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Serious mental illness not a factor in most mass school shootings
Mass shootings, often on school campuses, have become a regular and sad reality in the United States.
The statistics are grim. Every day 12 children die from gun violence in America and another 32 are shot and injured. Since the Columbine High School shooting in 1999, more than 338,000 students in the United States have experienced school gun violence, according to the nonprofit organization Sandy Hook Promise.
A new analysis from the Columbia Mass Murder Database (CMMD) sheds fresh light on the debate over whether mental illness or easy access to guns is the key driver of mass shootings.
The findings, which are published in the Journal of Forensic Sciences, show that most perpetrators of mass school shootings are young, White men without serious mental illness.
A ‘straw man’
Mental health is often used as a “straw man” in debates about mass shootings, lead investigator Ragy Girgis, MD, told this news organization.
“There are many factors that contribute to the mass shooting epidemic, including gun access, criminality, substance use and misuse, and many others. Mental illness is incidental in the vast majority of cases,” said Dr. Girgis, with Columbia University Irving Medical Center, New York, and the New York State Psychiatric Institute.
“People with serious mental illness constitute only a small portion of the perpetrators of gun violence in this country,” coinvestigator Paul Appelbaum, MD, professor of psychiatry, medicine, and law at Columbia University, New York, told this news organization.
Using the CMMD, the researchers examined 82 incidents of mass murder perpetrated in academic settings including schools, colleges, and universities. The average number of victims of these incidents was eight. More than half (60%) of mass school shootings involved at least one semi- or fully automatic firearm.
All 82 incidents were initiated by men (mean age, 28), and 67% were White. About two-thirds (63%) involved guns.
More than three-quarters (77%) of all perpetrators of mass murders in academic settings had no recorded history of psychotic symptoms.
Despite the absence of serious mental illness, almost half (46%) of the mass school shooters took their own lives at the scene, suggesting that they viewed themselves as engaging in some form of “final act,” the researchers note.
“The major difference between mass shooters in school settings and elsewhere is the higher rate of suicide by the perpetrators in school settings. That suggests that the shootings are often part of a preexisting intent to die on the part of the shooter,” said Dr. Appelbaum.
Epidemic of emptiness
He noted that the typical profile of a mass school shooter is that of “a young male with anger problems, often as a result of bullying or abuse, frequently described as a loner, who has signaled a desire to kill other people.”
“If we only focus on mental illness, we will miss the warning signs in the majority of cases associated with victimization (such as bullying) and consequent anger,” Dr. Appelbaum said.
Dr. Girgis said there is a need to deal with the “epidemic of emptiness, narcissism, anger, and societal rejection felt by many young men/boys who, when combined with a desire to take their own lives and a great need for notoriety, feel that perpetrating a mass school shooting is their only option.”
“We also need to understand why it is so easy for so many mass school shooters to obtain firearms that are not theirs – either illegally or from someone else who themselves may have obtained the firearm legally,” Dr. Girgis said.
“All countries have people with mental illness,” Dr. Appelbaum said, “but among developed countries the U.S. is unique in the easy availability of weapons and in our disproportionate rate of murders.”
He also noted that school shootings are not a problem that clinicians are going to solve.
“Although they can be alert to signals from their patients of an intent to harm people in a school (or other) setting, the vast majority of shooters are not receiving treatment for a mental disorder,” Dr. Appelbaum said.
“This is a problem that can only be substantially diminished by reducing access to firearms, which includes requirements for safe storage, universal background checks, waiting periods to purchase firearms, and similar means-oriented interventions,” he added.
Need for regular mental health checks
Thea Gallagher, PsyD, who was not involved in the study, noted that mass school shooters may not have a psychotic illness, but with mental health there is a “spectrum, and obviously, that individual is struggling to some extent, most likely, mentally, if they are at a place where they are willing to take the lives of others and themselves.”
“We need to understand more about how people get to this place and the issues people are struggling with. We need to push for yearly mental health checks just like the yearly physical,” Dr. Gallagher, with the department of psychiatry at NYU Langone Health, New York, told this news organization.
“The more that we create conversation and moments to talk about how people are feeling internally, the better chance we have to give people who are struggling healthy coping strategies and the opportunity to process their emotions and not bury them,” Dr. Gallagher said.
Support for the study was provided in part by the New York State Office of Mental Hygiene, and the Elizabeth K. Dollard Charitable Trust. Dr. Girgis has received royalties and/or advances from books on mental health published by Wipf and Stock, and Routledge/Taylor and Francis. He has consulted for Noble Insights, IMS Expert Services, and Fowler White Burnett. Dr. Appelbaum and Dr. Gallagher report no relevant financial relationships.
A version of this article first appeared on Medscape.com.
Mass shootings, often on school campuses, have become a regular and sad reality in the United States.
The statistics are grim. Every day 12 children die from gun violence in America and another 32 are shot and injured. Since the Columbine High School shooting in 1999, more than 338,000 students in the United States have experienced school gun violence, according to the nonprofit organization Sandy Hook Promise.
A new analysis from the Columbia Mass Murder Database (CMMD) sheds fresh light on the debate over whether mental illness or easy access to guns is the key driver of mass shootings.
The findings, which are published in the Journal of Forensic Sciences, show that most perpetrators of mass school shootings are young, White men without serious mental illness.
A ‘straw man’
Mental health is often used as a “straw man” in debates about mass shootings, lead investigator Ragy Girgis, MD, told this news organization.
“There are many factors that contribute to the mass shooting epidemic, including gun access, criminality, substance use and misuse, and many others. Mental illness is incidental in the vast majority of cases,” said Dr. Girgis, with Columbia University Irving Medical Center, New York, and the New York State Psychiatric Institute.
“People with serious mental illness constitute only a small portion of the perpetrators of gun violence in this country,” coinvestigator Paul Appelbaum, MD, professor of psychiatry, medicine, and law at Columbia University, New York, told this news organization.
Using the CMMD, the researchers examined 82 incidents of mass murder perpetrated in academic settings including schools, colleges, and universities. The average number of victims of these incidents was eight. More than half (60%) of mass school shootings involved at least one semi- or fully automatic firearm.
All 82 incidents were initiated by men (mean age, 28), and 67% were White. About two-thirds (63%) involved guns.
More than three-quarters (77%) of all perpetrators of mass murders in academic settings had no recorded history of psychotic symptoms.
Despite the absence of serious mental illness, almost half (46%) of the mass school shooters took their own lives at the scene, suggesting that they viewed themselves as engaging in some form of “final act,” the researchers note.
“The major difference between mass shooters in school settings and elsewhere is the higher rate of suicide by the perpetrators in school settings. That suggests that the shootings are often part of a preexisting intent to die on the part of the shooter,” said Dr. Appelbaum.
Epidemic of emptiness
He noted that the typical profile of a mass school shooter is that of “a young male with anger problems, often as a result of bullying or abuse, frequently described as a loner, who has signaled a desire to kill other people.”
“If we only focus on mental illness, we will miss the warning signs in the majority of cases associated with victimization (such as bullying) and consequent anger,” Dr. Appelbaum said.
Dr. Girgis said there is a need to deal with the “epidemic of emptiness, narcissism, anger, and societal rejection felt by many young men/boys who, when combined with a desire to take their own lives and a great need for notoriety, feel that perpetrating a mass school shooting is their only option.”
“We also need to understand why it is so easy for so many mass school shooters to obtain firearms that are not theirs – either illegally or from someone else who themselves may have obtained the firearm legally,” Dr. Girgis said.
“All countries have people with mental illness,” Dr. Appelbaum said, “but among developed countries the U.S. is unique in the easy availability of weapons and in our disproportionate rate of murders.”
He also noted that school shootings are not a problem that clinicians are going to solve.
“Although they can be alert to signals from their patients of an intent to harm people in a school (or other) setting, the vast majority of shooters are not receiving treatment for a mental disorder,” Dr. Appelbaum said.
“This is a problem that can only be substantially diminished by reducing access to firearms, which includes requirements for safe storage, universal background checks, waiting periods to purchase firearms, and similar means-oriented interventions,” he added.
Need for regular mental health checks
Thea Gallagher, PsyD, who was not involved in the study, noted that mass school shooters may not have a psychotic illness, but with mental health there is a “spectrum, and obviously, that individual is struggling to some extent, most likely, mentally, if they are at a place where they are willing to take the lives of others and themselves.”
“We need to understand more about how people get to this place and the issues people are struggling with. We need to push for yearly mental health checks just like the yearly physical,” Dr. Gallagher, with the department of psychiatry at NYU Langone Health, New York, told this news organization.
“The more that we create conversation and moments to talk about how people are feeling internally, the better chance we have to give people who are struggling healthy coping strategies and the opportunity to process their emotions and not bury them,” Dr. Gallagher said.
Support for the study was provided in part by the New York State Office of Mental Hygiene, and the Elizabeth K. Dollard Charitable Trust. Dr. Girgis has received royalties and/or advances from books on mental health published by Wipf and Stock, and Routledge/Taylor and Francis. He has consulted for Noble Insights, IMS Expert Services, and Fowler White Burnett. Dr. Appelbaum and Dr. Gallagher report no relevant financial relationships.
A version of this article first appeared on Medscape.com.
Mass shootings, often on school campuses, have become a regular and sad reality in the United States.
The statistics are grim. Every day 12 children die from gun violence in America and another 32 are shot and injured. Since the Columbine High School shooting in 1999, more than 338,000 students in the United States have experienced school gun violence, according to the nonprofit organization Sandy Hook Promise.
A new analysis from the Columbia Mass Murder Database (CMMD) sheds fresh light on the debate over whether mental illness or easy access to guns is the key driver of mass shootings.
The findings, which are published in the Journal of Forensic Sciences, show that most perpetrators of mass school shootings are young, White men without serious mental illness.
A ‘straw man’
Mental health is often used as a “straw man” in debates about mass shootings, lead investigator Ragy Girgis, MD, told this news organization.
“There are many factors that contribute to the mass shooting epidemic, including gun access, criminality, substance use and misuse, and many others. Mental illness is incidental in the vast majority of cases,” said Dr. Girgis, with Columbia University Irving Medical Center, New York, and the New York State Psychiatric Institute.
“People with serious mental illness constitute only a small portion of the perpetrators of gun violence in this country,” coinvestigator Paul Appelbaum, MD, professor of psychiatry, medicine, and law at Columbia University, New York, told this news organization.
Using the CMMD, the researchers examined 82 incidents of mass murder perpetrated in academic settings including schools, colleges, and universities. The average number of victims of these incidents was eight. More than half (60%) of mass school shootings involved at least one semi- or fully automatic firearm.
All 82 incidents were initiated by men (mean age, 28), and 67% were White. About two-thirds (63%) involved guns.
More than three-quarters (77%) of all perpetrators of mass murders in academic settings had no recorded history of psychotic symptoms.
Despite the absence of serious mental illness, almost half (46%) of the mass school shooters took their own lives at the scene, suggesting that they viewed themselves as engaging in some form of “final act,” the researchers note.
“The major difference between mass shooters in school settings and elsewhere is the higher rate of suicide by the perpetrators in school settings. That suggests that the shootings are often part of a preexisting intent to die on the part of the shooter,” said Dr. Appelbaum.
Epidemic of emptiness
He noted that the typical profile of a mass school shooter is that of “a young male with anger problems, often as a result of bullying or abuse, frequently described as a loner, who has signaled a desire to kill other people.”
“If we only focus on mental illness, we will miss the warning signs in the majority of cases associated with victimization (such as bullying) and consequent anger,” Dr. Appelbaum said.
Dr. Girgis said there is a need to deal with the “epidemic of emptiness, narcissism, anger, and societal rejection felt by many young men/boys who, when combined with a desire to take their own lives and a great need for notoriety, feel that perpetrating a mass school shooting is their only option.”
“We also need to understand why it is so easy for so many mass school shooters to obtain firearms that are not theirs – either illegally or from someone else who themselves may have obtained the firearm legally,” Dr. Girgis said.
“All countries have people with mental illness,” Dr. Appelbaum said, “but among developed countries the U.S. is unique in the easy availability of weapons and in our disproportionate rate of murders.”
He also noted that school shootings are not a problem that clinicians are going to solve.
“Although they can be alert to signals from their patients of an intent to harm people in a school (or other) setting, the vast majority of shooters are not receiving treatment for a mental disorder,” Dr. Appelbaum said.
“This is a problem that can only be substantially diminished by reducing access to firearms, which includes requirements for safe storage, universal background checks, waiting periods to purchase firearms, and similar means-oriented interventions,” he added.
Need for regular mental health checks
Thea Gallagher, PsyD, who was not involved in the study, noted that mass school shooters may not have a psychotic illness, but with mental health there is a “spectrum, and obviously, that individual is struggling to some extent, most likely, mentally, if they are at a place where they are willing to take the lives of others and themselves.”
“We need to understand more about how people get to this place and the issues people are struggling with. We need to push for yearly mental health checks just like the yearly physical,” Dr. Gallagher, with the department of psychiatry at NYU Langone Health, New York, told this news organization.
“The more that we create conversation and moments to talk about how people are feeling internally, the better chance we have to give people who are struggling healthy coping strategies and the opportunity to process their emotions and not bury them,” Dr. Gallagher said.
Support for the study was provided in part by the New York State Office of Mental Hygiene, and the Elizabeth K. Dollard Charitable Trust. Dr. Girgis has received royalties and/or advances from books on mental health published by Wipf and Stock, and Routledge/Taylor and Francis. He has consulted for Noble Insights, IMS Expert Services, and Fowler White Burnett. Dr. Appelbaum and Dr. Gallagher report no relevant financial relationships.
A version of this article first appeared on Medscape.com.
Docs can help combat TikTok misinformation on rare psychiatric disorder
SAN FRANCISCO – , new research shows.
These findings, say investigators, underscore the need for mental health professionals to help counter the spread of false information by creating accurate content and posting it on the popular social media platform.
“Health care professionals need to make engaging content to post on social media platforms like YouTube and especially TikTok, to reach wider audiences and combat misinformation about DID,” study investigator Isreal Bladimir Munoz, a fourth-year medical student at University of Texas, Galveston, said in an interview.
The findings were presented at the annual meeting of the American Psychiatric Association.
Popularized by the media
A rare condition affecting less than 1% of the general population, DID involves two or more distinct personality states, along with changes in behavior and memory gaps.
The condition has been popularized in books and the media. Movies such as “Split,” “Psycho,” and “Fight Club” all feature characters with DID.
“These bring awareness about the condition, but also often sensationalize or stigmatize it and reinforce stereotypes,” said Mr. Munoz.
In recent years, social media has become an integral part of everyday life. An estimated 4.2 billion people actively frequent sites such as YouTube, TikTok, Twitter, and Meta.
Although social media allows for instant communication and the opportunity for self-expression, there are mounting concerns about the spread of misinformation and its potential impact on mental health and privacy, said Mr. Munoz.
To evaluate the quality and accuracy of information about DID on social media, investigators analyzed 60 YouTube and 97 TikTok videos on the condition.
To evaluate the reliability and the intent and reliability of videos, researchers used the modified DISCERN instrument and the Global Quality Scale, a five-point rating system.
Using these tools, the researchers determined whether the selected videos were useful, misleading, or neither. Mr. Munoz said videos were classified as useful if they contained accurate information about the condition and its pathogenesis, treatment, and management.
Researchers determined that for YouTube videos, 51.7% were useful, 6.6% were misleading, and 34.7% were neither. About 43.3% of these videos involved interviews, 21.7% were educational, 15% involved personal stories, 8.3% were films/TV programs, 5% were comedy skits, and 3.3% were another content type.
The highest quality YouTube videos were from educational organizations and health care professionals. The least accurate videos came from independent users and film/TV sources.
As for TikTok videos on DID, only 5.2% were useful, 10.3% were misleading, and 41.7% were neither.
The main sources for TikTok videos were independent organizations, whereas podcasts and film/TV were the least common sources.
The findings, said Mr. Munoz, underscore the need for medical professionals to develop high-quality content about DID and post it on TikTok to counter misinformation on social media.
Call to action
In a comment, Howard Y. Liu, MD, a child and adolescent psychiatrist and chair of the department of psychiatry, University of Nebraska, Omaha, described the study as “compelling.”
When it comes to public health messages, it’s important to know what social media people are using. Today’s parents are on Twitter and Facebook, whereas their children are more likely to be checking out YouTube and TikTok, said Dr. Liu, chair of the APA’s Council on Communications.
“TikTok is critical because that’s where all the youth eyeballs are,” he said.
The medical profession needs to engage with the platform to reach this next-generation audience and help stop the spread of misinformation about DID, said Dr. Liu. He noted that the APA is looking into undertaking such an initiative.
The study investigators report no relevant disclosures. Dr. Liu reports no relevant disclosures.
A version of this article first appeared on Medscape.com.
SAN FRANCISCO – , new research shows.
These findings, say investigators, underscore the need for mental health professionals to help counter the spread of false information by creating accurate content and posting it on the popular social media platform.
“Health care professionals need to make engaging content to post on social media platforms like YouTube and especially TikTok, to reach wider audiences and combat misinformation about DID,” study investigator Isreal Bladimir Munoz, a fourth-year medical student at University of Texas, Galveston, said in an interview.
The findings were presented at the annual meeting of the American Psychiatric Association.
Popularized by the media
A rare condition affecting less than 1% of the general population, DID involves two or more distinct personality states, along with changes in behavior and memory gaps.
The condition has been popularized in books and the media. Movies such as “Split,” “Psycho,” and “Fight Club” all feature characters with DID.
“These bring awareness about the condition, but also often sensationalize or stigmatize it and reinforce stereotypes,” said Mr. Munoz.
In recent years, social media has become an integral part of everyday life. An estimated 4.2 billion people actively frequent sites such as YouTube, TikTok, Twitter, and Meta.
Although social media allows for instant communication and the opportunity for self-expression, there are mounting concerns about the spread of misinformation and its potential impact on mental health and privacy, said Mr. Munoz.
To evaluate the quality and accuracy of information about DID on social media, investigators analyzed 60 YouTube and 97 TikTok videos on the condition.
To evaluate the reliability and the intent and reliability of videos, researchers used the modified DISCERN instrument and the Global Quality Scale, a five-point rating system.
