outcome
  • Mania impairs ability to act appropriately in courtroom
  • Paranoid delusions impair ability to work with defense counsel
  • Disorganized thinking impairs concentration and attention
  • Delusions, disorganized thinking, low intellect, or dementia result in irrational decision-making about defense
  • Hallucinations distract from paying attention to the trial
Source: Reference 5
Related resources

  • Grisso T. Evaluating competencies: forensic assessments and instruments, 2nd ed. New York: Springer; 2002.
  • Melton GB, Petrila J, Poythress G, Slobogin C. Psychological evaluations for the courts: a handbook for mental health professionals and lawyers, 2nd ed. New York: Guilford Press; 1997.
  • American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law. www.aapl.org.
References

1. Hoge SK, Bonnie RJ, Poythress N, Monahan J. Attorney-client decision making in criminal cases: Client competence and participation as perceived by their attorneys. Behav Sci Law 1992;10:385-94.

2. Poythress NG, Bonnie RJ, Hoge SK, et al. Client abilities to assist counsel and make decisions in criminal cases: Findings from three studies. Law Hum Behav 1994;18(4):437-52.

3. Hoge SK, Bonnie RJ, Poythress N, et al. The MacArthur Adjudicative Competency Study: development and validation of a research instrument. Law Hum Behav 1997;21(2):141-79.

4. Skeem JL, Golding SL, Cohn NB, et al. Logic and reliability of evaluations of competence to stand trial. Law Hum Behav 1998;22(5):519-47.

5. Resnick PJ, Noffsinger SG. Competence to stand trial and the insanity defense. In: Simon RL, Gold LH, eds. Textbook of forensic psychiatry: the clinicians guide to assessment Arlington, VA; American Psychiatric Publishing, 2003;329-47.

6. Grubin D. Fitness to plead in England and Wales. East Sussex, UK: Psychology Press; 1996.

7. Dusky v United States, 362, 402 (US 1960).

8. Freckelton I. Rationality and flexibility in assessment of fitness to stand trial. Int J Law Psychiatry 1986;19:39-59.

9. Reich J, Tookey L. Disagreements between court and psychiatrist on competency to stand trial. J Clin Psychiatry 1986;47:29-30.

10. Bonnie R. The competence of criminal defendants: beyond Dusky and Drop. University of Miami Law Review 1993;47:539-601.

11. Nicholson R, Kugler K. Competent and incompetent criminal defendants: a quantitative review of comparative research. Psychol Bull 1991;109:355-70.

12. Noffsinger SG. Restoration to competency practice guidelines. Int J Offender Ther Comparative Criminology 2001;45(2):356-62.

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Stephen Noffsinger, MD
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Mr. P, age 39, attacks a convenience store clerk with a knife and is charged with aggravated assault. The judge grants the defense attorney’s request that Mr. P’s competency to stand trial be evaluated. Mr. P’s medical records show paranoid schizophrenia diagnosed at age 22, multiple psychiatric hospitalizations, and chronic medication noncompliance.

You may be called on to determine capacity—such as whether a patient can provide informed consent for a medical procedure. Judges or juries make decisions about competency—often based on a psychiatrist’s opinion about a person’s capacity.

This article describes how to prepare a report stating your opinion about whether a defendant such as Mr. P is competent to stand trial.

What is competency?

The defendant’s attorney usually raises the question of whether a defendant is competent to stand trial, but a judge or prosecuting attorney also may suggest an evaluation. Defense attorneys question their clients’ competence to stand trial in approximately 8% to 15% of felony cases, and up to 50,000 defendants are referred for competency evaluations each year.1-4 Competency may be questioned when the defendant:

  • is obviously mentally ill or has a history of mental illness
  • appears to be making irrational decisions
  • has difficulty interacting with the court or defense counsel.5
The judge will order a competency evaluation by an independent psychiatrist, and the defense attorney or prosecutor may request additional evaluations.

“Competency” and “sanity” are often used together in discussions of criminal prosecution of mentally-ill defendants. This article describes evaluating competence to stand trial; we will discuss how to evaluate sanity in a future issue of Current Psychiatry.

Competency is dynamic; the law defines many types, each with a legal definition and requisite capacity. A person may be competent in one area but incompetent in another. He may be incompetent to make a decision about psychiatric hospitalization, for example, yet retain competency to give or withhold informed consent for treatment.

