The Importance of Emotional Intelligence When Leading in a Time of Crisis

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The coronavirus disease of 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has created innumerable challenges on scales both global and personal while straining health systems and their personnel. Hospitalists and hospital medicine groups are experiencing unique burdens as they confront the pandemic on the frontlines. Hospital medicine groups are being challenged by the rapid operational changes necessary in preparing for and caring for patients with COVID-19. These challenges include drafting new diagnostic and management algorithms, establishing and enacting policies on personal protective equipment (PPE) and patient and provider testing, modifying staffing protocols including deploying staff to new roles or integrating non-hospitalists into hospital medicine roles, and developing capacity for patient surges1—all in the setting of uncertainty about how the pandemic may affect individual hospitals or health systems and how long these repercussions may last. In this perspective, we describe key lessons we have learned in leading our hospital medicine group during the COVID-19 pandemic: how to apply emotional intelligence to proactively address the emotional effects of the crisis.

LEARNING FROM EARLY MISSTEPS

In the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic, the evolving knowledge of the disease process, changing national and local public health guidelines, and instability of the PPE supply chain necessitated rapid change. This pace no longer allowed for our typical time frame of weeks to months for implementation of large-scale operational changes; instead, it demanded adaptation in hours to days. We operated under a strategy of developing new workflows and policies that were logical and reflected the best available information at the time.

For instance, our hospital medicine service cared for some of the earliest-identified COVID-19 patients in the United States in early February 2020. Our initial operational plan for caring for patients with COVID-19 involved grouping these patients on a limited number of direct-care hospitalist teams. The advantages of this approach, which benefitted from low numbers of initial patients, were clear: consolidation of clinical and operational knowledge (including optimal PPE practices) in a few individuals, streamlining communication with infectious diseases specialists and public health departments, and requiring change on only a couple of teams while allowing others to continue their usual workflow. However, we soon learned that providers caring for COVID-19 patients were experiencing an onslaught of negative emotions: fear of contracting the virus themselves or carrying it home to infect loved ones, anxiety of not understanding the clinical disease or having treatments to offer, resentment of having been randomly assigned to the team that would care for these patients, and loneliness of being a sole provider experiencing these emotions. We found ourselves in the position of managing these emotional responses reactively.

APPLYING EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE TO LEADING IN A CRISIS

To reduce the distress experienced by our hospitalists and to lead more effectively, we realized the need to proactively address the emotional effects that the pandemic was having. Several authors who have written about valuable leadership lessons during this time have noted the importance of acknowledging the emotional tolls of such a crisis and creating venues for hospitalists to share their experiences.1-4 However, solely adding “wellness” as a checklist item for leaders to address fails to capture the nuances of the complex human emotions that hospitalists may endure at this time and how these emotions influence frontline hospitalists’ responses to operational changes. It is critically important for hospital medicine leaders to employ emotional intelligence, defined as “the ability to monitor one’s own and others’ feelings and emotions, to discriminate among them and to use this information to guide one’s thinking and actions.”5-7 Integrating emotional intelligence allows hospital medicine leaders to anticipate, identify, articulate, and manage the emotional responses to necessary changes and stresses that occur during a crisis such as the COVID-19 pandemic.

As we applied principles of emotional intelligence to our leadership response to the COVID crisis, we found the following seven techniques effective (Appendix Table):

1. ASK. Leaders should ask individual hospitalists “How are you feeling?” instead of “How are you doing?” or “How can I help?” This question may feel too intimate for some, or leaders may worry that the question feels patronizing; however, in our experience, hospitalists respond positively to this prompt, welcome the opportunity to communicate their feelings, and value being heard. Moreover, when hospitalists feel overwhelmed, they may not be able to determine what help they do or do not need. By understanding the emotions of frontline hospitalists, leaders may be better able to address those emotions directly, find solutions to problems, and anticipate reactions to future policies.4

2. SHARE. Leaders should model what they ask of frontline hospitalists and share their own feelings, even if they are experiencing mixed or negative emotions. For instance, a leader who is feeling saddened about the death of a patient can begin a meeting by sharing this sentiment. By allowing themselves to display vulnerability, leaders demonstrate courage and promote a culture of openness, honesty, and mutual trust.

3. INITIATE. Leaders should embrace difficult conversations and be transparent about uncertainty, although they may not have the answers and may need to take local responsibility for consequences of decisions made externally, such as those made by the health system or government. Confronting difficult discussions and being transparent about “unknowns” provides acknowledgement, reassurance, and shared experience that expresses to the hospitalist group that, while the future may be unsettled, they will face it together.

4. ANTICIPATE. Leaders should anticipate the emotional responses to operational changes while designing them and rolling them out. While negative emotions may heavily outweigh positive emotions in times of crisis, we have also found that harnessing positive emotions when designing operational initiatives can assist with successful implementation. For example, by surveying our hospitalists, we found that many felt enthusiastic about caring for patients with COVID-19, curious about new skill sets, and passionate about helping in a time of crisis. By generating a list of these hospitalists up front, we were able to preferentially staff COVID-19 teams with providers who were eager to care for those patients and, thereby, minimize anxiety among those who were more apprehensive.

5. ENCOURAGE. Leaders should provide time and space (including virtually) for hospitalists to discuss their emotions.8 We found that creating multiple layers of opportunity for expression allows for engagement with a wider range of hospitalists, some of whom may be reluctant to share feelings openly or to a group, whereas others may enjoy the opportunity to reveal their feelings publicly. These varied venues for emotional expression may range from brief individual check-ins to open “office hours” to dedicated meetings such as “Hospitalist Town Halls.” For instance, spending the first few minutes of a meeting with a smaller group by encouraging each participant to share something personal can build community and mutual understanding, as well as cue leaders in to where participants may be on the emotional landscape.

6. NURTURE. Beyond inviting the expression of emotions, leaders should ensure that hospitalists have access to more formal systems of support, especially for hospitalists who may be experiencing more intense negative emotions. Support may be provided through unit- or team-based debriefing sessions, health-system sponsored support programs, or individual counseling sessions.4,8

7. APPRECIATE. Leaders should deliberately foster gratitude by sincerely and frequently expressing their appreciation. Because expressing gratitude builds resiliency,9 cultivating a culture of gratitude may bolster resilience in the entire hospital medicine group. Opportunities for thankfulness abound as hospitalists volunteer for extra shifts, cover for ill colleagues, participate in new working groups and task forces, and sacrifice their personal safety on the front lines. We often incorporate statements of appreciation into one-on-one conversations with hospitalists, during operational and divisional meetings, and in email. We also built gratitude expressions into the daily work on the Respiratory Isolation Unit at our hospital via daily interdisciplinary huddles for frontline providers to share their experiences and emotions. During huddles, providers are asked to pair negative emotions with suggestions for improvement and to share a moment of gratitude. This helps to engender a spirit of camaraderie, shared mission, and collective optimism.

CONCLUSION

Hospitalists are experiencing a wide range of emotions related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Hospital medicine leaders must have strategies to understand the emotions providers are experiencing. Being aware of and acknowledging these emotions up front can help leaders plan and implement the operational changes necessary to manage the crisis. Because our health system and city have fortunately been spared the worst of the pandemic so far without large volumes of patients with COVID-19, we recognize that the strategies above may be challenging for leaders in overwhelmed health systems. However, we hope that leaders at all levels can apply the lessons we have learned: to ask hospitalists how they are feeling, share their own feelings, initiate difficult conversations when needed, anticipate the emotional effects of operational changes, encourage expressions of emotion in multiple venues, nurture hospitalists who need more formal support, and appreciate frontline hospitalists. While the emotional needs of hospitalists will undoubtedly change over time as the pandemic evolves, we suspect that these strategies will continue to be important over the coming weeks, months, and longer as we settle into the postpandemic world.