Using these tools, the researchers determined whether the selected videos were useful, misleading, or neither. Mr. Munoz said videos were classified as useful if they contained accurate information about the condition and its pathogenesis, treatment, and management.
Researchers determined that for YouTube videos, 51.7% were useful, 6.6% were misleading, and 34.7% were neither. About 43.3% of these videos involved interviews, 21.7% were educational, 15% involved personal stories, 8.3% were films/TV programs, 5% were comedy skits, and 3.3% were another content type.
The highest quality YouTube videos were from educational organizations and health care professionals. The least accurate videos came from independent users and film/TV sources.
As for TikTok videos on DID, only 5.2% were useful, 10.3% were misleading, and 41.7% were neither.
The main sources for TikTok videos were independent organizations, whereas podcasts and film/TV were the least common sources.
The findings, said Mr. Munoz, underscore the need for medical professionals to develop high-quality content about DID and post it on TikTok to counter misinformation on social media.
Call to action
In a comment, Howard Y. Liu, MD, a child and adolescent psychiatrist and chair of the department of psychiatry, University of Nebraska, Omaha, described the study as “compelling.”
When it comes to public health messages, it’s important to know what social media people are using. Today’s parents are on Twitter and Facebook, whereas their children are more likely to be checking out YouTube and TikTok, said Dr. Liu, chair of the APA’s Council on Communications.
“TikTok is critical because that’s where all the youth eyeballs are,” he said.
The medical profession needs to engage with the platform to reach this next-generation audience and help stop the spread of misinformation about DID, said Dr. Liu. He noted that the APA is looking into undertaking such an initiative.
The study investigators report no relevant disclosures. Dr. Liu reports no relevant disclosures.
A version of this article first appeared on Medscape.com.
SAN FRANCISCO – , new research shows.
These findings, say investigators, underscore the need for mental health professionals to help counter the spread of false information by creating accurate content and posting it on the popular social media platform.
“Health care professionals need to make engaging content to post on social media platforms like YouTube and especially TikTok, to reach wider audiences and combat misinformation about DID,” study investigator Isreal Bladimir Munoz, a fourth-year medical student at University of Texas, Galveston, said in an interview.
The findings were presented at the annual meeting of the American Psychiatric Association.
Popularized by the media
A rare condition affecting less than 1% of the general population, DID involves two or more distinct personality states, along with changes in behavior and memory gaps.
The condition has been popularized in books and the media. Movies such as “Split,” “Psycho,” and “Fight Club” all feature characters with DID.
“These bring awareness about the condition, but also often sensationalize or stigmatize it and reinforce stereotypes,” said Mr. Munoz.
In recent years, social media has become an integral part of everyday life. An estimated 4.2 billion people actively frequent sites such as YouTube, TikTok, Twitter, and Meta.
Although social media allows for instant communication and the opportunity for self-expression, there are mounting concerns about the spread of misinformation and its potential impact on mental health and privacy, said Mr. Munoz.
To evaluate the quality and accuracy of information about DID on social media, investigators analyzed 60 YouTube and 97 TikTok videos on the condition.
To evaluate the reliability and the intent and reliability of videos, researchers used the modified DISCERN instrument and the Global Quality Scale, a five-point rating system.
Using these tools, the researchers determined whether the selected videos were useful, misleading, or neither. Mr. Munoz said videos were classified as useful if they contained accurate information about the condition and its pathogenesis, treatment, and management.
Researchers determined that for YouTube videos, 51.7% were useful, 6.6% were misleading, and 34.7% were neither. About 43.3% of these videos involved interviews, 21.7% were educational, 15% involved personal stories, 8.3% were films/TV programs, 5% were comedy skits, and 3.3% were another content type.
The highest quality YouTube videos were from educational organizations and health care professionals. The least accurate videos came from independent users and film/TV sources.
As for TikTok videos on DID, only 5.2% were useful, 10.3% were misleading, and 41.7% were neither.
The main sources for TikTok videos were independent organizations, whereas podcasts and film/TV were the least common sources.
The findings, said Mr. Munoz, underscore the need for medical professionals to develop high-quality content about DID and post it on TikTok to counter misinformation on social media.
Call to action
In a comment, Howard Y. Liu, MD, a child and adolescent psychiatrist and chair of the department of psychiatry, University of Nebraska, Omaha, described the study as “compelling.”
When it comes to public health messages, it’s important to know what social media people are using. Today’s parents are on Twitter and Facebook, whereas their children are more likely to be checking out YouTube and TikTok, said Dr. Liu, chair of the APA’s Council on Communications.
“TikTok is critical because that’s where all the youth eyeballs are,” he said.
The medical profession needs to engage with the platform to reach this next-generation audience and help stop the spread of misinformation about DID, said Dr. Liu. He noted that the APA is looking into undertaking such an initiative.
The study investigators report no relevant disclosures. Dr. Liu reports no relevant disclosures.
A version of this article first appeared on Medscape.com.
AT APA 2023
Choosing our terms: The diagnostic words we use can be harmful
We are living in an era of increasing sensitivity to our diversity and the ways we interact, but also an era of growing resistance to change and accommodation. As clinicians, we hope to be among the sensitive and the progressive, open to improving our views and interactions. And as part of our respect for those we treat, we seek to speak clearly with them about our assessment of what is disrupting their lives and about their options.
Using the right words is crucial in that work. Well-chosen words can be heard and understood. Poorly chosen words can be confusing or off-putting; they may miscommunicate or be offensive. Careful choice of words is also important among colleagues, who may not always mean the same things when using the same words.
In psychiatry, consumer knowledge and access are growing. There are effective standard treatments and promising new ones. But our terminology is often antique and obscure. This is so despite a recognition that some terms we use may communicate poorly and some are deprecating.
A notable example is “schizophrenia.” Originally referring to cognitive phenomena that were not adequately coherent with reality or one another, it has gone through periods of describing most psychosis to particular subsets of psychoses. Debates persist on specific criteria for key symptoms and typical course. Even two clinicians trained in the same site may not agree on the defining criteria, and the public, mostly informed by books, movies, and newspapers, is even more confused, often believing schizophrenia is multiple-personality disorder. In addition, the press and public often associate schizophrenia with violent behavior and uniformly bad outcomes, and for those reasons, a diagnosis is not only frightening but also stigmatizing.1
Many papers have presented the case for retiring “schizophrenia.”2 And practical efforts to rename schizophrenia have been made. These efforts have occurred in countries in which English is not the primary language.3 In Japan, schizophrenia was replaced by “integration disorder.” In Hong Kong, “disorder of thought and perception” was implemented. Korea chose “attunement disorder.” A recent large survey of stakeholders, including clinicians, researchers, and consumers in the United States, explored alternatives in English.4 Terms receiving approval included: “psychosis spectrum syndrome,” “altered perception syndrome,” and “neuro-emotional integration disorder.”
Despite these recommendations, the standard manuals of diagnosis, the ICD and DSM, have maintained the century-old term “schizophrenia” in their most recent editions, released in 2022. Aside from the inertia commonly associated with long-standing practices, it has been noted that many of the alternatives suggested or, in some places, implemented, are complex, somewhat vague, or too inclusive to distinguish different clinical presentations requiring different treatment approaches. They might not be compelling for use or optimal to guide caregiving.
Perhaps more concerning than “schizophrenia” are terms used to describe personality disorders.5 “Personality disorder” itself is problematic, implying a core and possibly unalterable fault in an individual. And among the personality disorders, words for the related group of disorders called “Cluster B” in the DSM raise issues. This includes the terms narcissistic, antisocial, histrionic, and borderline in DSM-5-TR. The first three terms are clearly pejorative. The last is unclear: What is the border between? Originally, it was bordering on psychosis, but as explained in DSM and ICD, borderline disorder is much more closely related to other personality disorders.
Notably, the “Cluster B” disorders run together in families, but men are more likely to be called antisocial and women borderline, even though the overlap in signs and symptoms is profound, suggesting marginally different manifestations of the same condition. The ICD has made changes to address the problems associated with some of these terms. ICD proposes personality “difficulty” to replace personality “disorder”; a modest change but less offensive. And it proposes seeing all, or at least most, personality disorders as being related to one another. Most share features of disturbances in sense-of-self and relationships with others. As descriptors, ICD kept “borderline pattern,” but replaced “antisocial” with “dissocial,” in an effort to be accurate but less demeaning. Other descriptors it proposes are negative affectivity, detachment, disinhibition, and anankastia, the last referring to compulsions.
These are notable advances. Can the field find even better terms to communicate hard to hear information, with words that are less problematic? In search of options, we surveyed clinicians at academic centers about the terms they preferred to avoid and the ones they prefer to use in talking with patients.6 Their practices may be informative.
Briefly summarized, these clinicians preferred not to use “schizophrenia” and very few used “antisocial,” “histrionic,” or “narcissistic.” Most avoided using “borderline” as well. Instead, they recommended discussing specific symptoms and manifestations of illness or dysfunctional behavior and relationships with their patients. They employed terms including “psychosis,” “hallucination,” “delusion,” “thinking disorder,” and “mood disorder.” They explained these terms, as needed, and found that patients understood them.
For Cluster B personality disorders, they spoke of personality traits and styles and specifically about “conduct,” “rule breaking,” “coping,” “self-focus,” “emotionality,” and “reactivity.” Those choices are not perfect, of course. Medical terms are often not standard words used in a conversational way. But the words chosen by these clinicians are generally straightforward and may communicate in a clear and acceptable fashion. It is also notable that the terms match how the clinicians assess and treat their patients, as observed in a separate study of their practices.7 That is, the clinicians advised that they look for and suggest treatments for the specific symptoms they see that most disrupt an individual’s life, such as delusions or mood instability. They are not much guided by diagnoses, like schizophrenia or borderline disorder. That makes the chosen terms not only less confusing or off-putting but also more practical.
Changing terminology in any field is difficult. We are trained to use standard terms. Clearly, however, many clinicians avoid some terms and use alternatives in their work. Asked why, they responded that they did so precisely to communicate more effectively and more respectfully. That is key to their treatment goals. Perhaps others will consider these choices useful in their work. And perhaps both the DSM and the ICD will not only continue to consider but will decide to implement alternatives for problematic terms in the years ahead, as they discuss their next revisions.
Dr. Cohen is director of the Program for Neuropsychiatric Research at McLean Hospital, Belmont, Mass., and Robertson-Steele Professor of Psychiatry at Harvard Medical School, Boston.
References
1. Lasalvia A et al. Renaming schizophrenia? A survey among psychiatrists, mental health service users and family members in Italy. Schizophr Res. 2021;228:502-9.
2. Gülöksüz S et al. Renaming schizophrenia: 5 x 5. Epidemiol Psychiatr Sci. 2019;28(3):254-7.
3. Sartorius N et al. Name change for schizophrenia. Schizophr Bull. 2014;40(2):255-8.
4. Mesholam-Gately RI et al. Are we ready for a name change for schizophrenia? A survey of multiple stakeholders. Schizophr Res. 2021;238:152-60.
5. Mulder R. The evolving nosology of personality disorder and its clinical utility. World Psychiatry. 2021 Oct;20(3):361-2.
6. Cohen BM et al. Diagnostic terms psychiatrists prefer to use for common psychotic and personality disorders. J Psychiatr Res. 2022 Sep 5;155:226-31.
7. Cohen BM, et al. Use of DSM-5 diagnoses vs. other clinical information by US academic-affiliated psychiatrists in assessing and treating psychotic disorders. World Psychiatry. 2021 Oct;20(3):447-8.
We are living in an era of increasing sensitivity to our diversity and the ways we interact, but also an era of growing resistance to change and accommodation. As clinicians, we hope to be among the sensitive and the progressive, open to improving our views and interactions. And as part of our respect for those we treat, we seek to speak clearly with them about our assessment of what is disrupting their lives and about their options.
Using the right words is crucial in that work. Well-chosen words can be heard and understood. Poorly chosen words can be confusing or off-putting; they may miscommunicate or be offensive. Careful choice of words is also important among colleagues, who may not always mean the same things when using the same words.
In psychiatry, consumer knowledge and access are growing. There are effective standard treatments and promising new ones. But our terminology is often antique and obscure. This is so despite a recognition that some terms we use may communicate poorly and some are deprecating.
A notable example is “schizophrenia.” Originally referring to cognitive phenomena that were not adequately coherent with reality or one another, it has gone through periods of describing most psychosis to particular subsets of psychoses. Debates persist on specific criteria for key symptoms and typical course. Even two clinicians trained in the same site may not agree on the defining criteria, and the public, mostly informed by books, movies, and newspapers, is even more confused, often believing schizophrenia is multiple-personality disorder. In addition, the press and public often associate schizophrenia with violent behavior and uniformly bad outcomes, and for those reasons, a diagnosis is not only frightening but also stigmatizing.1
Many papers have presented the case for retiring “schizophrenia.”2 And practical efforts to rename schizophrenia have been made. These efforts have occurred in countries in which English is not the primary language.3 In Japan, schizophrenia was replaced by “integration disorder.” In Hong Kong, “disorder of thought and perception” was implemented. Korea chose “attunement disorder.” A recent large survey of stakeholders, including clinicians, researchers, and consumers in the United States, explored alternatives in English.4 Terms receiving approval included: “psychosis spectrum syndrome,” “altered perception syndrome,” and “neuro-emotional integration disorder.”
Despite these recommendations, the standard manuals of diagnosis, the ICD and DSM, have maintained the century-old term “schizophrenia” in their most recent editions, released in 2022. Aside from the inertia commonly associated with long-standing practices, it has been noted that many of the alternatives suggested or, in some places, implemented, are complex, somewhat vague, or too inclusive to distinguish different clinical presentations requiring different treatment approaches. They might not be compelling for use or optimal to guide caregiving.
Perhaps more concerning than “schizophrenia” are terms used to describe personality disorders.5 “Personality disorder” itself is problematic, implying a core and possibly unalterable fault in an individual. And among the personality disorders, words for the related group of disorders called “Cluster B” in the DSM raise issues. This includes the terms narcissistic, antisocial, histrionic, and borderline in DSM-5-TR. The first three terms are clearly pejorative. The last is unclear: What is the border between? Originally, it was bordering on psychosis, but as explained in DSM and ICD, borderline disorder is much more closely related to other personality disorders.
Notably, the “Cluster B” disorders run together in families, but men are more likely to be called antisocial and women borderline, even though the overlap in signs and symptoms is profound, suggesting marginally different manifestations of the same condition. The ICD has made changes to address the problems associated with some of these terms. ICD proposes personality “difficulty” to replace personality “disorder”; a modest change but less offensive. And it proposes seeing all, or at least most, personality disorders as being related to one another. Most share features of disturbances in sense-of-self and relationships with others. As descriptors, ICD kept “borderline pattern,” but replaced “antisocial” with “dissocial,” in an effort to be accurate but less demeaning. Other descriptors it proposes are negative affectivity, detachment, disinhibition, and anankastia, the last referring to compulsions.
These are notable advances. Can the field find even better terms to communicate hard to hear information, with words that are less problematic? In search of options, we surveyed clinicians at academic centers about the terms they preferred to avoid and the ones they prefer to use in talking with patients.6 Their practices may be informative.
Briefly summarized, these clinicians preferred not to use “schizophrenia” and very few used “antisocial,” “histrionic,” or “narcissistic.” Most avoided using “borderline” as well. Instead, they recommended discussing specific symptoms and manifestations of illness or dysfunctional behavior and relationships with their patients. They employed terms including “psychosis,” “hallucination,” “delusion,” “thinking disorder,” and “mood disorder.” They explained these terms, as needed, and found that patients understood them.
For Cluster B personality disorders, they spoke of personality traits and styles and specifically about “conduct,” “rule breaking,” “coping,” “self-focus,” “emotionality,” and “reactivity.” Those choices are not perfect, of course. Medical terms are often not standard words used in a conversational way. But the words chosen by these clinicians are generally straightforward and may communicate in a clear and acceptable fashion. It is also notable that the terms match how the clinicians assess and treat their patients, as observed in a separate study of their practices.7 That is, the clinicians advised that they look for and suggest treatments for the specific symptoms they see that most disrupt an individual’s life, such as delusions or mood instability. They are not much guided by diagnoses, like schizophrenia or borderline disorder. That makes the chosen terms not only less confusing or off-putting but also more practical.
Changing terminology in any field is difficult. We are trained to use standard terms. Clearly, however, many clinicians avoid some terms and use alternatives in their work. Asked why, they responded that they did so precisely to communicate more effectively and more respectfully. That is key to their treatment goals. Perhaps others will consider these choices useful in their work. And perhaps both the DSM and the ICD will not only continue to consider but will decide to implement alternatives for problematic terms in the years ahead, as they discuss their next revisions.
Dr. Cohen is director of the Program for Neuropsychiatric Research at McLean Hospital, Belmont, Mass., and Robertson-Steele Professor of Psychiatry at Harvard Medical School, Boston.
References
1. Lasalvia A et al. Renaming schizophrenia? A survey among psychiatrists, mental health service users and family members in Italy. Schizophr Res. 2021;228:502-9.
2. Gülöksüz S et al. Renaming schizophrenia: 5 x 5. Epidemiol Psychiatr Sci. 2019;28(3):254-7.
3. Sartorius N et al. Name change for schizophrenia. Schizophr Bull. 2014;40(2):255-8.
4. Mesholam-Gately RI et al. Are we ready for a name change for schizophrenia? A survey of multiple stakeholders. Schizophr Res. 2021;238:152-60.
5. Mulder R. The evolving nosology of personality disorder and its clinical utility. World Psychiatry. 2021 Oct;20(3):361-2.
6. Cohen BM et al. Diagnostic terms psychiatrists prefer to use for common psychotic and personality disorders. J Psychiatr Res. 2022 Sep 5;155:226-31.
7. Cohen BM, et al. Use of DSM-5 diagnoses vs. other clinical information by US academic-affiliated psychiatrists in assessing and treating psychotic disorders. World Psychiatry. 2021 Oct;20(3):447-8.
We are living in an era of increasing sensitivity to our diversity and the ways we interact, but also an era of growing resistance to change and accommodation. As clinicians, we hope to be among the sensitive and the progressive, open to improving our views and interactions. And as part of our respect for those we treat, we seek to speak clearly with them about our assessment of what is disrupting their lives and about their options.