Evaluating competency also is dynamic, depending on the patient’s present state:

  • She might be incapable of giving informed consent for surgery while delirious but capable to make a competent decision about treatment after sensorium clears.
  • A psychotic defendant may be incompetent to stand trial initially but may be restored to competency after treatment.

The ‘dusky standard’

Courts have long recognized that the mentally ill may be incapable of defending themselves against criminal charges (Box).6 The U.S. Supreme Court in 1960 established in Dusky v. United States that the legal standard for competence to stand trial is “whether [the person] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” This standard has been adopted in principle by all states and the federal jurisdiction.7

The “Dusky standard” indicates that a defendant is incompetent to stand trial if, because of a mental illness or other condition, he is unable to:

  • understand the nature and objectives of the court proceedings
  • or assist in his defense (Table 1).
This means that mental illness alone is insufficient to establish incompetence. A mentally-ill defendant can be considered competent to stand trial if the illness does not impair his ability to understand court proceedings or assist in his defense.

Judges ultimately determine defendants’ competence to stand trial, but psychiatrists’ opinions are adopted in 90% of cases.8,9

Box

‘Mute by malice’ or ‘visitation of God’

The concept of competence to stand trial originated in 13th-century England. Persons charged with a crime were required to enter a plea in the King’s Court. Defendants who refused to enter a plea were either:

  • confined and starved (“prison forte et dure”)
  • or slowly crushed under the weight of stones (“peine forte et dure”).2

Before this punishment was exacted, the reason the alleged criminals did not enter a plea had to be determined. Defendants deemed mute by malice (intentionally withholding a plea) were subjected to the aforementioned cruelties. A defendant deemed mute by visitation of God (unable to comprehend that he was required to enter a plea because of mental illness/retardation) was spared, and a plea of not guilty was entered for him.

In the United States, a person’s right to be competent in legal proceedings is implicitly guaranteed by two constitutional amendments:

  • right to counsel (Sixth Amendment)
  • right to due process (Fourteenth Amendment).
Table 1

The ‘Dusky standard’ of competence

A defendant is incompetent to stand trial if he is:
  • unable to understand the trial’s nature and objectives
  • or unable to assist in his own defense
‘Nature and objectives’ of a trial include:
  • charges against the defendant
  • severity of the charges
  • pleas that may be entered
  • roles of courtroom personnel
  • the trial’s adversarial nature
‘Assisting in own defense’ includes ability to:
  • work with attorney
  • appreciate defendant’s role
  • understand plea bargaining
  • make rational defense decisions
  • consider using mental illness defense
  • pay attention in court
  • be free of self-defeating behavior
  • evaluate evidence and predict probable trial outcome
  • display appropriate behavior
  • give reliable account of offense
Source: Dusky v US (1960)
 

 

How to assess competency

If a judge asks you to evaluate a defendant’s competency, you need to know the standard governing competence to stand trial in the judge’s jurisdiction. All courts in the United States use the Dusky standard, but the wording varies.

Review the defendant’s case records, including court papers (with a list of charges), medical records, and psychiatric records. Then interview the defendant to thoroughly evaluate his mental status and collect a detailed psychiatric history.

If the defendant has a mental disorder, it must impair his ability to understand the proceedings or participate in his defense to result in incompetency. Sources who know the defendant (spouse, family, or friends) may provide useful collateral information.

Assessment tools. Some argue that tools designed to help determine competency can assess understanding of facts related to the trial but not ability to reason. The MacArthur Competency Assessment Tool—Criminal Adjudication is thought to assess both decisional competency and factual understanding.10 Another new tool, the Evaluation of Competency to Stand Trial-revised (ECST-R), is beginning to be used more frequently to evaluate possible malingering and case-specific information.

These tools can be purchased online through vendors such as www3.parinc.com. Though useful, these tools serve as adjuncts to the clinical interview.

In your report to the court, include relevant information from the mental status evaluation, the diagnosis, and—most important—a clear, concise opinion of the defendant’s current competence to stand trial.

Case: does Mr. P meet the standard?

During your interview, Mr. P endorses chronic auditory hallucinations telling him to harm others. He is alert and oriented to location, date, and current events. He can adequately describe courtroom proceedings and each individual’s role, noting that he had been to court before on a drug possession charge, for which he received probation.

When you ask Mr. P about his attorney, he leans in and whispers, “My attorney and my mother have a secret plan to send me to prison for the rest of my life.” He contends his attorney is telling him to claim he is “crazy” to make him “look bad” in court.