Files
References

1. Chopra V, Toner E, Waldhorn R, Washer L. How should U.S. hospitals prepare for coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19)? Ann Intern Med. 2020;172(9):621-622. https://doi.org/10.7326/m20-0907
2. Garg M, Wray CM. Hospital medicine management in the time of COVID-19: preparing for a sprint and a marathon. J Hosp Med. 2020;15(5):305-307. https://doi.org/10.12788/jhm.3427
3. Hertling M. Ten tips for a crisis : lessons from a soldier. J Hosp Med. 2020;15(5):275-276. https://doi.org/10.12788/jhm.3424
4. Shanafelt T, Ripp J, Trockel M. Understanding and addressing sources of anxiety among health care professionals during the COVID-19 pandemic. JAMA. Published online April 7, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2020.5893
5. Mintz LJ, Stoller JK. A systematic review of physician leadership and emotional intelligence. J Grad Med Educ. 2014;6(1):21-31. https://doi.org/10.4300/jgme-d-13-00012.1
6. Goleman D, Boyatzis R. Emotional intelligence has 12 elements. Which do you need to work on? Harvard Business Review. February 6, 2017. Accessed April 16, 2020. https://hbr.org/2017/02/emotional-intelligence-has-12-elements-which-do-you-need-to-work-on
7. Salovey P, Mayer JD. Emotional intelligence. Imagin Cogn Pers. 1990;9(3):185-211. https://doi.org/10.2190/DUGG-P24E-52WK-6CDG
8. Kisely S, Warren N, McMahon L, Dalais C, Henry I, Siskind D. Occurrence, prevention, and management of the psychological effects of emerging virus outbreaks on healthcare workers: rapid review and meta-analysis. BMJ. 2020;369:m1642. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.m1642
9. Kopans D. How to evaluate, manage, and strengthen your resilience. Harvard Business Review. June 14, 2016. Accessed April 21, 2020. https://hbr.org/2016/06/how-to-evaluate-manage-and-strengthen-your-resilience

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The coronavirus disease of 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has created innumerable challenges on scales both global and personal while straining health systems and their personnel. Hospitalists and hospital medicine groups are experiencing unique burdens as they confront the pandemic on the frontlines. Hospital medicine groups are being challenged by the rapid operational changes necessary in preparing for and caring for patients with COVID-19. These challenges include drafting new diagnostic and management algorithms, establishing and enacting policies on personal protective equipment (PPE) and patient and provider testing, modifying staffing protocols including deploying staff to new roles or integrating non-hospitalists into hospital medicine roles, and developing capacity for patient surges1—all in the setting of uncertainty about how the pandemic may affect individual hospitals or health systems and how long these repercussions may last. In this perspective, we describe key lessons we have learned in leading our hospital medicine group during the COVID-19 pandemic: how to apply emotional intelligence to proactively address the emotional effects of the crisis.

LEARNING FROM EARLY MISSTEPS

In the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic, the evolving knowledge of the disease process, changing national and local public health guidelines, and instability of the PPE supply chain necessitated rapid change. This pace no longer allowed for our typical time frame of weeks to months for implementation of large-scale operational changes; instead, it demanded adaptation in hours to days. We operated under a strategy of developing new workflows and policies that were logical and reflected the best available information at the time.

For instance, our hospital medicine service cared for some of the earliest-identified COVID-19 patients in the United States in early February 2020. Our initial operational plan for caring for patients with COVID-19 involved grouping these patients on a limited number of direct-care hospitalist teams. The advantages of this approach, which benefitted from low numbers of initial patients, were clear: consolidation of clinical and operational knowledge (including optimal PPE practices) in a few individuals, streamlining communication with infectious diseases specialists and public health departments, and requiring change on only a couple of teams while allowing others to continue their usual workflow. However, we soon learned that providers caring for COVID-19 patients were experiencing an onslaught of negative emotions: fear of contracting the virus themselves or carrying it home to infect loved ones, anxiety of not understanding the clinical disease or having treatments to offer, resentment of having been randomly assigned to the team that would care for these patients, and loneliness of being a sole provider experiencing these emotions. We found ourselves in the position of managing these emotional responses reactively.

APPLYING EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE TO LEADING IN A CRISIS

To reduce the distress experienced by our hospitalists and to lead more effectively, we realized the need to proactively address the emotional effects that the pandemic was having. Several authors who have written about valuable leadership lessons during this time have noted the importance of acknowledging the emotional tolls of such a crisis and creating venues for hospitalists to share their experiences.1-4 However, solely adding “wellness” as a checklist item for leaders to address fails to capture the nuances of the complex human emotions that hospitalists may endure at this time and how these emotions influence frontline hospitalists’ responses to operational changes. It is critically important for hospital medicine leaders to employ emotional intelligence, defined as “the ability to monitor one’s own and others’ feelings and emotions, to discriminate among them and to use this information to guide one’s thinking and actions.”5-7 Integrating emotional intelligence allows hospital medicine leaders to anticipate, identify, articulate, and manage the emotional responses to necessary changes and stresses that occur during a crisis such as the COVID-19 pandemic.

As we applied principles of emotional intelligence to our leadership response to the COVID crisis, we found the following seven techniques effective (Appendix Table):

1. ASK. Leaders should ask individual hospitalists “How are you feeling?” instead of “How are you doing?” or “How can I help?” This question may feel too intimate for some, or leaders may worry that the question feels patronizing; however, in our experience, hospitalists respond positively to this prompt, welcome the opportunity to communicate their feelings, and value being heard. Moreover, when hospitalists feel overwhelmed, they may not be able to determine what help they do or do not need. By understanding the emotions of frontline hospitalists, leaders may be better able to address those emotions directly, find solutions to problems, and anticipate reactions to future policies.4

2. SHARE. Leaders should model what they ask of frontline hospitalists and share their own feelings, even if they are experiencing mixed or negative emotions. For instance, a leader who is feeling saddened about the death of a patient can begin a meeting by sharing this sentiment. By allowing themselves to display vulnerability, leaders demonstrate courage and promote a culture of openness, honesty, and mutual trust.

3. INITIATE. Leaders should embrace difficult conversations and be transparent about uncertainty, although they may not have the answers and may need to take local responsibility for consequences of decisions made externally, such as those made by the health system or government. Confronting difficult discussions and being transparent about “unknowns” provides acknowledgement, reassurance, and shared experience that expresses to the hospitalist group that, while the future may be unsettled, they will face it together.

4. ANTICIPATE. Leaders should anticipate the emotional responses to operational changes while designing them and rolling them out. While negative emotions may heavily outweigh positive emotions in times of crisis, we have also found that harnessing positive emotions when designing operational initiatives can assist with successful implementation. For example, by surveying our hospitalists, we found that many felt enthusiastic about caring for patients with COVID-19, curious about new skill sets, and passionate about helping in a time of crisis. By generating a list of these hospitalists up front, we were able to preferentially staff COVID-19 teams with providers who were eager to care for those patients and, thereby, minimize anxiety among those who were more apprehensive.

5. ENCOURAGE. Leaders should provide time and space (including virtually) for hospitalists to discuss their emotions.8 We found that creating multiple layers of opportunity for expression allows for engagement with a wider range of hospitalists, some of whom may be reluctant to share feelings openly or to a group, whereas others may enjoy the opportunity to reveal their feelings publicly. These varied venues for emotional expression may range from brief individual check-ins to open “office hours” to dedicated meetings such as “Hospitalist Town Halls.” For instance, spending the first few minutes of a meeting with a smaller group by encouraging each participant to share something personal can build community and mutual understanding, as well as cue leaders in to where participants may be on the emotional landscape.

6. NURTURE. Beyond inviting the expression of emotions, leaders should ensure that hospitalists have access to more formal systems of support, especially for hospitalists who may be experiencing more intense negative emotions. Support may be provided through unit- or team-based debriefing sessions, health-system sponsored support programs, or individual counseling sessions.4,8

7. APPRECIATE. Leaders should deliberately foster gratitude by sincerely and frequently expressing their appreciation. Because expressing gratitude builds resiliency,9 cultivating a culture of gratitude may bolster resilience in the entire hospital medicine group. Opportunities for thankfulness abound as hospitalists volunteer for extra shifts, cover for ill colleagues, participate in new working groups and task forces, and sacrifice their personal safety on the front lines. We often incorporate statements of appreciation into one-on-one conversations with hospitalists, during operational and divisional meetings, and in email. We also built gratitude expressions into the daily work on the Respiratory Isolation Unit at our hospital via daily interdisciplinary huddles for frontline providers to share their experiences and emotions. During huddles, providers are asked to pair negative emotions with suggestions for improvement and to share a moment of gratitude. This helps to engender a spirit of camaraderie, shared mission, and collective optimism.

CONCLUSION

Hospitalists are experiencing a wide range of emotions related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Hospital medicine leaders must have strategies to understand the emotions providers are experiencing. Being aware of and acknowledging these emotions up front can help leaders plan and implement the operational changes necessary to manage the crisis. Because our health system and city have fortunately been spared the worst of the pandemic so far without large volumes of patients with COVID-19, we recognize that the strategies above may be challenging for leaders in overwhelmed health systems. However, we hope that leaders at all levels can apply the lessons we have learned: to ask hospitalists how they are feeling, share their own feelings, initiate difficult conversations when needed, anticipate the emotional effects of operational changes, encourage expressions of emotion in multiple venues, nurture hospitalists who need more formal support, and appreciate frontline hospitalists. While the emotional needs of hospitalists will undoubtedly change over time as the pandemic evolves, we suspect that these strategies will continue to be important over the coming weeks, months, and longer as we settle into the postpandemic world.

The coronavirus disease of 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has created innumerable challenges on scales both global and personal while straining health systems and their personnel. Hospitalists and hospital medicine groups are experiencing unique burdens as they confront the pandemic on the frontlines. Hospital medicine groups are being challenged by the rapid operational changes necessary in preparing for and caring for patients with COVID-19. These challenges include drafting new diagnostic and management algorithms, establishing and enacting policies on personal protective equipment (PPE) and patient and provider testing, modifying staffing protocols including deploying staff to new roles or integrating non-hospitalists into hospital medicine roles, and developing capacity for patient surges1—all in the setting of uncertainty about how the pandemic may affect individual hospitals or health systems and how long these repercussions may last. In this perspective, we describe key lessons we have learned in leading our hospital medicine group during the COVID-19 pandemic: how to apply emotional intelligence to proactively address the emotional effects of the crisis.

