Government and Regulations

Growing up I can remember my father telling stories of service members in the medical battalion he commanded in World War II (WWII) who after the war with his encouragement and their GI Bill educational benefits went to school to become doctors, nurses, and dentists. They were among the 2,300,000 veterans who attended US colleges and universities through the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act passed in 1944. The American Legion navigated the bill through the twists and turns of congressional support, and it was one of their leaders who invented the catchy GI Bill shorthand.²

As with most political legislation, there were mixed motives driving passage of the act, and like many policies in America, the primary impetus was economic. While the war was raging overseas, at home the US Department of Labor predicted that by the war’s end, 16 million service members would be jobless. Apprehensive about the prospect of yet another financial depression, in 1943 a White House agency recommended that the federal government fund education and training for the individuals who had served during the war.²

While troops stormed the beaches of Normandy, wartime President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) signed the bill that delivered not only educational and training opportunities for service members and veterans, but also funded home loans and US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) hospitals. The bill was practical in that it provided not only tuition, but also books, supplies, a living stipend, and counseling for the students. The bill technically expired in 1956, but a series of extensions and expansions has been true to the original intention to offer those who served their nation in the military a better life as citizens.

Articles describing the impact of the GI Bill use terms like life changing and transformative.^3,4 Our contemporary culture makes it difficult to imagine how out of reach a college education was for the generation that fought WWII. Universities were primarily for the rich and connected, the powerful and privileged. Were it not for the upward social mobility the GI Bill propelled, the American dream would not have become a reality for many farmers, small town merchants, and factory workers. The GI Bill though could not by itself ensure equity. The systemic racism endemic in the United States and among the elected representatives who debated the bill resulted in many Black service members especially in the South being denied entrance to institutions of higher learning.⁵ Despite this invidious discrimination, the bill was a profound effort to help many other service members to successfully reintegrate into the society they had preserved and defended.⁴

“With the signing of this bill, a well-rounded program of special veterans’ benefits is nearly completed,” FDR said, capturing its noble intent: “It gives emphatic notice to the men and women in our armed forces that the American people do not intend to let them down.”⁶

Regrettably, we have not kept FDR’s pledge. Now unscrupulous businesses are preying on the aspirations of military personnel and veterans for an education and thwarting their ability to seek gainful employment. For more than a decade, respected news media have reported that for-profit universities were exploiting service members trying to improve their lives through obtaining a college education via the GI Bill.⁷ The sad irony is that what enabled the exploitation to occur was a major expansion of the benefits under the Post-9/11 GI Bill. This version granted educational funding to any individual who had served on active duty for 90 days or more after September 10, 2001.⁸ Federal law prohibits for-profit educational institutions from receiving more than 90% of their total revenue from federal student aid. A loophole in the law enabled these institutions to categorize GI Bill funding as private not government dollars. Bad old American greed drove these for-profit colleges and universities to aggressively recruit veterans who trusted in the good faith of the academic institutions. Once the GI Bill monies were exhausted, veterans had already invested so much time and energy in a degree or certificate, the schools could persuade them to take out student loans with the promise of job placement assistance that never materialized. They took advantage of the veterans’ hopes to fatten their own bottom line in the face of declining enrolments.⁹ Journalists, government, think tank reports, and even a documentary described the tragic stories of service members left unemployed with immense debt and degrees that to many of them were now worthless.¹⁰

After years of reporters exposing the scam and politically thwarted efforts to stop it, Congress and President Biden closed what was known as the 90/10 loophole. This ended the weaponization of education it had promoted. In October 2022, the US Department of Education announced its final rule to prohibit the widespread educational fraud that had betrayed so many veterans and service members, which Secretary Dennis McDonough described as “abuse.”¹¹Some readers may wonder why I have devoted an editorial to a topic that seems somewhat distant from the health care that is the primary domain of Federal Practitioner. It happens that education is in closer proximity to health for our patients than many of us might have realized. A 2018 Military Medicine study found that veterans who took advantage of the educational opportunities of the GI Bill had better health and reduced smoking, among other benefits.¹² This connection between health and education should serve as a source of pride for all of us in federal practice as we are part of organizations that affirm the holistic concept of health that embraces not just medicine but education, housing, and other services essential for comprehensive well-being.

Growing up I can remember my father telling stories of service members in the medical battalion he commanded in World War II (WWII) who after the war with his encouragement and their GI Bill educational benefits went to school to become doctors, nurses, and dentists. They were among the 2,300,000 veterans who attended US colleges and universities through the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act passed in 1944. The American Legion navigated the bill through the twists and turns of congressional support, and it was one of their leaders who invented the catchy GI Bill shorthand.²

As with most political legislation, there were mixed motives driving passage of the act, and like many policies in America, the primary impetus was economic. While the war was raging overseas, at home the US Department of Labor predicted that by the war’s end, 16 million service members would be jobless. Apprehensive about the prospect of yet another financial depression, in 1943 a White House agency recommended that the federal government fund education and training for the individuals who had served during the war.²

While troops stormed the beaches of Normandy, wartime President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) signed the bill that delivered not only educational and training opportunities for service members and veterans, but also funded home loans and US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) hospitals. The bill was practical in that it provided not only tuition, but also books, supplies, a living stipend, and counseling for the students. The bill technically expired in 1956, but a series of extensions and expansions has been true to the original intention to offer those who served their nation in the military a better life as citizens.

Articles describing the impact of the GI Bill use terms like life changing and transformative.^3,4 Our contemporary culture makes it difficult to imagine how out of reach a college education was for the generation that fought WWII. Universities were primarily for the rich and connected, the powerful and privileged. Were it not for the upward social mobility the GI Bill propelled, the American dream would not have become a reality for many farmers, small town merchants, and factory workers. The GI Bill though could not by itself ensure equity. The systemic racism endemic in the United States and among the elected representatives who debated the bill resulted in many Black service members especially in the South being denied entrance to institutions of higher learning.⁵ Despite this invidious discrimination, the bill was a profound effort to help many other service members to successfully reintegrate into the society they had preserved and defended.⁴

“With the signing of this bill, a well-rounded program of special veterans’ benefits is nearly completed,” FDR said, capturing its noble intent: “It gives emphatic notice to the men and women in our armed forces that the American people do not intend to let them down.”⁶

Regrettably, we have not kept FDR’s pledge. Now unscrupulous businesses are preying on the aspirations of military personnel and veterans for an education and thwarting their ability to seek gainful employment. For more than a decade, respected news media have reported that for-profit universities were exploiting service members trying to improve their lives through obtaining a college education via the GI Bill.⁷ The sad irony is that what enabled the exploitation to occur was a major expansion of the benefits under the Post-9/11 GI Bill. This version granted educational funding to any individual who had served on active duty for 90 days or more after September 10, 2001.⁸ Federal law prohibits for-profit educational institutions from receiving more than 90% of their total revenue from federal student aid. A loophole in the law enabled these institutions to categorize GI Bill funding as private not government dollars. Bad old American greed drove these for-profit colleges and universities to aggressively recruit veterans who trusted in the good faith of the academic institutions. Once the GI Bill monies were exhausted, veterans had already invested so much time and energy in a degree or certificate, the schools could persuade them to take out student loans with the promise of job placement assistance that never materialized. They took advantage of the veterans’ hopes to fatten their own bottom line in the face of declining enrolments.⁹ Journalists, government, think tank reports, and even a documentary described the tragic stories of service members left unemployed with immense debt and degrees that to many of them were now worthless.¹⁰

After years of reporters exposing the scam and politically thwarted efforts to stop it, Congress and President Biden closed what was known as the 90/10 loophole. This ended the weaponization of education it had promoted. In October 2022, the US Department of Education announced its final rule to prohibit the widespread educational fraud that had betrayed so many veterans and service members, which Secretary Dennis McDonough described as “abuse.”¹¹Some readers may wonder why I have devoted an editorial to a topic that seems somewhat distant from the health care that is the primary domain of Federal Practitioner. It happens that education is in closer proximity to health for our patients than many of us might have realized. A 2018 Military Medicine study found that veterans who took advantage of the educational opportunities of the GI Bill had better health and reduced smoking, among other benefits.¹² This connection between health and education should serve as a source of pride for all of us in federal practice as we are part of organizations that affirm the holistic concept of health that embraces not just medicine but education, housing, and other services essential for comprehensive well-being.

Growing up I can remember my father telling stories of service members in the medical battalion he commanded in World War II (WWII) who after the war with his encouragement and their GI Bill educational benefits went to school to become doctors, nurses, and dentists. They were among the 2,300,000 veterans who attended US colleges and universities through the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act passed in 1944. The American Legion navigated the bill through the twists and turns of congressional support, and it was one of their leaders who invented the catchy GI Bill shorthand.²

As with most political legislation, there were mixed motives driving passage of the act, and like many policies in America, the primary impetus was economic. While the war was raging overseas, at home the US Department of Labor predicted that by the war’s end, 16 million service members would be jobless. Apprehensive about the prospect of yet another financial depression, in 1943 a White House agency recommended that the federal government fund education and training for the individuals who had served during the war.²

While troops stormed the beaches of Normandy, wartime President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) signed the bill that delivered not only educational and training opportunities for service members and veterans, but also funded home loans and US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) hospitals. The bill was practical in that it provided not only tuition, but also books, supplies, a living stipend, and counseling for the students. The bill technically expired in 1956, but a series of extensions and expansions has been true to the original intention to offer those who served their nation in the military a better life as citizens.

Articles describing the impact of the GI Bill use terms like life changing and transformative.^3,4 Our contemporary culture makes it difficult to imagine how out of reach a college education was for the generation that fought WWII. Universities were primarily for the rich and connected, the powerful and privileged. Were it not for the upward social mobility the GI Bill propelled, the American dream would not have become a reality for many farmers, small town merchants, and factory workers. The GI Bill though could not by itself ensure equity. The systemic racism endemic in the United States and among the elected representatives who debated the bill resulted in many Black service members especially in the South being denied entrance to institutions of higher learning.⁵ Despite this invidious discrimination, the bill was a profound effort to help many other service members to successfully reintegrate into the society they had preserved and defended.⁴

“With the signing of this bill, a well-rounded program of special veterans’ benefits is nearly completed,” FDR said, capturing its noble intent: “It gives emphatic notice to the men and women in our armed forces that the American people do not intend to let them down.”⁶

Regrettably, we have not kept FDR’s pledge. Now unscrupulous businesses are preying on the aspirations of military personnel and veterans for an education and thwarting their ability to seek gainful employment. For more than a decade, respected news media have reported that for-profit universities were exploiting service members trying to improve their lives through obtaining a college education via the GI Bill.⁷ The sad irony is that what enabled the exploitation to occur was a major expansion of the benefits under the Post-9/11 GI Bill. This version granted educational funding to any individual who had served on active duty for 90 days or more after September 10, 2001.⁸ Federal law prohibits for-profit educational institutions from receiving more than 90% of their total revenue from federal student aid. A loophole in the law enabled these institutions to categorize GI Bill funding as private not government dollars. Bad old American greed drove these for-profit colleges and universities to aggressively recruit veterans who trusted in the good faith of the academic institutions. Once the GI Bill monies were exhausted, veterans had already invested so much time and energy in a degree or certificate, the schools could persuade them to take out student loans with the promise of job placement assistance that never materialized. They took advantage of the veterans’ hopes to fatten their own bottom line in the face of declining enrolments.⁹ Journalists, government, think tank reports, and even a documentary described the tragic stories of service members left unemployed with immense debt and degrees that to many of them were now worthless.¹⁰

After years of reporters exposing the scam and politically thwarted efforts to stop it, Congress and President Biden closed what was known as the 90/10 loophole. This ended the weaponization of education it had promoted. In October 2022, the US Department of Education announced its final rule to prohibit the widespread educational fraud that had betrayed so many veterans and service members, which Secretary Dennis McDonough described as “abuse.”¹¹Some readers may wonder why I have devoted an editorial to a topic that seems somewhat distant from the health care that is the primary domain of Federal Practitioner. It happens that education is in closer proximity to health for our patients than many of us might have realized. A 2018 Military Medicine study found that veterans who took advantage of the educational opportunities of the GI Bill had better health and reduced smoking, among other benefits.¹² This connection between health and education should serve as a source of pride for all of us in federal practice as we are part of organizations that affirm the holistic concept of health that embraces not just medicine but education, housing, and other services essential for comprehensive well-being.

Beyond Reps (dba IronRod Health and Cardiac Monitoring Services) has agreed to pay $673,200 to resolve allegations that it submitted false claims to federal health care programs relating to remote cardiac monitoring services.

The U.S. Department of Justice alleges that between Jan. 1, 2018, and April 30, 2021, IronRod, with headquarters in Phoenix, used technicians who lacked required credentials to conduct remote cardiac monitoring readings.

The government further alleges that between June 1, 2018, and Aug. 20, 2018, the company misrepresented that it performed services in New York state in order to get higher reimbursements from Medicare for remote cardiac monitoring services.

“Providers that seek payment from federal health programs are required to follow laws meant to protect beneficiaries, as well as to protect the integrity of those programs,” U.S. Attorney Trini E. Ross said in a statement.

“Our office is committed to pursuing cases against any provider that cuts corners or seeks to obtain payments for which they are not entitled,” Ms. Ross said.

A request to Beyond Reps for comment was not returned.

The civil settlement resolves claims brought under the qui tam (whistleblower) provisions of the False Claims Act by Coleen DeGroat.

Under those provisions, a private party can file an action on behalf of the United States and receive a portion of any recovery. Ms. DeGroat will receive a share of the settlement.

A version of this article first appeared on Medscape.com.

Beyond Reps (dba IronRod Health and Cardiac Monitoring Services) has agreed to pay $673,200 to resolve allegations that it submitted false claims to federal health care programs relating to remote cardiac monitoring services.

The U.S. Department of Justice alleges that between Jan. 1, 2018, and April 30, 2021, IronRod, with headquarters in Phoenix, used technicians who lacked required credentials to conduct remote cardiac monitoring readings.

The government further alleges that between June 1, 2018, and Aug. 20, 2018, the company misrepresented that it performed services in New York state in order to get higher reimbursements from Medicare for remote cardiac monitoring services.

“Providers that seek payment from federal health programs are required to follow laws meant to protect beneficiaries, as well as to protect the integrity of those programs,” U.S. Attorney Trini E. Ross said in a statement.

“Our office is committed to pursuing cases against any provider that cuts corners or seeks to obtain payments for which they are not entitled,” Ms. Ross said.

A request to Beyond Reps for comment was not returned.

The civil settlement resolves claims brought under the qui tam (whistleblower) provisions of the False Claims Act by Coleen DeGroat.

Under those provisions, a private party can file an action on behalf of the United States and receive a portion of any recovery. Ms. DeGroat will receive a share of the settlement.

A version of this article first appeared on Medscape.com.

Beyond Reps (dba IronRod Health and Cardiac Monitoring Services) has agreed to pay $673,200 to resolve allegations that it submitted false claims to federal health care programs relating to remote cardiac monitoring services.