Using the right words is crucial in that work. Well-chosen words can be heard and understood. Poorly chosen words can be confusing or off-putting; they may miscommunicate or be offensive. Careful choice of words is also important among colleagues, who may not always mean the same things when using the same words.
In psychiatry, consumer knowledge and access are growing. There are effective standard treatments and promising new ones. But our terminology is often antique and obscure. This is so despite a recognition that some terms we use may communicate poorly and some are deprecating.
A notable example is “schizophrenia.” Originally referring to cognitive phenomena that were not adequately coherent with reality or one another, it has gone through periods of describing most psychosis to particular subsets of psychoses. Debates persist on specific criteria for key symptoms and typical course. Even two clinicians trained in the same site may not agree on the defining criteria, and the public, mostly informed by books, movies, and newspapers, is even more confused, often believing schizophrenia is multiple-personality disorder. In addition, the press and public often associate schizophrenia with violent behavior and uniformly bad outcomes, and for those reasons, a diagnosis is not only frightening but also stigmatizing.1
Many papers have presented the case for retiring “schizophrenia.”2 And practical efforts to rename schizophrenia have been made. These efforts have occurred in countries in which English is not the primary language.3 In Japan, schizophrenia was replaced by “integration disorder.” In Hong Kong, “disorder of thought and perception” was implemented. Korea chose “attunement disorder.” A recent large survey of stakeholders, including clinicians, researchers, and consumers in the United States, explored alternatives in English.4 Terms receiving approval included: “psychosis spectrum syndrome,” “altered perception syndrome,” and “neuro-emotional integration disorder.”
Despite these recommendations, the standard manuals of diagnosis, the ICD and DSM, have maintained the century-old term “schizophrenia” in their most recent editions, released in 2022. Aside from the inertia commonly associated with long-standing practices, it has been noted that many of the alternatives suggested or, in some places, implemented, are complex, somewhat vague, or too inclusive to distinguish different clinical presentations requiring different treatment approaches. They might not be compelling for use or optimal to guide caregiving.
Perhaps more concerning than “schizophrenia” are terms used to describe personality disorders.5 “Personality disorder” itself is problematic, implying a core and possibly unalterable fault in an individual. And among the personality disorders, words for the related group of disorders called “Cluster B” in the DSM raise issues. This includes the terms narcissistic, antisocial, histrionic, and borderline in DSM-5-TR. The first three terms are clearly pejorative. The last is unclear: What is the border between? Originally, it was bordering on psychosis, but as explained in DSM and ICD, borderline disorder is much more closely related to other personality disorders.
Notably, the “Cluster B” disorders run together in families, but men are more likely to be called antisocial and women borderline, even though the overlap in signs and symptoms is profound, suggesting marginally different manifestations of the same condition. The ICD has made changes to address the problems associated with some of these terms. ICD proposes personality “difficulty” to replace personality “disorder”; a modest change but less offensive. And it proposes seeing all, or at least most, personality disorders as being related to one another. Most share features of disturbances in sense-of-self and relationships with others. As descriptors, ICD kept “borderline pattern,” but replaced “antisocial” with “dissocial,” in an effort to be accurate but less demeaning. Other descriptors it proposes are negative affectivity, detachment, disinhibition, and anankastia, the last referring to compulsions.
These are notable advances. Can the field find even better terms to communicate hard to hear information, with words that are less problematic? In search of options, we surveyed clinicians at academic centers about the terms they preferred to avoid and the ones they prefer to use in talking with patients.6 Their practices may be informative.
Briefly summarized, these clinicians preferred not to use “schizophrenia” and very few used “antisocial,” “histrionic,” or “narcissistic.” Most avoided using “borderline” as well. Instead, they recommended discussing specific symptoms and manifestations of illness or dysfunctional behavior and relationships with their patients. They employed terms including “psychosis,” “hallucination,” “delusion,” “thinking disorder,” and “mood disorder.” They explained these terms, as needed, and found that patients understood them.
For Cluster B personality disorders, they spoke of personality traits and styles and specifically about “conduct,” “rule breaking,” “coping,” “self-focus,” “emotionality,” and “reactivity.” Those choices are not perfect, of course. Medical terms are often not standard words used in a conversational way. But the words chosen by these clinicians are generally straightforward and may communicate in a clear and acceptable fashion. It is also notable that the terms match how the clinicians assess and treat their patients, as observed in a separate study of their practices.7 That is, the clinicians advised that they look for and suggest treatments for the specific symptoms they see that most disrupt an individual’s life, such as delusions or mood instability. They are not much guided by diagnoses, like schizophrenia or borderline disorder. That makes the chosen terms not only less confusing or off-putting but also more practical.
Changing terminology in any field is difficult. We are trained to use standard terms. Clearly, however, many clinicians avoid some terms and use alternatives in their work. Asked why, they responded that they did so precisely to communicate more effectively and more respectfully. That is key to their treatment goals. Perhaps others will consider these choices useful in their work. And perhaps both the DSM and the ICD will not only continue to consider but will decide to implement alternatives for problematic terms in the years ahead, as they discuss their next revisions.
Dr. Cohen is director of the Program for Neuropsychiatric Research at McLean Hospital, Belmont, Mass., and Robertson-Steele Professor of Psychiatry at Harvard Medical School, Boston.
References
1. Lasalvia A et al. Renaming schizophrenia? A survey among psychiatrists, mental health service users and family members in Italy. Schizophr Res. 2021;228:502-9.
2. Gülöksüz S et al. Renaming schizophrenia: 5 x 5. Epidemiol Psychiatr Sci. 2019;28(3):254-7.
3. Sartorius N et al. Name change for schizophrenia. Schizophr Bull. 2014;40(2):255-8.
4. Mesholam-Gately RI et al. Are we ready for a name change for schizophrenia? A survey of multiple stakeholders. Schizophr Res. 2021;238:152-60.
5. Mulder R. The evolving nosology of personality disorder and its clinical utility. World Psychiatry. 2021 Oct;20(3):361-2.
6. Cohen BM et al. Diagnostic terms psychiatrists prefer to use for common psychotic and personality disorders. J Psychiatr Res. 2022 Sep 5;155:226-31.
7. Cohen BM, et al. Use of DSM-5 diagnoses vs. other clinical information by US academic-affiliated psychiatrists in assessing and treating psychotic disorders. World Psychiatry. 2021 Oct;20(3):447-8.
The newest form of mommy shaming: The 'narcissistic mother'
Narcissists appear to be everywhere. A few minutes on the Internet shows the dangers of narcissistic romantic partners, friends, and employers. Identifying and limiting the reach of their manipulative and self-centered endeavors is cast as both urgent and necessary. The destructive powers of the narcissistic mother are viewed as especially in need of remedy, and any bookstore can reveal the risks they pose: “Will I Ever Be Good Enough? Healing the Daughters of Narcissistic Mothers;” “You’re Not Crazy – It’s Your Mother: Freedom for Daughters of Narcissistic Mothers;” “Healing for Daughters of Narcissistic Mothers: A Practical Guide on How to Recover from the Childhood Trauma of Toxic Relationship with Your Mother and How You Can Handle Her Abuse Now As An Adult” – to name just a few (there are more).
As a psychologist specializing in parental estrangement, I (Dr. Coleman) regularly see letters from adult children explaining their discovery-through-therapy that their mother is a narcissist. The proclamation often comes when the therapist has never met the mother. Typically, the discovery is presented as a justification for ending the relationship with the parent. While these mothers could rightly be accused of being anxious, over-involved, depressed, or hurt by the lack of gratitude or reciprocity, the vast majority are not narcissists.
Which begs the question, why are so many being labeled in this way? Are therapists only now discovering the power of narcissistic mothers? Have they always existed, casting their spells upon unwary children? Are those now-grown children only today able to disentangle themselves from the longstanding, pervasive, and harmful influence of these parents, with the help of therapy? Or is this the newest form of mommy shaming as it engages head-on with our Diagnostic and Statistical Manuals?
We believe it is the latter.
Blaming mothers has a long reach. Mothers have been blamed for causing schizophrenia, autism, homosexuality, and effeminacy in men. While we used to call people selfish and “controlling,” narcissism is a more consequential label as it confers diagnostic validity from the mental health profession. Worse, it suggests an individual beyond reach, where the only answer is distance, containment, or estrangement.
The rise of the narcissistic mother comes during a time when, for the past 4 decades, the average working mother spends more time with her children than stay-at-home moms did in the supposed halcyon days of the 1960s’ middle class, before “parenting” was a common term. A variety of economists and sociologists observed that an increase in parental effort became necessary to launch children into adulthood given the retreat of governmental and corporate support for parents that began in the 1980s.
“The financial and emotional burden on families has grown in ways that were almost unimaginable just a half-century ago,” writes the University of Pennsylvania sociologist Frank Furstenberg in “On a New Schedule: Transitions to Adulthood and Family Change.” In addition, a view of children as vulnerable and in need of intense parental investment gained momentum over the course of the 20th century and has continued unabated into the present. As a result, an environment of intense maternal preoccupation, worry, guilt, and involvement with children’s grades, safety, health, and emotional states – referred to as “helicopter” and “tiger” mothering – grew into the norm across the classes.
While prior generations of parents could, by today’s standards, be viewed as being insufficiently involved, today’s parents have become “over-involved” – aided by the ability of parents to be in constant contact with their adult children through technology. While this shift to a more hands-on, more conscientious parenting has been a boon to parent–adult child relationships in the main, the downside has meant, for some, too much of a good thing. From that perspective, pathologizing a mother’s involvement or her expressions of hurt for that child’s lack of availability provides a shield against the child’s feelings of guilt or obligation.
Diagnoses can serve a social purpose: They can allow individuals to use the authority of our profession to decide who to be close to and who to let go. They can provide insulation against feelings of obligation or guilt. They create a way to label behavior as dysfunctional that in other eras or cultures would be considered normal, even valued. To that extent, diagnoses don’t occur in a cultural void. They are inextricably tied to larger ideals, be they individualistic – as exists in the United States – or collectivist, as exists in many other parts of the world.
While we have decided what parents owe our children, it is unclear what parents might ask in return. To that end, mothers who want more interest, availability, or gratitude today are vulnerable to being cast as selfish, uncaring, needy, and controlling. They can now be viewed as failing in their task of selfless devotion. Their desires for closeness or repair can be regarded as incompatible with the quest for the adult child’s self-fulfillment and identity; her identification with her children too great a barrier to their individuation.
There may well be good reasons to estrange family members for their intolerable behaviors, especially ones who have threatened personal safety. Yet, while there are plenty of problematic parents, few meet the diagnostic criteria of narcissistic personality disorder. More important, such labels can discourage a discussion of boundaries that both the parents and the adult children might find acceptable – which sometimes means asking family members to tolerate behavior or individuals not to their liking.
Diagnoses carry enormous social weight and can facilitate estrangements or negativity to mothers that are far more workable than our patients’ characterization of them might lead them or us to believe. ; it devalues their years of love and dedication, however flawed; and it weakens the fabric of connection that could otherwise exist. Rather than provide a path toward compassion or understanding, “narcissistic mother” just becomes the latest form of mommy shaming.
Dr. Coleman is a clinical psychologist and author of “Rules of Estrangement: Why Adult Children Cut Ties and How to Heal the Conflict” (New York: Penguin Random House, 2021). Dr. Miller is a coauthor of “Committed: The Battle Over Involuntary Psychiatric Care” (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016). She has a private practice and is an assistant professor of psychiatry and behavioral sciences at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore.
Narcissists appear to be everywhere. A few minutes on the Internet shows the dangers of narcissistic romantic partners, friends, and employers. Identifying and limiting the reach of their manipulative and self-centered endeavors is cast as both urgent and necessary. The destructive powers of the narcissistic mother are viewed as especially in need of remedy, and any bookstore can reveal the risks they pose: “Will I Ever Be Good Enough? Healing the Daughters of Narcissistic Mothers;” “You’re Not Crazy – It’s Your Mother: Freedom for Daughters of Narcissistic Mothers;” “Healing for Daughters of Narcissistic Mothers: A Practical Guide on How to Recover from the Childhood Trauma of Toxic Relationship with Your Mother and How You Can Handle Her Abuse Now As An Adult” – to name just a few (there are more).
As a psychologist specializing in parental estrangement, I (Dr. Coleman) regularly see letters from adult children explaining their discovery-through-therapy that their mother is a narcissist. The proclamation often comes when the therapist has never met the mother. Typically, the discovery is presented as a justification for ending the relationship with the parent. While these mothers could rightly be accused of being anxious, over-involved, depressed, or hurt by the lack of gratitude or reciprocity, the vast majority are not narcissists.
Which begs the question, why are so many being labeled in this way? Are therapists only now discovering the power of narcissistic mothers? Have they always existed, casting their spells upon unwary children? Are those now-grown children only today able to disentangle themselves from the longstanding, pervasive, and harmful influence of these parents, with the help of therapy? Or is this the newest form of mommy shaming as it engages head-on with our Diagnostic and Statistical Manuals?
We believe it is the latter.
Blaming mothers has a long reach. Mothers have been blamed for causing schizophrenia, autism, homosexuality, and effeminacy in men. While we used to call people selfish and “controlling,” narcissism is a more consequential label as it confers diagnostic validity from the mental health profession. Worse, it suggests an individual beyond reach, where the only answer is distance, containment, or estrangement.
The rise of the narcissistic mother comes during a time when, for the past 4 decades, the average working mother spends more time with her children than stay-at-home moms did in the supposed halcyon days of the 1960s’ middle class, before “parenting” was a common term. A variety of economists and sociologists observed that an increase in parental effort became necessary to launch children into adulthood given the retreat of governmental and corporate support for parents that began in the 1980s.
“The financial and emotional burden on families has grown in ways that were almost unimaginable just a half-century ago,” writes the University of Pennsylvania sociologist Frank Furstenberg in “On a New Schedule: Transitions to Adulthood and Family Change.” In addition, a view of children as vulnerable and in need of intense parental investment gained momentum over the course of the 20th century and has continued unabated into the present. As a result, an environment of intense maternal preoccupation, worry, guilt, and involvement with children’s grades, safety, health, and emotional states – referred to as “helicopter” and “tiger” mothering – grew into the norm across the classes.
While prior generations of parents could, by today’s standards, be viewed as being insufficiently involved, today’s parents have become “over-involved” – aided by the ability of parents to be in constant contact with their adult children through technology. While this shift to a more hands-on, more conscientious parenting has been a boon to parent–adult child relationships in the main, the downside has meant, for some, too much of a good thing. From that perspective, pathologizing a mother’s involvement or her expressions of hurt for that child’s lack of availability provides a shield against the child’s feelings of guilt or obligation.
Diagnoses can serve a social purpose: They can allow individuals to use the authority of our profession to decide who to be close to and who to let go. They can provide insulation against feelings of obligation or guilt. They create a way to label behavior as dysfunctional that in other eras or cultures would be considered normal, even valued. To that extent, diagnoses don’t occur in a cultural void. They are inextricably tied to larger ideals, be they individualistic – as exists in the United States – or collectivist, as exists in many other parts of the world.
While we have decided what parents owe our children, it is unclear what parents might ask in return. To that end, mothers who want more interest, availability, or gratitude today are vulnerable to being cast as selfish, uncaring, needy, and controlling. They can now be viewed as failing in their task of selfless devotion. Their desires for closeness or repair can be regarded as incompatible with the quest for the adult child’s self-fulfillment and identity; her identification with her children too great a barrier to their individuation.
There may well be good reasons to estrange family members for their intolerable behaviors, especially ones who have threatened personal safety. Yet, while there are plenty of problematic parents, few meet the diagnostic criteria of narcissistic personality disorder. More important, such labels can discourage a discussion of boundaries that both the parents and the adult children might find acceptable – which sometimes means asking family members to tolerate behavior or individuals not to their liking.
Diagnoses carry enormous social weight and can facilitate estrangements or negativity to mothers that are far more workable than our patients’ characterization of them might lead them or us to believe. ; it devalues their years of love and dedication, however flawed; and it weakens the fabric of connection that could otherwise exist. Rather than provide a path toward compassion or understanding, “narcissistic mother” just becomes the latest form of mommy shaming.
Dr. Coleman is a clinical psychologist and author of “Rules of Estrangement: Why Adult Children Cut Ties and How to Heal the Conflict” (New York: Penguin Random House, 2021). Dr. Miller is a coauthor of “Committed: The Battle Over Involuntary Psychiatric Care” (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016). She has a private practice and is an assistant professor of psychiatry and behavioral sciences at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore.
Narcissists appear to be everywhere. A few minutes on the Internet shows the dangers of narcissistic romantic partners, friends, and employers. Identifying and limiting the reach of their manipulative and self-centered endeavors is cast as both urgent and necessary. The destructive powers of the narcissistic mother are viewed as especially in need of remedy, and any bookstore can reveal the risks they pose: “Will I Ever Be Good Enough? Healing the Daughters of Narcissistic Mothers;” “You’re Not Crazy – It’s Your Mother: Freedom for Daughters of Narcissistic Mothers;” “Healing for Daughters of Narcissistic Mothers: A Practical Guide on How to Recover from the Childhood Trauma of Toxic Relationship with Your Mother and How You Can Handle Her Abuse Now As An Adult” – to name just a few (there are more).
As a psychologist specializing in parental estrangement, I (Dr. Coleman) regularly see letters from adult children explaining their discovery-through-therapy that their mother is a narcissist. The proclamation often comes when the therapist has never met the mother. Typically, the discovery is presented as a justification for ending the relationship with the parent. While these mothers could rightly be accused of being anxious, over-involved, depressed, or hurt by the lack of gratitude or reciprocity, the vast majority are not narcissists.
Which begs the question, why are so many being labeled in this way? Are therapists only now discovering the power of narcissistic mothers? Have they always existed, casting their spells upon unwary children? Are those now-grown children only today able to disentangle themselves from the longstanding, pervasive, and harmful influence of these parents, with the help of therapy? Or is this the newest form of mommy shaming as it engages head-on with our Diagnostic and Statistical Manuals?
We believe it is the latter.
Blaming mothers has a long reach. Mothers have been blamed for causing schizophrenia, autism, homosexuality, and effeminacy in men. While we used to call people selfish and “controlling,” narcissism is a more consequential label as it confers diagnostic validity from the mental health profession. Worse, it suggests an individual beyond reach, where the only answer is distance, containment, or estrangement.