LEARNING FROM EARLY MISSTEPS

In the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic, the evolving knowledge of the disease process, changing national and local public health guidelines, and instability of the PPE supply chain necessitated rapid change. This pace no longer allowed for our typical time frame of weeks to months for implementation of large-scale operational changes; instead, it demanded adaptation in hours to days. We operated under a strategy of developing new workflows and policies that were logical and reflected the best available information at the time.

For instance, our hospital medicine service cared for some of the earliest-identified COVID-19 patients in the United States in early February 2020. Our initial operational plan for caring for patients with COVID-19 involved grouping these patients on a limited number of direct-care hospitalist teams. The advantages of this approach, which benefitted from low numbers of initial patients, were clear: consolidation of clinical and operational knowledge (including optimal PPE practices) in a few individuals, streamlining communication with infectious diseases specialists and public health departments, and requiring change on only a couple of teams while allowing others to continue their usual workflow. However, we soon learned that providers caring for COVID-19 patients were experiencing an onslaught of negative emotions: fear of contracting the virus themselves or carrying it home to infect loved ones, anxiety of not understanding the clinical disease or having treatments to offer, resentment of having been randomly assigned to the team that would care for these patients, and loneliness of being a sole provider experiencing these emotions. We found ourselves in the position of managing these emotional responses reactively.

APPLYING EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE TO LEADING IN A CRISIS

To reduce the distress experienced by our hospitalists and to lead more effectively, we realized the need to proactively address the emotional effects that the pandemic was having. Several authors who have written about valuable leadership lessons during this time have noted the importance of acknowledging the emotional tolls of such a crisis and creating venues for hospitalists to share their experiences.1-4 However, solely adding “wellness” as a checklist item for leaders to address fails to capture the nuances of the complex human emotions that hospitalists may endure at this time and how these emotions influence frontline hospitalists’ responses to operational changes. It is critically important for hospital medicine leaders to employ emotional intelligence, defined as “the ability to monitor one’s own and others’ feelings and emotions, to discriminate among them and to use this information to guide one’s thinking and actions.”5-7 Integrating emotional intelligence allows hospital medicine leaders to anticipate, identify, articulate, and manage the emotional responses to necessary changes and stresses that occur during a crisis such as the COVID-19 pandemic.

As we applied principles of emotional intelligence to our leadership response to the COVID crisis, we found the following seven techniques effective (Appendix Table):

1. ASK. Leaders should ask individual hospitalists “How are you feeling?” instead of “How are you doing?” or “How can I help?” This question may feel too intimate for some, or leaders may worry that the question feels patronizing; however, in our experience, hospitalists respond positively to this prompt, welcome the opportunity to communicate their feelings, and value being heard. Moreover, when hospitalists feel overwhelmed, they may not be able to determine what help they do or do not need. By understanding the emotions of frontline hospitalists, leaders may be better able to address those emotions directly, find solutions to problems, and anticipate reactions to future policies.4

2. SHARE. Leaders should model what they ask of frontline hospitalists and share their own feelings, even if they are experiencing mixed or negative emotions. For instance, a leader who is feeling saddened about the death of a patient can begin a meeting by sharing this sentiment. By allowing themselves to display vulnerability, leaders demonstrate courage and promote a culture of openness, honesty, and mutual trust.

3. INITIATE. Leaders should embrace difficult conversations and be transparent about uncertainty, although they may not have the answers and may need to take local responsibility for consequences of decisions made externally, such as those made by the health system or government. Confronting difficult discussions and being transparent about “unknowns” provides acknowledgement, reassurance, and shared experience that expresses to the hospitalist group that, while the future may be unsettled, they will face it together.

4. ANTICIPATE. Leaders should anticipate the emotional responses to operational changes while designing them and rolling them out. While negative emotions may heavily outweigh positive emotions in times of crisis, we have also found that harnessing positive emotions when designing operational initiatives can assist with successful implementation. For example, by surveying our hospitalists, we found that many felt enthusiastic about caring for patients with COVID-19, curious about new skill sets, and passionate about helping in a time of crisis. By generating a list of these hospitalists up front, we were able to preferentially staff COVID-19 teams with providers who were eager to care for those patients and, thereby, minimize anxiety among those who were more apprehensive.

5. ENCOURAGE. Leaders should provide time and space (including virtually) for hospitalists to discuss their emotions.8 We found that creating multiple layers of opportunity for expression allows for engagement with a wider range of hospitalists, some of whom may be reluctant to share feelings openly or to a group, whereas others may enjoy the opportunity to reveal their feelings publicly. These varied venues for emotional expression may range from brief individual check-ins to open “office hours” to dedicated meetings such as “Hospitalist Town Halls.” For instance, spending the first few minutes of a meeting with a smaller group by encouraging each participant to share something personal can build community and mutual understanding, as well as cue leaders in to where participants may be on the emotional landscape.

6. NURTURE. Beyond inviting the expression of emotions, leaders should ensure that hospitalists have access to more formal systems of support, especially for hospitalists who may be experiencing more intense negative emotions. Support may be provided through unit- or team-based debriefing sessions, health-system sponsored support programs, or individual counseling sessions.4,8

7. APPRECIATE. Leaders should deliberately foster gratitude by sincerely and frequently expressing their appreciation. Because expressing gratitude builds resiliency,9 cultivating a culture of gratitude may bolster resilience in the entire hospital medicine group. Opportunities for thankfulness abound as hospitalists volunteer for extra shifts, cover for ill colleagues, participate in new working groups and task forces, and sacrifice their personal safety on the front lines. We often incorporate statements of appreciation into one-on-one conversations with hospitalists, during operational and divisional meetings, and in email. We also built gratitude expressions into the daily work on the Respiratory Isolation Unit at our hospital via daily interdisciplinary huddles for frontline providers to share their experiences and emotions. During huddles, providers are asked to pair negative emotions with suggestions for improvement and to share a moment of gratitude. This helps to engender a spirit of camaraderie, shared mission, and collective optimism.

CONCLUSION

Hospitalists are experiencing a wide range of emotions related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Hospital medicine leaders must have strategies to understand the emotions providers are experiencing. Being aware of and acknowledging these emotions up front can help leaders plan and implement the operational changes necessary to manage the crisis. Because our health system and city have fortunately been spared the worst of the pandemic so far without large volumes of patients with COVID-19, we recognize that the strategies above may be challenging for leaders in overwhelmed health systems. However, we hope that leaders at all levels can apply the lessons we have learned: to ask hospitalists how they are feeling, share their own feelings, initiate difficult conversations when needed, anticipate the emotional effects of operational changes, encourage expressions of emotion in multiple venues, nurture hospitalists who need more formal support, and appreciate frontline hospitalists. While the emotional needs of hospitalists will undoubtedly change over time as the pandemic evolves, we suspect that these strategies will continue to be important over the coming weeks, months, and longer as we settle into the postpandemic world.

References

1. Chopra V, Toner E, Waldhorn R, Washer L. How should U.S. hospitals prepare for coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19)? Ann Intern Med. 2020;172(9):621-622. https://doi.org/10.7326/m20-0907
2. Garg M, Wray CM. Hospital medicine management in the time of COVID-19: preparing for a sprint and a marathon. J Hosp Med. 2020;15(5):305-307. https://doi.org/10.12788/jhm.3427
3. Hertling M. Ten tips for a crisis : lessons from a soldier. J Hosp Med. 2020;15(5):275-276. https://doi.org/10.12788/jhm.3424
4. Shanafelt T, Ripp J, Trockel M. Understanding and addressing sources of anxiety among health care professionals during the COVID-19 pandemic. JAMA. Published online April 7, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2020.5893
5. Mintz LJ, Stoller JK. A systematic review of physician leadership and emotional intelligence. J Grad Med Educ. 2014;6(1):21-31. https://doi.org/10.4300/jgme-d-13-00012.1
6. Goleman D, Boyatzis R. Emotional intelligence has 12 elements. Which do you need to work on? Harvard Business Review. February 6, 2017. Accessed April 16, 2020. https://hbr.org/2017/02/emotional-intelligence-has-12-elements-which-do-you-need-to-work-on
7. Salovey P, Mayer JD. Emotional intelligence. Imagin Cogn Pers. 1990;9(3):185-211. https://doi.org/10.2190/DUGG-P24E-52WK-6CDG
8. Kisely S, Warren N, McMahon L, Dalais C, Henry I, Siskind D. Occurrence, prevention, and management of the psychological effects of emerging virus outbreaks on healthcare workers: rapid review and meta-analysis. BMJ. 2020;369:m1642. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.m1642
9. Kopans D. How to evaluate, manage, and strengthen your resilience. Harvard Business Review. June 14, 2016. Accessed April 21, 2020. https://hbr.org/2016/06/how-to-evaluate-manage-and-strengthen-your-resilience