In a separate interview, you question the corrections officer who accompanied Mr. P to the evaluation. He says Mr. P refuses to see his mother and his attorney when they come to visit him in jail and takes his medications only sporadically.

Understanding court proceedings. A defendant such as Mr. P must be able to understand the charges against him, that he is on trial for those charges, and the severity of the charges. He must be able to understand the pleas he can offer (guilty, not guilty, not guilty by reason of insanity, or no contest).

The defendant also must be aware of the roles of trial participants, including defense attorney, prosecutor, witnesses, judge, and jury. He must appreciate the trial’s adversarial nature, that his attorney is acting in his best interests and defending him, and that the prosecutor is trying to convict him.

Ability to assist in defense. A defendant must be able to have logical, coherent discussions with his attorney and be free of paranoid beliefs about the attorney. He must recognize his role as the defendant and maintain no delusions that he is somehow immune to prosecution.

In cooperation with his attorney, he must be able to evaluate the evidence against him and predict the trial’s probable outcome. He must help his attorney formulate a plan for his defense and make reasonable decisions about that plan. If relevant, he must be willing to consider using a mental illness defense at trial; therefore, he must possess a reasonable amount of insight into his mental illness. He also must:

  • be able to participate with his attorney in plea bargaining and grasp the meaning and outcome of this process
  • have sufficient memory and concentration to understand the trial proceedings.
A defendant must behave appropriately in court. For a finding of incompetency, inappropriate behavior must be the result of a mental illness and not intentional disruption of the trial.

Finally, a defendant must be motivated to assist in his defense and free of self-defeating behavior. For example, severely depressed patients seeking to punish themselves by causing an unfavorable trial outcome could be considered incompetent.

Mentally ill and incompetent

Mr. P has a clear history of mental illness, the first criterion for a defendant to be considered incompetent to stand trial. He has psychotic symptoms, but these alone are insufficient to consider him incompetent. Also, having competently stood trial in the past does not necessarily mean he is competent now.

 

 

Based on the beginning of the interview, Mr. P appears to understand the nature and objectives of court proceedings. His delusions about his attorney, however, clearly would impair his ability to assist in his defense.

Reporting to the court. A forensic evaluator’s report to the court might say: “It is my opinion, with reasonable medical certainty, that although Mr. P understands the nature and objectives of the court proceedings against him, he has a significant thought disorder that currently impairs his ability to assist in his own defense. In particular, Mr. P maintains delusions (a fixed, false belief held despite evidence to the contrary) that his attorney is plotting against him.”

Treatment to restore competency. Approximately 30% of evaluated defendants are adjudicated incompetent for a variety of reasons (Table 2).11 They often are committed to a forensic mental hospital for treatment to restore competency, which occurs in up to 90% of cases.12

Mr. P will likely be committed to restore competency, which may be achieved by treating his schizophrenia.

Defendants with disorders such as dementia or mental retardation may be considered unable to be restored to competency, and their charges are dismissed or held in abeyance. They may then be involuntarily hospitalized if committed through civil proceedings.

Table 2

7 common reasons defendants are found incompetent to stand trial

  • Low intelligence or dementia impairs understanding of trial process
  • Depression and self-defeating behavior limit motivation for trial’s best outcome
  • Mania impairs ability to act appropriately in courtroom
  • Paranoid delusions impair ability to work with defense counsel
  • Disorganized thinking impairs concentration and attention
  • Delusions, disorganized thinking, low intellect, or dementia result in irrational decision-making about defense
  • Hallucinations distract from paying attention to the trial
Source: Reference 5
Related resources

  • Grisso T. Evaluating competencies: forensic assessments and instruments, 2nd ed. New York: Springer; 2002.
  • Melton GB, Petrila J, Poythress G, Slobogin C. Psychological evaluations for the courts: a handbook for mental health professionals and lawyers, 2nd ed. New York: Guilford Press; 1997.
  • American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law. www.aapl.org.

Mr. P, age 39, attacks a convenience store clerk with a knife and is charged with aggravated assault. The judge grants the defense attorney’s request that Mr. P’s competency to stand trial be evaluated. Mr. P’s medical records show paranoid schizophrenia diagnosed at age 22, multiple psychiatric hospitalizations, and chronic medication noncompliance.

You may be called on to determine capacity—such as whether a patient can provide informed consent for a medical procedure. Judges or juries make decisions about competency—often based on a psychiatrist’s opinion about a person’s capacity.

This article describes how to prepare a report stating your opinion about whether a defendant such as Mr. P is competent to stand trial.