The rise of the narcissistic mother comes during a time when, for the past 4 decades, the average working mother spends more time with her children than stay-at-home moms did in the supposed halcyon days of the 1960s’ middle class, before “parenting” was a common term. A variety of economists and sociologists observed that an increase in parental effort became necessary to launch children into adulthood given the retreat of governmental and corporate support for parents that began in the 1980s.
“The financial and emotional burden on families has grown in ways that were almost unimaginable just a half-century ago,” writes the University of Pennsylvania sociologist Frank Furstenberg in “On a New Schedule: Transitions to Adulthood and Family Change.” In addition, a view of children as vulnerable and in need of intense parental investment gained momentum over the course of the 20th century and has continued unabated into the present. As a result, an environment of intense maternal preoccupation, worry, guilt, and involvement with children’s grades, safety, health, and emotional states – referred to as “helicopter” and “tiger” mothering – grew into the norm across the classes.
While prior generations of parents could, by today’s standards, be viewed as being insufficiently involved, today’s parents have become “over-involved” – aided by the ability of parents to be in constant contact with their adult children through technology. While this shift to a more hands-on, more conscientious parenting has been a boon to parent–adult child relationships in the main, the downside has meant, for some, too much of a good thing. From that perspective, pathologizing a mother’s involvement or her expressions of hurt for that child’s lack of availability provides a shield against the child’s feelings of guilt or obligation.
Diagnoses can serve a social purpose: They can allow individuals to use the authority of our profession to decide who to be close to and who to let go. They can provide insulation against feelings of obligation or guilt. They create a way to label behavior as dysfunctional that in other eras or cultures would be considered normal, even valued. To that extent, diagnoses don’t occur in a cultural void. They are inextricably tied to larger ideals, be they individualistic – as exists in the United States – or collectivist, as exists in many other parts of the world.
While we have decided what parents owe our children, it is unclear what parents might ask in return. To that end, mothers who want more interest, availability, or gratitude today are vulnerable to being cast as selfish, uncaring, needy, and controlling. They can now be viewed as failing in their task of selfless devotion. Their desires for closeness or repair can be regarded as incompatible with the quest for the adult child’s self-fulfillment and identity; her identification with her children too great a barrier to their individuation.
There may well be good reasons to estrange family members for their intolerable behaviors, especially ones who have threatened personal safety. Yet, while there are plenty of problematic parents, few meet the diagnostic criteria of narcissistic personality disorder. More important, such labels can discourage a discussion of boundaries that both the parents and the adult children might find acceptable – which sometimes means asking family members to tolerate behavior or individuals not to their liking.
Diagnoses carry enormous social weight and can facilitate estrangements or negativity to mothers that are far more workable than our patients’ characterization of them might lead them or us to believe. ; it devalues their years of love and dedication, however flawed; and it weakens the fabric of connection that could otherwise exist. Rather than provide a path toward compassion or understanding, “narcissistic mother” just becomes the latest form of mommy shaming.
Dr. Coleman is a clinical psychologist and author of “Rules of Estrangement: Why Adult Children Cut Ties and How to Heal the Conflict” (New York: Penguin Random House, 2021). Dr. Miller is a coauthor of “Committed: The Battle Over Involuntary Psychiatric Care” (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016). She has a private practice and is an assistant professor of psychiatry and behavioral sciences at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore.
Predicting BPD vs. bipolar treatment response: New imaging data
A new study identifies specific brain regions involved in treatment response in bipolar disorder (BD) and borderline personality disorder (BPD), potentially paving the way for more targeted treatment.
In a meta-analysis of 34 studies that used neuroimaging to investigate changes in brain activation following psychotherapy and pharmacotherapy for BD and BPD, investigators found most brain regions showing abnormal activation in both conditions improved after treatment. In particular, changes in brain activity after psychotherapy were found primarily in the frontal areas, whereas pharmacotherapy largely altered the limbic areas.
“,” senior investigator Xiaoming Li, PhD, professor, department of medical psychology, Anhui Medical University, Hefei, China, told this news organization.
“It may also contribute to the identification of more accurate neuroimaging biomarkers for treatment of the two disorders and to the finding of more effective therapy,” Dr. Li said.
The study was published online in the Journal of Clinical Psychiatry.
Blurred boundary
Dr. Li called BDs and BPDs “difficult to diagnose and differentiate,” noting that the comorbidity rate is “very high.” Underestimating the boundary between BD and BPD “increases the risk of improper or harmful drug exposure,” since mood stabilizing drugs are “considered to be the key therapeutic intervention for BD, while psychotherapy is the key treatment for BPD.”
The “blurred boundary between BD and BPD is one of the reasons it is important to study the relationship between these two diseases,” the authors said.
Previous studies comparing the relationship between BD and BPD “did not explore the similarities and differences in brain mechanisms between these two disorders after treatment,” they pointed out.
Patients with BD have a different disease course and response to therapy, compared to patient with BPD patients. “Misdiagnosis may result in the patients receiving ineffective treatment, so it is particularly important to explore the neural mechanisms of the treatment of these two diseases,” Dr. Li said.
To investigate, the researchers used activation likelihood estimation (ALE) – a technique that examines coordinates of neuroimaging data gleaned from published studies – after searching several databases from inception until June 2021.
This approach was used to “evaluate the similarities and differences in the activation of different brain regions in patients with BD and BPD after treatment with psychotherapy and drug therapy.”
Studies were required to focus on patients with a clinical diagnosis of BD or BPD; neuroimaging studies using functional MRI; coordinates of the peak activations in the stereotactic space of the Montreal Neurologic Institute or Talairach; treatment (pharmacologic or psychological) for patients with BD or BPD; and results of changes in brain activation after treatment, relative to a before-treatment condition.
Of 1,592 records, 34 studies (n = 912 subjects) met inclusion criteria and were selected and used in extracting the activation coordinates. The researchers extracted a total of 186 activity increase points and 90 activity decrease points. After combining these calculations, they found 12 increased activation clusters and 2 decreased activation clusters.
Of the studies, 23 focused on BD and 11 on BPD; 14 used psychotherapy, 18 used drug therapy, and 2 used a combination of both approaches.
Normalizing activation levels
Both treatments were associated with convergent activity increases and decreases in several brain regions: the anterior cingulate cortex, medial frontal gyrus, inferior frontal gyrus, cingulate gyrus, parahippocampal gyrus, and the posterior cingulate cortex.
The researchers then examined studies based on treatment method – psychotherapy or pharmacotherapy and the effect on the two disorders.
“After psychotherapy, the frontal lobe and temporal lobe were the primary brain regions in which activation changed, indicating a top-down effect of this therapy type, while after drug therapy, the limbic area was the region in which activation changed, indicating a ‘bottom-up’ effect,” said Dr. Li.
Dr. Li cited previous research pointing to functional and structural abnormalities in both disorders – especially in the default mode network (DMN) and frontolimbic network.
In particular, alterations in the amygdala and the parahippocampal gyrus are reported more frequently in BPD than in BD, whereas dysfunctional frontolimbic brain regions seem to underlie the emotional dysfunction in BPD. Several studies have also associated the impulsivity of BD with dysfunctions in the interplay of cortical-limbic circuits.
Dr. Li said the study findings suggest “that treatment may change these brain activation levels by acting on the abnormal brain circuit, such as the DMN and the frontolimbic network so as to ‘normalize’ its activity and improve symptoms.”
Specifically, brain regions with abnormally increased activation “showed decreased activation after treatment, and brain regions with abnormally decreased activation showed increased activation after treatment.”
Discrete, overlapping mechanisms
Commenting on the study, Roger S. McIntyre, MD, professor of psychiatry and pharmacology, University of Toronto, and head of the Mood Disorders Psychopharmacology Unit, said the study “provides additional support for the underlying neurobiological signature of bipolar disorder and a commonly encountered co-occurring condition – borderline personality disorder – having both discrete yet overlapping mechanisms.”
He found it interesting that “medications have a different principal target than psychosocial interventions, which has both academic and clinical implications.
“The academic implication is that we have reasons to believe that we will be in a position to parse the neurobiology of bipolar disorder or borderline personality disorder when we take an approach that isolates specific domains of psychopathology, which is what they [the authors] appear to be doing,” said Dr. McIntyre, who wasn’t associated with this research.
In addition, “from the clinical perspective, this provides a rationale for why we should be integrating pharmacotherapy with psychotherapy in people who have comorbid conditions like borderline personality disorder, which affects 20% of people living with bipolar disorder and 60% to 70% have borderline traits,” he added.
The research was supported by the Anhui Natural Science Foundation and Grants for Scientific Research from Anhui Medical University. Dr. Li and coauthors declared no relevant financial relationships. Dr. McIntyre has received research grant support from CIHR/GACD/National Natural Science Foundation of China and the Milken Institute; speaker/consultation fees from Lundbeck, Janssen, Alkermes, Neumora Therapeutics, Boehringer Ingelheim, Sage, Biogen, Mitsubishi Tanabe, Purdue, Pfizer, Otsuka, Takeda, Neurocrine, Sunovion, Bausch Health, Axsome, Novo Nordisk, Kris, Sanofi, Eisai, Intra-Cellular, NewBridge Pharmaceuticals, Viatris, AbbVie, Atai Life Sciences. Dr. McIntyre is a CEO of Braxia Scientific Corp.
A version of this article first appeared on Medscape.com.
A new study identifies specific brain regions involved in treatment response in bipolar disorder (BD) and borderline personality disorder (BPD), potentially paving the way for more targeted treatment.
In a meta-analysis of 34 studies that used neuroimaging to investigate changes in brain activation following psychotherapy and pharmacotherapy for BD and BPD, investigators found most brain regions showing abnormal activation in both conditions improved after treatment. In particular, changes in brain activity after psychotherapy were found primarily in the frontal areas, whereas pharmacotherapy largely altered the limbic areas.
“,” senior investigator Xiaoming Li, PhD, professor, department of medical psychology, Anhui Medical University, Hefei, China, told this news organization.
“It may also contribute to the identification of more accurate neuroimaging biomarkers for treatment of the two disorders and to the finding of more effective therapy,” Dr. Li said.
The study was published online in the Journal of Clinical Psychiatry.
Blurred boundary
Dr. Li called BDs and BPDs “difficult to diagnose and differentiate,” noting that the comorbidity rate is “very high.” Underestimating the boundary between BD and BPD “increases the risk of improper or harmful drug exposure,” since mood stabilizing drugs are “considered to be the key therapeutic intervention for BD, while psychotherapy is the key treatment for BPD.”
The “blurred boundary between BD and BPD is one of the reasons it is important to study the relationship between these two diseases,” the authors said.
Previous studies comparing the relationship between BD and BPD “did not explore the similarities and differences in brain mechanisms between these two disorders after treatment,” they pointed out.
Patients with BD have a different disease course and response to therapy, compared to patient with BPD patients. “Misdiagnosis may result in the patients receiving ineffective treatment, so it is particularly important to explore the neural mechanisms of the treatment of these two diseases,” Dr. Li said.
To investigate, the researchers used activation likelihood estimation (ALE) – a technique that examines coordinates of neuroimaging data gleaned from published studies – after searching several databases from inception until June 2021.
This approach was used to “evaluate the similarities and differences in the activation of different brain regions in patients with BD and BPD after treatment with psychotherapy and drug therapy.”
Studies were required to focus on patients with a clinical diagnosis of BD or BPD; neuroimaging studies using functional MRI; coordinates of the peak activations in the stereotactic space of the Montreal Neurologic Institute or Talairach; treatment (pharmacologic or psychological) for patients with BD or BPD; and results of changes in brain activation after treatment, relative to a before-treatment condition.
Of 1,592 records, 34 studies (n = 912 subjects) met inclusion criteria and were selected and used in extracting the activation coordinates. The researchers extracted a total of 186 activity increase points and 90 activity decrease points. After combining these calculations, they found 12 increased activation clusters and 2 decreased activation clusters.
Of the studies, 23 focused on BD and 11 on BPD; 14 used psychotherapy, 18 used drug therapy, and 2 used a combination of both approaches.
Normalizing activation levels
Both treatments were associated with convergent activity increases and decreases in several brain regions: the anterior cingulate cortex, medial frontal gyrus, inferior frontal gyrus, cingulate gyrus, parahippocampal gyrus, and the posterior cingulate cortex.
The researchers then examined studies based on treatment method – psychotherapy or pharmacotherapy and the effect on the two disorders.
“After psychotherapy, the frontal lobe and temporal lobe were the primary brain regions in which activation changed, indicating a top-down effect of this therapy type, while after drug therapy, the limbic area was the region in which activation changed, indicating a ‘bottom-up’ effect,” said Dr. Li.
Dr. Li cited previous research pointing to functional and structural abnormalities in both disorders – especially in the default mode network (DMN) and frontolimbic network.
In particular, alterations in the amygdala and the parahippocampal gyrus are reported more frequently in BPD than in BD, whereas dysfunctional frontolimbic brain regions seem to underlie the emotional dysfunction in BPD. Several studies have also associated the impulsivity of BD with dysfunctions in the interplay of cortical-limbic circuits.
Dr. Li said the study findings suggest “that treatment may change these brain activation levels by acting on the abnormal brain circuit, such as the DMN and the frontolimbic network so as to ‘normalize’ its activity and improve symptoms.”
Specifically, brain regions with abnormally increased activation “showed decreased activation after treatment, and brain regions with abnormally decreased activation showed increased activation after treatment.”
Discrete, overlapping mechanisms
Commenting on the study, Roger S. McIntyre, MD, professor of psychiatry and pharmacology, University of Toronto, and head of the Mood Disorders Psychopharmacology Unit, said the study “provides additional support for the underlying neurobiological signature of bipolar disorder and a commonly encountered co-occurring condition – borderline personality disorder – having both discrete yet overlapping mechanisms.”
He found it interesting that “medications have a different principal target than psychosocial interventions, which has both academic and clinical implications.
“The academic implication is that we have reasons to believe that we will be in a position to parse the neurobiology of bipolar disorder or borderline personality disorder when we take an approach that isolates specific domains of psychopathology, which is what they [the authors] appear to be doing,” said Dr. McIntyre, who wasn’t associated with this research.
In addition, “from the clinical perspective, this provides a rationale for why we should be integrating pharmacotherapy with psychotherapy in people who have comorbid conditions like borderline personality disorder, which affects 20% of people living with bipolar disorder and 60% to 70% have borderline traits,” he added.
The research was supported by the Anhui Natural Science Foundation and Grants for Scientific Research from Anhui Medical University. Dr. Li and coauthors declared no relevant financial relationships. Dr. McIntyre has received research grant support from CIHR/GACD/National Natural Science Foundation of China and the Milken Institute; speaker/consultation fees from Lundbeck, Janssen, Alkermes, Neumora Therapeutics, Boehringer Ingelheim, Sage, Biogen, Mitsubishi Tanabe, Purdue, Pfizer, Otsuka, Takeda, Neurocrine, Sunovion, Bausch Health, Axsome, Novo Nordisk, Kris, Sanofi, Eisai, Intra-Cellular, NewBridge Pharmaceuticals, Viatris, AbbVie, Atai Life Sciences. Dr. McIntyre is a CEO of Braxia Scientific Corp.
A version of this article first appeared on Medscape.com.
A new study identifies specific brain regions involved in treatment response in bipolar disorder (BD) and borderline personality disorder (BPD), potentially paving the way for more targeted treatment.
In a meta-analysis of 34 studies that used neuroimaging to investigate changes in brain activation following psychotherapy and pharmacotherapy for BD and BPD, investigators found most brain regions showing abnormal activation in both conditions improved after treatment. In particular, changes in brain activity after psychotherapy were found primarily in the frontal areas, whereas pharmacotherapy largely altered the limbic areas.
“,” senior investigator Xiaoming Li, PhD, professor, department of medical psychology, Anhui Medical University, Hefei, China, told this news organization.
“It may also contribute to the identification of more accurate neuroimaging biomarkers for treatment of the two disorders and to the finding of more effective therapy,” Dr. Li said.
The study was published online in the Journal of Clinical Psychiatry.
Blurred boundary
Dr. Li called BDs and BPDs “difficult to diagnose and differentiate,” noting that the comorbidity rate is “very high.” Underestimating the boundary between BD and BPD “increases the risk of improper or harmful drug exposure,” since mood stabilizing drugs are “considered to be the key therapeutic intervention for BD, while psychotherapy is the key treatment for BPD.”
The “blurred boundary between BD and BPD is one of the reasons it is important to study the relationship between these two diseases,” the authors said.
Previous studies comparing the relationship between BD and BPD “did not explore the similarities and differences in brain mechanisms between these two disorders after treatment,” they pointed out.
Patients with BD have a different disease course and response to therapy, compared to patient with BPD patients. “Misdiagnosis may result in the patients receiving ineffective treatment, so it is particularly important to explore the neural mechanisms of the treatment of these two diseases,” Dr. Li said.
To investigate, the researchers used activation likelihood estimation (ALE) – a technique that examines coordinates of neuroimaging data gleaned from published studies – after searching several databases from inception until June 2021.
This approach was used to “evaluate the similarities and differences in the activation of different brain regions in patients with BD and BPD after treatment with psychotherapy and drug therapy.”
Studies were required to focus on patients with a clinical diagnosis of BD or BPD; neuroimaging studies using functional MRI; coordinates of the peak activations in the stereotactic space of the Montreal Neurologic Institute or Talairach; treatment (pharmacologic or psychological) for patients with BD or BPD; and results of changes in brain activation after treatment, relative to a before-treatment condition.
Of 1,592 records, 34 studies (n = 912 subjects) met inclusion criteria and were selected and used in extracting the activation coordinates. The researchers extracted a total of 186 activity increase points and 90 activity decrease points. After combining these calculations, they found 12 increased activation clusters and 2 decreased activation clusters.
Of the studies, 23 focused on BD and 11 on BPD; 14 used psychotherapy, 18 used drug therapy, and 2 used a combination of both approaches.
Normalizing activation levels
Both treatments were associated with convergent activity increases and decreases in several brain regions: the anterior cingulate cortex, medial frontal gyrus, inferior frontal gyrus, cingulate gyrus, parahippocampal gyrus, and the posterior cingulate cortex.
The researchers then examined studies based on treatment method – psychotherapy or pharmacotherapy and the effect on the two disorders.