References

1. Chopra V, Toner E, Waldhorn R, Washer L. How should U.S. hospitals prepare for coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19)? Ann Intern Med. 2020;172(9):621-622. https://doi.org/10.7326/m20-0907
2. Garg M, Wray CM. Hospital medicine management in the time of COVID-19: preparing for a sprint and a marathon. J Hosp Med. 2020;15(5):305-307. https://doi.org/10.12788/jhm.3427
3. Hertling M. Ten tips for a crisis : lessons from a soldier. J Hosp Med. 2020;15(5):275-276. https://doi.org/10.12788/jhm.3424
4. Shanafelt T, Ripp J, Trockel M. Understanding and addressing sources of anxiety among health care professionals during the COVID-19 pandemic. JAMA. Published online April 7, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2020.5893
5. Mintz LJ, Stoller JK. A systematic review of physician leadership and emotional intelligence. J Grad Med Educ. 2014;6(1):21-31. https://doi.org/10.4300/jgme-d-13-00012.1
6. Goleman D, Boyatzis R. Emotional intelligence has 12 elements. Which do you need to work on? Harvard Business Review. February 6, 2017. Accessed April 16, 2020. https://hbr.org/2017/02/emotional-intelligence-has-12-elements-which-do-you-need-to-work-on
7. Salovey P, Mayer JD. Emotional intelligence. Imagin Cogn Pers. 1990;9(3):185-211. https://doi.org/10.2190/DUGG-P24E-52WK-6CDG
8. Kisely S, Warren N, McMahon L, Dalais C, Henry I, Siskind D. Occurrence, prevention, and management of the psychological effects of emerging virus outbreaks on healthcare workers: rapid review and meta-analysis. BMJ. 2020;369:m1642. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.m1642
9. Kopans D. How to evaluate, manage, and strengthen your resilience. Harvard Business Review. June 14, 2016. Accessed April 21, 2020. https://hbr.org/2016/06/how-to-evaluate-manage-and-strengthen-your-resilience

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One of the worst public health threats of our generation, coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), first emerged in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 and quickly spread to Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. These three countries have been praised for their control of the pandemic,1,2 while the number of cases worldwide, including those in the United States, has soared. Political alignment, centralized and integrated healthcare systems, small size, effective technology deployment, widespread testing combined with contact tracing and isolation, and personal protective equipment (PPE) availability underscore their successes.1,3-5 Although these factors differ starkly from those currently employed in the United States, a better understanding their experience may positively influence the myriad US responses. We describe some salient features of Singapore’s infection preparedness, provide examples of how these features guided the National University Hospital (NUH) Singapore COVID-19 response, and illustrate how one facet of the NUH response was translated to develop a new care model at the University of California, San Francisco (UCSF).

THE SINGAPORE EXPERIENCE OVER TIME

Singapore, a small island country (278 square miles) city-state in Southeast Asia has a population of 5.8 million people. Most Singaporeans receive their inpatient care in the public hospitals that are organized and resourced through the Singapore Ministry of Health (MOH). In 2003, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) infected 238 people and killed 33 over 3 months in Singapore, which led to a significant economic downturn. Singapore’s initial SARS experience unveiled limitations in infrastructure, staff preparedness, virus control methodology, and centralized crisis systems. Lessons gleaned from the SARS experience laid the foundation for Singapore’s subsequent disaster preparedness.6

Post-SARS, the MOH created structures and systems to prepare Singapore for future epidemics. All public hospitals expanded isolation capacity by constructing new units or repurposing existing ones and creating colocated Emergency Department (ED) isolation facilities. Additionally, the MOH commissioned the National Centre for Infectious Diseases, a 330-bed high-level isolation hospital.7 They also mandated hospital systems to regularly practice mass casualty and infectious (including respiratory) crisis responses through externally evaluated simulation.8 These are orchestrated down to the smallest detail and involve staff at all levels. For example, healthcare workers (HCW) being “deployed” outside of their specialty, housekeepers practicing novel hazardous waste disposal, and security guards managing crowds interact throughout the exercise.

The testing and viral spread control challenges during SARS spawned hospital-system epidemiology capacity building. Infectious diseases reporting guidelines were refined, and communication channels enhanced to include cross-hospital information sharing and direct lines of communication for epidemiology groups to and from the MOH. Enhanced contact tracing methodologies were adopted and practiced regularly. In addition, material stockpiles, supplies, and supply chains were recalibrated.

The Singapore government also adopted the Disease Outbreak Response System Condition (DORSCON) system,9 a color-coded framework for pandemic response that guides activation of crisis interventions broadly (such as temperature screening at airports and restrictions to travel and internal movements), as well as within the healthcare setting.

In addition to prompting these notable preparedness efforts, SARS had a palpable impact on Singaporeans’ collective psychology both within and outside of the hospital system. The very close-knit medical community lost colleagues during the crisis, and the larger community deeply felt the health and economic costs of this crisis.10 The resulting “respect” or “healthy fear” for infectious crises continues to the present day.

 

 

THE SINGAPORE COVID-19 RESPONSE: NATIONAL UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL EXPERIENCE

The NUH is a 1,200-bed public tertiary care academic health center in Singapore. Before the first COVID-19 case was diagnosed in Singapore, NUH joined forces with its broader health system, university resources (schools of medicine and public health), and international partners to refine the existing structures and systems in response to this new infectious threat.

One of these structures included the existing NUH ED negative-pressure “fever facility.” In the ED triage, patients are routinely screened for infectious diseases such as H1N1, MERS-CoV, and measles. In early January, these screening criteria were evolved to adapt to COVID-19. High-risk patients bypass common waiting areas and are sent directly to the fever facility for management. From there, patients requiring admission are sent to one of the inpatient isolation wards, each with over 21 negative-pressure isolation rooms. To expand isolation capacity, lower-priority patients were relocated, and the existing negative- and neutral-pressure rooms were converted into COVID-19 pandemic wards.

The pandemic wards are staffed by nurses with previous isolation experience and Internal Medicine and Subspecialty Medicine physicians and trainees working closely with Infectious Diseases experts. Pandemic Ward teams are sequestered from other clinical and administrative teams, wear hospital-­laundered scrubs, and use PPE-conserving practices. These strategies, implemented at the outset, are based on international guidelines contextualized to local needs and include extended use (up to 6 hours) of N95 respirators for the pandemic wards, and surgical masks in all other clinical areas. Notably, there have been no documented transmissions to HCW or patients at NUH. The workforce was maximized by limiting nonurgent clinical, administrative, research, and teaching activities.

In February, COVID-19 testing was initiated internally and deployed widely. NUH, at the time of this writing, has performed more than 6,000 swabs with up to 200 tests run per day (with 80 confirmed cases). Testing at this scale has allowed NUH to ensure: (a) prompt isolation of patients, even those with mild symptoms, (b) deisolation of those testing negative thus conserving PPE and isolation facilities, (c) a better understanding of the epidemiology and the wide range of clinical manifestations of COVID-19, and (d) early comprehensive contact tracing including mildly symptomatic patients.

The MOH plays a central role in coordinating COVID-19 activities and supports individual hospital systems such as NUH. Some of their crisis leadership strategies include daily text messages distributed countrywide, two-way communication channels that ensure feedback loops with hospital executives, epidemiology specialists, and operational workgroups, and engendering interhospital collaboration.11

A US HOSPITAL MEDICINE RESPONSE: UC SAN FRANCISCO

In the United States, the Joint Commission provides structures, tools, and processes for hospital systems to prepare for disasters.12 Many hospital systems have experience with natural disasters which, similar to Singapore’s planning, ensures structures and systems are in place during a crisis. Although these are transferable to multiple types of disasters, the US healthcare system’s direct experience with infectious crises is limited. A fairly distinctive facet—and an asset of US healthcare—is the role of hospitalists.

 

 

Hospitalists care for the majority of medical inpatients across the United States,13 and as such, they currently, and will increasingly, play a major role in the US COVID-19 response. This is the case at the UCSF Helen Diller Medical Center at Parnassus Heights (UCSFMC), a 600-bed academic medical center. To learn from other’s early experiences with COVID-19, UCSF Health System leadership connected with many outside health systems including NUH. As one of its multiple pandemic responses, they engaged the UCSFMC Division of Hospital Medicine (DHM), a division that includes 117 hospitalists, to work with hospital and health system leadership and launch a respiratory isolation unit (RIU) modeled after the NUH pandemic ward. The aim of the RIU is to group inpatients with either confirmed or suspected COVID-19 patients who do not require critical care.