The U.S. Department of Justice alleges that between Jan. 1, 2018, and April 30, 2021, IronRod, with headquarters in Phoenix, used technicians who lacked required credentials to conduct remote cardiac monitoring readings.

The government further alleges that between June 1, 2018, and Aug. 20, 2018, the company misrepresented that it performed services in New York state in order to get higher reimbursements from Medicare for remote cardiac monitoring services.

“Providers that seek payment from federal health programs are required to follow laws meant to protect beneficiaries, as well as to protect the integrity of those programs,” U.S. Attorney Trini E. Ross said in a statement.

“Our office is committed to pursuing cases against any provider that cuts corners or seeks to obtain payments for which they are not entitled,” Ms. Ross said.

A request to Beyond Reps for comment was not returned.

The civil settlement resolves claims brought under the qui tam (whistleblower) provisions of the False Claims Act by Coleen DeGroat.

Under those provisions, a private party can file an action on behalf of the United States and receive a portion of any recovery. Ms. DeGroat will receive a share of the settlement.

A version of this article first appeared on Medscape.com.

To paraphrase Winston Churchill, Gulf War Illness (GWI) is a mystery wrapped in an enigma—a complex interplay of multiple symptoms, caused by a variety of environmental and chemical hazards. To make things more difficult, there are no diagnostic biomarkers or objective laboratory tests with which to confirm a GWI case. Instead, clinicians rely on patients’ reports of symptoms and the absence of other explanations for the symptoms.

Looking to provide more information on the epidemiology and biology of GWI, US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) researchers analyzed data from the VA Cooperative Studies Program 2006/Million Veteran Program 029 cohort, the largest sample of GW-era veterans available for research to date: 35,902 veterans, of whom 13,107 deployed to a post 9/11 Persian Gulf conflict.

The researchers used the Kansas (KS) and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) definitions of GWI, both of which are based on patient self-reports. The KS GWI criteria for phenotype KS Sym+ require ≥ 2 mild symptoms or ≥ 1 moderate or severe symptoms in at least 3 of 6 domains: fatigue/sleep problems, pain, neurologic/cognitive/mood, gastrointestinal, respiratory, and skin. The criteria for phenotype KS Sym+/Dx- also exclude some diagnosed health conditions, such as cancer, diabetes mellitus, and heart disease. The researchers examined both of these phenotypes.

They also used 2 phenotypes of the CDC definition: CDC GWI is met if the veteran reports ≥ 1 symptoms in 2 of 3 domains (fatigue, musculoskeletal, and mood/cognition). The second, CDC GWI severe, is met if the veteran rates ≥ 1 symptoms as severe in ≥ 2 domains.

Of the veterans studied, 67.1% met the KS Sym+ phenotype; 21.5% met the KS Sym+/Dx– definition. A majority (81.1%) met the CDC GWI phenotype; 18.6% met the severe phenotype. The most prevalent KS GWI domains were neurologic/cognitive/mood (81.9%), fatigue/sleep problems (73.9%), and pain (71.5%).

Although their findings mainly laid a foundation for further research, the researchers pointed to some potential new avenues for exploration. For instance, “Importantly,” the researchers say, “we consistently observed that deployed relative to nondeployed veterans had higher odds of meeting each GWI phenotype.” For both deployed and nondeployed veterans, those who served in the Army or Marine Corps had higher odds of meeting the KS Sym+, CDC GWI, and CDC GWI severe phenotypes. Among the deployed, Reservists had higher odds of CDC GWI and CDC GWI severe than did active-duty veterans.

Their findings also revealed that older age was associated with lower odds of meeting the GWI phenotypes. “[S]omewhat surprisingly,” they note, this finding held in both nondeployed and deployed samples, even after adjusting for military rank during the war. The researchers cite other research that has suggested younger service members are at greater risk for GWI (because they’re more likely, for example, to be exposed to deployment-related toxins). Most studies, the researchers note, have shown GWI and related symptoms to be more common among enlisted personnel than officers. Biomarkers of aging, such as epigenetic age acceleration, they suggest, “may be useful in untangling the relationship between age and GWI case status.” 

Because they separately examined the association of demographic characteristics with the GWI phenotypes, the researchers also found that women, regardless of deployment status, had higher odds of meeting the GWI phenotypes compared with men.

Their findings will be used, the researchers say, “to understand how genetic variation is associated with the GWI phenotypes and to identify potential pathophysiologic underpinnings of GWI, pleiotropy with other traits, and gene by environment interactions.” With information from this large dataset of GW-era veterans, they will have a “powerful tool” for in-depth study of exposures and underlying genetic susceptibility to GWI—studies that could not be performed, they say, without the full description of the GWI phenotypes they have documented.

The study had several strengths, the researchers say. For example, unlike previous studies, this one had a sample size large enough to allow more representation of subpopulations, including age, sex, race, ethnicity, education, and military service. The researchers also collected data from surveys, especially data on veterans’ self-reported symptoms and other information “incompletely and infrequently documented in medical records.”

Finally, the data for the study were collected more than 27 years after the GW. It, therefore, gives an “updated, detailed description” of symptoms and conditions affecting GW-era veterans, decades after their return from service.

To paraphrase Winston Churchill, Gulf War Illness (GWI) is a mystery wrapped in an enigma—a complex interplay of multiple symptoms, caused by a variety of environmental and chemical hazards. To make things more difficult, there are no diagnostic biomarkers or objective laboratory tests with which to confirm a GWI case. Instead, clinicians rely on patients’ reports of symptoms and the absence of other explanations for the symptoms.

Looking to provide more information on the epidemiology and biology of GWI, US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) researchers analyzed data from the VA Cooperative Studies Program 2006/Million Veteran Program 029 cohort, the largest sample of GW-era veterans available for research to date: 35,902 veterans, of whom 13,107 deployed to a post 9/11 Persian Gulf conflict.

The researchers used the Kansas (KS) and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) definitions of GWI, both of which are based on patient self-reports. The KS GWI criteria for phenotype KS Sym+ require ≥ 2 mild symptoms or ≥ 1 moderate or severe symptoms in at least 3 of 6 domains: fatigue/sleep problems, pain, neurologic/cognitive/mood, gastrointestinal, respiratory, and skin. The criteria for phenotype KS Sym+/Dx- also exclude some diagnosed health conditions, such as cancer, diabetes mellitus, and heart disease. The researchers examined both of these phenotypes.

They also used 2 phenotypes of the CDC definition: CDC GWI is met if the veteran reports ≥ 1 symptoms in 2 of 3 domains (fatigue, musculoskeletal, and mood/cognition). The second, CDC GWI severe, is met if the veteran rates ≥ 1 symptoms as severe in ≥ 2 domains.

Of the veterans studied, 67.1% met the KS Sym+ phenotype; 21.5% met the KS Sym+/Dx– definition. A majority (81.1%) met the CDC GWI phenotype; 18.6% met the severe phenotype. The most prevalent KS GWI domains were neurologic/cognitive/mood (81.9%), fatigue/sleep problems (73.9%), and pain (71.5%).

Although their findings mainly laid a foundation for further research, the researchers pointed to some potential new avenues for exploration. For instance, “Importantly,” the researchers say, “we consistently observed that deployed relative to nondeployed veterans had higher odds of meeting each GWI phenotype.” For both deployed and nondeployed veterans, those who served in the Army or Marine Corps had higher odds of meeting the KS Sym+, CDC GWI, and CDC GWI severe phenotypes. Among the deployed, Reservists had higher odds of CDC GWI and CDC GWI severe than did active-duty veterans.

Their findings also revealed that older age was associated with lower odds of meeting the GWI phenotypes. “[S]omewhat surprisingly,” they note, this finding held in both nondeployed and deployed samples, even after adjusting for military rank during the war. The researchers cite other research that has suggested younger service members are at greater risk for GWI (because they’re more likely, for example, to be exposed to deployment-related toxins). Most studies, the researchers note, have shown GWI and related symptoms to be more common among enlisted personnel than officers. Biomarkers of aging, such as epigenetic age acceleration, they suggest, “may be useful in untangling the relationship between age and GWI case status.” 

Because they separately examined the association of demographic characteristics with the GWI phenotypes, the researchers also found that women, regardless of deployment status, had higher odds of meeting the GWI phenotypes compared with men.

Their findings will be used, the researchers say, “to understand how genetic variation is associated with the GWI phenotypes and to identify potential pathophysiologic underpinnings of GWI, pleiotropy with other traits, and gene by environment interactions.” With information from this large dataset of GW-era veterans, they will have a “powerful tool” for in-depth study of exposures and underlying genetic susceptibility to GWI—studies that could not be performed, they say, without the full description of the GWI phenotypes they have documented.

The study had several strengths, the researchers say. For example, unlike previous studies, this one had a sample size large enough to allow more representation of subpopulations, including age, sex, race, ethnicity, education, and military service. The researchers also collected data from surveys, especially data on veterans’ self-reported symptoms and other information “incompletely and infrequently documented in medical records.”

Finally, the data for the study were collected more than 27 years after the GW. It, therefore, gives an “updated, detailed description” of symptoms and conditions affecting GW-era veterans, decades after their return from service.

To paraphrase Winston Churchill, Gulf War Illness (GWI) is a mystery wrapped in an enigma—a complex interplay of multiple symptoms, caused by a variety of environmental and chemical hazards. To make things more difficult, there are no diagnostic biomarkers or objective laboratory tests with which to confirm a GWI case. Instead, clinicians rely on patients’ reports of symptoms and the absence of other explanations for the symptoms.

Looking to provide more information on the epidemiology and biology of GWI, US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) researchers analyzed data from the VA Cooperative Studies Program 2006/Million Veteran Program 029 cohort, the largest sample of GW-era veterans available for research to date: 35,902 veterans, of whom 13,107 deployed to a post 9/11 Persian Gulf conflict.

The researchers used the Kansas (KS) and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) definitions of GWI, both of which are based on patient self-reports. The KS GWI criteria for phenotype KS Sym+ require ≥ 2 mild symptoms or ≥ 1 moderate or severe symptoms in at least 3 of 6 domains: fatigue/sleep problems, pain, neurologic/cognitive/mood, gastrointestinal, respiratory, and skin. The criteria for phenotype KS Sym+/Dx- also exclude some diagnosed health conditions, such as cancer, diabetes mellitus, and heart disease. The researchers examined both of these phenotypes.

They also used 2 phenotypes of the CDC definition: CDC GWI is met if the veteran reports ≥ 1 symptoms in 2 of 3 domains (fatigue, musculoskeletal, and mood/cognition). The second, CDC GWI severe, is met if the veteran rates ≥ 1 symptoms as severe in ≥ 2 domains.

Of the veterans studied, 67.1% met the KS Sym+ phenotype; 21.5% met the KS Sym+/Dx– definition. A majority (81.1%) met the CDC GWI phenotype; 18.6% met the severe phenotype. The most prevalent KS GWI domains were neurologic/cognitive/mood (81.9%), fatigue/sleep problems (73.9%), and pain (71.5%).

Although their findings mainly laid a foundation for further research, the researchers pointed to some potential new avenues for exploration. For instance, “Importantly,” the researchers say, “we consistently observed that deployed relative to nondeployed veterans had higher odds of meeting each GWI phenotype.” For both deployed and nondeployed veterans, those who served in the Army or Marine Corps had higher odds of meeting the KS Sym+, CDC GWI, and CDC GWI severe phenotypes. Among the deployed, Reservists had higher odds of CDC GWI and CDC GWI severe than did active-duty veterans.

Their findings also revealed that older age was associated with lower odds of meeting the GWI phenotypes. “[S]omewhat surprisingly,” they note, this finding held in both nondeployed and deployed samples, even after adjusting for military rank during the war. The researchers cite other research that has suggested younger service members are at greater risk for GWI (because they’re more likely, for example, to be exposed to deployment-related toxins). Most studies, the researchers note, have shown GWI and related symptoms to be more common among enlisted personnel than officers. Biomarkers of aging, such as epigenetic age acceleration, they suggest, “may be useful in untangling the relationship between age and GWI case status.” 

Because they separately examined the association of demographic characteristics with the GWI phenotypes, the researchers also found that women, regardless of deployment status, had higher odds of meeting the GWI phenotypes compared with men.

Their findings will be used, the researchers say, “to understand how genetic variation is associated with the GWI phenotypes and to identify potential pathophysiologic underpinnings of GWI, pleiotropy with other traits, and gene by environment interactions.” With information from this large dataset of GW-era veterans, they will have a “powerful tool” for in-depth study of exposures and underlying genetic susceptibility to GWI—studies that could not be performed, they say, without the full description of the GWI phenotypes they have documented.

The study had several strengths, the researchers say. For example, unlike previous studies, this one had a sample size large enough to allow more representation of subpopulations, including age, sex, race, ethnicity, education, and military service. The researchers also collected data from surveys, especially data on veterans’ self-reported symptoms and other information “incompletely and infrequently documented in medical records.”

Finally, the data for the study were collected more than 27 years after the GW. It, therefore, gives an “updated, detailed description” of symptoms and conditions affecting GW-era veterans, decades after their return from service.

U.S. health officials want to simplify the recommended COVID-19 vaccine protocol, making it more like the process for annual flu shots.

The U.S. Food and Drug Administration is suggesting a single annual shot. The formulation would be selected in June targeting the most threatening COVID-19 strains, and then people could get a shot in the fall when people begin spending more time indoors and exposure increases. 

Some people, such as those who are older or immunocompromised, may need more than one dose.

A national advisory committee is expected to vote on the proposal at a meeting Jan. 26.

People in the United States have been much less likely to get an updated COVID-19 booster shot, compared with widespread uptake of the primary vaccine series. In its proposal, the FDA indicated it hoped a single annual shot would overcome challenges created by the complexity of the process – both in messaging and administration – attributed to that low booster rate. Nine in 10 people age 12 or older got the primary vaccine series in the United States, but only 15% got the latest booster shot for COVID-19.

About half of children and adults in the U.S. get an annual flu shot, according to Centers for Disease Control and Prevention data.

The FDA also wants to move to a single COVID-19 vaccine formulation that would be used for primary vaccine series and for booster shots.

COVID-19 cases, hospitalizations, and deaths are trending downward, according to the data tracker from the New York Times. Cases are down 28%, with 47,290 tallied daily. Hospitalizations are down 22%, with 37,474 daily. Deaths are down 4%, with an average of 489 per day as of Jan. 22.

A version of this article originally appeared on WebMD.com.

U.S. health officials want to simplify the recommended COVID-19 vaccine protocol, making it more like the process for annual flu shots.

The U.S. Food and Drug Administration is suggesting a single annual shot. The formulation would be selected in June targeting the most threatening COVID-19 strains, and then people could get a shot in the fall when people begin spending more time indoors and exposure increases. 

Some people, such as those who are older or immunocompromised, may need more than one dose.

A national advisory committee is expected to vote on the proposal at a meeting Jan. 26.