“After psychotherapy, the frontal lobe and temporal lobe were the primary brain regions in which activation changed, indicating a top-down effect of this therapy type, while after drug therapy, the limbic area was the region in which activation changed, indicating a ‘bottom-up’ effect,” said Dr. Li.
Dr. Li cited previous research pointing to functional and structural abnormalities in both disorders – especially in the default mode network (DMN) and frontolimbic network.
In particular, alterations in the amygdala and the parahippocampal gyrus are reported more frequently in BPD than in BD, whereas dysfunctional frontolimbic brain regions seem to underlie the emotional dysfunction in BPD. Several studies have also associated the impulsivity of BD with dysfunctions in the interplay of cortical-limbic circuits.
Dr. Li said the study findings suggest “that treatment may change these brain activation levels by acting on the abnormal brain circuit, such as the DMN and the frontolimbic network so as to ‘normalize’ its activity and improve symptoms.”
Specifically, brain regions with abnormally increased activation “showed decreased activation after treatment, and brain regions with abnormally decreased activation showed increased activation after treatment.”
Discrete, overlapping mechanisms
Commenting on the study, Roger S. McIntyre, MD, professor of psychiatry and pharmacology, University of Toronto, and head of the Mood Disorders Psychopharmacology Unit, said the study “provides additional support for the underlying neurobiological signature of bipolar disorder and a commonly encountered co-occurring condition – borderline personality disorder – having both discrete yet overlapping mechanisms.”
He found it interesting that “medications have a different principal target than psychosocial interventions, which has both academic and clinical implications.
“The academic implication is that we have reasons to believe that we will be in a position to parse the neurobiology of bipolar disorder or borderline personality disorder when we take an approach that isolates specific domains of psychopathology, which is what they [the authors] appear to be doing,” said Dr. McIntyre, who wasn’t associated with this research.
In addition, “from the clinical perspective, this provides a rationale for why we should be integrating pharmacotherapy with psychotherapy in people who have comorbid conditions like borderline personality disorder, which affects 20% of people living with bipolar disorder and 60% to 70% have borderline traits,” he added.
The research was supported by the Anhui Natural Science Foundation and Grants for Scientific Research from Anhui Medical University. Dr. Li and coauthors declared no relevant financial relationships. Dr. McIntyre has received research grant support from CIHR/GACD/National Natural Science Foundation of China and the Milken Institute; speaker/consultation fees from Lundbeck, Janssen, Alkermes, Neumora Therapeutics, Boehringer Ingelheim, Sage, Biogen, Mitsubishi Tanabe, Purdue, Pfizer, Otsuka, Takeda, Neurocrine, Sunovion, Bausch Health, Axsome, Novo Nordisk, Kris, Sanofi, Eisai, Intra-Cellular, NewBridge Pharmaceuticals, Viatris, AbbVie, Atai Life Sciences. Dr. McIntyre is a CEO of Braxia Scientific Corp.
A version of this article first appeared on Medscape.com.
FROM THE JOURNAL OF CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY
Cultivating strength: Psychological well-being after nonfatal suicide attempts
A study of three separate nationally representative samples of nearly 9,000 U.S. military veterans found psychological well-being – defined in terms of having a high sense of purpose, social connectedness, and happiness – to be significantly diminished among veteran suicide attempt survivors relative to nonattempters, even decades after their last attempt.1
Despite the trend toward diminished well-being, many veterans who survived a suicide attempt reported average to optimal levels of well-being. Specifically, 52%-60% of veterans reporting a prior suicide attempt also reported experiencing as much purpose, social connection, and happiness as veterans without a suicide attempt history. Remarkably, a small subset (2-7%) of veteran attempt survivors even reported higher levels of well-being than veterans without a suicide attempt history.
Thus,
These data are notable because, in 2021, approximately 1.4 million U.S. adults made a nonfatal suicide attempt. Historically, suicide research has understandably emphasized the study of risk factors that increase the likelihood that someone dies by suicide. Given that a prior suicide attempt is among the top risk factors for suicide, virtually all research on suicide attempt survivors has focused on their elevated risk for future suicidality. Yet, 9 out of 10 people who have made a nonfatal suicide attempt do not go on to die by suicide. It is thus critical to investigate the quality of life of the millions of suicide attempt survivors.
To date, we know little about a question keenly important to suicide attempt survivors and their loved ones: What is the possibility of rebuilding a meaningful, high-quality life after a suicide attempt?
In addition to reporting on the prevalence of high levels of psychological well-being after a nonfatal suicide attempt, it is pivotal to investigate factors that may help facilitate this outcome. To that end, we identified personal characteristics associated with high levels of well-being. Notably, it was malleable psychological strengths such as optimism and a curious mindset, more than the mere absence of symptoms, that were linked to higher levels of well-being among veteran suicide attempt survivors.
Current suicide prevention interventions and treatments, which often focus on mitigating immediate suicide risk by treating symptoms, may be overlooking the importance of cultivating and building psychological strengths that may help promote greater well-being and enriched lives. Moreover, treatments that emphasize such strengths might be particularly fruitful in mitigating suicide risk in veterans, as veterans may be more receptive to prevention and treatment initiatives that embrace the cultivation and bolstering of strengths that are inherent in military culture and values, such as resilience and perseverance in the face of life challenges.2
One notable caveat to this study is that the data were cross-sectional, meaning they were collected at a single time point. As such, the authors cannot conclude that factors such as curiosity necessarily caused higher levels of well-being in veterans, as opposed to well-being causing higher levels of curiosity.
Similarly, while one can infer that psychological well-being was near-absent at the time of a suicide attempt, well-being of attempt survivors was not assessed before their attempt. Longitudinal studies that follow attempt survivors over time are needed to understand how well-being changes over time for suicide attempt survivors and the causal chain in what predicts that change.
Nevertheless, the results of this large, multicohort study serve as an important first step toward a more comprehensive view of prognosis after a suicide attempt. Just as the process that leads to a suicide attempt is complex, so too is the process of recovery after an attempt. While this study provides sound estimates of well-being outcomes and some possible candidates that might facilitate these outcomes, a critical next step for future research is to replicate and extend these findings. To do so, it is pivotal to extend the assessment scope beyond symptom-based measures and include measures of well-being.
Additionally, the investment in resources into longer-term examinations following suicide attempts is essential to understand different pathways toward achieving greater well-being. Providing hope is vital and potentially lifesaving, as one of the most common experiences reported before a suicide attempt is an unremitting sense of hopelessness. Continued research on well-being has the potential to impart a more balanced, nuanced prognosis after a suicide attempt that challenges perceptions of an invariably bleak prospect of recovery after suicidality.
Collectively, these results highlight the importance of broadening the scope of how the mental health field views and treats psychiatric difficulties to include a greater focus on recovery-based outcomes and personal strengths that help facilitate recovery from adverse life experiences such as suicide attempts.
People desire lives that they enjoy and find meaningful, and having a history of suicide attempts does not preclude the prospect of such a life. It is time that suicide research reflects the vast landscape of potential outcomes after a suicide attempt that goes beyond the prediction of future suicide risk.
Mr. Brown is a doctoral student of clinical psychology at the University of South Florida, Tampa. Dr. Rottenberg is director of the Mood and Emotion Lab and area director of the department of clinical psychology, University of South Florida.
References
1. Brown BA et al. Psychological well-being in US veterans with non-fatal suicide attempts: A multi-cohort population-based study. J Affect Disord. 2022 Oct 1;314:34-43. doi: 10.1016/j.jad.2022.07.003.
2. Bryan CJ et al. Understanding and preventing military suicide. Arch Suicide Res. 2012;16(2):95-110. doi: 10.1080/13811118.2012.667321.
A study of three separate nationally representative samples of nearly 9,000 U.S. military veterans found psychological well-being – defined in terms of having a high sense of purpose, social connectedness, and happiness – to be significantly diminished among veteran suicide attempt survivors relative to nonattempters, even decades after their last attempt.1
Despite the trend toward diminished well-being, many veterans who survived a suicide attempt reported average to optimal levels of well-being. Specifically, 52%-60% of veterans reporting a prior suicide attempt also reported experiencing as much purpose, social connection, and happiness as veterans without a suicide attempt history. Remarkably, a small subset (2-7%) of veteran attempt survivors even reported higher levels of well-being than veterans without a suicide attempt history.
Thus,
These data are notable because, in 2021, approximately 1.4 million U.S. adults made a nonfatal suicide attempt. Historically, suicide research has understandably emphasized the study of risk factors that increase the likelihood that someone dies by suicide. Given that a prior suicide attempt is among the top risk factors for suicide, virtually all research on suicide attempt survivors has focused on their elevated risk for future suicidality. Yet, 9 out of 10 people who have made a nonfatal suicide attempt do not go on to die by suicide. It is thus critical to investigate the quality of life of the millions of suicide attempt survivors.
To date, we know little about a question keenly important to suicide attempt survivors and their loved ones: What is the possibility of rebuilding a meaningful, high-quality life after a suicide attempt?
In addition to reporting on the prevalence of high levels of psychological well-being after a nonfatal suicide attempt, it is pivotal to investigate factors that may help facilitate this outcome. To that end, we identified personal characteristics associated with high levels of well-being. Notably, it was malleable psychological strengths such as optimism and a curious mindset, more than the mere absence of symptoms, that were linked to higher levels of well-being among veteran suicide attempt survivors.
Current suicide prevention interventions and treatments, which often focus on mitigating immediate suicide risk by treating symptoms, may be overlooking the importance of cultivating and building psychological strengths that may help promote greater well-being and enriched lives. Moreover, treatments that emphasize such strengths might be particularly fruitful in mitigating suicide risk in veterans, as veterans may be more receptive to prevention and treatment initiatives that embrace the cultivation and bolstering of strengths that are inherent in military culture and values, such as resilience and perseverance in the face of life challenges.2
One notable caveat to this study is that the data were cross-sectional, meaning they were collected at a single time point. As such, the authors cannot conclude that factors such as curiosity necessarily caused higher levels of well-being in veterans, as opposed to well-being causing higher levels of curiosity.
Similarly, while one can infer that psychological well-being was near-absent at the time of a suicide attempt, well-being of attempt survivors was not assessed before their attempt. Longitudinal studies that follow attempt survivors over time are needed to understand how well-being changes over time for suicide attempt survivors and the causal chain in what predicts that change.
Nevertheless, the results of this large, multicohort study serve as an important first step toward a more comprehensive view of prognosis after a suicide attempt. Just as the process that leads to a suicide attempt is complex, so too is the process of recovery after an attempt. While this study provides sound estimates of well-being outcomes and some possible candidates that might facilitate these outcomes, a critical next step for future research is to replicate and extend these findings. To do so, it is pivotal to extend the assessment scope beyond symptom-based measures and include measures of well-being.
Additionally, the investment in resources into longer-term examinations following suicide attempts is essential to understand different pathways toward achieving greater well-being. Providing hope is vital and potentially lifesaving, as one of the most common experiences reported before a suicide attempt is an unremitting sense of hopelessness. Continued research on well-being has the potential to impart a more balanced, nuanced prognosis after a suicide attempt that challenges perceptions of an invariably bleak prospect of recovery after suicidality.
Collectively, these results highlight the importance of broadening the scope of how the mental health field views and treats psychiatric difficulties to include a greater focus on recovery-based outcomes and personal strengths that help facilitate recovery from adverse life experiences such as suicide attempts.
People desire lives that they enjoy and find meaningful, and having a history of suicide attempts does not preclude the prospect of such a life. It is time that suicide research reflects the vast landscape of potential outcomes after a suicide attempt that goes beyond the prediction of future suicide risk.
Mr. Brown is a doctoral student of clinical psychology at the University of South Florida, Tampa. Dr. Rottenberg is director of the Mood and Emotion Lab and area director of the department of clinical psychology, University of South Florida.
References
1. Brown BA et al. Psychological well-being in US veterans with non-fatal suicide attempts: A multi-cohort population-based study. J Affect Disord. 2022 Oct 1;314:34-43. doi: 10.1016/j.jad.2022.07.003.
2. Bryan CJ et al. Understanding and preventing military suicide. Arch Suicide Res. 2012;16(2):95-110. doi: 10.1080/13811118.2012.667321.
A study of three separate nationally representative samples of nearly 9,000 U.S. military veterans found psychological well-being – defined in terms of having a high sense of purpose, social connectedness, and happiness – to be significantly diminished among veteran suicide attempt survivors relative to nonattempters, even decades after their last attempt.1
Despite the trend toward diminished well-being, many veterans who survived a suicide attempt reported average to optimal levels of well-being. Specifically, 52%-60% of veterans reporting a prior suicide attempt also reported experiencing as much purpose, social connection, and happiness as veterans without a suicide attempt history. Remarkably, a small subset (2-7%) of veteran attempt survivors even reported higher levels of well-being than veterans without a suicide attempt history.
Thus,
These data are notable because, in 2021, approximately 1.4 million U.S. adults made a nonfatal suicide attempt. Historically, suicide research has understandably emphasized the study of risk factors that increase the likelihood that someone dies by suicide. Given that a prior suicide attempt is among the top risk factors for suicide, virtually all research on suicide attempt survivors has focused on their elevated risk for future suicidality. Yet, 9 out of 10 people who have made a nonfatal suicide attempt do not go on to die by suicide. It is thus critical to investigate the quality of life of the millions of suicide attempt survivors.
To date, we know little about a question keenly important to suicide attempt survivors and their loved ones: What is the possibility of rebuilding a meaningful, high-quality life after a suicide attempt?
In addition to reporting on the prevalence of high levels of psychological well-being after a nonfatal suicide attempt, it is pivotal to investigate factors that may help facilitate this outcome. To that end, we identified personal characteristics associated with high levels of well-being. Notably, it was malleable psychological strengths such as optimism and a curious mindset, more than the mere absence of symptoms, that were linked to higher levels of well-being among veteran suicide attempt survivors.
Current suicide prevention interventions and treatments, which often focus on mitigating immediate suicide risk by treating symptoms, may be overlooking the importance of cultivating and building psychological strengths that may help promote greater well-being and enriched lives. Moreover, treatments that emphasize such strengths might be particularly fruitful in mitigating suicide risk in veterans, as veterans may be more receptive to prevention and treatment initiatives that embrace the cultivation and bolstering of strengths that are inherent in military culture and values, such as resilience and perseverance in the face of life challenges.2
One notable caveat to this study is that the data were cross-sectional, meaning they were collected at a single time point. As such, the authors cannot conclude that factors such as curiosity necessarily caused higher levels of well-being in veterans, as opposed to well-being causing higher levels of curiosity.
Similarly, while one can infer that psychological well-being was near-absent at the time of a suicide attempt, well-being of attempt survivors was not assessed before their attempt. Longitudinal studies that follow attempt survivors over time are needed to understand how well-being changes over time for suicide attempt survivors and the causal chain in what predicts that change.
Nevertheless, the results of this large, multicohort study serve as an important first step toward a more comprehensive view of prognosis after a suicide attempt. Just as the process that leads to a suicide attempt is complex, so too is the process of recovery after an attempt. While this study provides sound estimates of well-being outcomes and some possible candidates that might facilitate these outcomes, a critical next step for future research is to replicate and extend these findings. To do so, it is pivotal to extend the assessment scope beyond symptom-based measures and include measures of well-being.
Additionally, the investment in resources into longer-term examinations following suicide attempts is essential to understand different pathways toward achieving greater well-being. Providing hope is vital and potentially lifesaving, as one of the most common experiences reported before a suicide attempt is an unremitting sense of hopelessness. Continued research on well-being has the potential to impart a more balanced, nuanced prognosis after a suicide attempt that challenges perceptions of an invariably bleak prospect of recovery after suicidality.
Collectively, these results highlight the importance of broadening the scope of how the mental health field views and treats psychiatric difficulties to include a greater focus on recovery-based outcomes and personal strengths that help facilitate recovery from adverse life experiences such as suicide attempts.
People desire lives that they enjoy and find meaningful, and having a history of suicide attempts does not preclude the prospect of such a life. It is time that suicide research reflects the vast landscape of potential outcomes after a suicide attempt that goes beyond the prediction of future suicide risk.
Mr. Brown is a doctoral student of clinical psychology at the University of South Florida, Tampa. Dr. Rottenberg is director of the Mood and Emotion Lab and area director of the department of clinical psychology, University of South Florida.
References
1. Brown BA et al. Psychological well-being in US veterans with non-fatal suicide attempts: A multi-cohort population-based study. J Affect Disord. 2022 Oct 1;314:34-43. doi: 10.1016/j.jad.2022.07.003.
2. Bryan CJ et al. Understanding and preventing military suicide. Arch Suicide Res. 2012;16(2):95-110. doi: 10.1080/13811118.2012.667321.
Anxiety sensitivity fuels depression in dissociative identity disorder
Anxiety sensitivity refers to fear of the signs and symptoms of anxiety based on the individual’s belief that the signs of anxiety will have harmful consequences, wrote Xi Pan, LICSW, MPA, of McLean Hospital, Belmont, Mass., and colleagues.
Anxiety sensitivity can include cognitive, physical, and social elements: for example, fear that the inability to focus signals mental illness, fear that a racing heart might cause a heart attack, or fear that exhibiting anxiety signs in public (e.g., sweaty palms) will cause embarrassment, the researchers said.
Previous studies have found associations between anxiety sensitivity and panic attacks, and anxiety sensitivity has been shown to contribute to worsening symptoms in patients with anxiety disorders, depressive disorders, and trauma-related disorders such as posttraumatic stress disorder. However, “anxiety sensitivity has not been studied in individuals with complex dissociative disorders such as dissociative identity disorder (DID)” – who often have co-occurring PTSD and depression, the researchers said.
In a study published in the Journal of Psychiatric Research, the authors analyzed data from 21 treatment-seeking adult women with histories of childhood trauma, current PTSD, and dissociative identity disorder. Participants completed the Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI), Beck Depression Inventory-II, Childhood Trauma Questionnaire, Multidimensional Inventory of Dissociation, and PTSD Checklist for DSM-5.
Anxiety sensitivity in cognitive, physical, and social domains was assessed using ASI subscales.
Pearson correlations showed that symptoms of depression were significantly associated with anxiety sensitivity total scores and across all anxiety subscales. However, no direct associations appeared between anxiety sensitivity and PTSD or severe dissociative symptoms.