An interdisciplinary work group comprising hospitalists, infectious disease specialists, emergency department clinicians, nursing, rehabilitation experts, hospital epidemiology and infection-prevention leaders, safety specialists, and systems engineers was assembled to repurpose an existing medical unit and establish new care models for the RIU. This workgroup created clinical guidelines and workflows, and RIU leaders actively solicit feedback from the staff to advance these standards.

Hospitalists and nurses who volunteered to work on the UCSF attending-staffed RIU received extensive training, including online and widely available in-person PPE training delivered by infection-prevention experts. The RIU hospitalists engage with hospitalists nationwide through ongoing conference calls to share best practices and clinical cases. Patients are admitted by hospitalists to the RIU via the emergency department or directly from ambulatory sites. All RIU providers and staff are screened daily for symptoms prior to starting their shifts, wear hospital-laundered scrubs on the unit, and remain on the unit for the duration of their shift. Hospitalists and nurses communicate regularly to cluster their patient visits and interventions while specialists provide virtual consults (as deemed safe and appropriate) to optimize PPE conservation and decrease overall exposure. The Health System establishes and revises PPE protocols based on CDC guidelines, best available evidence, and supply chain realities. These guidelines are evolving and currently include surgical mask, gown, gloves, and eye protection for all patient interactions with suspected or confirmed COVID-19 and respirator use during aerosol-generating procedures. Research studies (eg, clinical trials and evaluations), informatics efforts (eg, patient flow dashboards), and healthcare technology innovations (eg, tablets for telehealth and video visits) are continually integrated into the RIU infrastructure. Robust attention to the well-being of everyone working on the unit includes chaplain visits, daily debriefs, meal delivery, and palliative care service support, which enrich the unit experience and instill a culture of unity.

MOVING FORWARD

The structures and systems born out of the 2003 SARS experience and the “test, trace, and isolate” strategy were arguably key drivers to flatten Singapore’s epidemic curve early in the pandemic.3 Even with these in place, Singapore is now experiencing a second wave with a significantly higher caseload.14 In response, the government instituted strict social distancing measures on April 3, closing schools and most workplaces. This suggests that the COVID-19 pandemic may fluctuate over time and that varying types and levels of interventions will be required to maintain long-term control. The NUH team describes experiencing cognitive overload given the ever-changing nature and volume of information and fatigue due to the effort required and duration of this crisis. New programs addressing these challenges are being developed and rapidly deployed.

 

 

Despite early testing limitations and newly minted systems, San Francisco is cautiously optimistic about its epidemic curve. Since the March 17, 2020, “shelter in place” order, COVID-19 hospitalizations have remained manageable and constant.15 This has afforded healthcare systems including UCSF critical time to evolve its clinical operations (eg, the RIU) and to leverage its academic culture coordinating its bench research, global health, epidemiology, clinical research, informatics, and clinical enterprise scholars and experts to advance COVID-19 science and inform pandemic solutions. Although the UCSF frontline teams are challenged by the stresses of being in the throes of the pandemic amidst a rapidly changing landscape (including changes in PPE and testing recommendations specifically), they are working together to build team resilience for what may come.

CONCLUSION

The world is facing a pandemic of tremendous proportions, and the United States is in the midst of a wave the height of which is yet to be seen. As Fisher and colleagues wrote in 2011, “Our response to infectious disease outbreaks is born out of past experience.”4 Singapore and NUH’s structures and systems that were put into place demonstrate this—they are timely, have been effective thus far, and will be tested in this next wave. “However, no two outbreaks are the same,” the authors wrote, “so an understanding of the infectious agent as well as the environment confronting it is fundamental to the response.”4 In the United States, hospitalists are a key asset in our environment to confront this virus. The UCSF experience exemplifies that, by combining new ideas from another system with on-the-ground expertise while working hand-in-hand with the hospital and health system, hospitalists can be a critical facet of the pandemic response. Hospitalists’ intrinsic abilities to collaborate, learn, and innovate will enable them to not only meet this challenge now but also to transform practices and capacities to respond to crises into the future.

Acknowledgment

Bradley Sharpe, MD, Division Chief, Division of Hospital Medicine, University of California, San Francisco, California, for his input on conception and critical review of this manuscript.

References

1. Wang CJ, Ng CY, Brook RH. Response to COVID-19 in Taiwan: big data analytics, new technology, and proactive testing. JAMA. 2020. https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2020.3151.
2. Legido-Quigley H, Asgari N, Teo YY, et al. Are high-performing health systems resilient against the COVID-19 epidemic? Lancet. 2020;395(10227):848-850. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)30551-1.
3. Wong JEL, Leo YS, Tan CC. COVID-19 in Singapore—current experience: critical global issues that require attention and action. JAMA. 2020;323(13):1243-1244. https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2020.2467.
4. Fisher D, Hui DS, Gao Z, et al. Pandemic response lessons from influenza H1N1 2009 in Asia. Respirology. 2011;16(6):876-882. https://doi.org/ 10.1111/j.1440-1843.2011.02003.x.
5. Wong ATY, Chen H, Liu SH, et al. From SARS to avian influenza preparedness in Hong Kong. Clin Infect Dis. 2017;64(suppl_2):S98-S104. https://doi.org/ 10.1093/cid/cix123.
6. Tan CC. SARS in Singapore--key lessons from an epidemic. Ann Acad Med Singapore. 2006;35(5):345-349.
7. National Centre for Infectious Diseases. About NCID. https://www.ncid.sg/About-NCID/Pages/default.aspx. Accessed April 5, 2020.
8. Cutter J. Preparing for an influenza pandemic in Singapore. Ann Acad Med Singapore. 2008;37(6):497-503.
9. Singapore Ministry of Health. What do the different DORSCON levels mean. http://www.gov.sg/article/what-do-the-different-dorscon-levels-mean. Accessed April 5, 2020.
10. Lee J-W, McKibbin WJ. Estimating the global economic costs of SARS. In: Knobler S, Mahmoud A, Lemon S, et al, eds. Institute of Medicine (US) Forum on Microbial Threats. Washington, DC: National Academies Press (US); 2004.
11. James EH, Wooten L. Leadership as (un)usual: how to display competence in times of crisis. Organ Dyn. 2005;34(2):141-152. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orgdyn.2005.03.005
12. The Joint Commission. Emergency Management: Coronavirus Resources. 2020. https://www.jointcommission.org/covid-19/. Accessed April 4, 2020.
13. Wachter RM, Goldman L. Zero to 50,000 – the 20th anniversary of the hospitalist. N Engl J Med. 2016;375(11):1009-1011. https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMp1607958.
14. Singapore Ministry of Health. Official Update of COVID-19 Situation in Singapore. 2020. https://experience.arcgis.com/experience/7e30edc490a5441a874f9efe67bd8b89. Accessed April 5, 2020.
15. Chronicle Digital Team. Coronavirus tracker. San Francisco Chronicle. https://projects.sfchronicle.com/2020/coronavirus-map/. Accessed April 5, 2020.

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1Division of Hospital Medicine, Department of Medicine, University of California, San Francisco, California; 2Duke-NUS Medical School, Singapore; 3Division of Infectious Diseases, Department of Medicine, National University Hospital, National University Health System, Singapore; 4Yong Loo Lin School of Medicine, National University of Singapore, Singapore; 5Division of Pediatric Hospital Medicine, Department of Pediatrics, University of California, San Francisco, California; 6Division of Hand and Reconstructive Microsurgery, Department of Orthopedic Surgery, National University Hospital, National University Health System, Singapore.

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The authors have nothing to disclose.

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1Division of Hospital Medicine, Department of Medicine, University of California, San Francisco, California; 2Duke-NUS Medical School, Singapore; 3Division of Infectious Diseases, Department of Medicine, National University Hospital, National University Health System, Singapore; 4Yong Loo Lin School of Medicine, National University of Singapore, Singapore; 5Division of Pediatric Hospital Medicine, Department of Pediatrics, University of California, San Francisco, California; 6Division of Hand and Reconstructive Microsurgery, Department of Orthopedic Surgery, National University Hospital, National University Health System, Singapore.

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The authors have nothing to disclose.

Author and Disclosure Information

1Division of Hospital Medicine, Department of Medicine, University of California, San Francisco, California; 2Duke-NUS Medical School, Singapore; 3Division of Infectious Diseases, Department of Medicine, National University Hospital, National University Health System, Singapore; 4Yong Loo Lin School of Medicine, National University of Singapore, Singapore; 5Division of Pediatric Hospital Medicine, Department of Pediatrics, University of California, San Francisco, California; 6Division of Hand and Reconstructive Microsurgery, Department of Orthopedic Surgery, National University Hospital, National University Health System, Singapore.

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One of the worst public health threats of our generation, coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), first emerged in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 and quickly spread to Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. These three countries have been praised for their control of the pandemic,1,2 while the number of cases worldwide, including those in the United States, has soared. Political alignment, centralized and integrated healthcare systems, small size, effective technology deployment, widespread testing combined with contact tracing and isolation, and personal protective equipment (PPE) availability underscore their successes.1,3-5 Although these factors differ starkly from those currently employed in the United States, a better understanding their experience may positively influence the myriad US responses. We describe some salient features of Singapore’s infection preparedness, provide examples of how these features guided the National University Hospital (NUH) Singapore COVID-19 response, and illustrate how one facet of the NUH response was translated to develop a new care model at the University of California, San Francisco (UCSF).