What is competency?

The defendant’s attorney usually raises the question of whether a defendant is competent to stand trial, but a judge or prosecuting attorney also may suggest an evaluation. Defense attorneys question their clients’ competence to stand trial in approximately 8% to 15% of felony cases, and up to 50,000 defendants are referred for competency evaluations each year.1-4 Competency may be questioned when the defendant:

  • is obviously mentally ill or has a history of mental illness
  • appears to be making irrational decisions
  • has difficulty interacting with the court or defense counsel.5
The judge will order a competency evaluation by an independent psychiatrist, and the defense attorney or prosecutor may request additional evaluations.

“Competency” and “sanity” are often used together in discussions of criminal prosecution of mentally-ill defendants. This article describes evaluating competence to stand trial; we will discuss how to evaluate sanity in a future issue of Current Psychiatry.

Competency is dynamic; the law defines many types, each with a legal definition and requisite capacity. A person may be competent in one area but incompetent in another. He may be incompetent to make a decision about psychiatric hospitalization, for example, yet retain competency to give or withhold informed consent for treatment.

Evaluating competency also is dynamic, depending on the patient’s present state:

  • She might be incapable of giving informed consent for surgery while delirious but capable to make a competent decision about treatment after sensorium clears.
  • A psychotic defendant may be incompetent to stand trial initially but may be restored to competency after treatment.

The ‘dusky standard’

Courts have long recognized that the mentally ill may be incapable of defending themselves against criminal charges (Box).6 The U.S. Supreme Court in 1960 established in Dusky v. United States that the legal standard for competence to stand trial is “whether [the person] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” This standard has been adopted in principle by all states and the federal jurisdiction.7

The “Dusky standard” indicates that a defendant is incompetent to stand trial if, because of a mental illness or other condition, he is unable to:

  • understand the nature and objectives of the court proceedings
  • or assist in his defense (Table 1).
This means that mental illness alone is insufficient to establish incompetence. A mentally-ill defendant can be considered competent to stand trial if the illness does not impair his ability to understand court proceedings or assist in his defense.

Judges ultimately determine defendants’ competence to stand trial, but psychiatrists’ opinions are adopted in 90% of cases.8,9

Box

‘Mute by malice’ or ‘visitation of God’

The concept of competence to stand trial originated in 13th-century England. Persons charged with a crime were required to enter a plea in the King’s Court. Defendants who refused to enter a plea were either:

  • confined and starved (“prison forte et dure”)
  • or slowly crushed under the weight of stones (“peine forte et dure”).2

Before this punishment was exacted, the reason the alleged criminals did not enter a plea had to be determined. Defendants deemed mute by malice (intentionally withholding a plea) were subjected to the aforementioned cruelties. A defendant deemed mute by visitation of God (unable to comprehend that he was required to enter a plea because of mental illness/retardation) was spared, and a plea of not guilty was entered for him.

In the United States, a person’s right to be competent in legal proceedings is implicitly guaranteed by two constitutional amendments:

  • right to counsel (Sixth Amendment)
  • right to due process (Fourteenth Amendment).
Table 1

The ‘Dusky standard’ of competence

A defendant is incompetent to stand trial if he is:
  • unable to understand the trial’s nature and objectives
  • or unable to assist in his own defense
‘Nature and objectives’ of a trial include:
  • charges against the defendant
  • severity of the charges
  • pleas that may be entered
  • roles of courtroom personnel
  • the trial’s adversarial nature
‘Assisting in own defense’ includes ability to:
  • work with attorney
  • appreciate defendant’s role
  • understand plea bargaining
  • make rational defense decisions
  • consider using mental illness defense
  • pay attention in court
  • be free of self-defeating behavior
  • evaluate evidence and predict probable trial outcome
  • display appropriate behavior
  • give reliable account of offense
Source: Dusky v US (1960)
 

 

How to assess competency

If a judge asks you to evaluate a defendant’s competency, you need to know the standard governing competence to stand trial in the judge’s jurisdiction. All courts in the United States use the Dusky standard, but the wording varies.

Review the defendant’s case records, including court papers (with a list of charges), medical records, and psychiatric records. Then interview the defendant to thoroughly evaluate his mental status and collect a detailed psychiatric history.

If the defendant has a mental disorder, it must impair his ability to understand the proceedings or participate in his defense to result in incompetency. Sources who know the defendant (spouse, family, or friends) may provide useful collateral information.