In a multiple regression analysis, the ASI cognitive subscale was a positive predictor of depressive symptoms, although physical and social subscale scores were not.
The researchers also tested for an indirect relationship between anxiety sensitivity and dissociative symptoms through depression. “Specifically, more severe ASI cognitive concerns were associated with more depressive symptoms, and more depressive symptoms predicted more severe pathological dissociation symptoms,” they wrote.
The findings were limited by the inability to show a direct causal relationship between anxiety sensitivity and depression, the researchers noted. Other limitations included the small sample size, use of self-reports, and the population of mainly White women, which may not generalize to other populations, they said.
However, the results represent the first empirical investigation of the relationship between anxiety sensitivity and DID symptoms, and support the value of assessment for anxiety sensitivity in DID patients in clinical practice, they said.
“If high levels of anxiety sensitivity are identified, the individual may benefit from targeted interventions, which in turn may alleviate some symptoms of depression and dissociation in DID,” the researchers concluded.
The study was supported by the National Institute of Mental Health and the Julia Kasparian Fund for Neuroscience Research. The researchers had no financial conflicts to disclose.
Anxiety sensitivity refers to fear of the signs and symptoms of anxiety based on the individual’s belief that the signs of anxiety will have harmful consequences, wrote Xi Pan, LICSW, MPA, of McLean Hospital, Belmont, Mass., and colleagues.
Anxiety sensitivity can include cognitive, physical, and social elements: for example, fear that the inability to focus signals mental illness, fear that a racing heart might cause a heart attack, or fear that exhibiting anxiety signs in public (e.g., sweaty palms) will cause embarrassment, the researchers said.
Previous studies have found associations between anxiety sensitivity and panic attacks, and anxiety sensitivity has been shown to contribute to worsening symptoms in patients with anxiety disorders, depressive disorders, and trauma-related disorders such as posttraumatic stress disorder. However, “anxiety sensitivity has not been studied in individuals with complex dissociative disorders such as dissociative identity disorder (DID)” – who often have co-occurring PTSD and depression, the researchers said.
In a study published in the Journal of Psychiatric Research, the authors analyzed data from 21 treatment-seeking adult women with histories of childhood trauma, current PTSD, and dissociative identity disorder. Participants completed the Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI), Beck Depression Inventory-II, Childhood Trauma Questionnaire, Multidimensional Inventory of Dissociation, and PTSD Checklist for DSM-5.
Anxiety sensitivity in cognitive, physical, and social domains was assessed using ASI subscales.
Pearson correlations showed that symptoms of depression were significantly associated with anxiety sensitivity total scores and across all anxiety subscales. However, no direct associations appeared between anxiety sensitivity and PTSD or severe dissociative symptoms.
In a multiple regression analysis, the ASI cognitive subscale was a positive predictor of depressive symptoms, although physical and social subscale scores were not.
The researchers also tested for an indirect relationship between anxiety sensitivity and dissociative symptoms through depression. “Specifically, more severe ASI cognitive concerns were associated with more depressive symptoms, and more depressive symptoms predicted more severe pathological dissociation symptoms,” they wrote.
The findings were limited by the inability to show a direct causal relationship between anxiety sensitivity and depression, the researchers noted. Other limitations included the small sample size, use of self-reports, and the population of mainly White women, which may not generalize to other populations, they said.
However, the results represent the first empirical investigation of the relationship between anxiety sensitivity and DID symptoms, and support the value of assessment for anxiety sensitivity in DID patients in clinical practice, they said.
“If high levels of anxiety sensitivity are identified, the individual may benefit from targeted interventions, which in turn may alleviate some symptoms of depression and dissociation in DID,” the researchers concluded.
The study was supported by the National Institute of Mental Health and the Julia Kasparian Fund for Neuroscience Research. The researchers had no financial conflicts to disclose.
Anxiety sensitivity refers to fear of the signs and symptoms of anxiety based on the individual’s belief that the signs of anxiety will have harmful consequences, wrote Xi Pan, LICSW, MPA, of McLean Hospital, Belmont, Mass., and colleagues.
Anxiety sensitivity can include cognitive, physical, and social elements: for example, fear that the inability to focus signals mental illness, fear that a racing heart might cause a heart attack, or fear that exhibiting anxiety signs in public (e.g., sweaty palms) will cause embarrassment, the researchers said.
Previous studies have found associations between anxiety sensitivity and panic attacks, and anxiety sensitivity has been shown to contribute to worsening symptoms in patients with anxiety disorders, depressive disorders, and trauma-related disorders such as posttraumatic stress disorder. However, “anxiety sensitivity has not been studied in individuals with complex dissociative disorders such as dissociative identity disorder (DID)” – who often have co-occurring PTSD and depression, the researchers said.
In a study published in the Journal of Psychiatric Research, the authors analyzed data from 21 treatment-seeking adult women with histories of childhood trauma, current PTSD, and dissociative identity disorder. Participants completed the Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI), Beck Depression Inventory-II, Childhood Trauma Questionnaire, Multidimensional Inventory of Dissociation, and PTSD Checklist for DSM-5.
Anxiety sensitivity in cognitive, physical, and social domains was assessed using ASI subscales.
Pearson correlations showed that symptoms of depression were significantly associated with anxiety sensitivity total scores and across all anxiety subscales. However, no direct associations appeared between anxiety sensitivity and PTSD or severe dissociative symptoms.
In a multiple regression analysis, the ASI cognitive subscale was a positive predictor of depressive symptoms, although physical and social subscale scores were not.
The researchers also tested for an indirect relationship between anxiety sensitivity and dissociative symptoms through depression. “Specifically, more severe ASI cognitive concerns were associated with more depressive symptoms, and more depressive symptoms predicted more severe pathological dissociation symptoms,” they wrote.
The findings were limited by the inability to show a direct causal relationship between anxiety sensitivity and depression, the researchers noted. Other limitations included the small sample size, use of self-reports, and the population of mainly White women, which may not generalize to other populations, they said.
However, the results represent the first empirical investigation of the relationship between anxiety sensitivity and DID symptoms, and support the value of assessment for anxiety sensitivity in DID patients in clinical practice, they said.
“If high levels of anxiety sensitivity are identified, the individual may benefit from targeted interventions, which in turn may alleviate some symptoms of depression and dissociation in DID,” the researchers concluded.
The study was supported by the National Institute of Mental Health and the Julia Kasparian Fund for Neuroscience Research. The researchers had no financial conflicts to disclose.
FROM THE JOURNAL OF PSYCHIATRIC RESEARCH
Borderline patients have longer time to depression remission
Major depressive episodes (MDEs) occur in major depressive disorder (MDD) and bipolar disorder (BD), John J. Söderholm, MD, of the University of Helsinki and colleagues wrote. Borderline personality disorder (BPD) includes an increased risk for depression, but data on the relationship between BPD symptoms and depressive illness are limited. In particular, they noted “a lack of studies prospectively comparing the presence of (hypo)manic symptoms over time during the recovery process from MDE between MDD, MDE/BD, and MDE/BPD patients.”
In a cohort study published in the Journal of Affective Disorders, the researchers collected data from 39 adult MDE patients with MDD, 33 with BD, and 23 with BPD. The patients were diagnosed with MDE using the SCID-I/P and SCID-II interviews, mixed symptoms were identified using the Mix-MDE scale, and borderline symptoms were identified using the Borderline Personality Disorder Severity Index.
Over a 6-month follow-up period, the participants completed biweekly online assessments. The primary outcomes were time to first full remission of symptoms and duration and nature of mood episodes.
Overall, the mean number of distinct mood states was 5.75, and the median duration was 60.9 days. When identified by subcohorts, the median number of mood state periods for MDD, BD, and BPD was 4.49, 8.05, and 4.67, respectively. The median durations were 69.2 days, 40.30 days, and 75.6 days, respectively.
The rates of remission for depressive symptoms were similar for MDD, MDE/BD, and MDE/BPD patients. However, MDE/BD patients had a significantly shorter time to first remission (hazard ratio, 2.44). Patients in the BPD group had a significantly longer time to first remission (HR, 0.95).
“When the cohort was divided into quintiles according to BPD feature severity, there was an approximately 1-month difference in time to first period of remission between the first and third and between the third and fifth quintiles, with longer times seen in patients with more severe BPD symptoms,” the researchers wrote.
The study findings were limited by several factors including the small sample size and short follow-up period that prevented investigation of depressive recurrence, the researchers noted. Other limitations included the lack of diagnostic blinding and variation in patients’ treatment schedules.
However, the results were strengthened by the representative samples of subjects with various disorders, the prospective and multimodal assessment of affective states, and the comparison of three patient groups in a single study.
As BPD was associated with a longer time to remission from depressive symptoms, the results suggest that BPD severity may be an indicator of more severe disease in patients with MDD in the context of depression, the researchers concluded.
The study was supported by the Finska Lakaresallskapet, the City of Helsinki, the Hospital District of Helsinki and Uusimaa, and the Finnish Psychiatric Association. The researchers had no financial conflicts to disclose.
Major depressive episodes (MDEs) occur in major depressive disorder (MDD) and bipolar disorder (BD), John J. Söderholm, MD, of the University of Helsinki and colleagues wrote. Borderline personality disorder (BPD) includes an increased risk for depression, but data on the relationship between BPD symptoms and depressive illness are limited. In particular, they noted “a lack of studies prospectively comparing the presence of (hypo)manic symptoms over time during the recovery process from MDE between MDD, MDE/BD, and MDE/BPD patients.”
In a cohort study published in the Journal of Affective Disorders, the researchers collected data from 39 adult MDE patients with MDD, 33 with BD, and 23 with BPD. The patients were diagnosed with MDE using the SCID-I/P and SCID-II interviews, mixed symptoms were identified using the Mix-MDE scale, and borderline symptoms were identified using the Borderline Personality Disorder Severity Index.
Over a 6-month follow-up period, the participants completed biweekly online assessments. The primary outcomes were time to first full remission of symptoms and duration and nature of mood episodes.
Overall, the mean number of distinct mood states was 5.75, and the median duration was 60.9 days. When identified by subcohorts, the median number of mood state periods for MDD, BD, and BPD was 4.49, 8.05, and 4.67, respectively. The median durations were 69.2 days, 40.30 days, and 75.6 days, respectively.
The rates of remission for depressive symptoms were similar for MDD, MDE/BD, and MDE/BPD patients. However, MDE/BD patients had a significantly shorter time to first remission (hazard ratio, 2.44). Patients in the BPD group had a significantly longer time to first remission (HR, 0.95).
“When the cohort was divided into quintiles according to BPD feature severity, there was an approximately 1-month difference in time to first period of remission between the first and third and between the third and fifth quintiles, with longer times seen in patients with more severe BPD symptoms,” the researchers wrote.
The study findings were limited by several factors including the small sample size and short follow-up period that prevented investigation of depressive recurrence, the researchers noted. Other limitations included the lack of diagnostic blinding and variation in patients’ treatment schedules.
However, the results were strengthened by the representative samples of subjects with various disorders, the prospective and multimodal assessment of affective states, and the comparison of three patient groups in a single study.
As BPD was associated with a longer time to remission from depressive symptoms, the results suggest that BPD severity may be an indicator of more severe disease in patients with MDD in the context of depression, the researchers concluded.
The study was supported by the Finska Lakaresallskapet, the City of Helsinki, the Hospital District of Helsinki and Uusimaa, and the Finnish Psychiatric Association. The researchers had no financial conflicts to disclose.
Major depressive episodes (MDEs) occur in major depressive disorder (MDD) and bipolar disorder (BD), John J. Söderholm, MD, of the University of Helsinki and colleagues wrote. Borderline personality disorder (BPD) includes an increased risk for depression, but data on the relationship between BPD symptoms and depressive illness are limited. In particular, they noted “a lack of studies prospectively comparing the presence of (hypo)manic symptoms over time during the recovery process from MDE between MDD, MDE/BD, and MDE/BPD patients.”
In a cohort study published in the Journal of Affective Disorders, the researchers collected data from 39 adult MDE patients with MDD, 33 with BD, and 23 with BPD. The patients were diagnosed with MDE using the SCID-I/P and SCID-II interviews, mixed symptoms were identified using the Mix-MDE scale, and borderline symptoms were identified using the Borderline Personality Disorder Severity Index.
Over a 6-month follow-up period, the participants completed biweekly online assessments. The primary outcomes were time to first full remission of symptoms and duration and nature of mood episodes.
Overall, the mean number of distinct mood states was 5.75, and the median duration was 60.9 days. When identified by subcohorts, the median number of mood state periods for MDD, BD, and BPD was 4.49, 8.05, and 4.67, respectively. The median durations were 69.2 days, 40.30 days, and 75.6 days, respectively.
The rates of remission for depressive symptoms were similar for MDD, MDE/BD, and MDE/BPD patients. However, MDE/BD patients had a significantly shorter time to first remission (hazard ratio, 2.44). Patients in the BPD group had a significantly longer time to first remission (HR, 0.95).
“When the cohort was divided into quintiles according to BPD feature severity, there was an approximately 1-month difference in time to first period of remission between the first and third and between the third and fifth quintiles, with longer times seen in patients with more severe BPD symptoms,” the researchers wrote.
The study findings were limited by several factors including the small sample size and short follow-up period that prevented investigation of depressive recurrence, the researchers noted. Other limitations included the lack of diagnostic blinding and variation in patients’ treatment schedules.
However, the results were strengthened by the representative samples of subjects with various disorders, the prospective and multimodal assessment of affective states, and the comparison of three patient groups in a single study.
As BPD was associated with a longer time to remission from depressive symptoms, the results suggest that BPD severity may be an indicator of more severe disease in patients with MDD in the context of depression, the researchers concluded.
The study was supported by the Finska Lakaresallskapet, the City of Helsinki, the Hospital District of Helsinki and Uusimaa, and the Finnish Psychiatric Association. The researchers had no financial conflicts to disclose.
FROM THE JOURNAL OF AFFECTIVE DISORDERS
The anecdote as antidote: Psychiatric paradigms in Disney films
A common refrain in psychiatry is that the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition, Text Revision, (DSM-5-TR), published in 2022, is the best we can do.
Since the DSM-III was released in 1980, the American Psychiatric Association, which publishes the manual, has espoused the position that we should list symptoms, in a manner that is reminiscent of a checklist. For example, having a depressed mood on most days for a 2-week period, or a loss of interest in pleasurable things, as well as 4 additional symptoms – among them changes in appetite, changes in sleep, changes in psychomotor activity, fatigue, worthlessness, poor concentration, or thoughts of death – can lead to a diagnosis of a major depressive episode as part of a major depressive disorder.
Criticisms of this approach can be apparent. Patients subjected to such checklists, including being repeatedly asked to complete the Patient Health Questionnaire 9 (PHQ-9), which closely follows those criteria, can feel lost and even alienated by their providers. After all, one can ask all those questions and make a diagnosis of depression without even knowing about the patient’s stressors, their history, or their social context.
The DSM permits the diagnosis of psychiatric disorders without an understanding of the narrative of the patient. In its defense, the DSM is not a textbook of psychiatry, it is a guide on how to diagnose individuals. The DSM does not demand that psychiatrists only ask about the symptoms on the checklists; it is the providers who can choose to dismiss asking about the important facets of one’s life.
Yet every time we attend a lecture that starts by enumerating the DSM symptoms of the disorder being discussed, we are left with the dissatisfying impression that a specialist of this disorder should have a more nuanced and interesting description of their disorder of study. This feeling of discontent is compounded when we see a movie that encompasses so much of what is missing in today’s psychiatric parlance, and even more so if that movie is ostensibly made for children. Movies, by design, are particularly adept at encapsulating the narrative of someone’s life in a way that psychiatry can learn from.
Other than the embarrassment of not knowing a patient outside the checklist, the importance of narrative cannot be understated. Dr. Erik Erikson rightfully suggested that the point of life is “the acceptance of one’s one and only life cycle”1 or rather to know it was okay to have been oneself without additions or substitutions. Therefore, one must know what it has meant to be themselves to reconcile this question and achieve Ego Integrity rather than disgust and despair. Narrative is the way in which we understand who we are and what it has meant to be ourselves. An understanding of our personal narrative presents a unique opportunity in expressing what is missing in the DSM. Below, we provide two of our favorite examples in Disney films, among many.
‘Ratatouille’ (2007)
One of the missing features of the DSM is its inability to explain to patients the intrapsychic processes that guide us. One of these processes is how our values can lead us to a deep sense of guilt, shame, and the resulting feelings of alienation. It is extremely common for patients to enter our clinical practice feeling shackled by beliefs that they should accomplish more and be more than they are.
The animated film “Ratatouille” does an excellent job at addressing this feeling. The film follows Remy, the protagonist rat, and his adventures as he explores his passion for cooking. Remy teams up with the inept but good-natured human Alfredo Linguini and guides him through cooking while hiding under his chef’s hat. The primary antagonist, Anton Ego, is a particularly harsh food critic. His presence and appearance are somber. He exudes disdain. His trim physique and scarf suggest a man that will break and react to anything, and his skull-shaped typewriter in his coffin-shaped office informs the viewer that he is out to kill with his cruel words. Anton Ego serves as our projected super-ego. He is not an external judge but the judgment deep inside ourselves, goading us to be better with such severity that we are ultimately left feeling condemned.
Remy is the younger of two siblings. He is less physically adept but more intellectual than his older brother, who does not understand why Remy isn’t content eating scraps from the garbage like the rest of their rat clan. Remy is the creative part within us that wants to challenge the status quo and try something new. Remy also represents our shame and guilt for leaving our home. On one hand, we want to dare greatly, in this case at being an extraordinary chef, but on the other we are shy and cook in secret, hiding within the hat of another person. Remy struggles with the deep feeling that we do not deserve our success, that our family will leave us for being who we are, and that we are better off isolating and segregating from our challenges.
The movie concludes that through talent and hard work, our critics will accept us. Furthermore, once accepted for what we do, we can be further accepted for who we are. The movie ends with Remy cooking the eponymous dish ratatouille. He prepares it so remarkably well, the dish transports Anton Ego back to a sublime experience of eating ratatouille as a child, a touching moment which not only underscores food’s evocative link to memory but gives a glimpse at Anton Ego’s own narrative.