THE SINGAPORE EXPERIENCE OVER TIME

Singapore, a small island country (278 square miles) city-state in Southeast Asia has a population of 5.8 million people. Most Singaporeans receive their inpatient care in the public hospitals that are organized and resourced through the Singapore Ministry of Health (MOH). In 2003, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) infected 238 people and killed 33 over 3 months in Singapore, which led to a significant economic downturn. Singapore’s initial SARS experience unveiled limitations in infrastructure, staff preparedness, virus control methodology, and centralized crisis systems. Lessons gleaned from the SARS experience laid the foundation for Singapore’s subsequent disaster preparedness.6

Post-SARS, the MOH created structures and systems to prepare Singapore for future epidemics. All public hospitals expanded isolation capacity by constructing new units or repurposing existing ones and creating colocated Emergency Department (ED) isolation facilities. Additionally, the MOH commissioned the National Centre for Infectious Diseases, a 330-bed high-level isolation hospital.7 They also mandated hospital systems to regularly practice mass casualty and infectious (including respiratory) crisis responses through externally evaluated simulation.8 These are orchestrated down to the smallest detail and involve staff at all levels. For example, healthcare workers (HCW) being “deployed” outside of their specialty, housekeepers practicing novel hazardous waste disposal, and security guards managing crowds interact throughout the exercise.

The testing and viral spread control challenges during SARS spawned hospital-system epidemiology capacity building. Infectious diseases reporting guidelines were refined, and communication channels enhanced to include cross-hospital information sharing and direct lines of communication for epidemiology groups to and from the MOH. Enhanced contact tracing methodologies were adopted and practiced regularly. In addition, material stockpiles, supplies, and supply chains were recalibrated.

The Singapore government also adopted the Disease Outbreak Response System Condition (DORSCON) system,9 a color-coded framework for pandemic response that guides activation of crisis interventions broadly (such as temperature screening at airports and restrictions to travel and internal movements), as well as within the healthcare setting.

In addition to prompting these notable preparedness efforts, SARS had a palpable impact on Singaporeans’ collective psychology both within and outside of the hospital system. The very close-knit medical community lost colleagues during the crisis, and the larger community deeply felt the health and economic costs of this crisis.10 The resulting “respect” or “healthy fear” for infectious crises continues to the present day.

 

 

THE SINGAPORE COVID-19 RESPONSE: NATIONAL UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL EXPERIENCE

The NUH is a 1,200-bed public tertiary care academic health center in Singapore. Before the first COVID-19 case was diagnosed in Singapore, NUH joined forces with its broader health system, university resources (schools of medicine and public health), and international partners to refine the existing structures and systems in response to this new infectious threat.

One of these structures included the existing NUH ED negative-pressure “fever facility.” In the ED triage, patients are routinely screened for infectious diseases such as H1N1, MERS-CoV, and measles. In early January, these screening criteria were evolved to adapt to COVID-19. High-risk patients bypass common waiting areas and are sent directly to the fever facility for management. From there, patients requiring admission are sent to one of the inpatient isolation wards, each with over 21 negative-pressure isolation rooms. To expand isolation capacity, lower-priority patients were relocated, and the existing negative- and neutral-pressure rooms were converted into COVID-19 pandemic wards.

The pandemic wards are staffed by nurses with previous isolation experience and Internal Medicine and Subspecialty Medicine physicians and trainees working closely with Infectious Diseases experts. Pandemic Ward teams are sequestered from other clinical and administrative teams, wear hospital-­laundered scrubs, and use PPE-conserving practices. These strategies, implemented at the outset, are based on international guidelines contextualized to local needs and include extended use (up to 6 hours) of N95 respirators for the pandemic wards, and surgical masks in all other clinical areas. Notably, there have been no documented transmissions to HCW or patients at NUH. The workforce was maximized by limiting nonurgent clinical, administrative, research, and teaching activities.

In February, COVID-19 testing was initiated internally and deployed widely. NUH, at the time of this writing, has performed more than 6,000 swabs with up to 200 tests run per day (with 80 confirmed cases). Testing at this scale has allowed NUH to ensure: (a) prompt isolation of patients, even those with mild symptoms, (b) deisolation of those testing negative thus conserving PPE and isolation facilities, (c) a better understanding of the epidemiology and the wide range of clinical manifestations of COVID-19, and (d) early comprehensive contact tracing including mildly symptomatic patients.

The MOH plays a central role in coordinating COVID-19 activities and supports individual hospital systems such as NUH. Some of their crisis leadership strategies include daily text messages distributed countrywide, two-way communication channels that ensure feedback loops with hospital executives, epidemiology specialists, and operational workgroups, and engendering interhospital collaboration.11

A US HOSPITAL MEDICINE RESPONSE: UC SAN FRANCISCO

In the United States, the Joint Commission provides structures, tools, and processes for hospital systems to prepare for disasters.12 Many hospital systems have experience with natural disasters which, similar to Singapore’s planning, ensures structures and systems are in place during a crisis. Although these are transferable to multiple types of disasters, the US healthcare system’s direct experience with infectious crises is limited. A fairly distinctive facet—and an asset of US healthcare—is the role of hospitalists.

 

 

Hospitalists care for the majority of medical inpatients across the United States,13 and as such, they currently, and will increasingly, play a major role in the US COVID-19 response. This is the case at the UCSF Helen Diller Medical Center at Parnassus Heights (UCSFMC), a 600-bed academic medical center. To learn from other’s early experiences with COVID-19, UCSF Health System leadership connected with many outside health systems including NUH. As one of its multiple pandemic responses, they engaged the UCSFMC Division of Hospital Medicine (DHM), a division that includes 117 hospitalists, to work with hospital and health system leadership and launch a respiratory isolation unit (RIU) modeled after the NUH pandemic ward. The aim of the RIU is to group inpatients with either confirmed or suspected COVID-19 patients who do not require critical care.

An interdisciplinary work group comprising hospitalists, infectious disease specialists, emergency department clinicians, nursing, rehabilitation experts, hospital epidemiology and infection-prevention leaders, safety specialists, and systems engineers was assembled to repurpose an existing medical unit and establish new care models for the RIU. This workgroup created clinical guidelines and workflows, and RIU leaders actively solicit feedback from the staff to advance these standards.

Hospitalists and nurses who volunteered to work on the UCSF attending-staffed RIU received extensive training, including online and widely available in-person PPE training delivered by infection-prevention experts. The RIU hospitalists engage with hospitalists nationwide through ongoing conference calls to share best practices and clinical cases. Patients are admitted by hospitalists to the RIU via the emergency department or directly from ambulatory sites. All RIU providers and staff are screened daily for symptoms prior to starting their shifts, wear hospital-laundered scrubs on the unit, and remain on the unit for the duration of their shift. Hospitalists and nurses communicate regularly to cluster their patient visits and interventions while specialists provide virtual consults (as deemed safe and appropriate) to optimize PPE conservation and decrease overall exposure. The Health System establishes and revises PPE protocols based on CDC guidelines, best available evidence, and supply chain realities. These guidelines are evolving and currently include surgical mask, gown, gloves, and eye protection for all patient interactions with suspected or confirmed COVID-19 and respirator use during aerosol-generating procedures. Research studies (eg, clinical trials and evaluations), informatics efforts (eg, patient flow dashboards), and healthcare technology innovations (eg, tablets for telehealth and video visits) are continually integrated into the RIU infrastructure. Robust attention to the well-being of everyone working on the unit includes chaplain visits, daily debriefs, meal delivery, and palliative care service support, which enrich the unit experience and instill a culture of unity.

MOVING FORWARD

The structures and systems born out of the 2003 SARS experience and the “test, trace, and isolate” strategy were arguably key drivers to flatten Singapore’s epidemic curve early in the pandemic.3 Even with these in place, Singapore is now experiencing a second wave with a significantly higher caseload.14 In response, the government instituted strict social distancing measures on April 3, closing schools and most workplaces. This suggests that the COVID-19 pandemic may fluctuate over time and that varying types and levels of interventions will be required to maintain long-term control. The NUH team describes experiencing cognitive overload given the ever-changing nature and volume of information and fatigue due to the effort required and duration of this crisis. New programs addressing these challenges are being developed and rapidly deployed.

 

 

Despite early testing limitations and newly minted systems, San Francisco is cautiously optimistic about its epidemic curve. Since the March 17, 2020, “shelter in place” order, COVID-19 hospitalizations have remained manageable and constant.15 This has afforded healthcare systems including UCSF critical time to evolve its clinical operations (eg, the RIU) and to leverage its academic culture coordinating its bench research, global health, epidemiology, clinical research, informatics, and clinical enterprise scholars and experts to advance COVID-19 science and inform pandemic solutions. Although the UCSF frontline teams are challenged by the stresses of being in the throes of the pandemic amidst a rapidly changing landscape (including changes in PPE and testing recommendations specifically), they are working together to build team resilience for what may come.