People in the United States have been much less likely to get an updated COVID-19 booster shot, compared with widespread uptake of the primary vaccine series. In its proposal, the FDA indicated it hoped a single annual shot would overcome challenges created by the complexity of the process – both in messaging and administration – attributed to that low booster rate. Nine in 10 people age 12 or older got the primary vaccine series in the United States, but only 15% got the latest booster shot for COVID-19.

About half of children and adults in the U.S. get an annual flu shot, according to Centers for Disease Control and Prevention data.

The FDA also wants to move to a single COVID-19 vaccine formulation that would be used for primary vaccine series and for booster shots.

COVID-19 cases, hospitalizations, and deaths are trending downward, according to the data tracker from the New York Times. Cases are down 28%, with 47,290 tallied daily. Hospitalizations are down 22%, with 37,474 daily. Deaths are down 4%, with an average of 489 per day as of Jan. 22.

A version of this article originally appeared on WebMD.com.

U.S. health officials want to simplify the recommended COVID-19 vaccine protocol, making it more like the process for annual flu shots.

The U.S. Food and Drug Administration is suggesting a single annual shot. The formulation would be selected in June targeting the most threatening COVID-19 strains, and then people could get a shot in the fall when people begin spending more time indoors and exposure increases. 

Some people, such as those who are older or immunocompromised, may need more than one dose.

A national advisory committee is expected to vote on the proposal at a meeting Jan. 26.

People in the United States have been much less likely to get an updated COVID-19 booster shot, compared with widespread uptake of the primary vaccine series. In its proposal, the FDA indicated it hoped a single annual shot would overcome challenges created by the complexity of the process – both in messaging and administration – attributed to that low booster rate. Nine in 10 people age 12 or older got the primary vaccine series in the United States, but only 15% got the latest booster shot for COVID-19.

About half of children and adults in the U.S. get an annual flu shot, according to Centers for Disease Control and Prevention data.

The FDA also wants to move to a single COVID-19 vaccine formulation that would be used for primary vaccine series and for booster shots.

COVID-19 cases, hospitalizations, and deaths are trending downward, according to the data tracker from the New York Times. Cases are down 28%, with 47,290 tallied daily. Hospitalizations are down 22%, with 37,474 daily. Deaths are down 4%, with an average of 489 per day as of Jan. 22.

A version of this article originally appeared on WebMD.com.

Regular readers of Federal Practitioner may recall that I have had a tradition of dedicating the last column of the year to an ethics rendition of the popular trope of the annual best and worst. This year we will examine the stories of 2 military physicians through the lens of virtue ethics. Aristotle (384-322 bce), arguably the most famous Western philosopher, is the acknowledged founder of virtue ethics.

Virtue ethics is among the oldest of ethical theories, and Aristotle articulates this school of thought in his work Nicomachean Ethics.² It is a good fit for Federal Practitioner as it has been constructively applied to the moral development of both military³ and medical professionals.⁴

Here is a Reader’s Digest version of virtue theory with apologizes to all the real philosophers out there. There are different ways to categorize ethical theories. One approach is to distinguish them based on the aspects of primary interest. Consequentialist ethics theories are concerned with the outcomes of actions. Deontologic theories emphasize the intention of the moral agent. In contrast, virtue ethics theories focus on the character of a person. The virtuous individual is one who has practiced the habits of moral excellence and embodies the good life. They are honored as heroes and revered as saints; they are the exemplars we imitate in our aspirations.³

The epigraph sums up one of Aristotle’s central philosophical doctrines: the close relationship of ethics and politics.¹ Personal virtue is intelligible only in the context of community and aim, and the goal of virtue is to contribute to human happiness.⁵ War, whether in ancient Greece or modern Europe, is among the forces most inimical to human flourishing. The current war in Ukraine that has united much of the Western world in opposition to tyranny has divided the 2 physicians in our story along the normative lines of virtue ethics.

The doctor of virtue: Michael Siclari, MD. A 71-year-old US Department of Veterans Affairs physician, Siclari had previously served in the military as a National Guard physician during Operation Enduring Freedom (2001-2014) in Afghanistan. He decided to serve again in Ukraine. Siclari expressed his reasons for going to Ukraine in the language of what Aristotle thought was among the highest virtues: justice. “In retrospect, as I think about why I wanted to go to Ukraine, I think it’s more of a sense that I thought an injustice was happening.”⁷

Echoing the great Rabbi Hillel, Siclari saw the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a personal call to use his experience and training as a trauma and emergency medicine physician to help the Ukrainian people. “If not me, then who?” Siclari demonstrated another virtue: generosity in taking 10 days of personal leave in August 2022 to make the trip to Ukraine, hoping to work in a combat zone tending to wounded soldiers as he had in Afghanistan. When due to logistics he instead was assigned to care for refugees and assist with evacuations from the battlefield, he humbly and compassionately cared for those in his charge. Even now, back home, he speaks to audiences of health care professionals encouraging them to consider similar acts of altruism.⁵

Virtue for Aristotle is technically defined as the mean between 2 extremes of disposition or temperament. The virtue of courage is found in the moral middle ground between the deficiency of bravery that is cowardice and the vice of excess of reckless abandon. The former person fears too much and the latter too little and both thus exhibit vicious behavior.

The doctor of vice: James Lee Henry. Henry is a major and internal medicine physician in the United States Army stationed at Fort Bragg, headquarters of the US Army Special Operations Command. Along with his wife Anna Gabrielian, a civilian anesthesiologist, he was charged in September with conspiring to divulge the protected health information of American military and government employees to the Russian government.⁸ According to the Grand Jury indictment, Henry delivered into the hands of an undercover Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent, the medical records of a US Army officer, Department of Defense employee, and the spouses of 3 Army veterans, 2 of whom were deceased.⁹ In a gross twisting of virtue language, Gabrielian explained her motivation for the couple’s espionage in terms of sacrifice and loyalty. In an antipode of Siclari’s service, Henry purportedly wanted to join the Russian army but did not have the requisite combat experience. For his part, Henry’s abysmal defense of his betrayal of his country and his oath speaks for itself, if the United States were to declare war on Russia, Henry told the FBI agent, “at that point, I’ll have some ethical issues I have to work through.”⁸

We become virtuous people through imitating the example of those who have perfected the habits of moral excellence. During 2022, 2 federal practitioners responded to the challenge of war: one displayed the zenith of virtue, the other exhibited the nadir of vice. Seldom does a single year present us with such clear choices of who and how we want to be in 2023. American culture has so trivialized New Year’s resolutions that they are no longer substantive enough for the weight of the profound question of what constitutes the good life. Rather let us make a commitment in keeping with such morally serious matters. All of us live as mixed creatures, drawn to virtue and prone to vice. May we all strive this coming year to help each other meet the high bar another great man of virtue Abraham Lincoln set in his first inaugural address, to be the “better angels of our natures.”¹⁰

Regular readers of Federal Practitioner may recall that I have had a tradition of dedicating the last column of the year to an ethics rendition of the popular trope of the annual best and worst. This year we will examine the stories of 2 military physicians through the lens of virtue ethics. Aristotle (384-322 bce), arguably the most famous Western philosopher, is the acknowledged founder of virtue ethics.

Virtue ethics is among the oldest of ethical theories, and Aristotle articulates this school of thought in his work Nicomachean Ethics.² It is a good fit for Federal Practitioner as it has been constructively applied to the moral development of both military³ and medical professionals.⁴

Here is a Reader’s Digest version of virtue theory with apologizes to all the real philosophers out there. There are different ways to categorize ethical theories. One approach is to distinguish them based on the aspects of primary interest. Consequentialist ethics theories are concerned with the outcomes of actions. Deontologic theories emphasize the intention of the moral agent. In contrast, virtue ethics theories focus on the character of a person. The virtuous individual is one who has practiced the habits of moral excellence and embodies the good life. They are honored as heroes and revered as saints; they are the exemplars we imitate in our aspirations.³

The epigraph sums up one of Aristotle’s central philosophical doctrines: the close relationship of ethics and politics.¹ Personal virtue is intelligible only in the context of community and aim, and the goal of virtue is to contribute to human happiness.⁵ War, whether in ancient Greece or modern Europe, is among the forces most inimical to human flourishing. The current war in Ukraine that has united much of the Western world in opposition to tyranny has divided the 2 physicians in our story along the normative lines of virtue ethics.

The doctor of virtue: Michael Siclari, MD. A 71-year-old US Department of Veterans Affairs physician, Siclari had previously served in the military as a National Guard physician during Operation Enduring Freedom (2001-2014) in Afghanistan. He decided to serve again in Ukraine. Siclari expressed his reasons for going to Ukraine in the language of what Aristotle thought was among the highest virtues: justice. “In retrospect, as I think about why I wanted to go to Ukraine, I think it’s more of a sense that I thought an injustice was happening.”⁷

Echoing the great Rabbi Hillel, Siclari saw the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a personal call to use his experience and training as a trauma and emergency medicine physician to help the Ukrainian people. “If not me, then who?” Siclari demonstrated another virtue: generosity in taking 10 days of personal leave in August 2022 to make the trip to Ukraine, hoping to work in a combat zone tending to wounded soldiers as he had in Afghanistan. When due to logistics he instead was assigned to care for refugees and assist with evacuations from the battlefield, he humbly and compassionately cared for those in his charge. Even now, back home, he speaks to audiences of health care professionals encouraging them to consider similar acts of altruism.⁵

Virtue for Aristotle is technically defined as the mean between 2 extremes of disposition or temperament. The virtue of courage is found in the moral middle ground between the deficiency of bravery that is cowardice and the vice of excess of reckless abandon. The former person fears too much and the latter too little and both thus exhibit vicious behavior.

The doctor of vice: James Lee Henry. Henry is a major and internal medicine physician in the United States Army stationed at Fort Bragg, headquarters of the US Army Special Operations Command. Along with his wife Anna Gabrielian, a civilian anesthesiologist, he was charged in September with conspiring to divulge the protected health information of American military and government employees to the Russian government.⁸ According to the Grand Jury indictment, Henry delivered into the hands of an undercover Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent, the medical records of a US Army officer, Department of Defense employee, and the spouses of 3 Army veterans, 2 of whom were deceased.⁹ In a gross twisting of virtue language, Gabrielian explained her motivation for the couple’s espionage in terms of sacrifice and loyalty. In an antipode of Siclari’s service, Henry purportedly wanted to join the Russian army but did not have the requisite combat experience. For his part, Henry’s abysmal defense of his betrayal of his country and his oath speaks for itself, if the United States were to declare war on Russia, Henry told the FBI agent, “at that point, I’ll have some ethical issues I have to work through.”⁸

We become virtuous people through imitating the example of those who have perfected the habits of moral excellence. During 2022, 2 federal practitioners responded to the challenge of war: one displayed the zenith of virtue, the other exhibited the nadir of vice. Seldom does a single year present us with such clear choices of who and how we want to be in 2023. American culture has so trivialized New Year’s resolutions that they are no longer substantive enough for the weight of the profound question of what constitutes the good life. Rather let us make a commitment in keeping with such morally serious matters. All of us live as mixed creatures, drawn to virtue and prone to vice. May we all strive this coming year to help each other meet the high bar another great man of virtue Abraham Lincoln set in his first inaugural address, to be the “better angels of our natures.”¹⁰

Regular readers of Federal Practitioner may recall that I have had a tradition of dedicating the last column of the year to an ethics rendition of the popular trope of the annual best and worst. This year we will examine the stories of 2 military physicians through the lens of virtue ethics. Aristotle (384-322 bce), arguably the most famous Western philosopher, is the acknowledged founder of virtue ethics.

Virtue ethics is among the oldest of ethical theories, and Aristotle articulates this school of thought in his work Nicomachean Ethics.² It is a good fit for Federal Practitioner as it has been constructively applied to the moral development of both military³ and medical professionals.⁴

Here is a Reader’s Digest version of virtue theory with apologizes to all the real philosophers out there. There are different ways to categorize ethical theories. One approach is to distinguish them based on the aspects of primary interest. Consequentialist ethics theories are concerned with the outcomes of actions. Deontologic theories emphasize the intention of the moral agent. In contrast, virtue ethics theories focus on the character of a person. The virtuous individual is one who has practiced the habits of moral excellence and embodies the good life. They are honored as heroes and revered as saints; they are the exemplars we imitate in our aspirations.³

The epigraph sums up one of Aristotle’s central philosophical doctrines: the close relationship of ethics and politics.¹ Personal virtue is intelligible only in the context of community and aim, and the goal of virtue is to contribute to human happiness.⁵ War, whether in ancient Greece or modern Europe, is among the forces most inimical to human flourishing. The current war in Ukraine that has united much of the Western world in opposition to tyranny has divided the 2 physicians in our story along the normative lines of virtue ethics.

The doctor of virtue: Michael Siclari, MD. A 71-year-old US Department of Veterans Affairs physician, Siclari had previously served in the military as a National Guard physician during Operation Enduring Freedom (2001-2014) in Afghanistan. He decided to serve again in Ukraine. Siclari expressed his reasons for going to Ukraine in the language of what Aristotle thought was among the highest virtues: justice. “In retrospect, as I think about why I wanted to go to Ukraine, I think it’s more of a sense that I thought an injustice was happening.”⁷

Echoing the great Rabbi Hillel, Siclari saw the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a personal call to use his experience and training as a trauma and emergency medicine physician to help the Ukrainian people. “If not me, then who?” Siclari demonstrated another virtue: generosity in taking 10 days of personal leave in August 2022 to make the trip to Ukraine, hoping to work in a combat zone tending to wounded soldiers as he had in Afghanistan. When due to logistics he instead was assigned to care for refugees and assist with evacuations from the battlefield, he humbly and compassionately cared for those in his charge. Even now, back home, he speaks to audiences of health care professionals encouraging them to consider similar acts of altruism.⁵

Virtue for Aristotle is technically defined as the mean between 2 extremes of disposition or temperament. The virtue of courage is found in the moral middle ground between the deficiency of bravery that is cowardice and the vice of excess of reckless abandon. The former person fears too much and the latter too little and both thus exhibit vicious behavior.

The doctor of vice: James Lee Henry. Henry is a major and internal medicine physician in the United States Army stationed at Fort Bragg, headquarters of the US Army Special Operations Command. Along with his wife Anna Gabrielian, a civilian anesthesiologist, he was charged in September with conspiring to divulge the protected health information of American military and government employees to the Russian government.⁸ According to the Grand Jury indictment, Henry delivered into the hands of an undercover Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent, the medical records of a US Army officer, Department of Defense employee, and the spouses of 3 Army veterans, 2 of whom were deceased.⁹ In a gross twisting of virtue language, Gabrielian explained her motivation for the couple’s espionage in terms of sacrifice and loyalty. In an antipode of Siclari’s service, Henry purportedly wanted to join the Russian army but did not have the requisite combat experience. For his part, Henry’s abysmal defense of his betrayal of his country and his oath speaks for itself, if the United States were to declare war on Russia, Henry told the FBI agent, “at that point, I’ll have some ethical issues I have to work through.”⁸

We become virtuous people through imitating the example of those who have perfected the habits of moral excellence. During 2022, 2 federal practitioners responded to the challenge of war: one displayed the zenith of virtue, the other exhibited the nadir of vice. Seldom does a single year present us with such clear choices of who and how we want to be in 2023. American culture has so trivialized New Year’s resolutions that they are no longer substantive enough for the weight of the profound question of what constitutes the good life. Rather let us make a commitment in keeping with such morally serious matters. All of us live as mixed creatures, drawn to virtue and prone to vice. May we all strive this coming year to help each other meet the high bar another great man of virtue Abraham Lincoln set in his first inaugural address, to be the “better angels of our natures.”¹⁰

This Veterans Day we honor the passing of the largest expansion of veterans benefits and services in history. On August 10, 2022, President Biden signed the Sergeant First Class Heath Robinson Honoring our Promise to Address Comprehensive Toxics (PACT) Act. This act was named for a combat medic who died of a rare form of lung cancer believed to be the result of a toxic military exposure. His widow was present during the President's State of the Union address that urged Congress to pass the legislation.² 

Like all other congressional bills and government regulations, the PACT Act is complex in its details and still a work in progress. Simply put, the PACT Act expands and/or extends enrollment for a group of previously ineligible veterans. Eligibility will no longer require that veterans demonstrate a service-connected disability due to toxic exposure, including those from burn pits. This has long been a barrier for many veterans seeking benefits and not just related to toxic exposures. Logistical barriers and documentary losses have prevented many service members from establishing a clean chain of evidence for the injuries or illnesses they sustained while in uniform.
 
The new process is a massive step forward by the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to establish high standards of procedural justice for settling beneficiary claims. The PACT Act removes the burden from the shoulders of the veteran and places it squarely on the VA to demonstrate that > 20 different medical conditions--primarily cancers and respiratory illnesses--are linked to toxic exposure. The VA must establish that exposure occurred to cohorts of service members in specific theaters and time frames. A veteran who served in that area and period and has one of the indexed illnesses is presumed to have been exposed in the line of duty.^3,4

As a result, the VA instituted a new screening process to determine that toxic military exposures (a) led to illness; and (b) both exposure and illness are connected to service. According to the VA, the new process is evidence based, transparent, and allows the VA to fast-track policy decisions related to exposures. The PACT Act includes a provision intended to promote sustained implementation and prevent the program from succumbing as so many new initiatives have to inadequate adoption. VA is required to deploy its considerable internal research capacity to collaborate with external partners in and outside government to study military members with toxic exposures.⁴ 

Congress had initially proposed that the provisions of the PACT ACT would take effect in 2026, providing time to ramp up the process. The White House and VA telescoped that time line so veterans can begin now to apply for benefits that they could foreseeably receive in 2023. However, a long-standing problem for the VA has been unfunded agency or congressional mandates. These have often end in undermining the legislative intention or policy purpose of the program undermining their legislative intention or policy purpose through staffing shortages, leading to lack of or delayed access. The PACT Act promises to eschew the infamous Phoenix problem by providing increased personnel, training infrastructure, and technology resources for both the Veterans Benefit Administration and the Veterans Health Administration. Ironically, many seasoned VA observers expect the PACT expansion will lead to even larger backlogs of claims as hundreds of newly eligible veterans are added to the extant rolls of those seeking benefits.⁵ 

An estimated 1 in 5 veterans may be entitled to PACT benefits. The PACT Act is the latest of a long uneven movement toward distributive justice for veteran benefits and services. It is fitting in the month of Veterans Day 2022 to trace that trajectory. Congress first passed veteran benefits legislation in 1917, focused on soldiers with disabilities. This resulted in a massive investment in building hospitals. Ironically, part of the impetus for VA health care was an earlier toxic military exposure. World War I service members suffered from the detrimental effects of mustard gas among other chemical byproducts. In 1924, VA benefits and services underwent a momentous opening to include individuals with non-service-connected disabilities. Four years later, the VA tent became even bigger, welcoming women, National Guard, and militia members to receive care under its auspices.⁶ 

The PACT Act is a fitting memorial for Veterans Day as an increasingly divided country presents a unified response to veterans and their survivors exposed to a variety of toxins across multiple wars. The PACT Act was hard won with veterans and their advocates having to fight years of political bickering, government abdication of accountability, and scientific sparring before this bipartisan legislation passed.⁷ It covers Vietnam War veterans with several conditions due to Agent Orange exposure; Gulf War and post-9/11 veterans with cancer and respiratory conditions; and the service members deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq afflicted with illnesses due to the smoke of burn pits and other toxins. 

As many areas of the country roll back LGBTQ+ rights to health care and social services, the VA has emerged as a leader in the movement for diversity and inclusion. VA Secretary McDonough provided a pathway to VA eligibility for other than honorably discharged veterans, including those LGBTQ+ persons discharged under Don't Ask, Don't Tell.⁸ Lest we take this new inclusivity for granted, we should never forget that this journey toward equity for the military and VA has been long, slow, and uneven. There are many difficult miles yet to travel if we are to achieve liberty and justice for veteran members of racial minorities, women, and other marginalized populations. Even the PACT Act does not cover all putative exposures to toxins.⁹ Yet it is a significant step closer to fulfilling the motto of the VA LGBTQ+ program: to serve all who served.¹⁰ 

This Veterans Day we honor the passing of the largest expansion of veterans benefits and services in history. On August 10, 2022, President Biden signed the Sergeant First Class Heath Robinson Honoring our Promise to Address Comprehensive Toxics (PACT) Act. This act was named for a combat medic who died of a rare form of lung cancer believed to be the result of a toxic military exposure. His widow was present during the President's State of the Union address that urged Congress to pass the legislation.² 

Like all other congressional bills and government regulations, the PACT Act is complex in its details and still a work in progress. Simply put, the PACT Act expands and/or extends enrollment for a group of previously ineligible veterans. Eligibility will no longer require that veterans demonstrate a service-connected disability due to toxic exposure, including those from burn pits. This has long been a barrier for many veterans seeking benefits and not just related to toxic exposures. Logistical barriers and documentary losses have prevented many service members from establishing a clean chain of evidence for the injuries or illnesses they sustained while in uniform.
 
The new process is a massive step forward by the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to establish high standards of procedural justice for settling beneficiary claims. The PACT Act removes the burden from the shoulders of the veteran and places it squarely on the VA to demonstrate that > 20 different medical conditions--primarily cancers and respiratory illnesses--are linked to toxic exposure. The VA must establish that exposure occurred to cohorts of service members in specific theaters and time frames. A veteran who served in that area and period and has one of the indexed illnesses is presumed to have been exposed in the line of duty.^3,4

As a result, the VA instituted a new screening process to determine that toxic military exposures (a) led to illness; and (b) both exposure and illness are connected to service. According to the VA, the new process is evidence based, transparent, and allows the VA to fast-track policy decisions related to exposures. The PACT Act includes a provision intended to promote sustained implementation and prevent the program from succumbing as so many new initiatives have to inadequate adoption. VA is required to deploy its considerable internal research capacity to collaborate with external partners in and outside government to study military members with toxic exposures.⁴ 

Congress had initially proposed that the provisions of the PACT ACT would take effect in 2026, providing time to ramp up the process. The White House and VA telescoped that time line so veterans can begin now to apply for benefits that they could foreseeably receive in 2023. However, a long-standing problem for the VA has been unfunded agency or congressional mandates. These have often end in undermining the legislative intention or policy purpose of the program undermining their legislative intention or policy purpose through staffing shortages, leading to lack of or delayed access. The PACT Act promises to eschew the infamous Phoenix problem by providing increased personnel, training infrastructure, and technology resources for both the Veterans Benefit Administration and the Veterans Health Administration. Ironically, many seasoned VA observers expect the PACT expansion will lead to even larger backlogs of claims as hundreds of newly eligible veterans are added to the extant rolls of those seeking benefits.⁵ 

An estimated 1 in 5 veterans may be entitled to PACT benefits. The PACT Act is the latest of a long uneven movement toward distributive justice for veteran benefits and services. It is fitting in the month of Veterans Day 2022 to trace that trajectory. Congress first passed veteran benefits legislation in 1917, focused on soldiers with disabilities. This resulted in a massive investment in building hospitals. Ironically, part of the impetus for VA health care was an earlier toxic military exposure. World War I service members suffered from the detrimental effects of mustard gas among other chemical byproducts. In 1924, VA benefits and services underwent a momentous opening to include individuals with non-service-connected disabilities. Four years later, the VA tent became even bigger, welcoming women, National Guard, and militia members to receive care under its auspices.⁶ 

The PACT Act is a fitting memorial for Veterans Day as an increasingly divided country presents a unified response to veterans and their survivors exposed to a variety of toxins across multiple wars. The PACT Act was hard won with veterans and their advocates having to fight years of political bickering, government abdication of accountability, and scientific sparring before this bipartisan legislation passed.⁷ It covers Vietnam War veterans with several conditions due to Agent Orange exposure; Gulf War and post-9/11 veterans with cancer and respiratory conditions; and the service members deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq afflicted with illnesses due to the smoke of burn pits and other toxins. 

As many areas of the country roll back LGBTQ+ rights to health care and social services, the VA has emerged as a leader in the movement for diversity and inclusion. VA Secretary McDonough provided a pathway to VA eligibility for other than honorably discharged veterans, including those LGBTQ+ persons discharged under Don't Ask, Don't Tell.⁸ Lest we take this new inclusivity for granted, we should never forget that this journey toward equity for the military and VA has been long, slow, and uneven. There are many difficult miles yet to travel if we are to achieve liberty and justice for veteran members of racial minorities, women, and other marginalized populations. Even the PACT Act does not cover all putative exposures to toxins.⁹ Yet it is a significant step closer to fulfilling the motto of the VA LGBTQ+ program: to serve all who served.¹⁰ 

This Veterans Day we honor the passing of the largest expansion of veterans benefits and services in history. On August 10, 2022, President Biden signed the Sergeant First Class Heath Robinson Honoring our Promise to Address Comprehensive Toxics (PACT) Act. This act was named for a combat medic who died of a rare form of lung cancer believed to be the result of a toxic military exposure. His widow was present during the President's State of the Union address that urged Congress to pass the legislation.² 

Like all other congressional bills and government regulations, the PACT Act is complex in its details and still a work in progress. Simply put, the PACT Act expands and/or extends enrollment for a group of previously ineligible veterans. Eligibility will no longer require that veterans demonstrate a service-connected disability due to toxic exposure, including those from burn pits. This has long been a barrier for many veterans seeking benefits and not just related to toxic exposures. Logistical barriers and documentary losses have prevented many service members from establishing a clean chain of evidence for the injuries or illnesses they sustained while in uniform.
 
The new process is a massive step forward by the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to establish high standards of procedural justice for settling beneficiary claims. The PACT Act removes the burden from the shoulders of the veteran and places it squarely on the VA to demonstrate that > 20 different medical conditions--primarily cancers and respiratory illnesses--are linked to toxic exposure. The VA must establish that exposure occurred to cohorts of service members in specific theaters and time frames. A veteran who served in that area and period and has one of the indexed illnesses is presumed to have been exposed in the line of duty.^3,4

As a result, the VA instituted a new screening process to determine that toxic military exposures (a) led to illness; and (b) both exposure and illness are connected to service. According to the VA, the new process is evidence based, transparent, and allows the VA to fast-track policy decisions related to exposures. The PACT Act includes a provision intended to promote sustained implementation and prevent the program from succumbing as so many new initiatives have to inadequate adoption. VA is required to deploy its considerable internal research capacity to collaborate with external partners in and outside government to study military members with toxic exposures.⁴ 

Congress had initially proposed that the provisions of the PACT ACT would take effect in 2026, providing time to ramp up the process. The White House and VA telescoped that time line so veterans can begin now to apply for benefits that they could foreseeably receive in 2023. However, a long-standing problem for the VA has been unfunded agency or congressional mandates. These have often end in undermining the legislative intention or policy purpose of the program undermining their legislative intention or policy purpose through staffing shortages, leading to lack of or delayed access. The PACT Act promises to eschew the infamous Phoenix problem by providing increased personnel, training infrastructure, and technology resources for both the Veterans Benefit Administration and the Veterans Health Administration. Ironically, many seasoned VA observers expect the PACT expansion will lead to even larger backlogs of claims as hundreds of newly eligible veterans are added to the extant rolls of those seeking benefits.⁵ 

An estimated 1 in 5 veterans may be entitled to PACT benefits. The PACT Act is the latest of a long uneven movement toward distributive justice for veteran benefits and services. It is fitting in the month of Veterans Day 2022 to trace that trajectory. Congress first passed veteran benefits legislation in 1917, focused on soldiers with disabilities. This resulted in a massive investment in building hospitals. Ironically, part of the impetus for VA health care was an earlier toxic military exposure. World War I service members suffered from the detrimental effects of mustard gas among other chemical byproducts. In 1924, VA benefits and services underwent a momentous opening to include individuals with non-service-connected disabilities. Four years later, the VA tent became even bigger, welcoming women, National Guard, and militia members to receive care under its auspices.⁶ 

The PACT Act is a fitting memorial for Veterans Day as an increasingly divided country presents a unified response to veterans and their survivors exposed to a variety of toxins across multiple wars. The PACT Act was hard won with veterans and their advocates having to fight years of political bickering, government abdication of accountability, and scientific sparring before this bipartisan legislation passed.⁷ It covers Vietnam War veterans with several conditions due to Agent Orange exposure; Gulf War and post-9/11 veterans with cancer and respiratory conditions; and the service members deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq afflicted with illnesses due to the smoke of burn pits and other toxins. 

As many areas of the country roll back LGBTQ+ rights to health care and social services, the VA has emerged as a leader in the movement for diversity and inclusion. VA Secretary McDonough provided a pathway to VA eligibility for other than honorably discharged veterans, including those LGBTQ+ persons discharged under Don't Ask, Don't Tell.⁸ Lest we take this new inclusivity for granted, we should never forget that this journey toward equity for the military and VA has been long, slow, and uneven. There are many difficult miles yet to travel if we are to achieve liberty and justice for veteran members of racial minorities, women, and other marginalized populations. Even the PACT Act does not cover all putative exposures to toxins.⁹ Yet it is a significant step closer to fulfilling the motto of the VA LGBTQ+ program: to serve all who served.¹⁰ 

The US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is the largest integrated health care system in the United States, providing care for more than 9 million veterans.¹ With veterans experiencing mental health conditions like posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), substance use disorders, and other serious mental illnesses (SMI) at higher rates compared with the general population, the VA plays an important role in the provision of mental health services.^2-5 Since the implementation of its Mental Health Strategic Plan in 2004, the VA has overseen the development of a wide array of mental health programs geared toward the complex needs of veterans. Research has demonstrated VA care outperforming Medicaid-reimbursed services in terms of the percentage of veterans filling antidepressants for at least 12 weeks after initiation of treatment for major depressive disorder (MDD), as well as posthospitalization follow-up.⁶

Eligible veterans enrolled in the VA often also seek non-VA care. Medicaid covers nearly 10% of all nonelderly veterans, and of these veterans, 39% rely solely on Medicaid for health care access.⁷ Today, Medicaid is the largest payer for mental health services in the US, providing coverage for approximately 27% of Americans who have SMI and helping fulfill unmet mental health needs.^8,9 Understanding which of these systems veterans choose to use, and under which circumstances, is essential in guiding the allocation of limited health care resources.¹⁰

Beyond Medicaid, alternatives to VA care may include TRICARE, Medicare, Indian Health Services, and employer-based or self-purchased private insurance. While these options potentially increase convenience, choice, and access to health care practitioners (HCPs) and services not available at local VA systems, cross-system utilization with poor integration may cause care coordination and continuity problems, such as medication mismanagement and opioid overdose, unnecessary duplicate utilization, and possible increased mortality.^11-15 As recent national legislative changes, such as the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Veterans Access, Choice and Accountability Act, and the VA MISSION Act, continue to shift the health care landscape for veterans, questions surrounding how veterans are changing their health care use become significant.^16,17

Here, we approach the impacts of Medicaid expansion on veterans’ reliance on the VA for mental health services with a unique lens. We leverage a difference-in-difference design to study 2 historical Medicaid expansions in Arizona (AZ) and New York (NY), which extended eligibility to childless adults in 2001. Prior Medicaid dual-eligible mental health research investigated reliance shifts during the immediate postenrollment year in a subset of veterans newly enrolled in Medicaid.¹⁸ However, this study took place in a period of relative policy stability. In contrast, we investigate the potential effects of a broad policy shift by analyzing state-level changes in veterans’ reliance over 6 years after a statewide Medicaid expansion. We match expansion states with demographically similar nonexpansion states to account for unobserved trends and confounding effects. Prior studies have used this method to evaluate post-Medicaid expansion mortality changes and changes in veteran dual enrollment and hospitalizations.^10,19 While a study of ACA Medicaid expansion states would be ideal, Medicaid data from most states were only available through 2014 at the time of this analysis. Our study offers a quasi-experimental framework leveraging longitudinal data that can be applied as more post-ACA data become available.

Given the rising incidence of suicide among veterans, understanding care-seeking behaviors for depression among veterans is important as it is the most common psychiatric condition found in those who died by suicide.^20,21 Furthermore, depression may be useful as a clinical proxy for mental health policy impacts, given that the Patient Health Questionnaire-9 (PHQ-9) screening tool is well validated and increasingly research accessible, and it is a chronic condition responsive to both well-managed pharmacologic treatment and psychotherapeutic interventions.^22,23

In this study, we quantify the change in care-seeking behavior for depression among veterans after Medicaid expansion, using a quasi-experimental design. We hypothesize that new access to Medicaid would be associated with a shift away from using VA services for depression. Given the income-dependent eligibility requirements of Medicaid, we also hypothesize that veterans who qualified for VA coverage due to low income, determined by a regional means test (Priority group 5, “income-eligible”), would be more likely to shift care compared with those whose serviced-connected conditions related to their military service (Priority groups 1-4, “service-connected”) provide VA access.

Methods

To investigate the relative changes in veterans’ reliance on the VA for depression care after the 2001 NY and AZ Medicaid expansions We used a retrospective, difference-in-difference analysis. Our comparison pairings, based on prior demographic analyses were as follows: NY with Pennsylvania(PA); AZ with New Mexico and Nevada (NM/NV).¹⁹ The time frame of our analysis was 1999 to 2006, with pre- and postexpansion periods defined as 1999 to 2000 and 2001 to 2006, respectively.

Data

We included veterans aged 18 to 64 years, seeking care for depression from 1999 to 2006, who were also VA-enrolled and residing in our states of interest. We counted veterans as enrolled in Medicaid if they were enrolled at least 1 month in a given year.

Using similar methods like those used in prior studies, we selected patients with encounters documenting depression as the primary outpatient or inpatient diagnosis using International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision, Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM) codes: 296.2x for a single episode of major depressive disorder, 296.3x for a recurrent episode of MDD, 300.4 for dysthymia, and 311.0 for depression not otherwise specified.^18,24 We used data from the Medicaid Analytic eXtract files (MAX) for Medicaid data and the VA Corporate Data Warehouse (CDW) for VA data. We chose 1999 as the first study year because it was the earliest year MAX data were available.

Our final sample included 1833 person-years pre-expansion and 7157 postexpansion in our inpatient analysis, as well as 31,767 person-years pre-expansion and 130,382 postexpansion in our outpatient analysis.

Outcomes and Variables

Our primary outcomes were comparative shifts in VA reliance between expansion and nonexpansion states after Medicaid expansion for both inpatient and outpatient depression care. For each year of study, we calculated a veteran’s VA reliance by aggregating the number of days with depression-related encounters at the VA and dividing by the total number of days with a VA or Medicaid depression-related encounters for the year. To provide context to these shifts in VA reliance, we further analyzed the changes in the proportion of annual VA-Medicaid dual users and annual per capita utilization of depression care across the VA and Medicaid. Changes in the proportion would indicate a relative shift in usage between the VA and Medicaid. Annual per capita changes demonstrate changes in the volume of usage. Understanding how proportion and volume interact is critical to understanding likely ramifications for resource management and cost. For example, a relative shift in the proportion of care toward Medicaid might be explained by a substitution effect of increased Medicaid usage and lower VA per capita usage, or an additive (or complementary) effect, with more Medicaid services coming on top of the current VA services.

We conducted subanalyses by income-eligible and service-connected veterans and adjusted our models for age, non-White race, sex, distances to the nearest inpatient and outpatient VA facilities, and VA Relative Risk Score, which is a measure of disease burden and clinical complexity validated specifically for veterans.²⁵

Statistical Analysis

We used fractional logistic regression to model the adjusted effect of Medicaid expansion on VA reliance for depression care. In parallel, we leveraged ordered logit regression and negative binomial regression models to examine the proportion of VA-Medicaid dual users and the per capita utilization of Medicaid and VA depression care, respectively. To estimate the difference-in-difference effects, we used the interaction term of 2 categorical variables—expansion vs nonexpansion states and pre- vs postexpansion status—as the independent variable. We then calculated the average marginal effects with 95% CIs to estimate the differences in outcomes between expansion and nonexpansion states from pre- to postexpansion periods, as well as year-by-year shifts as a robustness check. We conducted these analyses using Stata MP, version 15.

This project was approved by the Baylor College of Medicine Institutional Review Board (IRB # H-40441) and the Michael E. Debakey Veterans Affairs Medical Center Research and Development Committee.

Results

Baseline and postexpansion characteristics

fdp03911436_t1.png

VA Reliance

Overall, we observed postexpansion decreases in VA reliance for depression care

fdp03911436_t2.png

fdp03911436_f2.png

fdp03911436_f1.png

At the state level, reliance on the VA for inpatient depression care in NY decreased by 13.53 pp (95% CI, -22.58 to -4.49) for income-eligible veterans and 16.67 pp (95% CI, -24.53 to -8.80) for service-connected veterans. No relative differences were observed in the outpatient comparisons for both income-eligible (-0.58 pp; 95% CI, -2.13 to 0.98) and service-connected (0.05 pp; 95% CI, -1.00 to 1.10) veterans. In AZ, Medicaid expansion was associated with decreased VA reliance for outpatient depression care among income-eligible veterans (-8.60 pp; 95% CI, -10.60 to -6.61), greater than that for service-connected veterans (-2.89 pp; 95% CI, -4.02 to -1.77). This decrease in VA reliance was significant in the inpatient context only for service-connected veterans (-4.55 pp; 95% CI, -8.14 to -0.97), not income-eligible veterans (-8.38 pp; 95% CI, -17.91 to 1.16).

By applying the aggregate pp changes toward the postexpansion number of visits across both expansion and nonexpansion states, we found that expansion of Medicaid across all our study states would have resulted in 996 fewer hospitalizations and 10,109 fewer outpatient visits for depression at VA in the postexpansion period vs if no states had chosen to expand Medicaid.

Dual Use/Per Capita Utilization

Overall, Medicaid expansion was associated with greater dual use for inpatient depression care—a 0.97-pp (95% CI, 0.46 to 1.48) increase among service-connected veterans and a 0.64-pp (95% CI, 0.35 to 0.94) increase among income-eligible veterans.
At the state level, NY similarly showed increases in dual use among both service-connected (1.48 pp; 95% CI, 0.80 to 2.16) and income-eligible veterans (0.73 pp; 95% CI, 0.39 to 1.07) after Medicaid expansion. However, dual use in AZ increased significantly only among service-connected veterans (0.70 pp; 95% CI, 0.03 to 1.38), not income-eligible veterans (0.31 pp; 95% CI, -0.17 to 0.78).

Among outpatient visits, Medicaid expansion was associated with increased dual use only for income-eligible veterans (0.16 pp; 95% CI, 0.03-0.29), and not service-connected veterans (0.09 pp; 95% CI, -0.04 to 0.21). State-level analyses showed that Medicaid expansion in NY was not associated with changes in dual use for either service-connected (0.01 pp; 95% CI, -0.16 to 0.17) or income-eligible veterans (0.03 pp; 95% CI, -0.12 to 0.18), while expansion in AZ was associated with increases in dual use among both service-connected (0.42 pp; 95% CI, 0.23 to 0.61) and income-eligible veterans (0.83 pp; 95% CI, 0.59 to 1.07).

Concerning per capita utilization of depression care after Medicaid expansion, analyses showed no detectable changes for either inpatient or outpatient services, among both service-connected and income-eligible veterans. However, while this pattern held at the state level among hospitalizations, outpatient visit results showed divergent trends between AZ and NY. In NY, Medicaid expansion was associated with decreased per capita utilization of outpatient depression care among both service-connected (-0.25 visits annually; 95% CI, -0.48 to -0.01) and income-eligible veterans (-0.64 visits annually; 95% CI, -0.93 to -0.35). In AZ, Medicaid expansion was associated with increased per capita utilization of outpatient depression care among both service-connected (0.62 visits annually; 95% CI, 0.32-0.91) and income-eligible veterans (2.32 visits annually; 95% CI, 1.99-2.65).

Discussion

Our study quantified changes in depression-related health care utilization after Medicaid expansions in NY and AZ in 2001. Overall, the balance of evidence indicated that Medicaid expansion was associated with decreased reliance on the VA for depression-related services. There was an exception: income-eligible veterans in AZ did not shift their hospital care away from the VA in a statistically discernible way, although the point estimate was lower. More broadly, these findings concerning veterans’ reliance varied not only in inpatient vs outpatient services and income- vs service-connected eligibility, but also in the state-level contexts of veteran dual users and per capita utilization.

Given that the overall per capita utilization of depression care was unchanged from pre- to postexpansion periods, one might interpret the decreases in VA reliance and increases in Medicaid-VA dual users as a substitution effect from VA care to non-VA care. This could be plausible for hospitalizations where state-level analyses showed similarly stable levels of per capita utilization. However, state-level trends in our outpatient utilization analysis, especially with a substantial 2.32 pp increase in annual per capita visits among income-eligible veterans in AZ, leave open the possibility that in some cases veterans may be complementing VA care with Medicaid-reimbursed services.

The causes underlying these differences in reliance shifts between NY and AZ are likely also influenced by the policy contexts of their respective Medicaid expansions. For example, in 1999, NY passed Kendra’s Law, which established a procedure for obtaining court orders for assisted outpatient mental health treatment for individuals deemed unlikely to survive safely in the community.²⁶ A reasonable inference is that there was less unfulfilled outpatient mental health need in NY under the existing accessibility provisioned by Kendra’s Law. In addition, while both states extended coverage to childless adults under 100% of the Federal Poverty level (FPL), the AZ Medicaid expansion was via a voters’ initiative and extended family coverage to 200% FPL vs 150% FPL for families in NY. Given that the AZ Medicaid expansion enjoyed both broader public participation and generosity in terms of eligibility, its uptake and therefore effect size may have been larger than in NY for nonacute outpatient care.

Our findings contribute to the growing body of literature surrounding the changes in health care utilization after Medicaid expansion, specifically for a newly dual-eligible population of veterans seeking mental health services for depression. While prior research concerning Medicare dual-enrolled veterans has shown high reliance on the VA for both mental health diagnoses and services, scholars have established the association of Medicaid enrollment with decreased VA reliance.^27-29 Our analysis is the first to investigate state-level effects of Medicaid expansion on VA reliance for a single mental health condition using a natural experimental framework. We focus on a population that includes a large portion of veterans who are newly Medicaid-eligible due to a sweeping policy change and use demographically matched nonexpansion states to draw comparisons in VA reliance for depression care. Our findings of Medicaid expansion–associated decreases in VA reliance for depression care complement prior literature that describe Medicaid enrollment–associated decreases in VA reliance for overall mental health care.

Implications

From a systems-level perspective, the implications of shifting services away from the VA are complex and incompletely understood. The VA lacks interoperability with the electronic health records (EHRs) used by Medicaid clinicians. Consequently, significant issues of service duplication and incomplete clinical data exist for veterans seeking treatment outside of the VA system, posing health care quality and safety concerns.³⁰ On one hand, Medicaid access is associated with increased health care utilization attributed to filling unmet needs for Medicare dual enrollees, as well as increased prescription filling for psychiatric medications.^31,32 Furthermore, the only randomized control trial of Medicaid expansion to date was associated with a 9-pp decrease in positive screening rates for depression among those who received access at around 2 years postexpansion.³³ On the other hand, the VA has developed a mental health system tailored to the particular needs of veterans, and health care practitioners at the VA have significantly greater rates of military cultural competency compared to those in nonmilitary settings (70% vs 24% in the TRICARE network and 8% among those with no military or TRICARE affiliation).³⁴ Compared to individuals seeking mental health services with private insurance plans, veterans were about twice as likely to receive appropriate treatment for schizophrenia and depression at the VA.³⁵ These documented strengths of VA mental health care may together help explain the small absolute number of visits that were associated with shifts away from VA overall after Medicaid expansion.

Finally, it is worth considering extrinsic factors that influence utilization among newly dual-eligible veterans. For example, hospitalizations are less likely to be planned than outpatient services, translating to a greater importance of proximity to a nearby medical facility than a veteran’s preference of where to seek care. In the same vein, major VA medical centers are fewer and more distant on average than VA outpatient clinics, therefore reducing the advantage of a Medicaid-reimbursed outpatient clinic in terms of distance.³⁶ These realities may partially explain the proportionally larger shifts away from the VA for hospitalizations compared to outpatient care for depression.

These shifts in utilization after Medicaid expansion may have important implications for VA policymakers. First, more study is needed to know which types of veterans are more likely to use Medicaid instead of VA services—or use both Medicaid and VA services. Our research indicates unsurprisingly that veterans without service-connected disability ratings and eligible for VA services due to low income are more likely to use at least some Medicaid services. Further understanding of who switches will be useful for the VA both tailoring its services to those who prefer VA and for reaching out to specific types of patients who might be better served by staying within the VA system. Finally, VA clinicians and administrators can prioritize improving care coordination for those who chose to use both Medicaid and VA services.

Limitations and Future Directions

Our results should be interpreted within methodological and data limitations. With only 2 states in our sample, NY demonstrably skewed overall results, contributing 1.7 to 3 times more observations than AZ across subanalyses—a challenge also cited by Sommers and colleagues.¹⁹ Our veteran groupings were also unable to distinguish those veterans classified as service-connected who may also have qualified by income-eligible criteria (which would tend to understate the size of results) and those veterans who gained and then lost Medicaid coverage in a given year. Our study also faces limitations in generalizability and establishing causality. First, we included only 2 historical state Medicaid expansions, compared with the 38 states and Washington, DC, that have now expanded Medicaid to date under the ACA. Just in the 2 states from our study, we noted significant heterogeneity in the shifts associated with Medicaid expansion, which makes extrapolating specific trends difficult. Differences in underlying health care resources, legislation, and other external factors may limit the applicability of Medicaid expansion in the era of the ACA, as well as the Veterans Choice and MISSION acts. Second, while we leveraged a difference-in-difference analysis using demographically matched, neighboring comparison states, our findings are nevertheless drawn from observational data obviating causality. VA data for other sources of coverage such as private insurance are limited and not included in our study, and MAX datasets vary by quality across states, translating to potential gaps in our study cohort.²⁸Finally, as in any study using diagnoses, visits addressing care for depression may have been missed if other diagnoses were noted as primary (eg, VA clinicians carrying forward old diagnoses, like PTSD, on the problem list) or nondepression care visits may have been captured if a depression diagnosis was used by default.

Moving forward, our study demonstrates the potential for applying a natural experimental approach to studying dual-eligible veterans at the interface of Medicaid expansion. We focused on changes in VA reliance for the specific condition of depression and, in doing so, invite further inquiry into the impact of state mental health policy on outcomes more proximate to veterans’ outcomes. Clinical indicators, such as rates of antidepressant filling, utilization and duration of psychotherapy, and PHQ-9 scores, can similarly be investigated by natural experimental design. While current limits of administrative data and the siloing of EHRs may pose barriers to some of these avenues of research, multidisciplinary methodologies and data querying innovations such as natural language processing algorithms for clinical notes hold exciting opportunities to bridge the gap between policy and clinical efficacy.

Conclusions

This study applied a difference-in-difference analysis and found that Medicaid expansion is associated with decreases in VA reliance for both inpatient and outpatient services for depression. As additional data are generated from the Medicaid expansions of the ACA, similarly robust methods should be applied to further explore the impacts associated with such policy shifts and open the door to a better understanding of implications at the clinical level.

Acknowledgments

We acknowledge the efforts of Janine Wong, who proofread and formatted the manuscript.

The US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is the largest integrated health care system in the United States, providing care for more than 9 million veterans.¹ With veterans experiencing mental health conditions like posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), substance use disorders, and other serious mental illnesses (SMI) at higher rates compared with the general population, the VA plays an important role in the provision of mental health services.^2-5 Since the implementation of its Mental Health Strategic Plan in 2004, the VA has overseen the development of a wide array of mental health programs geared toward the complex needs of veterans. Research has demonstrated VA care outperforming Medicaid-reimbursed services in terms of the percentage of veterans filling antidepressants for at least 12 weeks after initiation of treatment for major depressive disorder (MDD), as well as posthospitalization follow-up.⁶

Eligible veterans enrolled in the VA often also seek non-VA care. Medicaid covers nearly 10% of all nonelderly veterans, and of these veterans, 39% rely solely on Medicaid for health care access.⁷ Today, Medicaid is the largest payer for mental health services in the US, providing coverage for approximately 27% of Americans who have SMI and helping fulfill unmet mental health needs.^8,9 Understanding which of these systems veterans choose to use, and under which circumstances, is essential in guiding the allocation of limited health care resources.¹⁰

Beyond Medicaid, alternatives to VA care may include TRICARE, Medicare, Indian Health Services, and employer-based or self-purchased private insurance. While these options potentially increase convenience, choice, and access to health care practitioners (HCPs) and services not available at local VA systems, cross-system utilization with poor integration may cause care coordination and continuity problems, such as medication mismanagement and opioid overdose, unnecessary duplicate utilization, and possible increased mortality.^11-15 As recent national legislative changes, such as the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Veterans Access, Choice and Accountability Act, and the VA MISSION Act, continue to shift the health care landscape for veterans, questions surrounding how veterans are changing their health care use become significant.^16,17

Here, we approach the impacts of Medicaid expansion on veterans’ reliance on the VA for mental health services with a unique lens. We leverage a difference-in-difference design to study 2 historical Medicaid expansions in Arizona (AZ) and New York (NY), which extended eligibility to childless adults in 2001. Prior Medicaid dual-eligible mental health research investigated reliance shifts during the immediate postenrollment year in a subset of veterans newly enrolled in Medicaid.¹⁸ However, this study took place in a period of relative policy stability. In contrast, we investigate the potential effects of a broad policy shift by analyzing state-level changes in veterans’ reliance over 6 years after a statewide Medicaid expansion. We match expansion states with demographically similar nonexpansion states to account for unobserved trends and confounding effects. Prior studies have used this method to evaluate post-Medicaid expansion mortality changes and changes in veteran dual enrollment and hospitalizations.^10,19 While a study of ACA Medicaid expansion states would be ideal, Medicaid data from most states were only available through 2014 at the time of this analysis. Our study offers a quasi-experimental framework leveraging longitudinal data that can be applied as more post-ACA data become available.

Given the rising incidence of suicide among veterans, understanding care-seeking behaviors for depression among veterans is important as it is the most common psychiatric condition found in those who died by suicide.^20,21 Furthermore, depression may be useful as a clinical proxy for mental health policy impacts, given that the Patient Health Questionnaire-9 (PHQ-9) screening tool is well validated and increasingly research accessible, and it is a chronic condition responsive to both well-managed pharmacologic treatment and psychotherapeutic interventions.^22,23

In this study, we quantify the change in care-seeking behavior for depression among veterans after Medicaid expansion, using a quasi-experimental design. We hypothesize that new access to Medicaid would be associated with a shift away from using VA services for depression. Given the income-dependent eligibility requirements of Medicaid, we also hypothesize that veterans who qualified for VA coverage due to low income, determined by a regional means test (Priority group 5, “income-eligible”), would be more likely to shift care compared with those whose serviced-connected conditions related to their military service (Priority groups 1-4, “service-connected”) provide VA access.

Methods

To investigate the relative changes in veterans’ reliance on the VA for depression care after the 2001 NY and AZ Medicaid expansions We used a retrospective, difference-in-difference analysis. Our comparison pairings, based on prior demographic analyses were as follows: NY with Pennsylvania(PA); AZ with New Mexico and Nevada (NM/NV).¹⁹ The time frame of our analysis was 1999 to 2006, with pre- and postexpansion periods defined as 1999 to 2000 and 2001 to 2006, respectively.

Data

We included veterans aged 18 to 64 years, seeking care for depression from 1999 to 2006, who were also VA-enrolled and residing in our states of interest. We counted veterans as enrolled in Medicaid if they were enrolled at least 1 month in a given year.

Using similar methods like those used in prior studies, we selected patients with encounters documenting depression as the primary outpatient or inpatient diagnosis using International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision, Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM) codes: 296.2x for a single episode of major depressive disorder, 296.3x for a recurrent episode of MDD, 300.4 for dysthymia, and 311.0 for depression not otherwise specified.^18,24 We used data from the Medicaid Analytic eXtract files (MAX) for Medicaid data and the VA Corporate Data Warehouse (CDW) for VA data. We chose 1999 as the first study year because it was the earliest year MAX data were available.

Our final sample included 1833 person-years pre-expansion and 7157 postexpansion in our inpatient analysis, as well as 31,767 person-years pre-expansion and 130,382 postexpansion in our outpatient analysis.

Outcomes and Variables

Our primary outcomes were comparative shifts in VA reliance between expansion and nonexpansion states after Medicaid expansion for both inpatient and outpatient depression care. For each year of study, we calculated a veteran’s VA reliance by aggregating the number of days with depression-related encounters at the VA and dividing by the total number of days with a VA or Medicaid depression-related encounters for the year. To provide context to these shifts in VA reliance, we further analyzed the changes in the proportion of annual VA-Medicaid dual users and annual per capita utilization of depression care across the VA and Medicaid. Changes in the proportion would indicate a relative shift in usage between the VA and Medicaid. Annual per capita changes demonstrate changes in the volume of usage. Understanding how proportion and volume interact is critical to understanding likely ramifications for resource management and cost. For example, a relative shift in the proportion of care toward Medicaid might be explained by a substitution effect of increased Medicaid usage and lower VA per capita usage, or an additive (or complementary) effect, with more Medicaid services coming on top of the current VA services.

We conducted subanalyses by income-eligible and service-connected veterans and adjusted our models for age, non-White race, sex, distances to the nearest inpatient and outpatient VA facilities, and VA Relative Risk Score, which is a measure of disease burden and clinical complexity validated specifically for veterans.²⁵

Statistical Analysis

We used fractional logistic regression to model the adjusted effect of Medicaid expansion on VA reliance for depression care. In parallel, we leveraged ordered logit regression and negative binomial regression models to examine the proportion of VA-Medicaid dual users and the per capita utilization of Medicaid and VA depression care, respectively. To estimate the difference-in-difference effects, we used the interaction term of 2 categorical variables—expansion vs nonexpansion states and pre- vs postexpansion status—as the independent variable. We then calculated the average marginal effects with 95% CIs to estimate the differences in outcomes between expansion and nonexpansion states from pre- to postexpansion periods, as well as year-by-year shifts as a robustness check. We conducted these analyses using Stata MP, version 15.

This project was approved by the Baylor College of Medicine Institutional Review Board (IRB # H-40441) and the Michael E. Debakey Veterans Affairs Medical Center Research and Development Committee.

Results

Baseline and postexpansion characteristics

fdp03911436_t1.png

VA Reliance

Overall, we observed postexpansion decreases in VA reliance for depression care

fdp03911436_t2.png

fdp03911436_f2.png

fdp03911436_f1.png

At the state level, reliance on the VA for inpatient depression care in NY decreased by 13.53 pp (95% CI, -22.58 to -4.49) for income-eligible veterans and 16.67 pp (95% CI, -24.53 to -8.80) for service-connected veterans. No relative differences were observed in the outpatient comparisons for both income-eligible (-0.58 pp; 95% CI, -2.13 to 0.98) and service-connected (0.05 pp; 95% CI, -1.00 to 1.10) veterans. In AZ, Medicaid expansion was associated with decreased VA reliance for outpatient depression care among income-eligible veterans (-8.60 pp; 95% CI, -10.60 to -6.61), greater than that for service-connected veterans (-2.89 pp; 95% CI, -4.02 to -1.77). This decrease in VA reliance was significant in the inpatient context only for service-connected veterans (-4.55 pp; 95% CI, -8.14 to -0.97), not income-eligible veterans (-8.38 pp; 95% CI, -17.91 to 1.16).

By applying the aggregate pp changes toward the postexpansion number of visits across both expansion and nonexpansion states, we found that expansion of Medicaid across all our study states would have resulted in 996 fewer hospitalizations and 10,109 fewer outpatient visits for depression at VA in the postexpansion period vs if no states had chosen to expand Medicaid.

Dual Use/Per Capita Utilization

Overall, Medicaid expansion was associated with greater dual use for inpatient depression care—a 0.97-pp (95% CI, 0.46 to 1.48) increase among service-connected veterans and a 0.64-pp (95% CI, 0.35 to 0.94) increase among income-eligible veterans.
At the state level, NY similarly showed increases in dual use among both service-connected (1.48 pp; 95% CI, 0.80 to 2.16) and income-eligible veterans (0.73 pp; 95% CI, 0.39 to 1.07) after Medicaid expansion. However, dual use in AZ increased significantly only among service-connected veterans (0.70 pp; 95% CI, 0.03 to 1.38), not income-eligible veterans (0.31 pp; 95% CI, -0.17 to 0.78).

Among outpatient visits, Medicaid expansion was associated with increased dual use only for income-eligible veterans (0.16 pp; 95% CI, 0.03-0.29), and not service-connected veterans (0.09 pp; 95% CI, -0.04 to 0.21). State-level analyses showed that Medicaid expansion in NY was not associated with changes in dual use for either service-connected (0.01 pp; 95% CI, -0.16 to 0.17) or income-eligible veterans (0.03 pp; 95% CI, -0.12 to 0.18), while expansion in AZ was associated with increases in dual use among both service-connected (0.42 pp; 95% CI, 0.23 to 0.61) and income-eligible veterans (0.83 pp; 95% CI, 0.59 to 1.07).

Concerning per capita utilization of depression care after Medicaid expansion, analyses showed no detectable changes for either inpatient or outpatient services, among both service-connected and income-eligible veterans. However, while this pattern held at the state level among hospitalizations, outpatient visit results showed divergent trends between AZ and NY. In NY, Medicaid expansion was associated with decreased per capita utilization of outpatient depression care among both service-connected (-0.25 visits annually; 95% CI, -0.48 to -0.01) and income-eligible veterans (-0.64 visits annually; 95% CI, -0.93 to -0.35). In AZ, Medicaid expansion was associated with increased per capita utilization of outpatient depression care among both service-connected (0.62 visits annually; 95% CI, 0.32-0.91) and income-eligible veterans (2.32 visits annually; 95% CI, 1.99-2.65).

Discussion

Our study quantified changes in depression-related health care utilization after Medicaid expansions in NY and AZ in 2001. Overall, the balance of evidence indicated that Medicaid expansion was associated with decreased reliance on the VA for depression-related services. There was an exception: income-eligible veterans in AZ did not shift their hospital care away from the VA in a statistically discernible way, although the point estimate was lower. More broadly, these findings concerning veterans’ reliance varied not only in inpatient vs outpatient services and income- vs service-connected eligibility, but also in the state-level contexts of veteran dual users and per capita utilization.

Given that the overall per capita utilization of depression care was unchanged from pre- to postexpansion periods, one might interpret the decreases in VA reliance and increases in Medicaid-VA dual users as a substitution effect from VA care to non-VA care. This could be plausible for hospitalizations where state-level analyses showed similarly stable levels of per capita utilization. However, state-level trends in our outpatient utilization analysis, especially with a substantial 2.32 pp increase in annual per capita visits among income-eligible veterans in AZ, leave open the possibility that in some cases veterans may be complementing VA care with Medicaid-reimbursed services.

The causes underlying these differences in reliance shifts between NY and AZ are likely also influenced by the policy contexts of their respective Medicaid expansions. For example, in 1999, NY passed Kendra’s Law, which established a procedure for obtaining court orders for assisted outpatient mental health treatment for individuals deemed unlikely to survive safely in the community.²⁶ A reasonable inference is that there was less unfulfilled outpatient mental health need in NY under the existing accessibility provisioned by Kendra’s Law. In addition, while both states extended coverage to childless adults under 100% of the Federal Poverty level (FPL), the AZ Medicaid expansion was via a voters’ initiative and extended family coverage to 200% FPL vs 150% FPL for families in NY. Given that the AZ Medicaid expansion enjoyed both broader public participation and generosity in terms of eligibility, its uptake and therefore effect size may have been larger than in NY for nonacute outpatient care.

Our findings contribute to the growing body of literature surrounding the changes in health care utilization after Medicaid expansion, specifically for a newly dual-eligible population of veterans seeking mental health services for depression. While prior research concerning Medicare dual-enrolled veterans has shown high reliance on the VA for both mental health diagnoses and services, scholars have established the association of Medicaid enrollment with decreased VA reliance.^27-29 Our analysis is the first to investigate state-level effects of Medicaid expansion on VA reliance for a single mental health condition using a natural experimental framework. We focus on a population that includes a large portion of veterans who are newly Medicaid-eligible due to a sweeping policy change and use demographically matched nonexpansion states to draw comparisons in VA reliance for depression care. Our findings of Medicaid expansion–associated decreases in VA reliance for depression care complement prior literature that describe Medicaid enrollment–associated decreases in VA reliance for overall mental health care.

Implications

From a systems-level perspective, the implications of shifting services away from the VA are complex and incompletely understood. The VA lacks interoperability with the electronic health records (EHRs) used by Medicaid clinicians. Consequently, significant issues of service duplication and incomplete clinical data exist for veterans seeking treatment outside of the VA system, posing health care quality and safety concerns.³⁰ On one hand, Medicaid access is associated with increased health care utilization attributed to filling unmet needs for Medicare dual enrollees, as well as increased prescription filling for psychiatric medications.^31,32 Furthermore, the only randomized control trial of Medicaid expansion to date was associated with a 9-pp decrease in positive screening rates for depression among those who received access at around 2 years postexpansion.³³ On the other hand, the VA has developed a mental health system tailored to the particular needs of veterans, and health care practitioners at the VA have significantly greater rates of military cultural competency compared to those in nonmilitary settings (70% vs 24% in the TRICARE network and 8% among those with no military or TRICARE affiliation).³⁴ Compared to individuals seeking mental health services with private insurance plans, veterans were about twice as likely to receive appropriate treatment for schizophrenia and depression at the VA.³⁵ These documented strengths of VA mental health care may together help explain the small absolute number of visits that were associated with shifts away from VA overall after Medicaid expansion.

Finally, it is worth considering extrinsic factors that influence utilization among newly dual-eligible veterans. For example, hospitalizations are less likely to be planned than outpatient services, translating to a greater importance of proximity to a nearby medical facility than a veteran’s preference of where to seek care. In the same vein, major VA medical centers are fewer and more distant on average than VA outpatient clinics, therefore reducing the advantage of a Medicaid-reimbursed outpatient clinic in terms of distance.³⁶ These realities may partially explain the proportionally larger shifts away from the VA for hospitalizations compared to outpatient care for depression.

These shifts in utilization after Medicaid expansion may have important implications for VA policymakers. First, more study is needed to know which types of veterans are more likely to use Medicaid instead of VA services—or use both Medicaid and VA services. Our research indicates unsurprisingly that veterans without service-connected disability ratings and eligible for VA services due to low income are more likely to use at least some Medicaid services. Further understanding of who switches will be useful for the VA both tailoring its services to those who prefer VA and for reaching out to specific types of patients who might be better served by staying within the VA system. Finally, VA clinicians and administrators can prioritize improving care coordination for those who chose to use both Medicaid and VA services.

Limitations and Future Directions

Our results should be interpreted within methodological and data limitations. With only 2 states in our sample, NY demonstrably skewed overall results, contributing 1.7 to 3 times more observations than AZ across subanalyses—a challenge also cited by Sommers and colleagues.¹⁹ Our veteran groupings were also unable to distinguish those veterans classified as service-connected who may also have qualified by income-eligible criteria (which would tend to understate the size of results) and those veterans who gained and then lost Medicaid coverage in a given year. Our study also faces limitations in generalizability and establishing causality. First, we included only 2 historical state Medicaid expansions, compared with the 38 states and Washington, DC, that have now expanded Medicaid to date under the ACA. Just in the 2 states from our study, we noted significant heterogeneity in the shifts associated with Medicaid expansion, which makes extrapolating specific trends difficult. Differences in underlying health care resources, legislation, and other external factors may limit the applicability of Medicaid expansion in the era of the ACA, as well as the Veterans Choice and MISSION acts. Second, while we leveraged a difference-in-difference analysis using demographically matched, neighboring comparison states, our findings are nevertheless drawn from observational data obviating causality. VA data for other sources of coverage such as private insurance are limited and not included in our study, and MAX datasets vary by quality across states, translating to potential gaps in our study cohort.²⁸Finally, as in any study using diagnoses, visits addressing care for depression may have been missed if other diagnoses were noted as primary (eg, VA clinicians carrying forward old diagnoses, like PTSD, on the problem list) or nondepression care visits may have been captured if a depression diagnosis was used by default.

Moving forward, our study demonstrates the potential for applying a natural experimental approach to studying dual-eligible veterans at the interface of Medicaid expansion. We focused on changes in VA reliance for the specific condition of depression and, in doing so, invite further inquiry into the impact of state mental health policy on outcomes more proximate to veterans’ outcomes. Clinical indicators, such as rates of antidepressant filling, utilization and duration of psychotherapy, and PHQ-9 scores, can similarly be investigated by natural experimental design. While current limits of administrative data and the siloing of EHRs may pose barriers to some of these avenues of research, multidisciplinary methodologies and data querying innovations such as natural language processing algorithms for clinical notes hold exciting opportunities to bridge the gap between policy and clinical efficacy.

Conclusions

This study applied a difference-in-difference analysis and found that Medicaid expansion is associated with decreases in VA reliance for both inpatient and outpatient services for depression. As additional data are generated from the Medicaid expansions of the ACA, similarly robust methods should be applied to further explore the impacts associated with such policy shifts and open the door to a better understanding of implications at the clinical level.

Acknowledgments

We acknowledge the efforts of Janine Wong, who proofread and formatted the manuscript.

The US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is the largest integrated health care system in the United States, providing care for more than 9 million veterans.¹ With veterans experiencing mental health conditions like posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), substance use disorders, and other serious mental illnesses (SMI) at higher rates compared with the general population, the VA plays an important role in the provision of mental health services.^2-5 Since the implementation of its Mental Health Strategic Plan in 2004, the VA has overseen the development of a wide array of mental health programs geared toward the complex needs of veterans. Research has demonstrated VA care outperforming Medicaid-reimbursed services in terms of the percentage of veterans filling antidepressants for at least 12 weeks after initiation of treatment for major depressive disorder (MDD), as well as posthospitalization follow-up.⁶

Eligible veterans enrolled in the VA often also seek non-VA care. Medicaid covers nearly 10% of all nonelderly veterans, and of these veterans, 39% rely solely on Medicaid for health care access.⁷ Today, Medicaid is the largest payer for mental health services in the US, providing coverage for approximately 27% of Americans who have SMI and helping fulfill unmet mental health needs.^8,9 Understanding which of these systems veterans choose to use, and under which circumstances, is essential in guiding the allocation of limited health care resources.¹⁰

Beyond Medicaid, alternatives to VA care may include TRICARE, Medicare, Indian Health Services, and employer-based or self-purchased private insurance. While these options potentially increase convenience, choice, and access to health care practitioners (HCPs) and services not available at local VA systems, cross-system utilization with poor integration may cause care coordination and continuity problems, such as medication mismanagement and opioid overdose, unnecessary duplicate utilization, and possible increased mortality.^11-15 As recent national legislative changes, such as the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Veterans Access, Choice and Accountability Act, and the VA MISSION Act, continue to shift the health care landscape for veterans, questions surrounding how veterans are changing their health care use become significant.^16,17

Here, we approach the impacts of Medicaid expansion on veterans’ reliance on the VA for mental health services with a unique lens. We leverage a difference-in-difference design to study 2 historical Medicaid expansions in Arizona (AZ) and New York (NY), which extended eligibility to childless adults in 2001. Prior Medicaid dual-eligible mental health research investigated reliance shifts during the immediate postenrollment year in a subset of veterans newly enrolled in Medicaid.¹⁸ However, this study took place in a period of relative policy stability. In contrast, we investigate the potential effects of a broad policy shift by analyzing state-level changes in veterans’ reliance over 6 years after a statewide Medicaid expansion. We match expansion states with demographically similar nonexpansion states to account for unobserved trends and confounding effects. Prior studies have used this method to evaluate post-Medicaid expansion mortality changes and changes in veteran dual enrollment and hospitalizations.^10,19 While a study of ACA Medicaid expansion states would be ideal, Medicaid data from most states were only available through 2014 at the time of this analysis. Our study offers a quasi-experimental framework leveraging longitudinal data that can be applied as more post-ACA data become available.

Given the rising incidence of suicide among veterans, understanding care-seeking behaviors for depression among veterans is important as it is the most common psychiatric condition found in those who died by suicide.^20,21 Furthermore, depression may be useful as a clinical proxy for mental health policy impacts, given that the Patient Health Questionnaire-9 (PHQ-9) screening tool is well validated and increasingly research accessible, and it is a chronic condition responsive to both well-managed pharmacologic treatment and psychotherapeutic interventions.^22,23

In this study, we quantify the change in care-seeking behavior for depression among veterans after Medicaid expansion, using a quasi-experimental design. We hypothesize that new access to Medicaid would be associated with a shift away from using VA services for depression. Given the income-dependent eligibility requirements of Medicaid, we also hypothesize that veterans who qualified for VA coverage due to low income, determined by a regional means test (Priority group 5, “income-eligible”), would be more likely to shift care compared with those whose serviced-connected conditions related to their military service (Priority groups 1-4, “service-connected”) provide VA access.

Methods

To investigate the relative changes in veterans’ reliance on the VA for depression care after the 2001 NY and AZ Medicaid expansions We used a retrospective, difference-in-difference analysis. Our comparison pairings, based on prior demographic analyses were as follows: NY with Pennsylvania(PA); AZ with New Mexico and Nevada (NM/NV).¹⁹ The time frame of our analysis was 1999 to 2006, with pre- and postexpansion periods defined as 1999 to 2000 and 2001 to 2006, respectively.

Data

We included veterans aged 18 to 64 years, seeking care for depression from 1999 to 2006, who were also VA-enrolled and residing in our states of interest. We counted veterans as enrolled in Medicaid if they were enrolled at least 1 month in a given year.

Using similar methods like those used in prior studies, we selected patients with encounters documenting depression as the primary outpatient or inpatient diagnosis using International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision, Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM) codes: 296.2x for a single episode of major depressive disorder, 296.3x for a recurrent episode of MDD, 300.4 for dysthymia, and 311.0 for depression not otherwise specified.^18,24 We used data from the Medicaid Analytic eXtract files (MAX) for Medicaid data and the VA Corporate Data Warehouse (CDW) for VA data. We chose 1999 as the first study year because it was the earliest year MAX data were available.

Our final sample included 1833 person-years pre-expansion and 7157 postexpansion in our inpatient analysis, as well as 31,767 person-years pre-expansion and 130,382 postexpansion in our outpatient analysis.

Outcomes and Variables

Our primary outcomes were comparative shifts in VA reliance between expansion and nonexpansion states after Medicaid expansion for both inpatient and outpatient depression care. For each year of study, we calculated a veteran’s VA reliance by aggregating the number of days with depression-related encounters at the VA and dividing by the total number of days with a VA or Medicaid depression-related encounters for the year. To provide context to these shifts in VA reliance, we further analyzed the changes in the proportion of annual VA-Medicaid dual users and annual per capita utilization of depression care across the VA and Medicaid. Changes in the proportion would indicate a relative shift in usage between the VA and Medicaid. Annual per capita changes demonstrate changes in the volume of usage. Understanding how proportion and volume interact is critical to understanding likely ramifications for resource management and cost. For example, a relative shift in the proportion of care toward Medicaid might be explained by a substitution effect of increased Medicaid usage and lower VA per capita usage, or an additive (or complementary) effect, with more Medicaid services coming on top of the current VA services.

We conducted subanalyses by income-eligible and service-connected veterans and adjusted our models for age, non-White race, sex, distances to the nearest inpatient and outpatient VA facilities, and VA Relative Risk Score, which is a measure of disease burden and clinical complexity validated specifically for veterans.²⁵

Statistical Analysis

We used fractional logistic regression to model the adjusted effect of Medicaid expansion on VA reliance for depression care. In parallel, we leveraged ordered logit regression and negative binomial regression models to examine the proportion of VA-Medicaid dual users and the per capita utilization of Medicaid and VA depression care, respectively. To estimate the difference-in-difference effects, we used the interaction term of 2 categorical variables—expansion vs nonexpansion states and pre- vs postexpansion status—as the independent variable. We then calculated the average marginal effects with 95% CIs to estimate the differences in outcomes between expansion and nonexpansion states from pre- to postexpansion periods, as well as year-by-year shifts as a robustness check. We conducted these analyses using Stata MP, version 15.

This project was approved by the Baylor College of Medicine Institutional Review Board (IRB # H-40441) and the Michael E. Debakey Veterans Affairs Medical Center Research and Development Committee.

Results

Baseline and postexpansion characteristics

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VA Reliance

Overall, we observed postexpansion decreases in VA reliance for depression care

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At the state level, reliance on the VA for inpatient depression care in NY decreased by 13.53 pp (95% CI, -22.58 to -4.49) for income-eligible veterans and 16.67 pp (95% CI, -24.53 to -8.80) for service-connected veterans. No relative differences were observed in the outpatient comparisons for both income-eligible (-0.58 pp; 95% CI, -2.13 to 0.98) and service-connected (0.05 pp; 95% CI, -1.00 to 1.10) veterans. In AZ, Medicaid expansion was associated with decreased VA reliance for outpatient depression care among income-eligible veterans (-8.60 pp; 95% CI, -10.60 to -6.61), greater than that for service-connected veterans (-2.89 pp; 95% CI, -4.02 to -1.77). This decrease in VA reliance was significant in the inpatient context only for service-connected veterans (-4.55 pp; 95% CI, -8.14 to -0.97), not income-eligible veterans (-8.38 pp; 95% CI, -17.91 to 1.16).

By applying the aggregate pp changes toward the postexpansion number of visits across both expansion and nonexpansion states, we found that expansion of Medicaid across all our study states would have resulted in 996 fewer hospitalizations and 10,109 fewer outpatient visits for depression at VA in the postexpansion period vs if no states had chosen to expand Medicaid.

Dual Use/Per Capita Utilization

Overall, Medicaid expansion was associated with greater dual use for inpatient depression care—a 0.97-pp (95% CI, 0.46 to 1.48) increase among service-connected veterans and a 0.64-pp (95% CI, 0.35 to 0.94) increase among income-eligible veterans.
At the state level, NY similarly showed increases in dual use among both service-connected (1.48 pp; 95% CI, 0.80 to 2.16) and income-eligible veterans (0.73 pp; 95% CI, 0.39 to 1.07) after Medicaid expansion. However, dual use in AZ increased significantly only among service-connected veterans (0.70 pp; 95% CI, 0.03 to 1.38), not income-eligible veterans (0.31 pp; 95% CI, -0.17 to 0.78).

Among outpatient visits, Medicaid expansion was associated with increased dual use only for income-eligible veterans (0.16 pp; 95% CI, 0.03-0.29), and not service-connected veterans (0.09 pp; 95% CI, -0.04 to 0.21). State-level analyses showed that Medicaid expansion in NY was not associated with changes in dual use for either service-connected (0.01 pp; 95% CI, -0.16 to 0.17) or income-eligible veterans (0.03 pp; 95% CI, -0.12 to 0.18), while expansion in AZ was associated with increases in dual use among both service-connected (0.42 pp; 95% CI, 0.23 to 0.61) and income-eligible veterans (0.83 pp; 95% CI, 0.59 to 1.07).

Concerning per capita utilization of depression care after Medicaid expansion, analyses showed no detectable changes for either inpatient or outpatient services, among both service-connected and income-eligible veterans. However, while this pattern held at the state level among hospitalizations, outpatient visit results showed divergent trends between AZ and NY. In NY, Medicaid expansion was associated with decreased per capita utilization of outpatient depression care among both service-connected (-0.25 visits annually; 95% CI, -0.48 to -0.01) and income-eligible veterans (-0.64 visits annually; 95% CI, -0.93 to -0.35). In AZ, Medicaid expansion was associated with increased per capita utilization of outpatient depression care among both service-connected (0.62 visits annually; 95% CI, 0.32-0.91) and income-eligible veterans (2.32 visits annually; 95% CI, 1.99-2.65).

Discussion

Our study quantified changes in depression-related health care utilization after Medicaid expansions in NY and AZ in 2001. Overall, the balance of evidence indicated that Medicaid expansion was associated with decreased reliance on the VA for depression-related services. There was an exception: income-eligible veterans in AZ did not shift their hospital care away from the VA in a statistically discernible way, although the point estimate was lower. More broadly, these findings concerning veterans’ reliance varied not only in inpatient vs outpatient services and income- vs service-connected eligibility, but also in the state-level contexts of veteran dual users and per capita utilization.

Given that the overall per capita utilization of depression care was unchanged from pre- to postexpansion periods, one might interpret the decreases in VA reliance and increases in Medicaid-VA dual users as a substitution effect from VA care to non-VA care. This could be plausible for hospitalizations where state-level analyses showed similarly stable levels of per capita utilization. However, state-level trends in our outpatient utilization analysis, especially with a substantial 2.32 pp increase in annual per capita visits among income-eligible veterans in AZ, leave open the possibility that in some cases veterans may be complementing VA care with Medicaid-reimbursed services.

The causes underlying these differences in reliance shifts between NY and AZ are likely also influenced by the policy contexts of their respective Medicaid expansions. For example, in 1999, NY passed Kendra’s Law, which established a procedure for obtaining court orders for assisted outpatient mental health treatment for individuals deemed unlikely to survive safely in the community.²⁶ A reasonable inference is that there was less unfulfilled outpatient mental health need in NY under the existing accessibility provisioned by Kendra’s Law. In addition, while both states extended coverage to childless adults under 100% of the Federal Poverty level (FPL), the AZ Medicaid expansion was via a voters’ initiative and extended family coverage to 200% FPL vs 150% FPL for families in NY. Given that the AZ Medicaid expansion enjoyed both broader public participation and generosity in terms of eligibility, its uptake and therefore effect size may have been larger than in NY for nonacute outpatient care.

Our findings contribute to the growing body of literature surrounding the changes in health care utilization after Medicaid expansion, specifically for a newly dual-eligible population of veterans seeking mental health services for depression. While prior research concerning Medicare dual-enrolled veterans has shown high reliance on the VA for both mental health diagnoses and services, scholars have established the association of Medicaid enrollment with decreased VA reliance.^27-29 Our analysis is the first to investigate state-level effects of Medicaid expansion on VA reliance for a single mental health condition using a natural experimental framework. We focus on a population that includes a large portion of veterans who are newly Medicaid-eligible due to a sweeping policy change and use demographically matched nonexpansion states to draw comparisons in VA reliance for depression care. Our findings of Medicaid expansion–associated decreases in VA reliance for depression care complement prior literature that describe Medicaid enrollment–associated decreases in VA reliance for overall mental health care.

Implications

From a systems-level perspective, the implications of shifting services away from the VA are complex and incompletely understood. The VA lacks interoperability with the electronic health records (EHRs) used by Medicaid clinicians. Consequently, significant issues of service duplication and incomplete clinical data exist for veterans seeking treatment outside of the VA system, posing health care quality and safety concerns.³⁰ On one hand, Medicaid access is associated with increased health care utilization attributed to filling unmet needs for Medicare dual enrollees, as well as increased prescription filling for psychiatric medications.^31,32 Furthermore, the only randomized control trial of Medicaid expansion to date was associated with a 9-pp decrease in positive screening rates for depression among those who received access at around 2 years postexpansion.³³ On the other hand, the VA has developed a mental health system tailored to the particular needs of veterans, and health care practitioners at the VA have significantly greater rates of military cultural competency compared to those in nonmilitary settings (70% vs 24% in the TRICARE network and 8% among those with no military or TRICARE affiliation).³⁴ Compared to individuals seeking mental health services with private insurance plans, veterans were about twice as likely to receive appropriate treatment for schizophrenia and depression at the VA.³⁵ These documented strengths of VA mental health care may together help explain the small absolute number of visits that were associated with shifts away from VA overall after Medicaid expansion.

Finally, it is worth considering extrinsic factors that influence utilization among newly dual-eligible veterans. For example, hospitalizations are less likely to be planned than outpatient services, translating to a greater importance of proximity to a nearby medical facility than a veteran’s preference of where to seek care. In the same vein, major VA medical centers are fewer and more distant on average than VA outpatient clinics, therefore reducing the advantage of a Medicaid-reimbursed outpatient clinic in terms of distance.³⁶ These realities may partially explain the proportionally larger shifts away from the VA for hospitalizations compared to outpatient care for depression.

These shifts in utilization after Medicaid expansion may have important implications for VA policymakers. First, more study is needed to know which types of veterans are more likely to use Medicaid instead of VA services—or use both Medicaid and VA services. Our research indicates unsurprisingly that veterans without service-connected disability ratings and eligible for VA services due to low income are more likely to use at least some Medicaid services. Further understanding of who switches will be useful for the VA both tailoring its services to those who prefer VA and for reaching out to specific types of patients who might be better served by staying within the VA system. Finally, VA clinicians and administrators can prioritize improving care coordination for those who chose to use both Medicaid and VA services.

Limitations and Future Directions

Our results should be interpreted within methodological and data limitations. With only 2 states in our sample, NY demonstrably skewed overall results, contributing 1.7 to 3 times more observations than AZ across subanalyses—a challenge also cited by Sommers and colleagues.¹⁹ Our veteran groupings were also unable to distinguish those veterans classified as service-connected who may also have qualified by income-eligible criteria (which would tend to understate the size of results) and those veterans who gained and then lost Medicaid coverage in a given year. Our study also faces limitations in generalizability and establishing causality. First, we included only 2 historical state Medicaid expansions, compared with the 38 states and Washington, DC, that have now expanded Medicaid to date under the ACA. Just in the 2 states from our study, we noted significant heterogeneity in the shifts associated with Medicaid expansion, which makes extrapolating specific trends difficult. Differences in underlying health care resources, legislation, and other external factors may limit the applicability of Medicaid expansion in the era of the ACA, as well as the Veterans Choice and MISSION acts. Second, while we leveraged a difference-in-difference analysis using demographically matched, neighboring comparison states, our findings are nevertheless drawn from observational data obviating causality. VA data for other sources of coverage such as private insurance are limited and not included in our study, and MAX datasets vary by quality across states, translating to potential gaps in our study cohort.²⁸Finally, as in any study using diagnoses, visits addressing care for depression may have been missed if other diagnoses were noted as primary (eg, VA clinicians carrying forward old diagnoses, like PTSD, on the problem list) or nondepression care visits may have been captured if a depression diagnosis was used by default.

Moving forward, our study demonstrates the potential for applying a natural experimental approach to studying dual-eligible veterans at the interface of Medicaid expansion. We focused on changes in VA reliance for the specific condition of depression and, in doing so, invite further inquiry into the impact of state mental health policy on outcomes more proximate to veterans’ outcomes. Clinical indicators, such as rates of antidepressant filling, utilization and duration of psychotherapy, and PHQ-9 scores, can similarly be investigated by natural experimental design. While current limits of administrative data and the siloing of EHRs may pose barriers to some of these avenues of research, multidisciplinary methodologies and data querying innovations such as natural language processing algorithms for clinical notes hold exciting opportunities to bridge the gap between policy and clinical efficacy.

Conclusions

This study applied a difference-in-difference analysis and found that Medicaid expansion is associated with decreases in VA reliance for both inpatient and outpatient services for depression. As additional data are generated from the Medicaid expansions of the ACA, similarly robust methods should be applied to further explore the impacts associated with such policy shifts and open the door to a better understanding of implications at the clinical level.

Acknowledgments

We acknowledge the efforts of Janine Wong, who proofread and formatted the manuscript.

Black veterans hospitalized with COVID-19 were less likely to be treated with evidence-based treatments, in a study conducted in 130 US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) medical centers between March 1, 2020, and February 28, 2022.

The study involved 12,135 Black veterans and 40,717 White veterans. Most patients hospitalized during period 1 (March-September 2020) were Black veterans and the proportion of White patients increased over time. The latter 3 periods, which included the Delta- and Omicron-predominant periods, saw the most admissions.

Controlling for the site of treatment, Black patients were equally likely to be admitted to the intensive care unit (40% vs 43%). However, they were less likely to receive steroids, remdesivir, or immunomodulatory drugs.

The researchers say their data confirm other findings from 41 US health care systems participating in the National Patient-Centered Clinical Research Network (PCORNet), which found lower use of monoclonal antibody treatment for COVID infection for patients who identified as Asian, Black, Hispanic, American Indian or Alaska Native, Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, or multiple races.

The researchers did not observe consistent differences in clinical outcomes between Black and White patients. After adjusting for demographics, chronic health conditions, severity of acute illness, and receipt of COVID-19–specific treatments, there was no association of Black race with hospital mortality or 30-day readmission. Black and White patients had a similar burden of preexisting health conditions. Of 38,782 patients discharged, 14% were readmitted within 30 days; the median time to readmission for both groups was 9 days.

Differences in care were partially explained by within- and between-hospital differences, the researchers say. They also cite research that demonstrated a poorer quality of care for hospitals with higher monthly COVID-19 discharges and hospital size.

The study results contradict the assumptions that differences in inpatient treatment by race and ethnicity may be due to differences in clinical indications for medication use based on age and comorbidities, such as chronic kidney or liver disease, the researchers say. For one thing, the VA issued a systemwide COVID-19 response plan that included specific treatment guidelines and distribution plans. But they also point to recent reports that have suggested that occult hypoxemia not detected by pulse oximetry occurs “far more often in Black patients than White patients,” which could result in delayed or missed opportunities to treat patients with COVID-19.

Black veterans hospitalized with COVID-19 were less likely to be treated with evidence-based treatments, in a study conducted in 130 US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) medical centers between March 1, 2020, and February 28, 2022.

The study involved 12,135 Black veterans and 40,717 White veterans. Most patients hospitalized during period 1 (March-September 2020) were Black veterans and the proportion of White patients increased over time. The latter 3 periods, which included the Delta- and Omicron-predominant periods, saw the most admissions.

Controlling for the site of treatment, Black patients were equally likely to be admitted to the intensive care unit (40% vs 43%). However, they were less likely to receive steroids, remdesivir, or immunomodulatory drugs.

The researchers say their data confirm other findings from 41 US health care systems participating in the National Patient-Centered Clinical Research Network (PCORNet), which found lower use of monoclonal antibody treatment for COVID infection for patients who identified as Asian, Black, Hispanic, American Indian or Alaska Native, Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, or multiple races.

The researchers did not observe consistent differences in clinical outcomes between Black and White patients. After adjusting for demographics, chronic health conditions, severity of acute illness, and receipt of COVID-19–specific treatments, there was no association of Black race with hospital mortality or 30-day readmission. Black and White patients had a similar burden of preexisting health conditions. Of 38,782 patients discharged, 14% were readmitted within 30 days; the median time to readmission for both groups was 9 days.

Differences in care were partially explained by within- and between-hospital differences, the researchers say. They also cite research that demonstrated a poorer quality of care for hospitals with higher monthly COVID-19 discharges and hospital size.

The study results contradict the assumptions that differences in inpatient treatment by race and ethnicity may be due to differences in clinical indications for medication use based on age and comorbidities, such as chronic kidney or liver disease, the researchers say. For one thing, the VA issued a systemwide COVID-19 response plan that included specific treatment guidelines and distribution plans. But they also point to recent reports that have suggested that occult hypoxemia not detected by pulse oximetry occurs “far more often in Black patients than White patients,” which could result in delayed or missed opportunities to treat patients with COVID-19.

Black veterans hospitalized with COVID-19 were less likely to be treated with evidence-based treatments, in a study conducted in 130 US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) medical centers between March 1, 2020, and February 28, 2022.

The study involved 12,135 Black veterans and 40,717 White veterans. Most patients hospitalized during period 1 (March-September 2020) were Black veterans and the proportion of White patients increased over time. The latter 3 periods, which included the Delta- and Omicron-predominant periods, saw the most admissions.

Controlling for the site of treatment, Black patients were equally likely to be admitted to the intensive care unit (40% vs 43%). However, they were less likely to receive steroids, remdesivir, or immunomodulatory drugs.

The researchers say their data confirm other findings from 41 US health care systems participating in the National Patient-Centered Clinical Research Network (PCORNet), which found lower use of monoclonal antibody treatment for COVID infection for patients who identified as Asian, Black, Hispanic, American Indian or Alaska Native, Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, or multiple races.

The researchers did not observe consistent differences in clinical outcomes between Black and White patients. After adjusting for demographics, chronic health conditions, severity of acute illness, and receipt of COVID-19–specific treatments, there was no association of Black race with hospital mortality or 30-day readmission. Black and White patients had a similar burden of preexisting health conditions. Of 38,782 patients discharged, 14% were readmitted within 30 days; the median time to readmission for both groups was 9 days.

Differences in care were partially explained by within- and between-hospital differences, the researchers say. They also cite research that demonstrated a poorer quality of care for hospitals with higher monthly COVID-19 discharges and hospital size.

The study results contradict the assumptions that differences in inpatient treatment by race and ethnicity may be due to differences in clinical indications for medication use based on age and comorbidities, such as chronic kidney or liver disease, the researchers say. For one thing, the VA issued a systemwide COVID-19 response plan that included specific treatment guidelines and distribution plans. But they also point to recent reports that have suggested that occult hypoxemia not detected by pulse oximetry occurs “far more often in Black patients than White patients,” which could result in delayed or missed opportunities to treat patients with COVID-19.