Ego is first won over by the dish, and only afterward learns of Remy’s true identity. Remy’s talent is undeniable though, and even the stuffy Ego must accept the film’s theme that “Anyone can cook,” even a rat – the rat that we all sometimes feel we are deep inside, rotten to the core but trying so hard to be accepted by others, and ultimately by ourselves. In the end, we overcome the disgust inherent in the imagery of a rat in a kitchen and instead embrace our hero’s achievement of ego integrity as he combines his identities as a member of a clan of rats, and one of Paris’s finest chefs.
While modern psychiatry can favor looking at people through the lens of biology rather than narrative, “Ratatouille” can serve as a reminder of the powerful unconscious forces that guide our lives. “Ratatouille” is not a successful movie only because of the compelling narrative, but also because the narrative matches the important psychic paradigms that psychiatry once embraced.
‘Inside Out’ (2015)
Another missing feature of the DSM is its inability to explain how symptoms feel and manifest psychologically. One such feeling is that of control – whether one is in control of one’s life, feelings, and action or rather a victim of external forces. It is extremely common for patients to enter our clinical practice feeling traumatized by the life they’ve lived and powerless to produce any change. Part of our role is to guide them through this journey from the object of their lives to the subject of their lives.
In the animated feature “Inside Out,” Riley, a preteen girl, goes through the tribulation of growing up and learning about herself. This seemingly happy child, content playing hockey with her best friend, Meg, on the picturesque frozen lakes of Minnesota, reaches her inevitable conflict. Her parents uproot her life, moving the family to San Francisco. By doing so, they disconnect her from her school, her friends, and her hobbies. While all this is happening, we spend time inside Riley’s psyche with the personified characters of Riley’s emotions as they affect her decisions and daily actions amidst the backdrop of her core memories and islands of personality.
During the move, her parents seemingly change and ultimately destroy every facet of Riley’s sense of self, which is animated as the collapse of her personality islands. Her best friend engages Riley in a video call just to inform her that she has a new friend who plays hockey equally well. Her parents do not hear Riley’s concerns and are portrayed as distracted by their adult problems. Riley feels ridiculed in her new school and unable to share her feelings with her parents, who ask her to still be their “happy girl” and indirectly ask her to fake pleasure to alleviate their own anxiety.
The climax of the movie is when Riley decides to run away from San Francisco and her parents, to return to her perceived true home, Minnesota. The climax is resolved when Riley realizes that her parents’ love, representing the connection we have to others, transcends her need for control. To some degree, we are all powerless in the face of the tremendous forces of life and share the difficult task of accepting the cards we were dealt, thus making the story of Riley so compelling.
Additionally, the climax is further resolved by another argument that psychiatry (and the DSM) should consider embracing. Emotions are not all symptoms and living without negative emotion is not the goal of life. Riley grows from preteen to teenager, and from object to subject of her life, by realizing that her symptoms/feelings are not just nuisances to avoid and hide, but the key to meaning. Our anger drives us to try hard. Our fear protects us from harm. Our sadness attracts the warmth and care of others. Our disgust protects us physically from noxious material (symbolized as a dreaded broccoli floret for preteen Riley) and socially by encouraging us to share societal norms. Similarly, patients and people in general would benefit by being taught that, while symptoms may permit the better assessment of psychiatric conditions using the DSM, life is much more than that.
It is unfair to blame the DSM for things it was not designed to do. The DSM doesn’t advertise itself as a guidebook of all behaviors, at all times. However, for a variety of reasons, it has become the main way psychiatry describes people. While we commend the APA for its effort and do not know that we could make it any better, we are frequently happily reminded that in about 90 minutes, filmmakers are able to display an empathic understanding of personal narratives that biologic psychiatry can miss.
Dr. Pulido is a psychiatry resident at the University of California, San Diego. She is interested in women’s mental health, medical education, and outpatient psychiatry. Dr. Badre is a clinical and forensic psychiatrist in San Diego. He holds teaching positions at the University of California, San Diego, and the University of San Diego. He teaches medical education, psychopharmacology, ethics in psychiatry, and correctional care. Dr. Badre can be reached at his website, BadreMD.com. He has no conflicts of interest.
References
1. Erikson, EH. Childhood and society (New York: WW Norton, 1950).
A common refrain in psychiatry is that the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition, Text Revision, (DSM-5-TR), published in 2022, is the best we can do.
Since the DSM-III was released in 1980, the American Psychiatric Association, which publishes the manual, has espoused the position that we should list symptoms, in a manner that is reminiscent of a checklist. For example, having a depressed mood on most days for a 2-week period, or a loss of interest in pleasurable things, as well as 4 additional symptoms – among them changes in appetite, changes in sleep, changes in psychomotor activity, fatigue, worthlessness, poor concentration, or thoughts of death – can lead to a diagnosis of a major depressive episode as part of a major depressive disorder.
Criticisms of this approach can be apparent. Patients subjected to such checklists, including being repeatedly asked to complete the Patient Health Questionnaire 9 (PHQ-9), which closely follows those criteria, can feel lost and even alienated by their providers. After all, one can ask all those questions and make a diagnosis of depression without even knowing about the patient’s stressors, their history, or their social context.
The DSM permits the diagnosis of psychiatric disorders without an understanding of the narrative of the patient. In its defense, the DSM is not a textbook of psychiatry, it is a guide on how to diagnose individuals. The DSM does not demand that psychiatrists only ask about the symptoms on the checklists; it is the providers who can choose to dismiss asking about the important facets of one’s life.
Yet every time we attend a lecture that starts by enumerating the DSM symptoms of the disorder being discussed, we are left with the dissatisfying impression that a specialist of this disorder should have a more nuanced and interesting description of their disorder of study. This feeling of discontent is compounded when we see a movie that encompasses so much of what is missing in today’s psychiatric parlance, and even more so if that movie is ostensibly made for children. Movies, by design, are particularly adept at encapsulating the narrative of someone’s life in a way that psychiatry can learn from.
Other than the embarrassment of not knowing a patient outside the checklist, the importance of narrative cannot be understated. Dr. Erik Erikson rightfully suggested that the point of life is “the acceptance of one’s one and only life cycle”1 or rather to know it was okay to have been oneself without additions or substitutions. Therefore, one must know what it has meant to be themselves to reconcile this question and achieve Ego Integrity rather than disgust and despair. Narrative is the way in which we understand who we are and what it has meant to be ourselves. An understanding of our personal narrative presents a unique opportunity in expressing what is missing in the DSM. Below, we provide two of our favorite examples in Disney films, among many.
‘Ratatouille’ (2007)
One of the missing features of the DSM is its inability to explain to patients the intrapsychic processes that guide us. One of these processes is how our values can lead us to a deep sense of guilt, shame, and the resulting feelings of alienation. It is extremely common for patients to enter our clinical practice feeling shackled by beliefs that they should accomplish more and be more than they are.
The animated film “Ratatouille” does an excellent job at addressing this feeling. The film follows Remy, the protagonist rat, and his adventures as he explores his passion for cooking. Remy teams up with the inept but good-natured human Alfredo Linguini and guides him through cooking while hiding under his chef’s hat. The primary antagonist, Anton Ego, is a particularly harsh food critic. His presence and appearance are somber. He exudes disdain. His trim physique and scarf suggest a man that will break and react to anything, and his skull-shaped typewriter in his coffin-shaped office informs the viewer that he is out to kill with his cruel words. Anton Ego serves as our projected super-ego. He is not an external judge but the judgment deep inside ourselves, goading us to be better with such severity that we are ultimately left feeling condemned.
Remy is the younger of two siblings. He is less physically adept but more intellectual than his older brother, who does not understand why Remy isn’t content eating scraps from the garbage like the rest of their rat clan. Remy is the creative part within us that wants to challenge the status quo and try something new. Remy also represents our shame and guilt for leaving our home. On one hand, we want to dare greatly, in this case at being an extraordinary chef, but on the other we are shy and cook in secret, hiding within the hat of another person. Remy struggles with the deep feeling that we do not deserve our success, that our family will leave us for being who we are, and that we are better off isolating and segregating from our challenges.
The movie concludes that through talent and hard work, our critics will accept us. Furthermore, once accepted for what we do, we can be further accepted for who we are. The movie ends with Remy cooking the eponymous dish ratatouille. He prepares it so remarkably well, the dish transports Anton Ego back to a sublime experience of eating ratatouille as a child, a touching moment which not only underscores food’s evocative link to memory but gives a glimpse at Anton Ego’s own narrative.
Ego is first won over by the dish, and only afterward learns of Remy’s true identity. Remy’s talent is undeniable though, and even the stuffy Ego must accept the film’s theme that “Anyone can cook,” even a rat – the rat that we all sometimes feel we are deep inside, rotten to the core but trying so hard to be accepted by others, and ultimately by ourselves. In the end, we overcome the disgust inherent in the imagery of a rat in a kitchen and instead embrace our hero’s achievement of ego integrity as he combines his identities as a member of a clan of rats, and one of Paris’s finest chefs.
While modern psychiatry can favor looking at people through the lens of biology rather than narrative, “Ratatouille” can serve as a reminder of the powerful unconscious forces that guide our lives. “Ratatouille” is not a successful movie only because of the compelling narrative, but also because the narrative matches the important psychic paradigms that psychiatry once embraced.
‘Inside Out’ (2015)
Another missing feature of the DSM is its inability to explain how symptoms feel and manifest psychologically. One such feeling is that of control – whether one is in control of one’s life, feelings, and action or rather a victim of external forces. It is extremely common for patients to enter our clinical practice feeling traumatized by the life they’ve lived and powerless to produce any change. Part of our role is to guide them through this journey from the object of their lives to the subject of their lives.
In the animated feature “Inside Out,” Riley, a preteen girl, goes through the tribulation of growing up and learning about herself. This seemingly happy child, content playing hockey with her best friend, Meg, on the picturesque frozen lakes of Minnesota, reaches her inevitable conflict. Her parents uproot her life, moving the family to San Francisco. By doing so, they disconnect her from her school, her friends, and her hobbies. While all this is happening, we spend time inside Riley’s psyche with the personified characters of Riley’s emotions as they affect her decisions and daily actions amidst the backdrop of her core memories and islands of personality.
During the move, her parents seemingly change and ultimately destroy every facet of Riley’s sense of self, which is animated as the collapse of her personality islands. Her best friend engages Riley in a video call just to inform her that she has a new friend who plays hockey equally well. Her parents do not hear Riley’s concerns and are portrayed as distracted by their adult problems. Riley feels ridiculed in her new school and unable to share her feelings with her parents, who ask her to still be their “happy girl” and indirectly ask her to fake pleasure to alleviate their own anxiety.
The climax of the movie is when Riley decides to run away from San Francisco and her parents, to return to her perceived true home, Minnesota. The climax is resolved when Riley realizes that her parents’ love, representing the connection we have to others, transcends her need for control. To some degree, we are all powerless in the face of the tremendous forces of life and share the difficult task of accepting the cards we were dealt, thus making the story of Riley so compelling.
Additionally, the climax is further resolved by another argument that psychiatry (and the DSM) should consider embracing. Emotions are not all symptoms and living without negative emotion is not the goal of life. Riley grows from preteen to teenager, and from object to subject of her life, by realizing that her symptoms/feelings are not just nuisances to avoid and hide, but the key to meaning. Our anger drives us to try hard. Our fear protects us from harm. Our sadness attracts the warmth and care of others. Our disgust protects us physically from noxious material (symbolized as a dreaded broccoli floret for preteen Riley) and socially by encouraging us to share societal norms. Similarly, patients and people in general would benefit by being taught that, while symptoms may permit the better assessment of psychiatric conditions using the DSM, life is much more than that.
It is unfair to blame the DSM for things it was not designed to do. The DSM doesn’t advertise itself as a guidebook of all behaviors, at all times. However, for a variety of reasons, it has become the main way psychiatry describes people. While we commend the APA for its effort and do not know that we could make it any better, we are frequently happily reminded that in about 90 minutes, filmmakers are able to display an empathic understanding of personal narratives that biologic psychiatry can miss.
Dr. Pulido is a psychiatry resident at the University of California, San Diego. She is interested in women’s mental health, medical education, and outpatient psychiatry. Dr. Badre is a clinical and forensic psychiatrist in San Diego. He holds teaching positions at the University of California, San Diego, and the University of San Diego. He teaches medical education, psychopharmacology, ethics in psychiatry, and correctional care. Dr. Badre can be reached at his website, BadreMD.com. He has no conflicts of interest.
References
1. Erikson, EH. Childhood and society (New York: WW Norton, 1950).
A common refrain in psychiatry is that the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition, Text Revision, (DSM-5-TR), published in 2022, is the best we can do.
Since the DSM-III was released in 1980, the American Psychiatric Association, which publishes the manual, has espoused the position that we should list symptoms, in a manner that is reminiscent of a checklist. For example, having a depressed mood on most days for a 2-week period, or a loss of interest in pleasurable things, as well as 4 additional symptoms – among them changes in appetite, changes in sleep, changes in psychomotor activity, fatigue, worthlessness, poor concentration, or thoughts of death – can lead to a diagnosis of a major depressive episode as part of a major depressive disorder.
Criticisms of this approach can be apparent. Patients subjected to such checklists, including being repeatedly asked to complete the Patient Health Questionnaire 9 (PHQ-9), which closely follows those criteria, can feel lost and even alienated by their providers. After all, one can ask all those questions and make a diagnosis of depression without even knowing about the patient’s stressors, their history, or their social context.
The DSM permits the diagnosis of psychiatric disorders without an understanding of the narrative of the patient. In its defense, the DSM is not a textbook of psychiatry, it is a guide on how to diagnose individuals. The DSM does not demand that psychiatrists only ask about the symptoms on the checklists; it is the providers who can choose to dismiss asking about the important facets of one’s life.
Yet every time we attend a lecture that starts by enumerating the DSM symptoms of the disorder being discussed, we are left with the dissatisfying impression that a specialist of this disorder should have a more nuanced and interesting description of their disorder of study. This feeling of discontent is compounded when we see a movie that encompasses so much of what is missing in today’s psychiatric parlance, and even more so if that movie is ostensibly made for children. Movies, by design, are particularly adept at encapsulating the narrative of someone’s life in a way that psychiatry can learn from.
Other than the embarrassment of not knowing a patient outside the checklist, the importance of narrative cannot be understated. Dr. Erik Erikson rightfully suggested that the point of life is “the acceptance of one’s one and only life cycle”1 or rather to know it was okay to have been oneself without additions or substitutions. Therefore, one must know what it has meant to be themselves to reconcile this question and achieve Ego Integrity rather than disgust and despair. Narrative is the way in which we understand who we are and what it has meant to be ourselves. An understanding of our personal narrative presents a unique opportunity in expressing what is missing in the DSM. Below, we provide two of our favorite examples in Disney films, among many.
‘Ratatouille’ (2007)
One of the missing features of the DSM is its inability to explain to patients the intrapsychic processes that guide us. One of these processes is how our values can lead us to a deep sense of guilt, shame, and the resulting feelings of alienation. It is extremely common for patients to enter our clinical practice feeling shackled by beliefs that they should accomplish more and be more than they are.
The animated film “Ratatouille” does an excellent job at addressing this feeling. The film follows Remy, the protagonist rat, and his adventures as he explores his passion for cooking. Remy teams up with the inept but good-natured human Alfredo Linguini and guides him through cooking while hiding under his chef’s hat. The primary antagonist, Anton Ego, is a particularly harsh food critic. His presence and appearance are somber. He exudes disdain. His trim physique and scarf suggest a man that will break and react to anything, and his skull-shaped typewriter in his coffin-shaped office informs the viewer that he is out to kill with his cruel words. Anton Ego serves as our projected super-ego. He is not an external judge but the judgment deep inside ourselves, goading us to be better with such severity that we are ultimately left feeling condemned.
Remy is the younger of two siblings. He is less physically adept but more intellectual than his older brother, who does not understand why Remy isn’t content eating scraps from the garbage like the rest of their rat clan. Remy is the creative part within us that wants to challenge the status quo and try something new. Remy also represents our shame and guilt for leaving our home. On one hand, we want to dare greatly, in this case at being an extraordinary chef, but on the other we are shy and cook in secret, hiding within the hat of another person. Remy struggles with the deep feeling that we do not deserve our success, that our family will leave us for being who we are, and that we are better off isolating and segregating from our challenges.
The movie concludes that through talent and hard work, our critics will accept us. Furthermore, once accepted for what we do, we can be further accepted for who we are. The movie ends with Remy cooking the eponymous dish ratatouille. He prepares it so remarkably well, the dish transports Anton Ego back to a sublime experience of eating ratatouille as a child, a touching moment which not only underscores food’s evocative link to memory but gives a glimpse at Anton Ego’s own narrative.
Ego is first won over by the dish, and only afterward learns of Remy’s true identity. Remy’s talent is undeniable though, and even the stuffy Ego must accept the film’s theme that “Anyone can cook,” even a rat – the rat that we all sometimes feel we are deep inside, rotten to the core but trying so hard to be accepted by others, and ultimately by ourselves. In the end, we overcome the disgust inherent in the imagery of a rat in a kitchen and instead embrace our hero’s achievement of ego integrity as he combines his identities as a member of a clan of rats, and one of Paris’s finest chefs.
While modern psychiatry can favor looking at people through the lens of biology rather than narrative, “Ratatouille” can serve as a reminder of the powerful unconscious forces that guide our lives. “Ratatouille” is not a successful movie only because of the compelling narrative, but also because the narrative matches the important psychic paradigms that psychiatry once embraced.
‘Inside Out’ (2015)
Another missing feature of the DSM is its inability to explain how symptoms feel and manifest psychologically. One such feeling is that of control – whether one is in control of one’s life, feelings, and action or rather a victim of external forces. It is extremely common for patients to enter our clinical practice feeling traumatized by the life they’ve lived and powerless to produce any change. Part of our role is to guide them through this journey from the object of their lives to the subject of their lives.
In the animated feature “Inside Out,” Riley, a preteen girl, goes through the tribulation of growing up and learning about herself. This seemingly happy child, content playing hockey with her best friend, Meg, on the picturesque frozen lakes of Minnesota, reaches her inevitable conflict. Her parents uproot her life, moving the family to San Francisco. By doing so, they disconnect her from her school, her friends, and her hobbies. While all this is happening, we spend time inside Riley’s psyche with the personified characters of Riley’s emotions as they affect her decisions and daily actions amidst the backdrop of her core memories and islands of personality.