Assessment tools. Some argue that tools designed to help determine competency can assess understanding of facts related to the trial but not ability to reason. The MacArthur Competency Assessment Tool—Criminal Adjudication is thought to assess both decisional competency and factual understanding.10 Another new tool, the Evaluation of Competency to Stand Trial-revised (ECST-R), is beginning to be used more frequently to evaluate possible malingering and case-specific information.

These tools can be purchased online through vendors such as www3.parinc.com. Though useful, these tools serve as adjuncts to the clinical interview.

In your report to the court, include relevant information from the mental status evaluation, the diagnosis, and—most important—a clear, concise opinion of the defendant’s current competence to stand trial.

Case: does Mr. P meet the standard?

During your interview, Mr. P endorses chronic auditory hallucinations telling him to harm others. He is alert and oriented to location, date, and current events. He can adequately describe courtroom proceedings and each individual’s role, noting that he had been to court before on a drug possession charge, for which he received probation.

When you ask Mr. P about his attorney, he leans in and whispers, “My attorney and my mother have a secret plan to send me to prison for the rest of my life.” He contends his attorney is telling him to claim he is “crazy” to make him “look bad” in court.

In a separate interview, you question the corrections officer who accompanied Mr. P to the evaluation. He says Mr. P refuses to see his mother and his attorney when they come to visit him in jail and takes his medications only sporadically.

Understanding court proceedings. A defendant such as Mr. P must be able to understand the charges against him, that he is on trial for those charges, and the severity of the charges. He must be able to understand the pleas he can offer (guilty, not guilty, not guilty by reason of insanity, or no contest).

The defendant also must be aware of the roles of trial participants, including defense attorney, prosecutor, witnesses, judge, and jury. He must appreciate the trial’s adversarial nature, that his attorney is acting in his best interests and defending him, and that the prosecutor is trying to convict him.

Ability to assist in defense. A defendant must be able to have logical, coherent discussions with his attorney and be free of paranoid beliefs about the attorney. He must recognize his role as the defendant and maintain no delusions that he is somehow immune to prosecution.

In cooperation with his attorney, he must be able to evaluate the evidence against him and predict the trial’s probable outcome. He must help his attorney formulate a plan for his defense and make reasonable decisions about that plan. If relevant, he must be willing to consider using a mental illness defense at trial; therefore, he must possess a reasonable amount of insight into his mental illness. He also must:

  • be able to participate with his attorney in plea bargaining and grasp the meaning and outcome of this process
  • have sufficient memory and concentration to understand the trial proceedings.
A defendant must behave appropriately in court. For a finding of incompetency, inappropriate behavior must be the result of a mental illness and not intentional disruption of the trial.

Finally, a defendant must be motivated to assist in his defense and free of self-defeating behavior. For example, severely depressed patients seeking to punish themselves by causing an unfavorable trial outcome could be considered incompetent.

Mentally ill and incompetent

Mr. P has a clear history of mental illness, the first criterion for a defendant to be considered incompetent to stand trial. He has psychotic symptoms, but these alone are insufficient to consider him incompetent. Also, having competently stood trial in the past does not necessarily mean he is competent now.

 

 

Based on the beginning of the interview, Mr. P appears to understand the nature and objectives of court proceedings. His delusions about his attorney, however, clearly would impair his ability to assist in his defense.

Reporting to the court. A forensic evaluator’s report to the court might say: “It is my opinion, with reasonable medical certainty, that although Mr. P understands the nature and objectives of the court proceedings against him, he has a significant thought disorder that currently impairs his ability to assist in his own defense. In particular, Mr. P maintains delusions (a fixed, false belief held despite evidence to the contrary) that his attorney is plotting against him.”

Treatment to restore competency. Approximately 30% of evaluated defendants are adjudicated incompetent for a variety of reasons (Table 2).11 They often are committed to a forensic mental hospital for treatment to restore competency, which occurs in up to 90% of cases.12

Mr. P will likely be committed to restore competency, which may be achieved by treating his schizophrenia.

Defendants with disorders such as dementia or mental retardation may be considered unable to be restored to competency, and their charges are dismissed or held in abeyance. They may then be involuntarily hospitalized if committed through civil proceedings.

Table 2

7 common reasons defendants are found incompetent to stand trial

  • Low intelligence or dementia impairs understanding of trial process
  • Depression and self-defeating behavior limit motivation for trial’s best outcome
  • Mania impairs ability to act appropriately in courtroom
  • Paranoid delusions impair ability to work with defense counsel
  • Disorganized thinking impairs concentration and attention
  • Delusions, disorganized thinking, low intellect, or dementia result in irrational decision-making about defense
  • Hallucinations distract from paying attention to the trial
Source: Reference 5
Related resources

  • Grisso T. Evaluating competencies: forensic assessments and instruments, 2nd ed. New York: Springer; 2002.
  • Melton GB, Petrila J, Poythress G, Slobogin C. Psychological evaluations for the courts: a handbook for mental health professionals and lawyers, 2nd ed. New York: Guilford Press; 1997.
  • American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law. www.aapl.org.
References

1. Hoge SK, Bonnie RJ, Poythress N, Monahan J. Attorney-client decision making in criminal cases: Client competence and participation as perceived by their attorneys. Behav Sci Law 1992;10:385-94.

2. Poythress NG, Bonnie RJ, Hoge SK, et al. Client abilities to assist counsel and make decisions in criminal cases: Findings from three studies. Law Hum Behav 1994;18(4):437-52.

3. Hoge SK, Bonnie RJ, Poythress N, et al. The MacArthur Adjudicative Competency Study: development and validation of a research instrument. Law Hum Behav 1997;21(2):141-79.

4. Skeem JL, Golding SL, Cohn NB, et al. Logic and reliability of evaluations of competence to stand trial. Law Hum Behav 1998;22(5):519-47.

5. Resnick PJ, Noffsinger SG. Competence to stand trial and the insanity defense. In: Simon RL, Gold LH, eds. Textbook of forensic psychiatry: the clinicians guide to assessment Arlington, VA; American Psychiatric Publishing, 2003;329-47.

6. Grubin D. Fitness to plead in England and Wales. East Sussex, UK: Psychology Press; 1996.

7. Dusky v United States, 362, 402 (US 1960).

8. Freckelton I. Rationality and flexibility in assessment of fitness to stand trial. Int J Law Psychiatry 1986;19:39-59.

9. Reich J, Tookey L. Disagreements between court and psychiatrist on competency to stand trial. J Clin Psychiatry 1986;47:29-30.

10. Bonnie R. The competence of criminal defendants: beyond Dusky and Drop. University of Miami Law Review 1993;47:539-601.

11. Nicholson R, Kugler K. Competent and incompetent criminal defendants: a quantitative review of comparative research. Psychol Bull 1991;109:355-70.

12. Noffsinger SG. Restoration to competency practice guidelines. Int J Offender Ther Comparative Criminology 2001;45(2):356-62.

References

1. Hoge SK, Bonnie RJ, Poythress N, Monahan J. Attorney-client decision making in criminal cases: Client competence and participation as perceived by their attorneys. Behav Sci Law 1992;10:385-94.

2. Poythress NG, Bonnie RJ, Hoge SK, et al. Client abilities to assist counsel and make decisions in criminal cases: Findings from three studies. Law Hum Behav 1994;18(4):437-52.

3. Hoge SK, Bonnie RJ, Poythress N, et al. The MacArthur Adjudicative Competency Study: development and validation of a research instrument. Law Hum Behav 1997;21(2):141-79.

4. Skeem JL, Golding SL, Cohn NB, et al. Logic and reliability of evaluations of competence to stand trial. Law Hum Behav 1998;22(5):519-47.

5. Resnick PJ, Noffsinger SG. Competence to stand trial and the insanity defense. In: Simon RL, Gold LH, eds. Textbook of forensic psychiatry: the clinicians guide to assessment Arlington, VA; American Psychiatric Publishing, 2003;329-47.

6. Grubin D. Fitness to plead in England and Wales. East Sussex, UK: Psychology Press; 1996.

7. Dusky v United States, 362, 402 (US 1960).

8. Freckelton I. Rationality and flexibility in assessment of fitness to stand trial. Int J Law Psychiatry 1986;19:39-59.

9. Reich J, Tookey L. Disagreements between court and psychiatrist on competency to stand trial. J Clin Psychiatry 1986;47:29-30.

10. Bonnie R. The competence of criminal defendants: beyond Dusky and Drop. University of Miami Law Review 1993;47:539-601.

11. Nicholson R, Kugler K. Competent and incompetent criminal defendants: a quantitative review of comparative research. Psychol Bull 1991;109:355-70.

12. Noffsinger SG. Restoration to competency practice guidelines. Int J Offender Ther Comparative Criminology 2001;45(2):356-62.

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