CONCLUSION

The world is facing a pandemic of tremendous proportions, and the United States is in the midst of a wave the height of which is yet to be seen. As Fisher and colleagues wrote in 2011, “Our response to infectious disease outbreaks is born out of past experience.”4 Singapore and NUH’s structures and systems that were put into place demonstrate this—they are timely, have been effective thus far, and will be tested in this next wave. “However, no two outbreaks are the same,” the authors wrote, “so an understanding of the infectious agent as well as the environment confronting it is fundamental to the response.”4 In the United States, hospitalists are a key asset in our environment to confront this virus. The UCSF experience exemplifies that, by combining new ideas from another system with on-the-ground expertise while working hand-in-hand with the hospital and health system, hospitalists can be a critical facet of the pandemic response. Hospitalists’ intrinsic abilities to collaborate, learn, and innovate will enable them to not only meet this challenge now but also to transform practices and capacities to respond to crises into the future.

Acknowledgment

Bradley Sharpe, MD, Division Chief, Division of Hospital Medicine, University of California, San Francisco, California, for his input on conception and critical review of this manuscript.

One of the worst public health threats of our generation, coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), first emerged in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 and quickly spread to Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. These three countries have been praised for their control of the pandemic,1,2 while the number of cases worldwide, including those in the United States, has soared. Political alignment, centralized and integrated healthcare systems, small size, effective technology deployment, widespread testing combined with contact tracing and isolation, and personal protective equipment (PPE) availability underscore their successes.1,3-5 Although these factors differ starkly from those currently employed in the United States, a better understanding their experience may positively influence the myriad US responses. We describe some salient features of Singapore’s infection preparedness, provide examples of how these features guided the National University Hospital (NUH) Singapore COVID-19 response, and illustrate how one facet of the NUH response was translated to develop a new care model at the University of California, San Francisco (UCSF).

THE SINGAPORE EXPERIENCE OVER TIME

Singapore, a small island country (278 square miles) city-state in Southeast Asia has a population of 5.8 million people. Most Singaporeans receive their inpatient care in the public hospitals that are organized and resourced through the Singapore Ministry of Health (MOH). In 2003, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) infected 238 people and killed 33 over 3 months in Singapore, which led to a significant economic downturn. Singapore’s initial SARS experience unveiled limitations in infrastructure, staff preparedness, virus control methodology, and centralized crisis systems. Lessons gleaned from the SARS experience laid the foundation for Singapore’s subsequent disaster preparedness.6

Post-SARS, the MOH created structures and systems to prepare Singapore for future epidemics. All public hospitals expanded isolation capacity by constructing new units or repurposing existing ones and creating colocated Emergency Department (ED) isolation facilities. Additionally, the MOH commissioned the National Centre for Infectious Diseases, a 330-bed high-level isolation hospital.7 They also mandated hospital systems to regularly practice mass casualty and infectious (including respiratory) crisis responses through externally evaluated simulation.8 These are orchestrated down to the smallest detail and involve staff at all levels. For example, healthcare workers (HCW) being “deployed” outside of their specialty, housekeepers practicing novel hazardous waste disposal, and security guards managing crowds interact throughout the exercise.

The testing and viral spread control challenges during SARS spawned hospital-system epidemiology capacity building. Infectious diseases reporting guidelines were refined, and communication channels enhanced to include cross-hospital information sharing and direct lines of communication for epidemiology groups to and from the MOH. Enhanced contact tracing methodologies were adopted and practiced regularly. In addition, material stockpiles, supplies, and supply chains were recalibrated.

The Singapore government also adopted the Disease Outbreak Response System Condition (DORSCON) system,9 a color-coded framework for pandemic response that guides activation of crisis interventions broadly (such as temperature screening at airports and restrictions to travel and internal movements), as well as within the healthcare setting.

In addition to prompting these notable preparedness efforts, SARS had a palpable impact on Singaporeans’ collective psychology both within and outside of the hospital system. The very close-knit medical community lost colleagues during the crisis, and the larger community deeply felt the health and economic costs of this crisis.10 The resulting “respect” or “healthy fear” for infectious crises continues to the present day.

 

 

THE SINGAPORE COVID-19 RESPONSE: NATIONAL UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL EXPERIENCE

The NUH is a 1,200-bed public tertiary care academic health center in Singapore. Before the first COVID-19 case was diagnosed in Singapore, NUH joined forces with its broader health system, university resources (schools of medicine and public health), and international partners to refine the existing structures and systems in response to this new infectious threat.

One of these structures included the existing NUH ED negative-pressure “fever facility.” In the ED triage, patients are routinely screened for infectious diseases such as H1N1, MERS-CoV, and measles. In early January, these screening criteria were evolved to adapt to COVID-19. High-risk patients bypass common waiting areas and are sent directly to the fever facility for management. From there, patients requiring admission are sent to one of the inpatient isolation wards, each with over 21 negative-pressure isolation rooms. To expand isolation capacity, lower-priority patients were relocated, and the existing negative- and neutral-pressure rooms were converted into COVID-19 pandemic wards.

The pandemic wards are staffed by nurses with previous isolation experience and Internal Medicine and Subspecialty Medicine physicians and trainees working closely with Infectious Diseases experts. Pandemic Ward teams are sequestered from other clinical and administrative teams, wear hospital-­laundered scrubs, and use PPE-conserving practices. These strategies, implemented at the outset, are based on international guidelines contextualized to local needs and include extended use (up to 6 hours) of N95 respirators for the pandemic wards, and surgical masks in all other clinical areas. Notably, there have been no documented transmissions to HCW or patients at NUH. The workforce was maximized by limiting nonurgent clinical, administrative, research, and teaching activities.

In February, COVID-19 testing was initiated internally and deployed widely. NUH, at the time of this writing, has performed more than 6,000 swabs with up to 200 tests run per day (with 80 confirmed cases). Testing at this scale has allowed NUH to ensure: (a) prompt isolation of patients, even those with mild symptoms, (b) deisolation of those testing negative thus conserving PPE and isolation facilities, (c) a better understanding of the epidemiology and the wide range of clinical manifestations of COVID-19, and (d) early comprehensive contact tracing including mildly symptomatic patients.

The MOH plays a central role in coordinating COVID-19 activities and supports individual hospital systems such as NUH. Some of their crisis leadership strategies include daily text messages distributed countrywide, two-way communication channels that ensure feedback loops with hospital executives, epidemiology specialists, and operational workgroups, and engendering interhospital collaboration.11

A US HOSPITAL MEDICINE RESPONSE: UC SAN FRANCISCO

In the United States, the Joint Commission provides structures, tools, and processes for hospital systems to prepare for disasters.12 Many hospital systems have experience with natural disasters which, similar to Singapore’s planning, ensures structures and systems are in place during a crisis. Although these are transferable to multiple types of disasters, the US healthcare system’s direct experience with infectious crises is limited. A fairly distinctive facet—and an asset of US healthcare—is the role of hospitalists.

 

 

Hospitalists care for the majority of medical inpatients across the United States,13 and as such, they currently, and will increasingly, play a major role in the US COVID-19 response. This is the case at the UCSF Helen Diller Medical Center at Parnassus Heights (UCSFMC), a 600-bed academic medical center. To learn from other’s early experiences with COVID-19, UCSF Health System leadership connected with many outside health systems including NUH. As one of its multiple pandemic responses, they engaged the UCSFMC Division of Hospital Medicine (DHM), a division that includes 117 hospitalists, to work with hospital and health system leadership and launch a respiratory isolation unit (RIU) modeled after the NUH pandemic ward. The aim of the RIU is to group inpatients with either confirmed or suspected COVID-19 patients who do not require critical care.

An interdisciplinary work group comprising hospitalists, infectious disease specialists, emergency department clinicians, nursing, rehabilitation experts, hospital epidemiology and infection-prevention leaders, safety specialists, and systems engineers was assembled to repurpose an existing medical unit and establish new care models for the RIU. This workgroup created clinical guidelines and workflows, and RIU leaders actively solicit feedback from the staff to advance these standards.

Hospitalists and nurses who volunteered to work on the UCSF attending-staffed RIU received extensive training, including online and widely available in-person PPE training delivered by infection-prevention experts. The RIU hospitalists engage with hospitalists nationwide through ongoing conference calls to share best practices and clinical cases. Patients are admitted by hospitalists to the RIU via the emergency department or directly from ambulatory sites. All RIU providers and staff are screened daily for symptoms prior to starting their shifts, wear hospital-laundered scrubs on the unit, and remain on the unit for the duration of their shift. Hospitalists and nurses communicate regularly to cluster their patient visits and interventions while specialists provide virtual consults (as deemed safe and appropriate) to optimize PPE conservation and decrease overall exposure. The Health System establishes and revises PPE protocols based on CDC guidelines, best available evidence, and supply chain realities. These guidelines are evolving and currently include surgical mask, gown, gloves, and eye protection for all patient interactions with suspected or confirmed COVID-19 and respirator use during aerosol-generating procedures. Research studies (eg, clinical trials and evaluations), informatics efforts (eg, patient flow dashboards), and healthcare technology innovations (eg, tablets for telehealth and video visits) are continually integrated into the RIU infrastructure. Robust attention to the well-being of everyone working on the unit includes chaplain visits, daily debriefs, meal delivery, and palliative care service support, which enrich the unit experience and instill a culture of unity.

MOVING FORWARD

The structures and systems born out of the 2003 SARS experience and the “test, trace, and isolate” strategy were arguably key drivers to flatten Singapore’s epidemic curve early in the pandemic.3 Even with these in place, Singapore is now experiencing a second wave with a significantly higher caseload.14 In response, the government instituted strict social distancing measures on April 3, closing schools and most workplaces. This suggests that the COVID-19 pandemic may fluctuate over time and that varying types and levels of interventions will be required to maintain long-term control. The NUH team describes experiencing cognitive overload given the ever-changing nature and volume of information and fatigue due to the effort required and duration of this crisis. New programs addressing these challenges are being developed and rapidly deployed.

 

 

Despite early testing limitations and newly minted systems, San Francisco is cautiously optimistic about its epidemic curve. Since the March 17, 2020, “shelter in place” order, COVID-19 hospitalizations have remained manageable and constant.15 This has afforded healthcare systems including UCSF critical time to evolve its clinical operations (eg, the RIU) and to leverage its academic culture coordinating its bench research, global health, epidemiology, clinical research, informatics, and clinical enterprise scholars and experts to advance COVID-19 science and inform pandemic solutions. Although the UCSF frontline teams are challenged by the stresses of being in the throes of the pandemic amidst a rapidly changing landscape (including changes in PPE and testing recommendations specifically), they are working together to build team resilience for what may come.

CONCLUSION

The world is facing a pandemic of tremendous proportions, and the United States is in the midst of a wave the height of which is yet to be seen. As Fisher and colleagues wrote in 2011, “Our response to infectious disease outbreaks is born out of past experience.”4 Singapore and NUH’s structures and systems that were put into place demonstrate this—they are timely, have been effective thus far, and will be tested in this next wave. “However, no two outbreaks are the same,” the authors wrote, “so an understanding of the infectious agent as well as the environment confronting it is fundamental to the response.”4 In the United States, hospitalists are a key asset in our environment to confront this virus. The UCSF experience exemplifies that, by combining new ideas from another system with on-the-ground expertise while working hand-in-hand with the hospital and health system, hospitalists can be a critical facet of the pandemic response. Hospitalists’ intrinsic abilities to collaborate, learn, and innovate will enable them to not only meet this challenge now but also to transform practices and capacities to respond to crises into the future.

Acknowledgment

Bradley Sharpe, MD, Division Chief, Division of Hospital Medicine, University of California, San Francisco, California, for his input on conception and critical review of this manuscript.

References

1. Wang CJ, Ng CY, Brook RH. Response to COVID-19 in Taiwan: big data analytics, new technology, and proactive testing. JAMA. 2020. https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2020.3151.
2. Legido-Quigley H, Asgari N, Teo YY, et al. Are high-performing health systems resilient against the COVID-19 epidemic? Lancet. 2020;395(10227):848-850. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)30551-1.
3. Wong JEL, Leo YS, Tan CC. COVID-19 in Singapore—current experience: critical global issues that require attention and action. JAMA. 2020;323(13):1243-1244. https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2020.2467.
4. Fisher D, Hui DS, Gao Z, et al. Pandemic response lessons from influenza H1N1 2009 in Asia. Respirology. 2011;16(6):876-882. https://doi.org/ 10.1111/j.1440-1843.2011.02003.x.
5. Wong ATY, Chen H, Liu SH, et al. From SARS to avian influenza preparedness in Hong Kong. Clin Infect Dis. 2017;64(suppl_2):S98-S104. https://doi.org/ 10.1093/cid/cix123.
6. Tan CC. SARS in Singapore--key lessons from an epidemic. Ann Acad Med Singapore. 2006;35(5):345-349.
7. National Centre for Infectious Diseases. About NCID. https://www.ncid.sg/About-NCID/Pages/default.aspx. Accessed April 5, 2020.
8. Cutter J. Preparing for an influenza pandemic in Singapore. Ann Acad Med Singapore. 2008;37(6):497-503.
9. Singapore Ministry of Health. What do the different DORSCON levels mean. http://www.gov.sg/article/what-do-the-different-dorscon-levels-mean. Accessed April 5, 2020.
10. Lee J-W, McKibbin WJ. Estimating the global economic costs of SARS. In: Knobler S, Mahmoud A, Lemon S, et al, eds. Institute of Medicine (US) Forum on Microbial Threats. Washington, DC: National Academies Press (US); 2004.
11. James EH, Wooten L. Leadership as (un)usual: how to display competence in times of crisis. Organ Dyn. 2005;34(2):141-152. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orgdyn.2005.03.005
12. The Joint Commission. Emergency Management: Coronavirus Resources. 2020. https://www.jointcommission.org/covid-19/. Accessed April 4, 2020.
13. Wachter RM, Goldman L. Zero to 50,000 – the 20th anniversary of the hospitalist. N Engl J Med. 2016;375(11):1009-1011. https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMp1607958.
14. Singapore Ministry of Health. Official Update of COVID-19 Situation in Singapore. 2020. https://experience.arcgis.com/experience/7e30edc490a5441a874f9efe67bd8b89. Accessed April 5, 2020.
15. Chronicle Digital Team. Coronavirus tracker. San Francisco Chronicle. https://projects.sfchronicle.com/2020/coronavirus-map/. Accessed April 5, 2020.

References

1. Wang CJ, Ng CY, Brook RH. Response to COVID-19 in Taiwan: big data analytics, new technology, and proactive testing. JAMA. 2020. https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2020.3151.
2. Legido-Quigley H, Asgari N, Teo YY, et al. Are high-performing health systems resilient against the COVID-19 epidemic? Lancet. 2020;395(10227):848-850. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)30551-1.
3. Wong JEL, Leo YS, Tan CC. COVID-19 in Singapore—current experience: critical global issues that require attention and action. JAMA. 2020;323(13):1243-1244. https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2020.2467.
4. Fisher D, Hui DS, Gao Z, et al. Pandemic response lessons from influenza H1N1 2009 in Asia. Respirology. 2011;16(6):876-882. https://doi.org/ 10.1111/j.1440-1843.2011.02003.x.
5. Wong ATY, Chen H, Liu SH, et al. From SARS to avian influenza preparedness in Hong Kong. Clin Infect Dis. 2017;64(suppl_2):S98-S104. https://doi.org/ 10.1093/cid/cix123.
6. Tan CC. SARS in Singapore--key lessons from an epidemic. Ann Acad Med Singapore. 2006;35(5):345-349.
7. National Centre for Infectious Diseases. About NCID. https://www.ncid.sg/About-NCID/Pages/default.aspx. Accessed April 5, 2020.
8. Cutter J. Preparing for an influenza pandemic in Singapore. Ann Acad Med Singapore. 2008;37(6):497-503.
9. Singapore Ministry of Health. What do the different DORSCON levels mean. http://www.gov.sg/article/what-do-the-different-dorscon-levels-mean. Accessed April 5, 2020.
10. Lee J-W, McKibbin WJ. Estimating the global economic costs of SARS. In: Knobler S, Mahmoud A, Lemon S, et al, eds. Institute of Medicine (US) Forum on Microbial Threats. Washington, DC: National Academies Press (US); 2004.
11. James EH, Wooten L. Leadership as (un)usual: how to display competence in times of crisis. Organ Dyn. 2005;34(2):141-152. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orgdyn.2005.03.005
12. The Joint Commission. Emergency Management: Coronavirus Resources. 2020. https://www.jointcommission.org/covid-19/. Accessed April 4, 2020.
13. Wachter RM, Goldman L. Zero to 50,000 – the 20th anniversary of the hospitalist. N Engl J Med. 2016;375(11):1009-1011. https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMp1607958.
14. Singapore Ministry of Health. Official Update of COVID-19 Situation in Singapore. 2020. https://experience.arcgis.com/experience/7e30edc490a5441a874f9efe67bd8b89. Accessed April 5, 2020.
15. Chronicle Digital Team. Coronavirus tracker. San Francisco Chronicle. https://projects.sfchronicle.com/2020/coronavirus-map/. Accessed April 5, 2020.

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Journal of Hospital Medicine 15(5)
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Journal of Hospital Medicine 15(5)
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281-283. Published online first April 16, 2020
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