During the move, her parents seemingly change and ultimately destroy every facet of Riley’s sense of self, which is animated as the collapse of her personality islands. Her best friend engages Riley in a video call just to inform her that she has a new friend who plays hockey equally well. Her parents do not hear Riley’s concerns and are portrayed as distracted by their adult problems. Riley feels ridiculed in her new school and unable to share her feelings with her parents, who ask her to still be their “happy girl” and indirectly ask her to fake pleasure to alleviate their own anxiety.
The climax of the movie is when Riley decides to run away from San Francisco and her parents, to return to her perceived true home, Minnesota. The climax is resolved when Riley realizes that her parents’ love, representing the connection we have to others, transcends her need for control. To some degree, we are all powerless in the face of the tremendous forces of life and share the difficult task of accepting the cards we were dealt, thus making the story of Riley so compelling.
Additionally, the climax is further resolved by another argument that psychiatry (and the DSM) should consider embracing. Emotions are not all symptoms and living without negative emotion is not the goal of life. Riley grows from preteen to teenager, and from object to subject of her life, by realizing that her symptoms/feelings are not just nuisances to avoid and hide, but the key to meaning. Our anger drives us to try hard. Our fear protects us from harm. Our sadness attracts the warmth and care of others. Our disgust protects us physically from noxious material (symbolized as a dreaded broccoli floret for preteen Riley) and socially by encouraging us to share societal norms. Similarly, patients and people in general would benefit by being taught that, while symptoms may permit the better assessment of psychiatric conditions using the DSM, life is much more than that.
It is unfair to blame the DSM for things it was not designed to do. The DSM doesn’t advertise itself as a guidebook of all behaviors, at all times. However, for a variety of reasons, it has become the main way psychiatry describes people. While we commend the APA for its effort and do not know that we could make it any better, we are frequently happily reminded that in about 90 minutes, filmmakers are able to display an empathic understanding of personal narratives that biologic psychiatry can miss.
Dr. Pulido is a psychiatry resident at the University of California, San Diego. She is interested in women’s mental health, medical education, and outpatient psychiatry. Dr. Badre is a clinical and forensic psychiatrist in San Diego. He holds teaching positions at the University of California, San Diego, and the University of San Diego. He teaches medical education, psychopharmacology, ethics in psychiatry, and correctional care. Dr. Badre can be reached at his website, BadreMD.com. He has no conflicts of interest.
References
1. Erikson, EH. Childhood and society (New York: WW Norton, 1950).
Higher rates of PTSD, BPD in transgender vs. cisgender psych patients
Although mood disorders, depression, and anxiety were the most common diagnoses in both TGD and cisgender patients, “when we compared the diagnostic profiles [of TGD patients] to those of cisgender patients, we found an increased prevalence of PTSD and BPD,” study investigator Mark Zimmerman, MD, professor of psychiatry and human behavior, Brown University, Providence, R.I., told this news organization.
“What we concluded is that psychiatric programs that wish to treat TGD patients should either have or should develop expertise in treating PTSD and BPD, not just mood and anxiety disorders,” Dr. Zimmerman said.
The study was published online September 26 in the Journal of Clinical Psychiatry.
‘Piecemeal literature’
TGD individuals “experience high rates of various forms of psychopathology in general and when compared with cisgender persons,” the investigators note.
They point out that most empirical evidence has relied upon the use of brief, unstructured psychodiagnostic assessment measures and assessment of a “limited constellation of psychiatric symptoms domains,” resulting in a “piecemeal literature wherein each piece of research documents elevations in one – or a few – diagnostic domains.”
Studies pointing to broader psychosocial health variables have often relied upon self-reported measures. In addition, in studies that utilized a structured interview approach, none “used a formal interview procedure to assess psychiatric diagnoses” and most focused only on a “limited number of psychiatric conditions based on self-reports of past diagnosis.”
The goal of the current study was to use semistructured interviews administered by professionals to compare the diagnostic profiles of a samples of TGD and cisgender patients who presented for treatment at a single naturalistic, clinically acute setting – a partial hospital program.
Dr. Zimmerman said that there was an additional motive for conducting the study. “There has been discussion in the field as to whether or not transgender or gender-diverse individuals all have borderline personality disorder, but that hasn’t been our clinical impression.”
Rather, Dr. Zimmerman and colleagues believe TGD people “may have had more difficult childhoods and more difficult adjustments in society because of societal attitudes and have to deal with that stress, whether it be microaggressions or overt bullying and aggression.” The study was designed to investigate this issue.
In addition, studies conducted in primary care programs in individuals seeking gender-affirming surgery have “reported a limited number of psychiatric diagnoses, but we were wondering whether, amongst psychiatric patients specifically, there were differences in diagnostic profiles between transgender and gender-diverse patients and cisgender patients. If so, what might the implications be for providing care for this population?”
TGD not synonymous with borderline
To investigate, the researchers administered semistructured diagnostic interviews for DSM-IV disorders to 2,212 psychiatric patients (66% cisgender women, 30.8% cisgender men, 3.1% TGD; mean [standard deviation] age 36.7 [14.4] years) presenting to the Rhode Island Hospital Department of Psychiatry Partial Hospital Program between April 2014 and January 2021.
Patients also completed a demographic questionnaire including their assigned sex at birth and their current gender identity.
Most patients (44.9%) were single, followed by 23.5% who were married, 14.1% living in a relationship as if married, 12.0% divorced, 3.6% separated, and 1.9% widowed.
Almost three-quarters of participants (73.2%) identified as White, followed by Hispanic (10.7%), Black (6.7%), “other” or a combination of racial/ethnic backgrounds (6.6%), and Asian (2.7%).
There were no differences between cisgender and TGD groups in terms of race or education, but the TGD patients were significantly younger compared with their cisgender counterparts and were significantly more likely to have never been married.
The average number of psychiatric diagnoses in the sample was 3.05 (± 1.73), with TGD patients having a larger number of psychiatric diagnoses than did their cisgender peers (an average of 3.54 ± 1.88 vs. 3.04 ± 1.72, respectively; t = 2.37; P = .02).
Major depressive disorder (MDD) and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) were the most common disorders among both cisgender and TGD patients. However, after controlling for age, the researchers found that TGD patients were significantly more likely than were the cisgender patients to be diagnosed with PTSD and BPD (P < .05 for both).
“Of note, only about one-third of the TGD individuals were diagnosed with BPD, so it is important to realize that transgender or gender-diverse identity is not synonymous with BPD, as some have suggested,” noted Dr. Zimmerman, who is also the director of the outpatient division at the Partial Hospital Program, Rhode Island Hospital.
A representative sample?
Commenting on the study, Jack Drescher, MD, distinguished life fellow of the American Psychiatric Association and clinical professor of psychiatry, Columbia University, New York, called the findings “interesting” but noted that a limitation of the study is that it included “a patient population with likely more severe psychiatric illness, since they were all day hospital patients.”
The question is whether similar findings would be obtained in a less severely ill population, said Dr. Drescher, who is also a senior consulting analyst for sexuality and gender at Columbia University and was not involved with the study. “The patients in the study may not be representative of the general population, either cisgender or transgender.”
Dr. Drescher was “not surprised” by the finding regarding PTSD because the finding “is consistent with our understanding of the kinds of traumas that transgender people go through in day-to-day life.”
He noted that some people misunderstand the diagnostic criterion in BPD of identity confusion and think that because people with gender dysphoria may be confused about their identity, it means that all people who are transgender have borderline personality disorder, “but that’s not true.”
Dr. Zimmerman agreed. “The vast majority of individuals with BPD do not have a transgender or gender-diverse identity, and TGD should not be equated with BPD,” he said.
No source of study funding was disclosed. Dr. Zimmerman and coauthors and Dr. Drescher report no relevant financial relationships.
A version of this article first appeared on Medscape.com.
Although mood disorders, depression, and anxiety were the most common diagnoses in both TGD and cisgender patients, “when we compared the diagnostic profiles [of TGD patients] to those of cisgender patients, we found an increased prevalence of PTSD and BPD,” study investigator Mark Zimmerman, MD, professor of psychiatry and human behavior, Brown University, Providence, R.I., told this news organization.
“What we concluded is that psychiatric programs that wish to treat TGD patients should either have or should develop expertise in treating PTSD and BPD, not just mood and anxiety disorders,” Dr. Zimmerman said.
The study was published online September 26 in the Journal of Clinical Psychiatry.
‘Piecemeal literature’
TGD individuals “experience high rates of various forms of psychopathology in general and when compared with cisgender persons,” the investigators note.
They point out that most empirical evidence has relied upon the use of brief, unstructured psychodiagnostic assessment measures and assessment of a “limited constellation of psychiatric symptoms domains,” resulting in a “piecemeal literature wherein each piece of research documents elevations in one – or a few – diagnostic domains.”
Studies pointing to broader psychosocial health variables have often relied upon self-reported measures. In addition, in studies that utilized a structured interview approach, none “used a formal interview procedure to assess psychiatric diagnoses” and most focused only on a “limited number of psychiatric conditions based on self-reports of past diagnosis.”
The goal of the current study was to use semistructured interviews administered by professionals to compare the diagnostic profiles of a samples of TGD and cisgender patients who presented for treatment at a single naturalistic, clinically acute setting – a partial hospital program.
Dr. Zimmerman said that there was an additional motive for conducting the study. “There has been discussion in the field as to whether or not transgender or gender-diverse individuals all have borderline personality disorder, but that hasn’t been our clinical impression.”
Rather, Dr. Zimmerman and colleagues believe TGD people “may have had more difficult childhoods and more difficult adjustments in society because of societal attitudes and have to deal with that stress, whether it be microaggressions or overt bullying and aggression.” The study was designed to investigate this issue.
In addition, studies conducted in primary care programs in individuals seeking gender-affirming surgery have “reported a limited number of psychiatric diagnoses, but we were wondering whether, amongst psychiatric patients specifically, there were differences in diagnostic profiles between transgender and gender-diverse patients and cisgender patients. If so, what might the implications be for providing care for this population?”
TGD not synonymous with borderline
To investigate, the researchers administered semistructured diagnostic interviews for DSM-IV disorders to 2,212 psychiatric patients (66% cisgender women, 30.8% cisgender men, 3.1% TGD; mean [standard deviation] age 36.7 [14.4] years) presenting to the Rhode Island Hospital Department of Psychiatry Partial Hospital Program between April 2014 and January 2021.
Patients also completed a demographic questionnaire including their assigned sex at birth and their current gender identity.
Most patients (44.9%) were single, followed by 23.5% who were married, 14.1% living in a relationship as if married, 12.0% divorced, 3.6% separated, and 1.9% widowed.
Almost three-quarters of participants (73.2%) identified as White, followed by Hispanic (10.7%), Black (6.7%), “other” or a combination of racial/ethnic backgrounds (6.6%), and Asian (2.7%).
There were no differences between cisgender and TGD groups in terms of race or education, but the TGD patients were significantly younger compared with their cisgender counterparts and were significantly more likely to have never been married.
The average number of psychiatric diagnoses in the sample was 3.05 (± 1.73), with TGD patients having a larger number of psychiatric diagnoses than did their cisgender peers (an average of 3.54 ± 1.88 vs. 3.04 ± 1.72, respectively; t = 2.37; P = .02).
Major depressive disorder (MDD) and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) were the most common disorders among both cisgender and TGD patients. However, after controlling for age, the researchers found that TGD patients were significantly more likely than were the cisgender patients to be diagnosed with PTSD and BPD (P < .05 for both).
“Of note, only about one-third of the TGD individuals were diagnosed with BPD, so it is important to realize that transgender or gender-diverse identity is not synonymous with BPD, as some have suggested,” noted Dr. Zimmerman, who is also the director of the outpatient division at the Partial Hospital Program, Rhode Island Hospital.
A representative sample?
Commenting on the study, Jack Drescher, MD, distinguished life fellow of the American Psychiatric Association and clinical professor of psychiatry, Columbia University, New York, called the findings “interesting” but noted that a limitation of the study is that it included “a patient population with likely more severe psychiatric illness, since they were all day hospital patients.”
The question is whether similar findings would be obtained in a less severely ill population, said Dr. Drescher, who is also a senior consulting analyst for sexuality and gender at Columbia University and was not involved with the study. “The patients in the study may not be representative of the general population, either cisgender or transgender.”
Dr. Drescher was “not surprised” by the finding regarding PTSD because the finding “is consistent with our understanding of the kinds of traumas that transgender people go through in day-to-day life.”
He noted that some people misunderstand the diagnostic criterion in BPD of identity confusion and think that because people with gender dysphoria may be confused about their identity, it means that all people who are transgender have borderline personality disorder, “but that’s not true.”
Dr. Zimmerman agreed. “The vast majority of individuals with BPD do not have a transgender or gender-diverse identity, and TGD should not be equated with BPD,” he said.
No source of study funding was disclosed. Dr. Zimmerman and coauthors and Dr. Drescher report no relevant financial relationships.
A version of this article first appeared on Medscape.com.
Although mood disorders, depression, and anxiety were the most common diagnoses in both TGD and cisgender patients, “when we compared the diagnostic profiles [of TGD patients] to those of cisgender patients, we found an increased prevalence of PTSD and BPD,” study investigator Mark Zimmerman, MD, professor of psychiatry and human behavior, Brown University, Providence, R.I., told this news organization.
“What we concluded is that psychiatric programs that wish to treat TGD patients should either have or should develop expertise in treating PTSD and BPD, not just mood and anxiety disorders,” Dr. Zimmerman said.
The study was published online September 26 in the Journal of Clinical Psychiatry.
‘Piecemeal literature’
TGD individuals “experience high rates of various forms of psychopathology in general and when compared with cisgender persons,” the investigators note.
They point out that most empirical evidence has relied upon the use of brief, unstructured psychodiagnostic assessment measures and assessment of a “limited constellation of psychiatric symptoms domains,” resulting in a “piecemeal literature wherein each piece of research documents elevations in one – or a few – diagnostic domains.”
Studies pointing to broader psychosocial health variables have often relied upon self-reported measures. In addition, in studies that utilized a structured interview approach, none “used a formal interview procedure to assess psychiatric diagnoses” and most focused only on a “limited number of psychiatric conditions based on self-reports of past diagnosis.”
The goal of the current study was to use semistructured interviews administered by professionals to compare the diagnostic profiles of a samples of TGD and cisgender patients who presented for treatment at a single naturalistic, clinically acute setting – a partial hospital program.
Dr. Zimmerman said that there was an additional motive for conducting the study. “There has been discussion in the field as to whether or not transgender or gender-diverse individuals all have borderline personality disorder, but that hasn’t been our clinical impression.”
Rather, Dr. Zimmerman and colleagues believe TGD people “may have had more difficult childhoods and more difficult adjustments in society because of societal attitudes and have to deal with that stress, whether it be microaggressions or overt bullying and aggression.” The study was designed to investigate this issue.
In addition, studies conducted in primary care programs in individuals seeking gender-affirming surgery have “reported a limited number of psychiatric diagnoses, but we were wondering whether, amongst psychiatric patients specifically, there were differences in diagnostic profiles between transgender and gender-diverse patients and cisgender patients. If so, what might the implications be for providing care for this population?”
TGD not synonymous with borderline
To investigate, the researchers administered semistructured diagnostic interviews for DSM-IV disorders to 2,212 psychiatric patients (66% cisgender women, 30.8% cisgender men, 3.1% TGD; mean [standard deviation] age 36.7 [14.4] years) presenting to the Rhode Island Hospital Department of Psychiatry Partial Hospital Program between April 2014 and January 2021.
Patients also completed a demographic questionnaire including their assigned sex at birth and their current gender identity.
Most patients (44.9%) were single, followed by 23.5% who were married, 14.1% living in a relationship as if married, 12.0% divorced, 3.6% separated, and 1.9% widowed.
Almost three-quarters of participants (73.2%) identified as White, followed by Hispanic (10.7%), Black (6.7%), “other” or a combination of racial/ethnic backgrounds (6.6%), and Asian (2.7%).
There were no differences between cisgender and TGD groups in terms of race or education, but the TGD patients were significantly younger compared with their cisgender counterparts and were significantly more likely to have never been married.
The average number of psychiatric diagnoses in the sample was 3.05 (± 1.73), with TGD patients having a larger number of psychiatric diagnoses than did their cisgender peers (an average of 3.54 ± 1.88 vs. 3.04 ± 1.72, respectively; t = 2.37; P = .02).
Major depressive disorder (MDD) and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) were the most common disorders among both cisgender and TGD patients. However, after controlling for age, the researchers found that TGD patients were significantly more likely than were the cisgender patients to be diagnosed with PTSD and BPD (P < .05 for both).
“Of note, only about one-third of the TGD individuals were diagnosed with BPD, so it is important to realize that transgender or gender-diverse identity is not synonymous with BPD, as some have suggested,” noted Dr. Zimmerman, who is also the director of the outpatient division at the Partial Hospital Program, Rhode Island Hospital.
A representative sample?
Commenting on the study, Jack Drescher, MD, distinguished life fellow of the American Psychiatric Association and clinical professor of psychiatry, Columbia University, New York, called the findings “interesting” but noted that a limitation of the study is that it included “a patient population with likely more severe psychiatric illness, since they were all day hospital patients.”
The question is whether similar findings would be obtained in a less severely ill population, said Dr. Drescher, who is also a senior consulting analyst for sexuality and gender at Columbia University and was not involved with the study. “The patients in the study may not be representative of the general population, either cisgender or transgender.”
Dr. Drescher was “not surprised” by the finding regarding PTSD because the finding “is consistent with our understanding of the kinds of traumas that transgender people go through in day-to-day life.”
He noted that some people misunderstand the diagnostic criterion in BPD of identity confusion and think that because people with gender dysphoria may be confused about their identity, it means that all people who are transgender have borderline personality disorder, “but that’s not true.”
Dr. Zimmerman agreed. “The vast majority of individuals with BPD do not have a transgender or gender-diverse identity, and TGD should not be equated with BPD,” he said.
No source of study funding was disclosed. Dr. Zimmerman and coauthors and Dr. Drescher report no relevant financial relationships.
A version of this article first appeared on Medscape.com.
FROM JOURNAL OF CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY